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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to investigate, through the method of a case-study at two levels 
(development site and sub-region), the historical development of and current mechanisms used to 
deliver strategic spatial planning (large scale housing development). The theoretical underpinnings 
of strategic spatial planning are examined, including some key planning paradigms such as 
the ‘green belt’, ‘city regions’ and ‘spatial planning’. The key dichotomy of current policy – the 
‘desire to devolve’ through localism and the counteracting ‘centralising tendency’ as expressed 
through urban containment policy is then discussed. The substantive element of the research is 
an examination of these policies in practice, through a case-study at two levels. The first level of 
the case study is a site-level forensic examination of the West of Stevenage development, first put 
forward in the early 1990s but which is currently in abeyance without a single home having been 
built. The second level of the case study is a sub-regional study of the issues facing those with 
tasked with implementing strategic spatial planning across three very different local authorities 
– Stevenage, Luton and North Hertfordshire. This element of the research has been carried out 
largely through the medium of qualitative interviews with senior planning professionals, senior 
local politicians and a senior executive at a Local Enterprise Partnership. One significant piece 
of quantitative research is also presented in the research: a highly accurate, Great Britain wide 
survey of land use based on up to date Ordnance Survey data. The research concludes by offering 
five suggestions to improve strategic spatial planning in a growth area like the wider South 
East of England (four practical, policy-related steps and one theoretical reconceptualising of the 
discipline). 
Thanks to my supervisor, Professor Fran Tonkiss, and to the interview participants for their 
time and insights.
My love, as always, to Kristine. Thank you for all your love and support during the past seven 
years.
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Chapter 1
Purpose and aims of research
1.1: Overview of research
This thesis examines current approaches, placed within their historical contexts, to what has 
consistently been one of the most challenging aspects of urban policy in England: strategic 
spatial planning, through the medium of a case-study. This Chapter begins by examining 
the main theoretical concepts necessary for an understanding of strategic spatial planning 
(in the context of this research taken to mean significant housing development, along with 
associated infrastructure). The first of these broad concepts is the role of ‘planning paradigms’, 
such as the green belt, city regions and spatial planning within the ‘doctrine’ of the discipline. 
The overarching political and economic framework within which strategic spatial planning 
operates is then discussed, through the framing devices of neoliberal planning and ‘spatial 
liberalism’, which are more helpful concepts in an urban context than the catch-all container 
of neoliberalism. Important spatial manifestations of neoliberal planning, principally 
‘Functional Economic Areas’ (FEAs) and ‘city regions’, characterised by Allmendinger and 
Haughton (2009) as ‘soft spaces’ with fuzzy boundaries are introduced before the core sections 
of the Chapter present the key dichotomy of the research: the incompatible political ideals of 
localism (‘the desire to devolve’) and urban containment (‘the centralising tendency’). Short 
sections on power, planning and vested interests and central-local relations in the context of 
strategic spatial planning complete the theoretical introduction to the research. The Chapter 
concludes by acquainting the reader with the substantive subject of the research: the role of 
strategic spatial planning in the housing question, and the critical, but often neglected, issue of 
the infrastructure necessary to support significant new development.
Chapter 2 details the Methods employed in the research, employing the straightforward 
   9
and standard format of ‘Subjects and Procedures’. In essence, the research is a qualitative, 
interview based study of a case-study at two levels: a site-level study of a proposed greenfield 
development more than two decades in the making (and which has yet to see a spadeful of 
earth turned or a brick laid), and the wider sub-regional context of which the site forms but 
one part of the strategic spatial planning puzzle. After detailing the processes used to select 
the case study and the interview participants, the ‘Measures’ section sets out the practicalities 
of the interview process and the procedures followed to ensure the ethical integrity of 
the research, including obtaining consent to record and transcribe the interviews and the 
measures taken to preserve the appropriate level of anonymity of the participants. This Chapter 
concludes by introducing the one significant piece of quantitative analysis of the research: a 
highly accurate, Great Britain wide survey of land use using Ordnance Survey data. One of 
the principal weapons of the anti-development lobby is the claim that Britain is in danger of 
being ‘concreted over’ if, for example, green belt policy is in any way relaxed. The results of this 
survey are presented in Chapter 6, ‘Discussion and Conclusions’ and provide a firm rejoinder 
to these claims.
Chapter 3 is an in-depth analysis of the historical development and current state of strategic 
spatial planning, with a particular focus on what has come to be known as the ‘wider South 
East’ or the ‘Greater South East’. After tracing the various mechanisms of regional planning 
including SERPLAN, Growth Areas and the rise and fall of New Labour’s byzantine apparatus 
of regional governance, the principal policies for delivering strategic spatial planning under 
the current Conservative government are analysed. These include, as elements of the National 
Planning Policy Framework (NPPF), the ‘duty to co-operate’, and the New Homes Bonus. 
The Chapter closes by discussing the other two principal policies which impinge on strategic 
spatial planning, Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and the Community Infrastructure 
Levy (CIL).
Chapter 4 introduces the case study material at the site level - the West of Stevenage 
development - through a forensic analysis of a range of documents including official reports, 
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council committee minutes, local and national newspaper articles, and public representations 
to the various Planning Inquiries. The purpose of this Chapter is to link the more traditional, 
academic desk based analysis with the day-to-day materials of planning in practice. Issues 
connected with urban containment, housing targets, co-operation across local authority 
boundaries and the thorny issue of infrastructure provision form the core of this Chapter.
Chapter 5 moves to the sub-regional level, examining the strategic housing issues faced by 
planners, local politicians and LEP executives in three contrasting authorities: Stevenage, 
Luton and North Hertfordshire. This Chapter is where the bulk of the interview material 
is introduced and analysed and again addresses the central issues of cross-boundary 
co-operation, housing targets, green belt reviews and infrastructure provision. In addition, 
a number of the moral, ethical and professional issues faced by those tasked with delivering 
strategic urban policy, which are difficult to detect from secondary sources alone, are analysed, 
with their implications for the discipline of planning. This Chapter closes with a short 
examination of a different kind of strategic spatial planning in the Cambridge sub-region. 
Finally, Chapter 6 recapitulates the most significant finding of the study, namely that a 
curious inversion of roles seems to have occurred, with politicians emphasising the rational, 
technical aspects of strategic spatial planning, and the professional planners stressing the 
highly political, people-centred nature of the discipline. It is widely recognised that the current 
system of strategic spatial planning has many flaws and so the core sections of this Chapter 
focus on five steps, including four substantive policy changes and one plea for a theoretical 
reappraisal of the discipline. After noting the main limitations of the research, the thesis closes 
with a ‘big-picture’ view of main issues connected with strategic spatial planning in England.
‘Strategic spatial planning’: each of these three words carries significant meaning. ‘Strategic’ 
implies development (principally residential – the focus of this thesis – but can also mean 
commercial) of a certain scale that, crucially, requires new or additional infrastructure (an 
important theme further developed below) to support it. ‘Spatial’, when associated with 
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‘strategic’, signifies activities which do not necessarily fit neatly within traditional boundaries, 
whether they be administrative (e.g. local authorities), statistical (e.g. Census units) or even 
functional (e.g. travel-to-work areas). Finally, ‘planning’, even when taken as a stand-alone 
concept, connotes a plethora of meanings across a range of contexts. When combined with 
‘spatial’, ‘planning’, is usually understood as a particular way of doing planning, with an 
associated ideology.  Typically, governments have approached the problem of strategic spatial 
planning in one of two ways: ‘top down’ or ‘bottom up’. The current trend is very much ‘bottom 
up’ or at least that is what the government would like to have us believe, having replaced what 
was, under the previous Labour administration, very much a ‘top down’ system. 
The incoming Conservative-led coalition government’s narratives of the ‘Big Society’ and 
‘localism’ trumpeted a reversal of top-down, centralizing tendencies (Painter, 2013: 7). In 
terms of ‘larger than local’ or strategic spatial planning, this meant the (eventual) replacement 
of regional governance with a deregulated system of sub-regional groupings (principally Local 
Enterprise Partnerships, ‘city-regions’ and entities like the ‘Northern Powerhouse’, which 
has necessarily increased the potential for increased asymmetry (Deas, 2013: 67). Although 
Rogerson (2011) argues that, “the Government have sensibly resisted calls to over-prescribe 
what strategic planning frameworks should look like in different places”, Featherstone et al 
(2012: 178) argue that both Labour and coalition governments have failed to recognise these 
asymmetries, preferring instead a simplistic view of localities as, “discrete and unitary entities 
that are somehow awaiting governance.” In the planning lexicon, ‘strategic’ has often been 
substituted for ‘larger than local’. The phrase came into common currency through a letter 
produced by the RTPI in August 2010 and co-signed by 28 other groups which gained front 
page coverage in the Financial Times (Pickard, 2010) and a slot on Radio 4’s Today programme 
(BBC, 2010). The letter defines ‘larger than local’ planning as, “democratic decision-making 
that is larger than the local, but smaller than the national” - a phrase borrowed verbatim from 
a speech given to the Local Government Association by the then Planning Minister Greg Clark 
in July 2010. Given the huge gulf – across spatial, social, economic, and governance domains 
– between the national and the local, this definition is not especially helpful or insightful. It 
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does, though, have the virtue of simplicity, and a theme that will be developed throughout this 
work is the importance of easy-to-grasp concepts which can be deployed by the various vested 
interests across the principal, very public, battlegrounds – the print, online and visual/audio 
media. Strategic spatial planning is a process that, on one level, is very much played out ‘on the 
ground’ in the white heat of argument, counter-argument and bitter enmity – a fact that was 
grasped early on in the research. 
As noted above, ‘spatial planning’ is a loaded concept, upon which Louis Albrechts (2004, 
2006) and Vincent Nadin (2007), in particular, have written extensively. It is helpful to set out 
Albrechts’ (2015: 511) most recent views on what strategic planning entails:
  Strategic planning is defined as: a sociospatial process through which a range of people 
in diverse institutional relations and positions come together to design planmaking 
processes and develop contents and strategies for the management of spatial change; 
an opportunity for constructing new ideas and processes that can carry them 
forward; collective efforts to reimagine a city, urban region, or region and to translate 
the outcome into priorities for area investment, conservation measures, strategic 
infrastructure investments, and principles of land-use regulation…Defined in these 
ways strategic spatial planning is as much about process, institutional design, and 
mobilization as it is about the development of substantive theories.
A number of key themes which run throughout this research are suggested in this 
interpretation of strategic spatial planning. The first of these is the multi-scalar institutional 
nature of the process. In the context of planning in England, this has come to be known as 
‘central-local relations’. Also made explicit is the expectation that practitioners will seek out 
and establish partnerships with a wide range of other stakeholders. Albrechts then enumerates 
some of the activities such cross-scalar, partnership-based groups will undertake, including 
land-use regulation and infrastructure investment. In the context of housing development 
this means financing ‘fixed assets’ such as schools, healthcare facilities and adequate network 
infrastructure (principally broadband, sewage and transport links). Due to the symbiotic 
dependencies between ‘fixed’ infrastructure and the inherently mobile and ‘fluid’ nature 
of networks (whether they carry electronic data, waste-water or the quotidian flows of 
commuters), this issue is one of the most contested aspects of strategic spatial planning. 
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Finally, Albrechts’ definition ends by alluding to the contested, context- and place-specific 
nature of strategic spatial planning. However, the single most important idea to take from 
Albrechts’ work (over several decades) on strategic spatial planning is that it is an explicitly 
normative concept, as opposed to more traditional, socio-technical forms of planning (e.g. 
Albrechts, 1999, 2003, 2015).
Although Albrechts is one of the outstanding theorists of strategic spatial planning, his 
perspective is an explicitly pan-European one, and as the concept has come to take on a 
particular set of meanings in England, Vincent Nadin’s work is helpful is helpful in this 
context. He identified two important features specific to the English context, firstly, that “the 
reality of spatial planning will be built and defined in practice through the creation of regional 
spatial strategies” (Nadin, 2007: 44), and, secondly, the focus on outputs (e.g. in terms of 
housing numbers) rather than outcomes (e.g. in terms of housing affordability or economic 
growth) (Nadin, 2007: 48; Cullingworth and Nadin, 2006: 242-43). A less positive reading of 
spatial planning in the English context is provided by Allmendinger and Haughton (2012: 98), 
who explicitly categorise the concept as, “an unstable fix and only ever likely to be a temporary 
phenomenon” . They argue that these characteristics make spatial planning similar to “much 
of the other apparatus of neoliberal governance” (ibid.). One of the traits of such apparatuses, 
they argue, is that, “genuine oppositional political debate [is] often shifted to arenas outside 
the apparatus of mainstream consensus-building within planning (ibid.), with the result that 
those unhappy with the planning system are increasingly turning to mechanisms outside the 
system, principally judicial review, for redress. This process forms an important element of the 
case-study, the proposed Stevenage West development. 
According to Allmendinger and Haughton, the “carefully stage-managed processes” of 
strategic spatial planning (2012: 90) leave disgruntled communities and individuals little 
choice but to turn to judicial review as a way of being ‘heard’ (2012: 98). This apparent failure 
raises the (oft-asked but yet to be satisfactorily answered) question of what planning is meant 
to achieve? For many decades (at least since the Planning Act 1968), it has been recognised 
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that the activity of planning should not be undertaken in isolation from the economic and 
social objectives which it was supposed to serve. More recently, increasing concern with the 
environmental impacts of development has meant that ‘sustainability’ has been added to the 
economic and social factors to be weighed when making planning decisions of strategic spatial 
importance. However, the inability of the planning system in England to adequately address 
the interrelationships between these three goals has resulted in fierce criticism, particularly in 
its perceived failure to make the correct links between housing supply and demand signals.
1.2: Paradigms and planning doctrine
Of central importance to the persistence of concepts such as, listed in chronological order, the 
green belt, the city region, and spatial planning, are their acceptance as ‘paradigms’ within the 
overarching ‘doctrine’ of the activity of planning. As Healey and Williams (1993: 712) note, 
the planning and containment of Greater London has been managed as much by “a collective 
ideology or spatial planning doctrine...as by formally coordinated policies.” ‘Paradigm’ is used 
here in the Kuhnian sense (i.e. “universally recognised scientific achievements that for a time 
provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners” (Kuhn, 1970: viii). 
Clearly, the word ‘scientific’ needs to be substituted for ‘planning’ to bear a fuller relation to the 
topics at hand, and, as Therborn (2011: 272) notes, social scientific urban research has been 
“driven by a hegemonic conception, a paradigm in a loose, not-quite-Kuhnian sense.” On the 
other hand, Harvey (1969: 47), argues that social and natural sciences should be treated in 
the same way since, “the demand for methodological differentiation between natural science 
and the social sciences and history on the grounds of major conceptual differences cannot be 
sustained.”
Kuhn himself (1970: 15) notes that “it remains an open question what parts of social 
science have yet acquired such paradigms at all...the road to a firm research consensus is 
extraordinarily arduous.” To ‘doctrine’, the Oxford English Dictionary applies the following 
definition: “a body or system of principles or tenets; a doctrinal or theoretical system; a theory; 
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a science, or department of knowledge” (Simpson et al, 1989). Lakatos (1974, as cited in Faludi 
and van der Valk, 1994: 23) makes a distinction between paradigms with negative and positive 
heuristics; those paradigms with negative heuristics do not allow the ‘hard core’ of the research 
programme to change, whereas paradigms with positive heuristics encourage the development 
of a ‘protective belt’ of theories and models which may undergo some modification over 
time. We may conclude that green belt policy is a paradigm with positive heuristics, since 
its purposes have been modified several times since its inception. Faludi (1999: 340) asks 
“whether European planning is in a ‘pre-doctrinal’ situation? The potential for doctrine seems 
to be there.” It seems indubitable, though, that urban containment in England has reached the 
status of established doctrine (Hall, 1973). Friedmann and Weaver (1979: 2) emphasise the 
importance of tracing the important historical developments of regional planning since this 
  will help to throw [doctrinal development]...into relief by revealing its origins, 
the options that were received, the influence of circumstantial events, alternative 
formulations that were neglected, and the new forms of doctrine that are beginning to 
emerge.
Foley (1963: viii) detects the development of planning doctrine in England in Abercrombie’s 
post-war plans produced for London, which contained “the influence of certain ideas, the 
crystallization of a reinforcing web of these ideas into doctrine, and the need to review this 
doctrine in the light of ongoing experience.” He explains this in terms of the way that the 
Greater London Plan converted “disparate and utopian” ideals into “more specific, graspable 
spatial patterns and development goals (ibid.: 52). Jacqueline Tyrwhitt (1948: 592-93) 
expands on this theme, attributing much of the popularity of Abercrombie’s scheme to the 
“simplicity of its concepts”. Allied to its simplicity, the ambiguity of the green belt concept is a 
further important reason for its popularity, since this ambiguity means that several differing 
interpretations of its purpose can be held (Munton, 1983: 1). Foley (1960: 219) reports the 
(possibly apocryphal) anecdote of the high-level civil servant with responsibility for town 
planning who is said to have asserted that the green belt was “the one goal he could readily 
understand and work toward with conviction!”
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In order for a planning paradigm to gain widespread acceptance, it needs an easily graspable 
central metaphor/image, or what van Eeten and Roe (2000: 58) call a “fiction”. Using the 
example of urban containment in the Netherlands - the ‘Groene Hart’ (‘green Heart’) - they 
argue that this central tenet of Dutch planning policy does not in fact exist, and that even 
its proponents accept this, though they maintain that it still provides the soundest basis for 
policymaking. This ‘mythmaking’ has links to Flyvbjerg’s (1998) account of rationality and 
power, and how power can perpetuate planning myths. The essence of a metaphor or ‘figure’ 
like the green belt is that it is an idea that goes beyond its original, literal meaning, evoking 
a particular set of mental images and/or emotions in people’s minds. More technically, 
Genette (1982: 47, as cited in Faludi and van der Valk, 1994: 21) describes a ‘figure’ as a 
linguistic device where, “between the letter and the meaning…there is a gap, a space, and 
like all spaces, it possesses a form. This form is called a figure.” However, figures as successful 
and durable as the green belt are few and far between. How many people are familiar with 
concepts from the London Plan’s (GLA, 2009) Key Diagram, such as the ‘Western Wedge’ or 
‘London-Luton-Bedford Corridor’? 
Allied to metaphors, symbols also play an important role in paradigm formation, since “[a] 
symbol functions to give people a feeling that they belong to a discourse” (Hajer, 1989: 45). 
They are powerful because, as Kunzmann (1996: 144) points out, “visualised concepts can 
contribute more to achieving certain political goals than legal and financial instruments” as 
they reduce complexity and facilitate communication. Because of this, Faludi (2002, as cited 
in Dühr, 2003: 935) emphasises that “cartographic visualizations of spatial policy require a 
higher degree of consensus”, and indeed, the design of visual expressions of the spatial policy 
expressed in the ESDP proved to be the most controversial part of the whole policy process 
(Faludi and Waterhout, 2002). In the final European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) 
document (EU Commission, 1999), no attempt was made to map complex, contentious 
concepts like polycentricity; the document restricts itself to simple descriptive cartography 
(e.g. daily mean temperature, land cover types). Cattan (2007: 126) argues that many of the 
well-known images used to visualise uneven development at the European scale (e.g. the 
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‘Blue Banana’, ‘European Pentagon’, ‘Golden Triangle’) are based on the classic, outdated, 
core-periphery paradigm and are merely relational (i.e. without a reliable, standardized 
quantitative base). Little work has been done to date on the symbolic significance of planning 
maps and diagrams at the national (English) scale. The combination of metaphors and 
symbols entails what Faludi (1996: 94) describes as the ‘frame-setting approach’, which enables 
complex, amorphous realities to be simplified, made sense of and acted upon. 
Paradigm and doctrine development is a far from straightforward process; as Foley (1960: 12) 
argues, doctrine, by its very nature, quickly tends to take on a self-justifying, ultra-rational 
tone. There are also problems with how one evaluates the success or otherwise of a particular 
doctrine or paradigm (Alexander and Faludi, 1989: 130-31). On the positive side, Faludi and 
van der Valk (1994: 22-23) argue that, by performing its role as ‘normal’ planning (in the 
Kuhnian sense - i.e. bureaucratic, professional and administrative in nature), doctrine reduces 
the burden of plan-making, which in turn allows planning to become more of a cumulative 
and progressive process rather than a succession of spikes. Plan-led systems are by their nature 
technocratic and rational, as opposed to sociocratic (where greater weight is attached to the 
views of a wide range of stakeholders) or communicative approaches (Faludi and van der Valk, 
1994). The main difference between technocratic and sociocratic/communicative approaches 
to planning is that the former is a more ‘individual’ approach, internal to the protagonists 
involved, whereas the latter two are far more interactive between actors (Alexander, 1998: 670).
How do we know whether we are in the process of moving from one paradigm to another? 
According to Kuhn’s prescription, the move from ‘normal’ to ‘extraordinary’ research involves, 
“the proliferation of competing articulations, the willingness to try anything, the expression 
of explicit discontent, the recourse to philosophy and to debate over fundamentals”. Using 
these signals as a guide, we may indeed be moving towards such a situation in the debate over 
urban containment. It is argued by Foley (1963: 143) that the erosion of planning doctrine is a 
process that has been happening slowly, over several decades, by the erosion of the strong legal 
and fiscal features at the heart of the planning legislation of the 1940s. Despite the high profile 
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that the future of the Metropolitan green belt has received in recent years, we must be careful 
not to conflate problems of political strategy with those of real substance (Foley, 1963: 150).
Before turning our attention to the current political and economic framework within which 
planning operates, it is perhaps useful to reemphasize the fundamental question - what is 
planning? An influential article by Aaron Wildavsky poses this very question and provides 
us with a number of valuable lessons. Wildavsky (1973: 140) argues that planning as a form 
of ‘future control’ is not only doomed to failure, but, by conflating the distinction between 
preparing plans and implementing them, the very act of planning loses its intention, since this 
act is:
   no longer immutable but problematical, a subject for bargaining, a counter in the flux 
of events. The stage shifts from the intentions specified in the plan to a multitude 
of actors whose intentions are alleged to be the real ones. The success of planning 
depends entirely on whose plans one has in mind. 
These words could have been written with green belts very much to the fore of the author’s 
mind. As a consequence of this, Wildavsky (1973: 149) goes on to argue, “planning is not a 
solution to any problem. It is just a way of restating in other language the problems we do not 
know how to solve.” Taking the example of urban containment, Batty (1987: 1) posits that 
“the garden cities and new towns, green belts...represent centrally managed and somewhat 
simplistic solutions to really rather complex problems” but that this is planning at its best. This 
idea of being able to cast a problem and its solution in simplistic terms is an important tenet of 
planning doctrine and will be explored in more depth below. The question of what planning 
is was taken up by Forester, who emphasised the inherently political nature of the activity of 
planning and went so far as to implicate planners in their willing involvement in Lukes’ ‘third 
face of power’, in that they encourage the participation of some individuals and groups at the 
expense of others, play an active role in ‘restricting’ and ‘opening’ particular topics for debate 
and essentially “focus citizens’ attention selectively” (Forester, 1989: 19). 
Recent work by Brenner and Schmid has challenged many of the epistemological foundations 
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of the discipline of built environment studies, in particular, “the categories, methods and 
cartographies” (Brenner and Schmid, 2015: 155) through which urban life can be understood. 
By invoking the epistemic shift engendered by the previous generation of radical critical 
geographers such as Castells and Harvey, who emerged during the late 1960s and early 1970s 
and challenged the field’s:
  broad consensus on...the equation of the urban with a specific spatial unit or settlement 
type - the city, or an upscaled territorial variant thereof, such as the metropolis, the 
conurbation, the metropolitan region, the megalopolis, the megacity, the megacity 
region and so forth
Brenner and Schmid (2015: 154) call for a similar reinvigoration of the current interpretative 
frameworks we use to understand ‘the urban’. They offer the increasingly common ‘urban 
age’ trope as evidence of a debate whose aim has been, “to promote a vision of cities as 
bounded, technologically controlled islands of ecorationality that are largely delinked from the 
broader territorial formations in which they are currently embedded” (Brenner and Schmid, 
2015: 157). These authors point to the many books and papers that have begun with some 
reformulation of the idea that, at some point in the recent past, society has moved from being 
predominantly rural to urban. Instead of utilising binary concepts such as the ‘urban age’, 
Brenner and Schmid (2015: 165) argue that, “the urban is not a (fixed) form but a process; 
as such, it is dynamic, historically evolving and variegated.” The same authors (Brenner and 
Schmid, 2015: 174) also argue that a second binary distinction, the urban/rural divide, “which 
has long served as an epistemological anchor for the most basic research operations of urban 
studies, has today become an increasingly obfuscatory basis for deciphering emergent patterns 
and pathways of sociospatial restructuring”. 
Further clarification of the urban/rural dichotomy as a ‘fiction’ or framing device, and which 
thus explicitly identifies it as a paradigm within planning doctrine, is provided by Wachsmuth 
(2014: 80), when he describes it as “a phenomenological category - a practical understanding 
of urban space - which distorts what it represents”. Importantly, though, there are words of 
caution against the tendency towards the search for ‘new’ urban forms as “an intellectual trap” 
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(Brenner and Schmid, 2015: 176) since, “the concept of the city is not dead...[it] is ideological” 
(Wachsmuth, 2014: 80). 
Although both Brenner and Schmid and Wachsmuth theorise from a global perspective, 
their work can be transposed to the English context and the processes described in the 
preceding paragraphs has led Robson (2014: 2) to conclude gloomily that, “there is more than 
enough evidence to support the view, in Peter Hetherington’s words, that for the first time in 
forty years we now have no urban policy.” It is clear that by ‘urban policy’ both Robson and 
Hetherington mean a coherent, thought-through, realisable set of ideas (what would have been 
described as ‘joined-up thinking’ in the heady early days of New Labour). 
What would the conceptual basis of such ideas look like? Firstly, there is a pressing need to 
better incorporate some of the dynamic aspects of city life into urban systems analyses if 
they are to be more successful in their aim of representing such processes. Perhaps the most 
important dynamic process is people’s (in)ability to access goods and services across the urban 
environment. Kaufmann’s (2011) work on the concept of ‘mobility’ is instructive, particularly 
his tripartite classification of space as areolar (a static conception of space as enclosed, with 
an inside and outside, i.e. with identifiable, Cartesian limits; this has been widely used in 
traditional spatial representations, e.g. in two-dimensional maps produced by government 
agencies), reticular (topological, network-based representations of space in which accessibility 
is a key concept and which modern GIS are able to capture in increasingly advanced ways) 
and rhizome (a non-Cartesian space in which distance is subsumed by time, exemplified 
by electronic financial markets or Internet communities such as Facebook or YouTube). 
Kaufmann prefigures one of Brenner and Schmid’s key arguments by emphasising that 
attempts to ‘reconceptualise’ the city based, for example, on networks or flows (i.e. reticular 
space), and which fail to take account of the other two typologies, therefore fall into an 
intellectual trap, with Sassen’s (2001) work on ‘global cities’ offered as an example (Kaufman, 
2011: 19).
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Secondly, the unit of analysis (and policy implementation) needs to be much more nuanced. 
Simple, binary distinctions like urban/rural1 or ‘urban age’ are unhelpful; indeed, and in 
support of Brenner and Schmid, Pugalis (2015: 129) argues that we need to move beyond 
“solely territorial definitions of ‘urban’” since such, “blunt territorial parcels lack regard 
to the structure, form, nature and history of sociospatial formations” (ibid.). At the same 
time, and again following the advice of Brenner and Schmid (2015) and Wachsmuth (2014), 
such constructs should not be abandoned in favour of new spatial fixes. It is here that the 
tectonic plates of qualitative and quantitative urban theory grind together somewhat uneasily. 
Technocratic concepts such as ‘functional economic area’ and ‘city-region’ are always likely, 
in some respect or other, to meet the ire of critical spatial theorists from a largely qualitative 
tradition, like Brenner and Harvey. 
At the heart of this disjuncture is the question of whether urban policies should be directed 
towards ‘people’ or ‘places’ (e.g. so-called Area Based Initiatives (ABIs) such as New Labour’s 
New Deal for Communities (NDC)). The pendulum has currently swung very much away 
from ABIs in favour of the people-based narrative of localism and the ‘Big Society’. The 
principal implication of the rejection of ABIs for strategic spatial planning is that “improved 
national economic performance may come at a cost in terms of widening spatial disparities at 
national or regional level” (Cheshire et al, 2014: 13). In other words, less well-performing areas 
should be left to stagnate (or, be subject to ‘managed decline’ to use a euphemism popular with 
right-of-centre urban policymakers), with resources targeted at making successful places even 
more successful. Those in favour of this socially Darwinistic form of urban policy point to the 
perceived failure of large-scale ABIs such as Detroit in the United States (Moretti, 2012) or the 
Thames Gateway in south east England. 
Acceptance of, if not agreement with, this phenomena under current conditions comes from 
a surprising source. Harvey (1973: 113) warns us that the untrammelled free market has a 
built-in propensity to resist any attempts to redistribute capital flows away from the most 
profitable (sub)regions. This suggests that any attempts to rebalance inter-regional economic 
1 The ‘rural-urban’ classification is an ongoing output of the UK Census.
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imbalances between the wider South East and the rest of the UK are futile under the present 
system of spatial liberalism. In a similar vein, Brownill and Carpenter (2009: 253) question the 
extent to which private sector interests pursuing a “competitiveness agenda” are privileged at 
the expense of locally based, horizontal governance networks. The increasing flexibility of the 
labour market is in stark contrast to an ever more inflexible housing market which presents 
significant barriers to geographical mobility for many people (Clapham, 2006: 60). In fact, as 
Gallent and Tewdwr-Jones (2006: 67) point out, the prevailing market philosophy has “created 
a comfortable, fairly well-housed majority, but left a very badly housed minority in its wake.” 
This type of thinking is extended to question ‘popular policies’ like the green belt, which, 
it is argued, are based on the misconception that, “differences that may appear to be spatial 
are, in reality, often driven by differences between people rather than places” (Cheshire et al, 
2014: 6). Spatial processes are certainly at work, it is argued, but this are driven by individuals 
in a process of ‘spatial sorting’ rather than by larger-scale mechanisms. Reflecting the more 
historically class-based nature of British society, Gibbons and Overman (2012) estimate that 
individual (i.e. ‘sorting’) effects account for 70% of disparities between areas, compared with a 
50-50 split between individual and area effects in France. While this may seem depressing to 
those who believe that effective strategic spatial planning can bring about real change for the 
better to both people and places, it highlights the need for urbanists to think in terms of what 
Graham and Healey (1999: 642) describe as, “relations and processes rather than objects and 
forms” (emphasis in original). In other words, concepts such as ‘green belt’, ‘sustainable urban 
extension’ or ‘compact city’ have become reified and need to be ‘re-humanised’ in terms of the 
specificities of their impacts on particular localities. Kaufmann’s (2011) work on ‘motilities’ is 
of particular utility in this respect.
1.3: The ‘ugly sisters’: neoliberal planning and spatial liberalism
As a phenomenon which is “always a political project” (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2013: 
7), it is a truism to state that ‘neoliberalism’ is an overused, oft-misunderstood concept. 
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Brenner et al (2010a: 184, original emphasis) describe it as, “something of a rascal concept 
– promiscuously pervasive, yet inconsistently defined, empirically imprecise and frequently 
contested.” However, the same authors go on to describe neoliberalisation as, “a keyword for 
understanding the regulatory transformations of our time” (Brenner et al, 2010b: 327). Whilst 
acknowledging the concept’s significance and all-pervasiveness, this research steers clear of 
mainstream debates which are discussed in depth elsewhere (e.g. Harvey, 2005; Chomsky, 
1999) and instead focuses on two less well-researched strands of the framework, the ‘ugly 
sisters’ of neoliberalism if you will. These are ‘neoliberal planning’, characterised in recent years 
as “austerity urbanism” by Peck (2012), and ‘spatial liberalism’, a concept championed in the 
English context by Nick Clarke and Allan Cochrane (Clarke and Cochrane, 2013). The British 
planning system has its roots in the welfare state, itself a reaction to the inequalities of the 
Victorian age (Batty, 1987: 1), and which, at its best, was expressed in the garden cities, New 
Towns and green belts of England. 
However, the certainty offered by these policies belongs to the past; today, planners must 
learn to work within the multiple spaces, both ‘soft’ and ‘fuzzy’ identified by Allmendinger 
and Haughton (2009) and discussed above. One of the major contradictions of neoliberal 
planning is the reliance of the ostensibly market-oriented development industry on a system of 
regulation (land use planning) to prevent all kinds of market failures and negative externalities 
(Taşan-Kok, 2012: 1-2). This contradiction has become even more pronounced in recent years, 
as Lord and Tewdwr-Jones (2014: 347), following the regime-level account of Peck and Tickell 
(2002), outline in their characterisation of changes to the English planning system since the 
election of the first Blair government in 1997 as one of “roll out/roll back neoliberalisation”, 
with the ‘roll-out’ phase corresponding to the launch of ‘spatial planning’, and the more recent 
‘roll back’ phase characterised by state retrenchment and ‘austerity urbanism’.
Clarke and Cochrane (2013: 17) explicitly locate localism (discussed in depth in the following 
section) within a framework of ‘spatial liberalism’ and they raise two key questions for 
the localist project, firstly, what it conceives as “rational and responsible local action”, and 
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secondly, what its “preferred technologies of government for ensuring such action” are. By 
examining whether strategic spatial planning (in the form of significant housing development 
and associated infrastructure) constitutes ‘rational and responsible local action’, as well as the 
mechanisms employed by local and central government to enable (or hinder) such action, this 
research tackles both these questions. A feature of spatial liberalism, and one of the aspects 
of the system of government in the United Kingdom that European planning academics 
find noteworthy is the possibility for dramatic policy swings following General Elections 
(Waterhout, Othengrafen and Sykes, 2013). Through spatial liberalism, planning has become, 
in Haughton’s (2012: 98) turn of phrase:
  almost a paradigmatic example of a sector used as a ‘political football’, one that 
every incoming administration attempts to use to explain the failings of the previous 
administration and demonstrate its own radical credentials. This makes for a bruised 
sector, accustomed to multiple reforms intended to ‘cure’ a problem that has been 
misdiagnosed.
Although ‘niche’ approaches to the study of neoliberalism such as neoliberal planning and 
spatial liberalism are less fashionable than ‘grand theories’ of the phenomenon, Allmendinger 
and Haughton (2013: 7) argue that “more abstract, macro-level and more nuanced, policy 
focused accounts of neoliberalization” are in fact “complementary, rather than one being seen 
as conceptually subordinate” (ibid.), and, just as in the case of spatial scales, they warn against 
the ‘Russian doll’ approach to policy periodization. At an abstract level, it was only within the 
last decades of the twentieth century that capitalism was able to overcome most of the friction 
of time and space, due to technological advances, coupled with deregulation and liberalization 
policies (Castells, 2010: 101). This has led to a new ensemble of spatio-temporalities...
neither disconnected nor chaotic though [they are]...conflictual and dynamic” (Harvey, 1996: 
287). From this flow of ‘spatio-temporalities’ are hewn what appear to be ‘permanences’ - 
the physical and institutional entities which surround us - although as Harvey (1996: 261) 
warns, these “‘permanences’ - no matter how solid they seem - are not eternal but always 
subject to time as ‘perpetual perishing.’” De Angelis (2008: 68) sees ‘neoliberal governance’ 
as oxymoronic and exhorts us that the latest round of spatio-temporal permanences are “an 
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attempt to manage clashing value practices in an increasingly marketised, socially polarised 
and environmentally unsustainable world.” 
Interestingly, however, Baeten (2012: 209) offers a different, less gloomy, more human, 
perspective on the ‘glamour’ and ‘temptations’ of neoliberal planning, describing:
  the thrill of competing for funding, pushing through plans, seeing spectacular 
architecture rising from the soil, or contributing to favourable statistics on investment, 
population, [and] local GDP. 
This, he argues, can be more stimulating, rewarding and achievable than, “the search for 
democracy, equity and diversity in the city” (ibid.). In any event, the neo-classical economic 
foundations of neoliberal planning are not going to go away any time soon; as Whitehead 
(2012: 126) points out, “it is difficult to believe that the neo-classical model will be superseded, 
as opposed to complemented, by other economic models.”
1.4: ‘Soft spaces’ and fuzzy boundaries: functional economic areas and city-regions
What are some of the spatial effects of neoliberal planning and spatial liberalism? A current 
‘buzz-phrase’ in strategic spatial planning circles is ‘functional economic areas’ (FEAs) 
- delineated areas which are a more ‘natural’ fit than historic/ceremonial/administrative 
boundaries in terms of how places are linked (by flows of people/information/services). They 
are an attempt to tackle what has been known since at least the middle of the last century as 
the ‘Modifiable Areal Unit Problem’ or ‘MAUP’ (e.g. Yule and Kendall, 1950) but which is 
“still often badly understood” (Openshaw and Taylor, 1979). Put simply, the MAUP affects all 
area-based spatial analyses in terms of the unit of analysis chosen (e.g. Census Output Area, 
local authority, ward, Parliamentary constituency, Travel-toWork Area); when boundaries 
are redrawn across the same area, the changes, however slight, will produce a new set of 
results. There are in fact two facets of the MAUP - the ‘zonal problem’ and the ‘scale problem’ 
(Wong, 2009). The zonal problem occurs when the number of areal units is stable or relatively 
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fixed and when the internal boundaries of these zones are redrawn (e.g. after redistricting 
or following changes to statistical zones for Census purposes). The thornier ‘scale problem’ 
is posed by the more fundamental question of setting the most appropriate level to conduct 
analysis at; i.e. a study area can be partitioned in an infinite number of ways but problems arise 
when different, sometimes conflicting data sources at different resolutions are melded together 
without an appreciation of the inconsistencies this can give rise to.
As Cheshire et al (2014: 161) note, there is a “surprisingly long history” of conceptualising 
urban areas in terms of functional, as opposed to merely customary or historic, units of 
analysis. The US Census Bureau invented the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) 
for the 1940 Census as there was a dawning realisation that processes of suburbanisation were 
rendering obsolete existing urban boundaries. By the mid-1960s, the concept of the ‘functional 
economic area’ (FEA), based on labour markets and travel-to-work areas had become common 
currency on the other side of the Atlantic (Fox and Kumar, 1965). Whereas traditional units 
of analysis (e.g. based on local authority, ward or other administrative boundaries) are largely 
static, ‘functional’ analyses capture dynamic concepts, such as flows of people, money or 
data between areas. As noted in the introduction, these flows are linked to static locations by 
infrastructure and are thus a key aspect of strategic spatial planning. The FEA concept has 
many supporters, Robson (2014: 3) describing the - somewhat belated - move in England 
towards it as, “a hugely welcome thrust...long overdue”. However, and as an indication that 
the MAUP lingers on, the paradoxical situation arises that, “the defining theoretical features 
underpinning functional area discourse are obliterated by the operational tendencies to 
construct hard boundaries” (Pugalis, 2015: 127). In other words, the very concept supposed to 
incorporate notions of fluidity, interconnection, and exchange itself becomes ossified through 
a process of spatial fetishism. A quite remarkable instance of this tendency to regard the FEA 
concept (in particular its current incarnation of choice, the ‘city-region’) as a ‘magic bullet’ is 
revealed in a paper by Freeman and Cheshire (2006: 3), who argue that:
  it is our view that having a common standard is more important than having the right 
standard since in some senses if there is a common standard which represents city‐
regions in a reasonably consistent way then that itself is the ‘right’ standard.
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In other words, establishing some metric which allows us to compare FEAs is more important 
than the underlying data used to define these areas, or, put more succinctly, comparison is 
necessary, never mind what is being compared. To some, this quest for ‘functionality’ is merely 
one of the last vestiges of the ‘city-as-a-system’ trope propagated by the Chicago School of 
urban theorists in the 1920s (Wachsmuth, 2014: 83-84). This perspective argues that, despite 
the significant technological advances of recent decades, attempts to use large-scale datasets 
to quantify urban interconnections merely recalls the gargantuan land-use/transportation 
models of the 1960s, when it was believed that such models could create optimum spatial 
systems (Marshall, 2007: 124). Naturally, there is much modern-day scepticism about the 
efficacy of such an approach. The past four decades since the publication of Herbert Simon’s 
landmark article on ‘bounded rationality’ have taught us that optimal solutions to strategic 
problems are often subordinated to ‘satisficing’ approaches, which retain, “more of the detail 
of the real-world situation, but settling for a satisfactory, rather than an approximate-best, 
decision” (Simon, 1972: 170). Clearly, then, although there are a number of advantages to the 
FEA concept (the key one being a realisation that it is better to attempt to fit policies to ‘real’ 
geographies rather than forcing them into artificial, if convenient, units), a merely technical 
approach will not get us very far, since strategic spatial strategy formulation, “is a messy, back-
and-forth process, with multiple layers of contestation and struggle” (Healey, 2007: 182).
Operating at a sub-regional scale, FEAs are an attempt to offer more flexible geographical 
configurations which have come to be known as ‘soft spaces’ with fuzzy boundaries, 
as opposed to the ‘hard spaces’ of central/local government with their non-functional 
administrative boundaries (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2009), beyond which are spatial 
policy “cliff edges” (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2010: 813) and which could be described as 
the policy equivalent of the MAUP. These are created through a process of what Allmendinger 
and Haughton (2009: 10) describe as “functional scalar privilege”, where the coincidence of 
‘in vogue’ boundaries such as housing market areas or travel-to-work areas can lead to, “a 
reinforcement of activity through focused resources and consensus” (ibid.). This need not be 
an inherently bad path to follow, although, analogous to the argument advanced by Cheshire 
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et al (2014), this can lead to the ‘managed decline’ of those areas not fortunate enough to be at 
the intersection of the prevailing units of policy delivery. 
A particularly vertiginous ‘cliff edge’ surrounds London, because of the current “exceptional 
English circumstance, whereby the country is bereft of a sub-national democratic economic 
development settlement” (Pugalis and Bentley, 2013: 864) beyond the capital. Perhaps there 
ought to be greater awareness of a ‘MIUP’ (Modifiable Institutional Unit Problem), where 
different perspectives and ‘stories’ emerge depending on the institutional scale addressed. 
Perhaps in an attempt to counteract the effects of the MIUP, one think-tank, the Adam Smith 
Institute, proposes a completely descaled planning system, allowing different local systems 
to compete in a social-Darwinian battle of the fittest (Papworth, 2012: 8). In other words, 
as Pennington (2002) argues, planning should devolve completely to the local scale in a 
“Hayekian discovery process” quite the opposite of centrally planned economies. It could be 
argued that human lives, neighbourhoods and communities are rather too precious to allow 
untrammelled free market activity of the type that a truly Hayekian discovery process would 
entail. 
Although it has taken many guises over the years, in its recent formulation the ‘city-region’ 
approach appears to offer the most effective representation of the FEA concept in practice. 
The notion can arguably be traced back a century ago to the work of Geddes (1915: 34) who 
used the term, defined by him as ‘town aggregates’, and then went on to suggest ‘conurbation’ 
as a more appropriate term (Coombes, 2013: 2-3). Storper (2014: 116) identifies an implicit 
paradox within the city-region paradigm, since, although they, “exhibit the most robust of 
the many complex systems of governance that humanity has devised...fragmentation is their 
inevitable condition”. This fragmentation at the level of governance is merely a reflection of the 
increasing ‘splintering’ (to paraphrase Graham and Marvin, 2001) and discontinuity of many 
individuals’ lives and is most clearly reflected in what Castells (1989) conceptualised as the 
‘space of flows’, comprising people, money, data and a host of other phenomena. In a belated 
understanding of this, and an important step forward in the definition of an appropriate unit 
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of policy analysis and implementation, is the realisation, in the words of Davoudi (2008: 57) 
that:
  there is no single city-region boundary. Instead, the city-region geometry is 
best characterised by multiplicity, fuzziness and overlaps, manifesting only an 
approximation of self-containment that is likely to vary for different kinds of activities, 
flows and functions.
Allied to this idea, an important criterion for the selection of the case-study area was the 
realisation that city-regions often extend beyond their rural hinterlands, including green belts, 
resulting in ‘leap-frog’ commuting (Painter, 2007: 8) and other important consequences related 
to housing choices for strategic spatial planners. 
1.5: The desire to devolve: localism and strategic spatial planning
The current Prime Minister set out his thinking on localism well before his party went 
into coalition with the Liberal Democrats, when he described it as “absolutely essential to 
our economic, social and political future” (Cameron, 2009). Taking his lead, the concept 
of localism is explored by breaking it down into its political, environmental and spatial 
components, (although there are large areas of overlap between these domains).
Politically, localism is fundamentally about the spatial distribution of power between different 
tiers of government, and can be conceptualised as ‘resistance’ (i.e. the periphery’s bid for 
greater autonomy from the centre) or, in contrast, as ‘efficiency’ (i.e. the centre’s perspective 
on devolving power) (Madanipour and Davoudi, 2015: 16). As these two authors note, these 
agendas are, “riddled with tensions between progressive and regressive potentials” (Davoudi 
and Madanipour, 2015: 1). These tensions have in recent years been characterised as “austerity 
urbanism” (Peck, 2012) and, more specifically, as “austerity localism” (DeVerteuil, 2013: 601). 
Cameron’s pronouncements on “radical decentralisation” through a three-pronged pledge2 are 
2 Firstly, to give people to instigate referenda on local issues. Secondly, to give local authorities a ‘local power of   
 competence’ to enable them to “carry out any lawful activity on behalf of their community” (Cameron, 2009).   
 Thirdly, to devolve political power to cities through elected mayors (subject to support for this system through  
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merely the latest incarnation of his party’s ideological commitment to ‘small state’ government 
based on supply-side economic theory. As Clarke and Cochrane (2013: 14) argue:
  the apparent plan is to complete moves begun in the 1980s and continued, sometimes 
hesitantly, over the last three decades: from local government to local governance; 
from Local Authorities to local partnerships; and from representative democracy to 
participatory democracy. 
It is however possible to trace the ideological commitment of the centre-right to localism 
much further back. Friedrich Hayek (1945: 525-26) made the case for decentralisation just 
after the end of the Second World War:
  If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation 
to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place, it would seem to 
follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with 
these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources 
immediately available to meet them. We cannot expect that this problem will be solved 
by first communicating all this knowledge to a central board which, after integrating 
all knowledge, issues its orders. We must solve it by some form of decentralization. But 
this answers only part of our problem. We need decentralization because only thus can 
we ensure that the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place will 
be promptly used. But the “man on the spot” cannot decide solely on the basis of his 
limited but intimate knowledge of the facts of his immediate surroundings. There still 
remains the problem of communicating to him such further information as he needs to 
fit his decisions into the whole pattern of changes of the larger economic system.
Localism, from an environmental perspective, can also be seen as a means of (partially) 
contributing towards the goal another highly contested concept, sustainable development 
(Davoudi and Madanipour, 2015: 2). Localism currently attains its spatial expression through 
the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF). Although several aspects of the NPPF are 
discussed in detail below (e.g. the Duty to Cooperate, the New Homes Bonus), it is appropriate 
at this stage to briefly analyse this policy framework in terms of its impact on sustainable 
development. At issue is the efficacy of what has come to be known as the ‘strong’ versus 
‘weak’ theory of sustainable development, in other words, to what degree ‘natural’ capital (e.g. 
greenfield land, with its perceived environmental benefits) can be substituted for ‘human’ 
 referenda). 
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capital (e.g. development, with its perceived economic benefits), while attempting to balance 
the needs of future people (‘intergenerational equity’). Taking the example of a proposed 5,000 
home urban extension, the ‘weak’ version of sustainable development merely asks whether the 
new housing and associated infrastructure would add to, or subtract from, the aggregate (i.e. 
human and natural) capital stock, (thereby assuming a significant degree of interchangeability 
between these two types of capital)? The ‘strong’ interpretation of sustainable development 
challenges the view that both of these forms of capital are substitutable, arguing that some 
environmental assets are essentially irreplaceable (Owens, 1994: 442-43).
Beckerman (1994: 193) draws the important distinction between the ‘technical’ definition of a 
sustainable development path (i.e. “simply...one that can be sustained over some specified time 
period”) and the notion as a normative concept (i.e. something that “ought to be followed”. He 
then develops this basic distinction into a choice between technical or de facto sustainability 
and the normative concept of sustainable development as optimality, making the point that, 
“it is obvious that many economic activities that are unsustainable may be perfectly optimal, 
and many that are sustainable may not even be desirable, let alone optimal” (Beckerman, 
1994: 194). Marcuse (1998: 105) goes even further, arguing that sustainable development as 
a normative goal, “just doesn’t work...it is not a goal, it is a constraint on the achievement of 
other goals”. More specifically, environmental capital “more and more becomes the limiting 
factor”, therefore, “the importance of keeping it separately intact increases” (Daly, 1995: 53).
The point to be made about this rather abstract theoretical debate is that, although it uses a 
different vocabulary, it actually replicates what is at the heart of many conflicts over strategic 
spatial planning proposals. De Angelis (2008: 69) sees the whole concept of ‘sustainable 
communities’, which began under New Labour and upon which so much of England’s housing 
and regeneration strategy has been predicated, as merely an attempt to address within the 
neoliberal paradigm the social and environmental problems raised by advocacy groups. 
Cochrane et al (2015: 13), writing specifically about the NPPF, support this view, arguing that 
the policy, “reflects a turn towards another version of corporatist neo-liberalism because of 
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the emphasis it places on viability (rather than sustainability) as the main criterion expected 
to determine what gets built.” It is instructive that the requirement to develop sustainably has 
been shifted from a statutory footing (in the 2004 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act) to 
its current non-statutory status in the NPPF. This very much reflects the policy expression of 
sustainable development as a normative concept - something very nice to aim for - but which 
is subordinated to a range of other, principally economic, goals. The policy clearly goes against 
the weight of academic opinion (i.e. the dangers of treating sustainable development as a 
normative, rather than a technical, concept), but a cynical observer would perhaps remark that 
this merely reflects the current disconnect between theory and practice.
From a spatial perspective, localism is a contested concept. This is logical, since space is 
the container for elements of the political, social and environmental and their inherent 
complexities. One viewpoint is that ‘the local’ is one of the lower tiers of a nested hierarchy of 
distinct scales ranging from the micro to the macro. A metaphor that is often used to describe 
the way in which these successively larger scales are related, in this instance by Herod and 
Wright (2002: 7), is that of a set of Russian Matryoshka dolls:
  each constituent doll and each constituent scale is separate and distinct and can be 
considered on its own, but the piece as a whole is only complete with each doll/scale 
nesting together, such that the dolls and scales fit together in one and only one way (a 
larger doll/scale simply will not fit inside a smaller one).
However, as Brenner (2001: 592) notes,
  traditional Euclidian, Cartesian and Westphalian notions of geographical scale as a 
fixed, bounded, self-enclosed and pre-given container are currently being superseded – 
at least within the parameters of critical geographical theory and research – by a highly 
productive emphasis on process, evolution, dynamism and sociopolitical contestation.
Kaufmann (2011: 12) provides us with a more colourful metaphor when he states categorically 
that, “today the Russian doll has burst and sent pieces flying in every direction.” Clarke 
and Cochrane (2013: 15) argue that this more complex reading of scalar relations - i.e. 
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that, “localities are both produced by and productive of globalisation and the global” - is 
singularly absent in the localism of recent UK governments. Instead, ‘localities’ continue to 
be seen, naïvely, as “the natural units of political geography” (ibid.) and local actors as “those 
best placed to find the best solutions to local needs” (HM Government, 2010: 2). However, 
“localities are by no means natural...[and]...local needs are rarely homogeneous” - in sum, 
“localities are rarely autonomous such that effective solutions to local needs are found just 
at the local scale” (Clarke and Cochrane, 2013: 14). Both New Labour’s attempt to govern 
through community (Amin, 2005) and the current government’s ‘Big Society’ model fall into 
the trap of what Albrechts (1998: 422) calls ‘Balkanization’ (i.e. the dominance of the local - 
whether viewed from the perspective of ‘resistance’ or ‘efficiency’ - over other spatio-political 
frameworks).
1.6: The centralising tendency: the role of green belts in strategic spatial planning
It is of course much easier to defend, uphold, and indeed, obfuscate, a devolutionary concept 
like localism. A material, centralist policy like the green belt is much more contentious. The 
term ‘green belt’ is such a loaded concept that even the way it is written can betray one’s 
attitude towards it; thus ‘Green Belt’ appears to reify it through capitalization and ‘greenbelt’ 
seems to trivialise it through concatenation. There is of course a middle way, ‘green belt’ and 
so this more neutral designation has been adopted, unless it appears as quoted in a primary/
secondary source. Rozee (2014: 12) argues that, “the one national spatial policy we have in 
England which has stood the test of time is Green Belt policy”, although she warns that it has 
been hijacked by those who benefit most from it, with the result that the policy has become a 
‘sacred cow’. The debate around the mid- to long-term future development of towns and cities 
in England has tended to polarise around two rather extreme narratives, the first of which 
demands the removal of “sclerotic” planning regulations to enable people to build where, 
when and how they like, while the second hankers after a particular view of the ‘rural idyll’ 
and is extremely resistant towards any attempt to develop greenfield sites. Interestingly, both of 
these views have traditionally been held by those on the centre right of the political spectrum, 
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although this is not a new situation; during the 1980s Margaret Thatcher’s Environment 
Secretary, Nicholas Ridley, pushed through legislation in the teeth of fierce opposition which 
facilitated the building of out-of-town shopping centres on green belt and greenfield sites 
(Moore, 2011). Clearly, neither of these narratives represent anything remotely close to reality, 
but such stark imagery illustrates how high the stakes are in the future development of the 
wider south east of England. 
How has the green belt idea become a shibboleth of the planning system which has eclipsed 
the bonds of a technocratic lexicon to become “a British institution” (Thomas, 1990: 136)? At 
stake is whether the ongoing reforms of the planning system (which has guided change to our 
built environment for more than 65 years) are leading to a paradigm shift in attitudes towards 
housebuilding, infrastructure, and other development. Nowhere in the country is the ‘housing 
crisis’ perceived to be as acute as in the wider South East, where managing development 
has been described as akin to “riding the tiger” (Lock, 1989). The green belt could, quite 
reasonably, be described as the tiger’s teeth, such is the fear or veneration, depending on one’s 
perspective, in which it is held. 
The onset of the most recent attempt to overhaul the planning system in England and Wales 
can be traced back to the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, described by Nadin 
(2007: 44) as the result of “the most extensive discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
form and scope of planning instruments since the mid-1960s.” This legislation heralded the 
importation into the United Kingdom of the European concept of ‘spatial planning’, defined by 
Gallent et al (2006: 182) as, “planning that reconciles competing interests and seeks to do more 
than merely control the use of land…an enabling force rather than a regulatory mechanism.” 
In other words, planning aligned more closely with the social and economic objectives it was 
intended to serve (Cullingworth and Nadin, 2006: 129). The concept emerged during the 
process of negotiating the ESDP during the mid- to late 1990s and made a critical distinction 
between land-use planning as a regulatory activity and spatial planning as a strategic enterprise 
(Faludi and Waterhout, 2002: 27-28). Allmendinger and Haughton (2012: 92) argue that, just 
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as the green belt concept offers a little of something to a wide constituency of interest groups, 
so ‘spatial planning’ appealed to a range of vested interests, at a superficial level at least. They 
contend that we have now reached a ‘post-spatial planning’ stage, since, “like much of the 
other apparatus of neoliberal governance, [it] was an unstable fix and only ever likely to be 
a temporary phenomenon” (ibid.: 98) and attribute its demise to two factors: its failure to 
streamline the development plan - planning permission process and the worsening economic 
situation from 2008 onwards (ibid.).
One of the consequences of an instrument of statutory regulation such as the green belt 
operating in a neoliberal economic framework is that it encourages rent-seeking behaviour. As 
Webster (2002) outlines, those fortunate enough to live within the green belt are members of 
an exclusive club which benefits disproportionately from the economic benefits (in the form 
of increased land and property values) and their ability to directly consume the social and 
environmental advantages of the surrounding land. Evans (1973) argues that green belt policy 
fails microeconomic reasoning on two counts: it is inefficient, since people find themselves 
on higher bid-rent curves than they would otherwise be on in urban fringe areas, and it is 
also inequitable because of the extra benefits accruing to residents in and around areas of 
urban containment. green belt policy also impedes the ‘creative destruction’ of free market 
economic growth (Gordon and Richardson, 1997: 101) since it generates pressure to maintain 
the status-quo - once new owners have paid inflated prices for property then it is very much 
in their interests to restrict further growth (Willis, 1982: 65). The granting of planning 
permission in and on the fringes of green belt land becomes a valuable economic right in itself 
and this encourages lobbying and interest group activity (Evans, 1988). All of these factors 
combine, according to Pennington (1997: 101-02) to create a system, which in its attempts to 
eliminate land-use externalities through statutory regulation, instead of through institutional 
reforms of the bundle of rights and responsibilities associated with property ownership, 
concentrates benefits on vested interests and bureaucrats, and disperses costs across the 
remaining bulk of urban consumers. Prior and Raemakers (2007: 595-96) argue that green 
belt policy is a “litmus test” for assessing the goodness-of-fit between the planning system and 
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the regime of accumulation, and they provide the examples of Edinburgh, where green belt 
policy was substantially overridden, and Dundee, whose green belt was abolished in 1980, as 
evidence for what happens when the “immovable shibboleth” of urban containment meets the 
“irresistible force” of the post-Fordist economy. 
There are, though, a number of paradoxes and contradictions in the green belt which 
may have contributed to, rather than detracted from, its longevity. Firstly, and somewhat 
against the grain of what undergraduate planning students are generally taught about the 
almost predetermined foresight and legacy of visionary figures like Howard, Geddes and 
Abercrombie, the green belt was a clear example of a distinct lack of policy coordination in 
strategic spatial planning terms, or what would have been described as ‘regional planning’ 
in the post-war period. What would appear, at first glance, to be two mutually reinforcing 
policies, the green belt and the New Towns were in fact arrived at in a haphazard, fortuitous 
manner because of the significant time-lag (in the case of Milton Keynes, decades) between 
the (highly incremental) implementation of green belt policy and the much later designation 
of New and Expanded Towns (Herington, 1990: 17). Secondly, despite being seen by the 
overwhelming majority of the general public, along with protectionist campaign groups, as a 
rural policy, it is in fact an urban policy designed to contain sprawl, protect the character of 
particular towns and villages and, more recently, to assist in urban regeneration through the 
‘brownfield first’ policy initiated under New Labour (Gunn, 2007: 596), and which continues 
to be espoused by the current government judging by the, “no need to build on the green belt” 
comments made by Business Secretary Sajid Javed on the Today programme on 10 July 2015 
(BBC, 2015). 
Thirdly, and most seriously, the green belt has moved away from its original purpose as an, 
“urban shaping device designed to manage growth on a regional and sub-regional scale” (Elson, 
1994: 154, emphasis added). Instead the policy has been expropriated by central government 
and is used rather like a set of thumbscrews on local government, to be relaxed or tightened, 
usually depending on the proximity of elections. That the Greater London green belt has 
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significant impacts on housing markets is undeniable; Cheshire et al (2014: 101) calculate that 
25 per cent is “certainly an underestimate” for the total cumulative increase in house prices 
attributable to green belt policy in the UK. 
In March 2010, just before the last General Election, a largely unheralded document was 
published which slipped under the radar probably due to a combination of the impending 
vote and its rather dry and unappetising title: Housing in the South East: First Report of Session 
2009-10. Contained within its pages, however, were perhaps the first attempts by policy 
makers, as opposed to policy wonks in think-tanks, to ‘think the unthinkable’ and envision the 
biggest shakeup for decades to one of the world’s oldest, and, by extension, most successful, 
urban strategies: 
  We think it is appropriate for there to be selective reviews of the green belt in the 
South East. The green belt policy has advantages, but is also has disadvantages...it was 
designed for a different time, and it is now working against the ideal of sustainable 
communities which hope to encourage people to work, rest and play in the same local 
area. As a result, there are areas of the region where the green belt is adding stress to 
the immediate transport network and inadvertently placing pressure for development 
on valuable areas of greenspace within urban areas.
            
This paragraph is a distillation of the strategic spatial planning issues described above: the 
greenfield/brownfield debate, transport infrastructure and planning policy qua/versus the 
market. Apart from being perhaps the most sustained and withering attack on the green belt 
concept from within Parliament since its inception, this Report signals the desperation with 
which policy makers are responding to the ‘housing crisis’ and provides the backdrop to the 
times in which we live - a time of stark, unpalatable choices and difficult decisions.
Fundamentally, what is at stake is whether the ongoing housing crisis is best dealt with 
by building vertically or horizontally, and whether a quality or quantity approach is more 
appropriate. Although this may appear at first glance to be a somewhat simplistic synopsis 
of the problem, it encapsulates the greenfield/brownfield debate as well as the importance of 
housing densities (which in turn have effects on travel patterns and choices). In an interview 
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with a Guardian correspondent, an unnamed local authority Chief Executive described the 
discomfort faced by communities opposed to development in their local areas as “nothing 
compared to the aggregate pain that people feel in this country because there is insufficient 
housing for them and their families” (Fearn, 2013). Because building ‘up’ or ‘out’ is intrinsically 
associated with the type of housing we create, questions of homeownership, and the wider 
culture of owning one’s property in the UK, are also relevant. In view of this argument, 
according to some commentators, “protecting the green belt is a promise that cannot be kept” 
(Lainton, 2013).
Supporters and opponents of the green belt concept alike both point to a survey carried out 
for Kate Barker’s Review of Land Use Planning (Barker, 2006: 44), which indicates that only 
13% of those interviewed gave a correct answer to the question, “What proportion of land 
in England do you think is developed?”; 54% of respondents believed that at least 50% of 
England was developed. Of course the true figure for the proportion of developed land in 
England is considerably lower than this - around 11% according to a Briefing Paper produced 
by the Adam Smith Institute (Papworth, 2012: 3)3. Opponents of urban containment argue 
that the widespread national support for green belts is therefore based on a “comprehensive 
misunderstanding of the situation and a lack of knowledge of the true facts” (Evans and 
Hartwich, 2007: 11). The actual proportion of developed land in the UK is, surprisingly, a 
matter of some debate. Nick Boles, the current Planning Minister, stated in a BBC Newsnight 
interview broadcast on 28th November 2012 that just 9% of Britain was built on and that 
increasing this to 12% would allow a million new homes to be built, “and we’ll have solved 
a housing problem” (Hope, 2012b). Boles’ pronouncements were derided as “back of the 
fag packet” calculations by Ben Cowell of the National Trust (Ross, 2012). The fact that 
fundamental variables such as the total area of the country that is developed are subject to 
widely varying claims illustrates the polemical and dogmatic nature of the debate. In an 
open letter to Planning Magazine, Ian Anderson, the Executive Director of Iceni Planning, 
welcomed Boles’ comments about the need to develop another 3% of open land, but he went 
3  The figures in the Briefing Paper are themselves referenced from 2012 ONS Land Use statistics which have been 
subject to rounding and are of uncertain provenance  (see http://www.iea.org.uk/blog/land-use-planning-the-corn-
laws-of-our-times). A more accurate, up-to-date calculation of land use across Great Britain is presented in Chapter 
6, ‘Discussion’.
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on to criticise the Planning Minister’s “rhetoric” that this development could take place 
without encroaching on green belt land, since, as he stated (Anderson, 2012) much non-green 
belt open land is:
   land of high agricultural value, high landscape value, flood plain, sports fields, land 
of outstanding natural beauty, sites of special scientific interest, strategic gaps, land of 
ecological value, scheduled ancient monuments, land blighted by infrastructure, and 
other more bespoke designations that have evolved through the careful analysis of the 
country by numerous generations of town planners.
On the other hand, much of the green belt, Anderson argues, is of lower quality than other 
open land and is “often arbitrary in its coverage.” However, there were plenty of people ready 
to take issue with Boles’ central argument, including the conservative philosopher of aesthetics 
Roger Scruton, who argued that “in Britain, everyone has a right to the country” and evoked 
images of Wordsworth, Coleridge and The Archers amongst others. To build on another 3% 
of England’s open land as Boles suggests, would, muses the philosopher ruefully, “take away 
the heart of England” (Scruton, 2012). The former Poet Laureate and current Chairman of the 
Campaign for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE) , Andrew Motion, was also critical of 
Boles in Rojas (2012), arguing that,
   on just about every level what he said was wrong...[he] doesn’t take into account 
the collateral effects of development. About 50 per cent of our land is already 
compromised in some way or other.
This argument points to one of the central issues surrounding the future of greenfield land 
in the Greater South East: the disjuncture between the ‘idea’ of these open spaces held by 
many (or most?) people - England’s ‘green and pleasant land’ with associated images of rural 
idyll - and the reality of many greenfield plots - monotonous swaths of low-grade agricultural 
or semi-industrial land, often virtually impossible to improve due to the draconian nature 
of the planning legislation attached to it. However, once greenfield land, of whatever quality, 
is developed, its previous status is lost forever; as Jane Owen, editor of House and Home 
put it, “You don’t know what you’ve got till it’s gone” (Owen, 2012). Despite the seemingly 
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almost universal acceptance of the green belt concept among the general population, research 
published in Kate Barker’s Interim Report into Land Use Planning (Barker, 2006: 155) 
indicates that respondents to a survey of the social benefits of open space value core urban 
green spaces (e.g. parks, squares, playgrounds) 60 times more than urban fringe green belt. 
In a report written for the Policy Exchange think-tank at the peak of the last housing bubble 
in 2007, two critics of the planning system conceded that “[t]he argument in favour of quicker, 
simpler and less restrictive planning will be hard to win” (Evans and Hartwich, 2007: 5). Six 
years and an ongoing economic crisis later and it is opponents of greenfield development who 
are on the defensive. Such interest groups point to two strategies that could be implemented 
before greenfield development is even considered: bringing empty properties back into use 
and prioritising brownfield development. On the issue of empty homes, Griffiths (2010) 
reported that more than 450,000 properties had been empty for more than six months. 
Using Communities and Local Government (CLG) housebuilding figures and population 
projections, this equates to almost a two year supply of new housing. Bringing empty homes 
back into use was a policy pushed by the Liberal Democrats (Aldred, 2010: 15). However, 
when one considers that the waiting list for council house accommodation is in excess of 5 
million people, it becomes clear that any empty homes proposal can form only a small element 
of an overarching housing strategy (Papworth, 2012). In any event, the UK vacant property 
rate of 3.4%, whilst significant in absolute terms, is one of the lowest in Europe (Eurostat, 2010, 
as cited in Niemietz, 2012). 
In terms of brownfield development, a report by a prominent, non-partisan think-tank, the 
Centre for Cities, argues that, after fifteen successful years, the policy has run its course. 
Virtually all of the most suitable sites have been developed by now, and other potential land 
uses which qualify as brownfield development, such as back gardens, are starting to come 
under increased pressure from developers (Cook, 2012). In any case, even at the policy’s dawn 
at the turn of the millennium, there was a spatial mismatch between the north of England 
(many brownfield sites but low demand) and the south, particularly the Greater South East 
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(comparatively fewer brownfield sites, but considerably higher demand). Seemingly in 
agreement with these sentiments, in The Plan for Growth, the coalition government removed 
the previous administration’s 60% target for new development on brownfield land (HMT, 
2011).
Opponents of greenfield development point to research carried out by the United Nations 
entitled Planning Sustainable Cities (UN, 2009) in which ‘compact cities’ are linked with 
lower greenhouse gas emissions compared with more sprawling urban developments (CPRE, 
2010: 20). This is, however, a contested finding, since the amount of ‘leapfrog’ commuting 
may significantly reduce any benefits from constraining urban form. The CPRE concedes 
that atmospheric emissions (largely transport-based) and other pollutants are a “particular 
problem” in the green belt (CPRE, 2010: 64). In terms of ‘leapfrog’ commuting, opponents of 
London’s green belt claim that it creates a commuter belt that “stretches from Lincolnshire to 
the Isle of Wight and from Oxfordshire to the Isle of Thanet” (Wiles, 2012). The green belt, 
by virtue of its very existence, fuels the need for a more extensive road- and public-transport 
network (Papworth, 2012). 
Proponents of greenfield development highlight the fact that the four English towns with the 
fastest-growing affordability gap between earnings and house prices - Oxford, Cambridge, 
London and Bournemouth - have one thing in common: green belts. As is so often the 
case though, correlation does not necessarily mean causation. Research critical of urban 
containment has castigated the planning system for actively imposing hidden costs on 
residents; for example, recent work by Cheshire et al (2012: 4) suggests that costs resulting 
from planning constraints were equal to a 4p in the pound tax for households in Reading. 
Those who believe that greenfield development is necessary also point to the vast land banks 
assembled by developers, for whom a strategy of ‘wait and see’, as ever scarcer land continues 
to rise in value, is more profitable than actually building on land for which they already have 
permission. As both Kate Barker and John Calcutt pointed out in their Reviews into housing 
supply point out, by assembling these land banks, developers are simply responding as 
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rational economic actors to the uncertainty generated by the planning system (Aldred, 2010). 
According to Kirkup and Hope (2011), the potential to deliver 300,000 new homes - equivalent 
to two year’s building at current rates - exists in these land banks. At the same time, we are told 
by the Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE) that the number of new homes planned on 
green belt sites has almost doubled - up to almost 150,000 from 81,000 in August 2012 (Press 
Association, 2013). It should be noted that this figure of 150,000 is obtained principally from 
local authority Core Strategy planning documents, which relate to potential developments up 
to twenty years hence (many, if not most, of which will remain unbuilt in developers’ land-
banks). The Core Strategy documents themselves are at widely varying stages of completion, 
with differing levels of validity as ‘material considerations’ accordingly.
Interestingly, although green belts up and down the country were an important issue during 
the last election, the Metropolitan green belt has been virtually a non-issue during the four 
London Mayoral elections to date, suggesting that those charged with the future development 
of nation’s capital believe that growth can be accommodated within its existing boundaries. 
However, on May 29th 2013, the European Commission entered the debate by criticising the 
principle of urban containment in their verdict on the UK’s economic reform programme 
by stating that, “the planning system, including green belt restrictions, continues to be an 
important constraint on the supply of housing” (EC, 2013: 4).
1.7: Power, planning and vested interests
Planning and development are inherently political acts; this is an inescapable fact. Despite how 
convenient it would be if development patterns were to follow similar scientific laws as those 
found in biology or physics, the reality is that urban form evolves in a far from deterministic 
fashion (Schiller, 2001: 8). The nature of planners’ work means that how they “organise 
attention is the central political problem of their practice” (Forester, 1989: 19), stressing some 
issues and downplaying others. A useful filter through which to examine the political arena 
in which planners work is Steven Lukes’ ‘three dimensions of power’ model (Lukes, 2005). 
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Specifically, Lukes traces the means by which particular issues are debated/ignored through 
the first and second dimensions (‘pluralistic’ and ‘nondecision-making’ respectively) to 
the third dimension (‘insidious power’), where those who wield power are able to gain the 
acquiescence of those outside the circles of influence, largely by getting the dominated to take 
on the values of those in power (Dowding, 2006: 137). 
One important way that Lukes’ theoretical framework is played out in planning practice is 
through ‘open’ and ‘restricted’ policy debates. Rydin and Myerson (1989: 473) argue that, due 
to the overwhelming level of support the green belt concept enjoys, debate on this issue is 
essentially ‘restricted’, since to hold a view contrary to the vast majority would be to reduce 
one’s level of ‘ethos’ (i.e. personal authority). Another question, such as housing, they argue, 
is much more ‘open’, since a wider range of opinions on the issue are possible. At the time that 
Rydin and Myerson were writing the green belt was very much a ‘non-issue’ (in the parlance of 
Lukes’ (2005: 39) framework it was a case of elite interest groups acting in concert to keep an 
‘unacceptable’ issue out of politics). However, the future of the green belt is by no means such 
a ‘restricted’ or ‘unacceptable’ issue for discussion; as noted at the start of this chapter, some 
influential interest groups have begun to ‘think the unthinkable’ regarding the future of the 
green belt (e.g. Birrell, 2012). Even so, as Starkie (1987: 269) points out, becoming an ‘issue’ is 
no guarantee that policies will change; in other words, becoming an issue is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for strategy revision.
An illuminating study of how processes of power and agenda-setting play out ‘for real’ was 
written by Bent Flyvbjerg (1998), in his case study of a major redevelopment of the Danish 
city of Aalborg. Far from the existence of an objective ‘rationality’ which experts only need 
reach an easy consensus over, “rationality is context-dependent and the context of rationality 
is power” (Flyvbjerg, 1998: 2). This relationship between rationality and power, although 
symbiotic, is unequal: “power has a rationality that rationality does not know, whereas 
rationality does not have a power that power does not know” (ibid.). The single most 
important conclusion we can take from Flyvbjerg’s work, so Faludi and Waterhout (2006: 9) 
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argue, is that 
  there can be no question of evidence forming a self-evident, objective basis for action. 
Rather, on methodological grounds, it is clear that what is accepted as decisive evidence 
is a matter of choice, and as such is value-laden and political.
Moving down the layers of abstraction, from power as a concept to power as it plays out in a 
case study, what evidence do we have relating to how power manifests itself in the strategic 
spatial planning process? Perhaps the first thing that becomes apparent from even a cursory 
examination of the development process is the sheer multiplicity of interest groups from 
across the whole political spectrum who are competing to have their voices heard. Gordon 
and Richardson (1997: 102) argue that “cities that are the most captive to special interests are 
the least likely to adopt growth-oriented policies”; this would suggest that the Metropolitan 
green belt is a place of stasis. It is often the case than an impressive coalition of forces align 
themselves against major developments, and especially against any perceived eroding of the 
green belt; Murdoch et al (2003: 82) identify five main groups who are strongly preservationist: 
local councillors, professional planners, developers, residents and environmentalists. However, 
Hoggart (1997: 259) argues that preservationists, even when acting in concert, are no match 
for pro-development interests who often have the support of powerful national interests - “the 
opposition of village residents to particular developments is very real but highly constrained”.
This idea that everything is ‘up for grabs’ is reflected in development plans - the very 
documents whose aim is to provide certainty in the planning process. Healey (1993: 84) argues 
that the plans have become “an arena of struggle” between different interest groups, a view 
that fits very closely with Lukes’ analytical framework. The results of these battles over the 
content and message of development plans has necessarily impacted on how the functions and 
purposes of the green belt have been regarded over time. As Amati and Yokohari (2006: 138) 
succinctly put it, 
 
  The green belt’s function was used as a way of ensuring its implementation. Thus, the 
function changed according to the group whose support was enlisted and according to 
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the period during which this support was sought.
An interesting perspective on the importance of governmental scale is provided by Munton 
(1983: 10), who argues that the further up the chain of government, towards the centre, one 
travels, the more “clear-cut, principled and highly generalised” the views on the functions 
of the green belt become. It is only as one travels in the opposite direction, to the level of 
individual developers, farmers and residents that things become messier, with opinions 
becoming “sharp, specific and self-interested.” Put another way, central government has always 
considered the green belt to be a strategic planning instrument with a certain amount of 
built-in flexibility to adapt to local needs (i.e. an assumption that limited development would 
occur) (Munton, 1983: 49). Before we look in detail at central-regional-local relations, it is 
useful to examine the theory behind spatial thinking across all governance scales.
1.8: Central-local relations and institutional scalar linkages
Despite the decentralist rhetoric of localism (and the wider UK narrative of devolution), 
England remains one of the most centralised territories of all OECD countries, with 
approximately 75 per cent of local authority income deriving from central government, 
placing it, “at one extreme of the European spectrum” (CLG, 2009: 46), in contrast to countries 
like Sweden and Denmark, where local government raises around three-quarters of its own 
revenue (Pugalis and Townsend, 2013a: 105). This privileging of the national over the ‘local’ 
and the ‘regional’ can be traced back to the Second World War and ‘post-war consensus’ which 
oversaw the creation of the welfare state within a Keynesian economics framework (Murdoch 
et al, 2003: 31). 
Disconnects between the aims of central and local government in England are not a recent 
phenomenon; the 2007 Lyons Inquiry into Local Government criticised the previous thirty 
years of reforms as, “a series of well-intentioned devolution initiatives which have often 
evolved into subtle instruments of [central] control” (Lyons, 2007: i). For example, both 
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Regional Policy Guidance (RPG) and its successor policy, Regional Spatial Strategies (RSS), 
were roundly criticised as, “being more akin to central government strategies for a region as 
opposed to locally distinctive and accountable strategies of each region” (Baker and Wong, 
2013: 92). Fenwick (2015: 10) argues that the root of the problem lies in the conflict between 
two incompatible messages offered from the centre: that local government should both ‘think 
big’ (in terms of city regions, joint procurement, shared services and collaboration with 
public-private partners), yet simultaneously ‘think small’ (for instance by embracing localism, 
neighbourhood and community government). Jones (2010: 375) describes the Office of the  
Deputy Prime Minister (which became the CLG) in the early 2000s as resembling:
  a gigantic think-tank, commissioning and producing a stream of reports and policy 
papers making varied recommendations for the spatial organisation of economic 
development, much to the confusion of those trying to guess the likely direction of 
government policy.
While such ‘alphabet soup’ policy outputs appear as the symptoms of the confusion which 
has reigned as to the best way to structure central-local relations, the cause of the problem 
would seem to be ongoing uncertainty as to the appropriate spatial units of analysis and 
implementation. City-regions seem to have emerged as the preferred option, although since 
many of them bear a striking resemblance to metropolitan counties which were abolished 
over thirty years ago, it is questionable whether they are not simply a convenient re-hashing 
of ‘zombie’ sub-regional administrative boundaries. There has been a historic unwillingness 
to follow through on policies which adapt the spatial units used to deliver local government; 
for example, the 1995-98 reorganisation created unitary councils only in some parts of 
England; central government refrained from a comprehensive application of the process on 
the basis that, “different parts of England have different needs and hence require differing 
local structures” (Fenwick, 2015: 9). As noted above, this additional complexity has created 
unintended consequences in terms of planning and transport policy in LEPs based on old 
County boundaries.
Even were an effective set of such spatial units to exist, there remains the problem of sufficient 
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cross-departmental central government ‘buy-in’ to follow through on agreed policies. Brian 
Robson (2014: 2) in an article entitled, ‘Does Britain no longer have an urban policy?’ notes 
that many of the senior civil servants who had experience of, and a commitment to, urban 
policy have disappeared from the scene (CLG was the most heavily culled central government 
department, congratulated by the Chancellor on having reduced itself by 60%). What expertise 
in urban policy remains seems to be concentrated in a group called the ‘Cities Policy Unit’, 
which is part of the Cabinet Office (and thus not a spending department). However, where the 
CLG and its predecessors had difficulty in persuading other departments to cede control to 
local actors, it appears that the localism agenda has achieved far greater success in spreading 
the message of decentralisation (Cheshire et al, 2014: 173).
As noted above, there has been an ongoing battle between various Whitehall departments 
over the ownership and future direction of strategic spatial planning. The principal causes 
of this tension have their roots in the ‘planning doctrine’ versus ‘economic development’ 
paradigm battle, which itself is a function of the degree to which one believes in concepts 
such as spatial equilibrium and spatial justice. A degree of friction emerged between the CLG 
and BIS over the disposal of the business and physical assets of the defunct RDAs, many of 
which were a complex patchwork painstakingly obtained as parts of a wider regeneration 
strategy (Pugalis and Townsend, 2012: 168). On a personal level, the two former leaders of 
these departments could not be more different - Eric Pickles, the rabble-rousing ex-local 
politician, and Vince Cable, the urbane economist who saw the value of retaining some 
vestiges of regional structures and was thus in favour of retaining at least some elements of 
the RDAs, which were viewed more favourably than the RSSs (Bentley et al, 2010: 553). As 
noted in the preceding section, six ‘BIS Local’ teams were created to give the department an 
England-wide presence outside Whitehall4. There was further conflict over the guidance issued 
to potential LEP partnerships - Pickles did not want to be too prescriptive about LEPs, urging 
local businesses and councils to define their own priorities, whereas Cable and Mark Prisk, the 
Business Minister responsible for LEPs wanted Pickles to be more open about what functions 
4  The six teams are named: ‘South Central and West; London and East; West Midlands; East Midlands; North West; 
and North East/Yorkshire and the Humber.
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central government saw LEPs carrying out. Cable also thought, along with the Department 
for Transport, that there should be fewer than 30 LEPs, since they needed to be of a certain 
scale to properly take on strategic spatial/transport functions (Hayman, 2012: 78-79). Matters 
came to a head when The Times published a leaked letter from Prisk to Cable and Pickles, in 
which Prisk warned that the LEP policy could result in “likely failure in large parts of England” 
(Hayman, 2010).
Tensions are not limited to CLG-BIS relations; the exchange of views between George Osborne 
and Eric Pickles described above is indicative of an ongoing battle between the Treasury and 
the CLG. In an ideal Treasury world, there would be little or no planning restrictions, and the 
economy would grow in tandem with the nation’s towns and cities, whereas Pickles and the 
CLG have to be far more sensitive to the needs and desires of local authorities, many, if not 
most, of which are firmly anti-development (as far as their own ‘back yards’ are concerned). 
Paul Goodman, Executive Editor of Conservative Home, writing in The Telegraph, stated 
that the Treasury preferred Labour’s centrally managed RSSs, which dictated housing targets 
to local authorities (Goodman, 2012). As often happens, policy moves in a cyclical pattern; 
central government attempted to control local councils during the 1980s through so-called 
‘planning by appeal’ - using planning inspectors to overrule those decisions of local councils 
which ‘went against the grain’ of central government policy (Morton, 2012: 6).These personal 
relationships are described because it is important to remember the human element in policy 
formulation and implementation, especially at the central level, which can seem very, very far 
away.
The biggest bone of contention between central and local tiers of governance is perhaps the 
negotiation and agreement of housing targets. Using the latest household projections from 
the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG), a total of 5 799 000 new 
households are forecast to emerge between 2008 and 2033 (CLG Live Table 401). Assuming 
a mean household size at 2008 levels of 2.33 persons per household, just under 250,000 new 
houses per year, every year, need to be built. Since household sizes are projected to decline over 
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the coming decades, this is a conservative estimate. A glance at the housebuilding completion 
rates in England since 1990-91 show that on average, 144,780 homes have been completed 
each year, a shortfall of more than 100,000 homes per year (CLG Live Table 209). Extreme 
caution should be attached to household projections, since they are based on a range of 
assumptions, and are highly sensitive to migration rates in particular (Aldred, 2010). Even so, 
it is long-term population projections, combined with housebuilding figures such as these that 
have fuelled the narrative of the ‘housing crisis’ that politicians tell us, on an almost weekly 
basis, afflicts the Greater South East of England in particular. The eradication of regional 
governance has had immediate, and significant, consequences on housing targets.
Cheshire (2009: 1) argues that the planning system “is the last element of that period of post 
war reconstruction which has not been modified to take into account market realities.” One 
of the reasons why the planning system has remained so intact over the past 70 years is the 
“considerable discretion” (Kelly and Gilg, 2000: 338) enjoyed by local planning authorities 
which has led to a robust system where few changes need to be made centrally as most 
interpretation is carried out at the local level. Naturally this leads to wider variation in the 
implementation of planning policy ‘on the ground’ than there would be in a much more tightly 
run, “top-down command and control” regime (Gordon and Richardson, 1997). Brotherton 
(1992) goes so far as to suggest that local authorities take the lead in determining policy 
tightness, with central government generally content to give development control departments 
their head, beyond a few very contentious planning applications. It could be argued that the 
planning system in England is analogous to the common law tradition, with the important 
exception that precedent is built from the base upwards, rather than handed down from on 
high, since Healey et al (1988) argue that the ‘legitimacy’ of planning decisions is established 
by locally elected members deciding cases.
The literature on a specific bundle of central-local relations of particular interest - 
implementation of green belt policy - sheds an interesting light on the preceding discussion.  
Due to the very strong presumption against development enjoyed by areas subject to green belt 
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designation an interesting, and extremely rare phenomenon can occur, in which central-local 
relations are turned on their head. In other words, as Elson (1986: xxv) notes:
  this unique quality gives it the potential to shift the initiative in central-local relations 
from the centre to the locality…green belt is thus a very desirable policy for a local 
authority seeking to retain or enhance its power to affect local events.
Much of this paradoxical situation springs from the almost total absence of a common 
understanding of the purposes of the green belt. Munton (1983: 137) argues that central 
government views the green belt as an instrument to achieve certain goals, a means to an 
end, whereas local actors see it as an end in itself - a concrete reality to be defended at all 
costs. The further one descends down the spatial and governmental scales, the more difficult 
it becomes to take a strategic view of the green belt, or, as Gallent et al (2006: 165) argue, 
green belts become a “generic intervention, designed to achieve wider objectives, without 
a specific purpose tied to the area of designation itself ” - that is, until one finds oneself 
implementing policy in such areas. In any event, as Kelly and Gilg (2000: 336) warn, we should 
be wary in drawing straightforward cause-and-effect links between policy formulation and 
its implementation. It could be argued that the combined effects of scale (both spatial and 
governmental) and temporality (i.e. the passage of time) have led to the ‘diffusion’ of green 
belt policy to the point where it is used as a negotiating tool between the various tiers of 
government/governance and the various competing vested interests (Elson, 1986). As Bulkeley 
(2005: 876) argues, there are:
  manifold ways in which such issues are created, constructed, regulated and contested 
between, across and among scales, and through hybrid governing arrangements which 
operate in network terms. 
A related, and important, strand of policy - strategic housing development - has undergone 
precisely the opposite paradox in recent years, with increasing central government 
intervention in the development and implementation of housing policy, leading to the “demise 
of the local”, according to Robinson (2003: 249). The balance of power in housing policy 
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shifted dramatically towards central government under the previous Labour administration 
(Dixon and Adams, 2008), a state of affairs which the much heralded Localism Act 2011 
attempted to redress, mainly by employing ‘carrot and stick’ approach (i.e. by means of the 
New Homes Bonus), using indirect forms of ‘steering’ to incentivise local actors to ‘voluntarily’ 
follow the desired course of action, especially in regard to building new housing. However, 
Broughton et al (2011: 88) argue that, far from transferring power from the centre to localities, 
the Act has consolidated the “real power” to decide resource allocation in the hands of central 
government, in a form of “centralised localism”.
Even though the influence of the regional tier of governance has been greatly reduced during 
the terms of the coalition and current Conservative government, the remaining tiers of 
planning, from parish meetings to local and County Councils and upwards towards the several 
central government departments with an interest in strategic spatial development, have their 
own agendas and motivations (Gallent and Tewdwr-Jones, 2007: 151). What is clear is that our 
ability to make appropriate connections between and across different spatial/governmental 
scales “is grossly underdeveloped” (Smith, 1992). This underdevelopment may partly be due 
to the imperceptible merging of what Bulpitt (1983) described as the ‘dual polity’, whereby 
local government was allowed a certain degree of autonomy in highly specific domains, at the 
cost of successive central governments increasing their scope to promote their own policy 
interests at the local level (for example in terms of setting the green belt agenda); a process 
which Catney (2009: 48) contends happened on an ever more frequent basis during the 1980s 
and 1990s. There has been a counter-current of thought which dates as least as far back as 
the Redcliffe-Maud Report 1969 (Redcliffe-Maud et al, 1969: vol. I, 1), which argues for local 
government which is able to:
  develop enough inherent strength to deal with national authorities in a valid 
partnership; and to adapt itself without disruption to the present unprecedented 
process of change in the way people live, work, move, shop and enjoy themselves.
These sentiments embrace not only a desire for more balanced central-local relations, but 
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also hint at the need to tackle issues (e.g. travel and new housing development) in a way that 
transcends arbitrary administrative boundaries. Doel (2012) argues that Lord Heseltine’s 
Report into local growth (Heseltine, 2012) resonates strongly with Redcliffe-Maud, although 
she goes on to contend that a few stones have been left unturned, including an almost complete 
absence of discussion of the evidence base left by regional governance. The NPPF, with its 
requirement that councils must identify a minimum of 5 years’ worth of housing supply (CLG, 
2012a: para. 47) ensures that Whitehall remains poised to step in should any council step out 
of line, thus the scope for central-local conflict remains very much alive.
1.9: Strategic spatial planning and the housing question
House building in the UK has been characterised as ‘speculative’, and often takes the form of 
large-scale schemes built by a diminishing number of volume producers. A focus of recent 
work on the economics of house-building has tried to establish whether or not those who are 
responsible for the supply of new homes (i.e. developers and builders) employ strategies geared 
towards achieving market monopoly. Such strategies could include deliberate withholding of 
supply (‘land-banking’), collusion among large construction companies, and ‘drip-feeding’ 
land for new development according to market conditions/forecasts. A report by the Office of 
Fair Trading found no systemic evidence of these behaviours, although they noted that volume 
home builders carried out their trade according to land transactions rather than through the 
creation of new housing units (OFT, 2008). Specifically, the OFT report concluded, “we found 
no evidence that individual homebuilders have persistent or widespread market power or that 
they are able to restrict supply or inflate prices” (OFT, 2008: para. 1.7) and that, “we have not 
found any evidence that homebuilders have the ability to anti-competitively hoard land or 
own a large amount of land with planning permission on which they have not started to build” 
(OFT, 2008: para. 1.8). In fact, they conclude that the largest ‘landbank’ may be held by the 
public sector (ibid.).
In any case, as Barker (2014: 72) notes, undeveloped planning permissions need to be 
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renewed every three years, with attendant costs and uncertainty, which is itself a “considerable 
incentive” for developers to build. Even removing from the equation the strategising and 
inclination of volume housebuilders to develop particular sites, there are significant questions 
surrounding the sector’s capacity to deliver the kind of levels of housing it has been suggested 
are necessary to keep pace with socio-demographic changes, principally because of its inherent 
conservatism and indifference to innovation and market research (Jones and Watkins, 2009: 
34). However, those on the other side of this argument contend that, by constricting the supply 
of new homes (and therefore raising the price of those which are built), volume housebuilders 
are simply following a tried and tested economic model. As Richard Jones, group head of 
regeneration and growth at EC Harris straightforwardly put it, “Having established a model 
that delivers good margins, large housebuilders won’t want to destroy that by throwing lots of 
houses into the marketplace” (Mayes, 2012). 
In Cochrane et al’s (2015: 11) work on housebuilder activity in the Milton Keynes and South 
Midlands (MKSM) Growth Region, they found that the most common rate of delivery on 
any one site was 50 new homes per year, meaning that a 1,000 home development could take 
twenty years to complete (if only one firm was involved). This is symptomatic of a wider 
problem affecting strategic spatial planning, that large scale sites are simply not attractive to 
both developers and planning authorities, because of the increased risks from working with 
a greater number of partners and the starker line between success and failure for larger sites 
(IPPR/Shelter, 2015: 26). The equation between land availability and the delivery of new 
housing is therefore not a simple one (Cochrane et al, 2015: 11). These phasing issues have 
knock-on effects on travel behaviour, since until a ‘critical mass’ is achieved to stimulate 
employment close to a strategic development site, newly arrived residents will have to 
commute elsewhere (Raco and Henderson, 2006: 509). Much of this complexity is created by 
a scalar mismatch between developers and planners, with the former privileging a scale below 
the sub-region though above specific sites (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2009: 9), a functional 
scale which is absent from the lexicon of many public sector planners, who tend to focus on a 
spatial level either above or below this.
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Of course, much of the criticism of housebuilders stems from a perception that they are 
failing to build new homes at a fast enough rate to cope with demand, and one of the principal 
methods used to determine demand are projections - of migration, population change and 
ultimately household formation. Forecasting has long formed one of the principal activities 
of both land use and transport planning, especially those working at central government level 
(Gallent and Tewdwr-Jones, 2006: 104), although the heady days of regarding demographic 
change as a ‘science’, with uncritical acceptance of the projections it provided have passed 
into distant memory (Foley, 1963: 20) and bitter experience has taught planners and other 
built environment actors to remain rather skeptical when faced with prognostications of any 
kind. Unlike weather forecasting, there seems to have been little improvement over time in 
the field of household projections; Barker (2014: 28) notes that ONS projections of household 
formation for the 2001-2006 period were estimated to have been 17% greater than actual rates. 
By far the biggest problem with demographic projections in England is that they have tended 
to be used as a disciplining influence from the centre, serving to, “draw actors together into 
a shared set of behaviour patterns” (Counsell and Haughton, 2004: 109-10). In the process of 
‘cascading’ figures down from central, through regional (when that tier existed) to the local 
level, the ‘objective’ calculations tend to become highly subjective, “determined not by real 
demand or need but by the agendas of competing political groups” (Gallent and Tewdwr-
Jones, 2006: 145). 
In other words, the “complexities of space” need to be kept at bay in the passage of projections 
across the scales of governance (Murdoch, 2000: 509), a Sisyphean task if ever there was one. 
There is an important point to be made about the direction in which housing targets travel 
(i.e. from the centre to the local or vice versa). Recalling the debate around ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
sustainable development, Murdoch (2000: 505) argues that truly sustainable development must 
be brought “down to earth”, and based on much more robust assessments of particular spatial 
contexts. This appears to be a plea to allow those at the local end of the spatial/governance 
scale to have a much greater say in calculating their needs. There is, however, a separate 
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argument which contends that, even if perfect projections of the number of new houses we 
need were produced, these would only be one factor in the relative determinants of growth in 
demand for houses and space (Cheshire et al, 2014: 98). In other words, projections should 
be regarded as merely one piece of the puzzle in a complex decision making process that 
should also take in a wide range of other information, including housing market behaviour 
(Maclennan, 2012: 23). In fact, Cheshire (2009: 13) argues that the real driver of house price 
inflation is income growth rather than growth in household formation, caused by the strong 
elasticity of demand for space.
This point goes to the heart of the debate surrounding the perceived housing crisis. The 
argument is frequently made, mainly by right of centre economists and think-tanks, that rising 
house prices which far outstrip real growth in household earnings is the major symptom of 
the predicament and that it is thus logical to suggest that the problem is rooted in supply-
side issues (e.g. Cheshire et al, 2014). The major cause, it is argued, is the disconnection 
between the planning system and the housing market, largely caused by the inflexibility of 
the twin pillars of the plan-led approach and development control (Gallent and Tewdwr-
Jones, 2006: 5). Kate Barker’s two Reviews into housing supply and land use planning at the 
height of the last housing bubble were directed at this very question (Barker, 2004; 2006). In 
her recent monograph which revisited the housing question (Barker, 2014), she identified 
the inherent difficulty in distinguishing between ‘good’ increases in property values and ‘bad’ 
ones reflecting land supply constraints. This problem is exacerbated by the failure of the 
planning system to take a sufficiently strategic view of land supply; instead decisions are taken 
on an authority by authority basis, which reflects, “the total absence of economic analysis 
in planning” (Cullingworth, 1997: 946). It is important to make the point that the planning 
system only constrains the supply of housing indirectly, through directly constraining land 
(Cheshire et al, 2014: 90). A recent report by the Institute of Public Policy Research and Shelter 
found that land prices have become even more volatile than house prices (IPPR/Shelter, 2015: 
10)
   56
In addition, even were the planning system better able to take account of price signals in a 
general sense, there are two features of the housing market which are particularly distorting in 
the wider South East of England, namely the impact of green belts on land supply and house 
prices, and the appropriate density and tenure mix at which to build (given the conflicting 
goals of housing policy and developers’ profit margins). According to the monocentric model 
of urban economics developed, among others, by Alonso (2013 [1964]) and Muth (1969), 
the effect of the green belt on the negative house price gradient that one would expect to 
encounter as one moves out from the Central Business District (CBD) is to introduce a sharp 
discontinuity in this gradient. Jones and Watkins (2009: 47) describe the house price gradient 
of an urban area surrounded by a green belt as “an umbrella with holes”, with the green belt 
acting as the umbrella and the urban areas as the ‘holes’. Thomas (1970: 100), quotes a ‘senior 
officer’ of the (then) Ministry of Housing and Local Government, who described the Greater 
London green belt as a “blanket full of moth-holes”. These distortions are further compounded 
by the difficulty in developing a financial mechanism which captures the uplift in land values 
for sites granted planning permission that would allow the necessary infrastructure to be built 
along with the proposed development. The highly speculative nature of house building in 
England is closely linked to the uncertainty, delay and risk inherent in the planning system. 
This often leads to a confrontational approach to major new development, with lawyers 
representing different sides frequently busier than planners and designers. 
However, while a number of these criticisms of the planning system are valid (particularly 
those concerning delays and blanket urban containment), several should, and have been, 
rebutted. Maclennan (2012: 13) argues that, “it is more than unbalanced analysis to assume 
that slow supply-side responses always and everywhere stem from the planning system stilling 
the responsive hand of an otherwise competitive, informed housing provision system”. This 
point is emphasised by Gallent and Tewdwr-Jones (2006: 19) who note that, “if planning were 
merely about efficient land release, then there would be little to distinguish it from a world of 
big business corporate planning.” Indeed, Kate Barker is said to have “rethought” aspects of 
the liberalisation of planning that she pressed for in her second Review (Docherty and Mackie, 
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2009: 3). It is therefore important to look at all aspects of the housing supply chain, inclusive of 
both the planning system and developers since it is currently characterised by low output and 
high development risk (IPPR/Shelter, 2015: 21). A general point should also be emphasised, 
viz., that in the overall picture, demand side factors are significantly more important than 
supply side issues, since new build housing accounts for just a fraction of total supply and 
transactions (Grigson, 1986 as cited in Bramley, 1993: 1024). Barker (2004: 18) estimated that 
in any one year, new build housing accounts for only 10 per cent of all transactions and adds 
just 1 per cent to the overall stock. Any set of progressive strategic spatial planning policies 
will, however, not seek to rely on this and will attempt to address supply side issues since these 
will, over the long run, significantly affect demand side behaviour.
On a more conceptual level, it is worthwhile questioning the efficacy of the market to fully 
capitalise the sorting mechanisms people use (by trading off housing and transport costs with 
the benefits of a particular location, within the constraining factor of their wages) - in other 
words, to achieve ‘spatial equilibrium’. Although Cheshire et al (2014: 30) argue that this is a, 
“highly reasonable assumption”, there is plenty of evidence to suggest the contrary, either in the 
form of multiple equilibria - the housing market area model (Goodman, 1978), or, more likely, 
spatial disequilibria (Maclennan et al, 1987). Simple common sense should tell us that factors 
like social housing, the existence of significant informational asymmetries between different 
actors, and serious inequalities in transport and accessibility have the effect of distorting the 
concept of spatial equilibrium beyond any helpful meaning, or, as Jones and Watkins (2009: 
73) somewhat more diplomatically put it, such distortions, “render the concept of equilibrium 
inappropriate as a basis for analysing urban housing systems”.
Rather than focusing on an abstract ‘grand unifying theory’ like spatial equilibrium, a more 
productive way of analysing the interactions between the planning system, housing markets, 
and travel and transport patterns is through the prism of spatial metrics such as density. 
Density is, for some, well on the way to becoming a tenet of planning doctrine, with Alexander 
(1993: 182) describing it as, “a complex concept involving the interaction of perceptions with 
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the concrete realities of the built environment”. The requirement to build at higher densities 
only becomes relevant when we look at development strategically; as Marcuse (1998: 107) 
points out, “If we look at each landscape separately, we are unable to ecologically justify plans 
for dense urban development. From a regional perspective, however, aggregation of urban and 
residential land uses may in fact be preferable.”
An important area of research for strategic spatial planning is establishing whether a 
relationship exists between density and distance travelled to work (e.g. Gordon et al, 1989a; 
Pushkarev and Zupan, 1977). Levinson (1997: 148) argues that densification is similar to 
polycentricity in that it is the market’s response to minimise spiralling interaction costs. 
However, the relationships between urban density and travel patterns have become much more 
complex in recent decades. Gone are the days when people’s ‘activity spaces’ and opportunities 
for social interaction took place within a much smaller radius, including the distance between 
home and work. What seems to have been one of the principal drivers towards higher density 
development, however, is that the demand for accessibility is less elastic than the demand for 
space, which is more of a luxury (Gordon, 2008: 4653). Much of the credit for establishing a 
(negative) correlation between higher density and per capita energy (i.e. fuel) consumption, 
thus encouraging a ‘pro-density’ perspective from many policy-makers, is due to Newman and 
Kenworthy’s oft cited (1989) paper. However, their work has been criticised in recent years, 
principally on the grounds that it grossly simplifies causality (i.e. higher density equals lower 
per capita energy use). It is argued that, instead of higher densities being the cause of lower 
fuel consumption, it is rather the case that higher transport costs give rise to higher densities 
(Echenique et al, 2012). It should be noted that Newman and Kenworthy attribute 60% of 
energy consumption to urban density, with the remaining 40% due to other variables related 
to fuel costs and vehicle efficiency (Mindali et al, 2004). A meta-analysis of studies carried out 
by Ewing and Cervero (2010) concluded that increasing density only has a marginal impact 
on reducing car travel, and other work has argued that high densities are responsible for 
negative externalities including traffic congestion (Sorensen et al, 2008) and respiratory disease 
(Schweitzer and Zhou, 2010).
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Gunn (2007: 610) argues that the Greater London green belt assumes even greater importance 
as densities increase in the metropolis, as it provides much needed recreational space and 
respite from urban life. This is something of a circular argument, however, since protecting the 
green belt will necessarily lead to higher density urban development, which makes the green 
belt ever more sacrosanct, thus strengthening the case for further urban densification, and so 
on. It is widely recognised that the green belt, by restricting the supply of land for housing, 
increases rents and house prices and encourages house builders to develop at higher densities 
than they would otherwise (Willis, 1982). Although higher density development often costs 
more in the short term, due to direct capital costs (e.g. the same type of apartment will be 
significantly more expensive in a 12-storey block than in a 2-storey building), over the longer 
term it yields higher financial and social returns (Keith, 2008: 64). Higher density development 
is also subject to diminishing marginal savings, since ever higher residential densities generate 
fewer land savings (Goodchild, 2008: 210). In fact, Cheshire and Magrini (2009) found that, at 
the strategic scale, and having controlled for other factors including city size, higher densities 
were associated with slower economic growth. At the level of individual developments, poorly 
planned higher densities can cause negative externalities including noise, loss of privacy, lack 
of personal space and reduced parking opportunities (although some would not necessarily 
class the last factor as a drawback) (Gunn, 2007: 598). 
1.10: Infrastructure: The role of transport in strategic spatial planning
Just as the planning system is expected to contribute to ‘sustainable’ growth and development, 
so is the transport network, as set out in the coalition Local Transport White Paper (DfT, 
2011). Even more so than spatial land use planning, transport infrastructure benefits 
significantly from economies of scale and a strategic approach (Stafford and Ayres, 2013: 
134). At the same time, the relationships between ‘larger than local’ planning and travel 
patterns are complex and non-linear, a state of affairs not helped by the long established 
lack of integration in the United Kingdom between spatial and transport planning (Hull, 
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2005). Foley was bemoaning this lack of integration more than half a century ago when 
he wrote that, “a most serious segment that has never been given fully to town planning is 
highway and transport planning” (Foley, 1960: 229). Contemporary examples of this lack of 
coordination abound. For example, under the New Labour administration, developers and 
RDAs were occasionally taken aback by the refusal of the Highways Agency to accept planning 
applications for large development sites if they would take traffic levels above the design 
capacity of the neighbouring road network (Townsend, 2009: 650). Professional barriers and 
cultural differences have resulted in situations such as land use planners seizing on the concept 
of ‘co-location’ of development without a proper understanding of the travel behaviours this 
might generate, and, on the other side of the coin, there have been situations where transport 
planners have failed to fully grasp the development consequences of new infrastructure 
(Martin, 2013: 56). Revealingly, there was little mention in either of Kate Barker’s Reviews 
into the housing supply and the planning system of the need for strategic transport 
infrastructure to support the proposed levels of development (Bolden and Harman, 2008: 
311). A combination of ongoing ambiguity over the appropriate spatial scale at which to take 
strategic spatial infrastructure decisions and the extremely long lead-in times needed to deliver 
such projects has contributed to the cleavages between land use and transport planning. For 
example, according to Martin (2013: 71) the £5 million ‘price tag’ used to define whether 
Local Transport Plan schemes are ‘major’ has been unchanged since the 1980s. Development 
continues to be ‘housing led’ rather than ‘infrastructure led’ in that housing targets in local 
plans mean little if they come without the necessary schools, healthcare facilities and roads 
(Cochrane et al, 2013: 794). This lack of certainty surrounding infrastructure funding and 
delivery was one of the principal concerns cited by these authors’ recent work on MKSM 
(Cochrane et al, 2015: 7).
More recent developments have demonstrated the complexities and, in a few cases, outright 
contradictions inherent to the localism debate as it relates to transport and travel. In March 
2011, the Transport Secretary, Philip Hammond drew attention to how the localist agenda 
had damaged transport, in particular local bus funding. In a speech to the Local Enterprise 
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Partnerships Network in September 2011, the Transport Secretary appeared once again to veer 
‘off message’ when he talked of, “unleash[ing] the potential of our regions” (Hammond, 2011), 
with the ‘r’ word positively taboo by this stage. Transport planners and practitioners have 
generally responded negatively to the revocation of Regional Strategies, with Hickman, Hall 
and Banister (2013: 218) describing this as “a huge retrograde step”. However, in an example 
of a ‘no-win’ situation for government, the centralist policy of green belts also conflicts with 
strategic transport policy, since urban containment is highly likely to result in higher vehicular 
carbon emissions as a result of ‘leap-frog’ commuting patterns and increasing distance 
between people and the shops and services they wish to access (Cheshire, 2009: 14). 
A high profile news item in November 2012 was the publication of the results of the UK’s 
commitment, under Phase I of the Kyoto Protocol, to reduce baseline emissions of six major 
greenhouse gases by 12.5% during the period 2008 - 2012. The UK failed to meet its target, 
although not by a wide margin; including sources of pollution due to land use, an 11% cut, 
relative to 1990 levels, was achieved (Clark, 2012). Achievements by individual nations count 
for little, of course, if the global trend shows only a slow reduction in harmful emissions, or, 
as in the case of non-Kyoto countries like China, sharp increases. Over the medium to long 
term, the Climate Change Act 2008 commits the UK to cutting greenhouse gases by 80% 
(relative to 1990 levels) by 2050 (HMSO, 2008). In the wider south east, the strong impetus 
for growth (principally in terms of housebuilding) over the short to medium term, means that 
particular care will need to be taken in the planning of large-scale developments since badly 
planned housing can lead to much greater spatial separation of homes and workplaces, with 
the inevitable consequence that harmful, transport-based, emissions will rise. In other words, 
a strategic approach to planning homes and transport infrastructure needs to be taken. As 
Headicar et al note (2009: 9): 
   The attractive proposition is that, if the relationships between a range of urban 
structure variables (say population density, settlement size, mix of use, etc.) and travel 
can be understood, then, by implication, land use planning (and other spatial planning 
methods) become very important tools in managing the growth in travel demand.
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In any event there needs to be far greater integration of spatial and transport planning. 
Current indications are not good; there appears to be a widening gulf between the priorities 
of the Department for Transport (DfT) and the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (CLG), with the DfT recently launching Britain’s biggest road-building 
programme since the £24 billion ‘roads for prosperity’ scheme launched under Margaret 
Thatcher in 1989, which was billed as “the biggest road programme since the Romans” (Vidal, 
2012). Many of the 150 or so schemes identified by the Campaign for Better Transport are 
‘zombie roads’ - previously dead schemes which have been resurrected to supposedly boost 
the nation’s flagging economy. A number of these proposed schemes have implications for the 
green belt, including the A602 Ware to Stevenage road widening, the Harlow Bypass and the 
M11 Junction 6 - 8 lane widening project. 
One of the principal areas of contention in the land-use - travel demand debate is the extent 
to which morphological characteristics (such as density, transport network attributes and 
the spatial distribution of homes and workplaces) can affect travel choices and patterns. The 
debate has become somewhat polarised, with some academics convinced that there are strong 
links between urban morphology and travel behaviour (cf. Kitamura et al, 1997: 126; Cervero 
and Landis, 1995: 2), while others are less persuaded by the strength of this link (e.g. Evans, 
1998: 137), since, as Breheny (1995: 83) points out, one of the main reasons why land-use 
policy often has questionable or diluted effects on travel demand is because the price signals 
associated with car travel (e.g. car tax, fuel duty) have tended to ensure that few motorists 
are discouraged from travelling longer and further in their cars. A third group is equivocal: 
according to Boarnet and Crane (2001: 842), “[i]t...appears premature to either conclude that 
the built environment can be reliably used as transportation policy tools at the margin or that 
it cannot”. In any case, it would be wise to keep Handy’s (1996: 162) warning in mind, when 
she states that,
  finding a strong relationship between urban form and travel patterns is not the same 
as showing that a change in urban form will lead to a change in travel behavior, and 
finding a strong relationship is  not the same as understanding that relationship.
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This warning applies especially to cross-sectional data, even where regression analysis 
produces strong correlations between land-use characteristics and travel patterns, since any 
links between variables may or may not be direct (Stead and Marshall, 2001: 131). Residential 
self-selection is another potential source of error - do residents in dense neighbourhoods travel 
less not because of the morphological characteristics of the urban fabric but simply because 
these areas attract people who prefer not to travel by car? (Crane, 2000: 13). A problem specific 
to the UK is the severe disjuncture between spatial (land-use) and transport planning which 
has meant that major transport infrastructure has often been implemented with scant regard 
for its wider land-use implications; often local planning authorities have simply had to accept 
centrally-planned network alterations as a basic input around which they must adapt their 
own plans (Cullingworth, 1997: 951). It is also the case that pricing signals (in the form of 
e.g. fuel or road pricing) are far stronger than any land-use measures can possibly be in the 
current distorted market of cheap car travel with motorists paying for little or none of the 
externalities associated with automobiles (Cervero and Landis, 1995: 9). Docherty and Mackie 
(2010: 3) contend from their reading of the Stern (2007) and Eddington (2006) Reports that 
“an enhanced and more interventionist planning system to act as a (partial) surrogate for 
pricing” offers some hope in terms of reducing transport emissions as part of Stern’s graduated 
approach. It is, however, unlikely that any policy formulation with the words ‘interventionist’ 
and ‘planning system’ will meet with much favour under the current coalition. However, since 
travel demand is directly linked to economic growth, a very small silver lining in the current 
cloudy economic situation is that overall transport use has fallen since 2008 (DfT, 2012).
The land-use - travel debate is of course especially relevant to the case at hand of morphology 
resulting from urban containment, since, as Rydin and Myerson (1989: 470) point out, 
“transport networks within an urban area can still come under pressure if commuting takes 
place across the green belt from residential developments in the outer metropolitan area.” This 
travel behaviour is caused when “development restrictions have pushed the city’s suburbs to 
leapfrog to the far side of a protected zone” (Champion, 2007: 34), but little analysis has been 
carried out into the interplay of socio-economic and morphological characteristics that may 
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affect these choices. What is clear, however, is that improved transportation infrastructure has 
allowed people who once would have had to move home from Outer London or the South East 
to work in the city centre to commute instead, although, as Leunig and Overman (2008: 76) 
point out, transport can substitute for migration over relatively short distances, but it cannot 
(yet) replace it over medium or long distances.
A substantial piece of transport infrastructure is planned which is a good practical illustration 
of the theoretical discussion above of the interplay of power, planning doctrine and vested 
interests, which, if it goes ahead, will have significant effects on house prices, linkages between 
towns and villages and which may (indirectly) lead to the opening up of the green belt. Phase 
1 of the proposed High Speed 2 (HS2) railway linking central London with Birmingham 
is planned to cut through 40km of the metropolitan greenbelt. The proposed route of HS2 
Phase One is shown in the map overleaf. An interesting example of what Flyvbjerg (1998: 
35) describes as the ‘rationalization of a prior political decision’ appears to have occurred 
in the downgrading of the ‘value’ of greenbelt and other protected open spaces. In a 2010 
assessment by HS2 Ltd, the corporate entity responsible for building the line, the ‘landscape 
impact’ caused by the section of line passing through the green belt and Chiltern AONB was 
estimated at just under £1.1 billion, a figure which was reduced to £114 million in the most 
recent Department for Transport estimate (DfT, 2012). DfT officials claimed that this tenfold 
reduction in impact was made possible by ‘green tunnels’ (roofed-over cuttings) and other 
mitigation strategies. A more cynical view might be that the technical exercise of ‘landscape 
impact’ assessment has been ‘rationalised’ to conform to an overriding political goal. In other 
words, as Flyvbjerg (1998: 36) explains, “Power, quite simply, produces that knowledge and 
that rationality which is conducive to the reality it wants.” Quite simply, the vast majority of 
the cost reduction was achieved by designating green belt and AONB land as ‘urban fringe/
greenbelt’, valued at £889/ha/yr on a scale of seven open space types used in cost-benefit 
exercises by the CLG. The only category which is valued less on the CLG scale is ‘intensive 
farmland’, worth just £103/ha/yr, with ‘urban core public space/city park the most ‘valuable’ 
open space at £54,000/ha/yr (CLG, 2012b). These types of normative valuation exercises 
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highlight the disjuncture between the ‘sacrosanct’ nature of green belt land in policy discourse 
and its ‘true’ value as an exploitable economic resource. 
Further antagonism of the anti-HS2 lobby, and what might appear as suspiciously ‘on-the-
hoof ’ policy making was provided (once again) by the Planning Minister, Nick Boles, who 
suggested that HS2 could stimulate housebuilding along its route (Hope, 2013), despite the 
fact, that by its very nature and purpose, HS2 is a high-speed service with no stops between 
London, Birmingham and the two northern city destinations which form Phase 2 of the 
project. Housing built alongside the route of HS2 is likely to suffer from noise pollution, 
vibration and other disbenefits. Of more significant interest when Phase 1 of HS2 opens 
(currently scheduled for 2026) will be the degree to which inter-regional long-distance 
commuting increases (i.e. from London-Birmingham and eventually to destinations further 
north). Will the rise of so-called ‘super-commuting’ signal the final victory of time over the 
friction of distance, and reduce still further the importance of urban form on travel patterns 
and choices?
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Chapter 2
Research design and methodology
2.1: Introduction
Having set out the main conceptual issues that the research will deal with in Chapter 1, the 
purpose of this Chapter is to outline the methods used to address these issues. This thesis 
employs both qualitative and quantitative methods in a research design which has come 
to be known as ‘triangulation’ (Campbell and Fiske, 1959). The aim of the triangulation 
process is not simply (or even necessarily) to validate the quantitative analysis by a series 
of confirmatory qualitative interviews, but rather to “capture a more complete, holistic, and 
contextual portrayal” of the phenomena under study (Jick, 1979). By ‘triangulating’ a range 
of interdisciplinary research techniques, in terms of primary sources (interviews/large scale 
datasets) and analysis (academic, professional and journalistic secondary sources/descriptive 
statistics) it becomes possible to arrive at a more nuanced treatment of the research aims 
(Næss, 2006: 38). As Bennett (2001: 1513) points out, “the comparative advantages of case 
study and statistical methods are largely complementary and...can thus achieve far more 
scientific progress together than either could alone.” 
2.2: Subjects and Procedures
There were two important questions to be addressed at the outset of the research process, 
namely the appropriate study area and the identification and selection of the interview 
participants. A total of thirteen proposed major developments was identified and shortlisted 
by a lengthy process of consulting the planning portal of each local planning authority 
across the Wider South East. The majority of these websites are very similar in structure 
and offer the facility for searching according to the type of application (e.g.  Major Housing, 
Office to Residential, Conservation Area). The West of Stevenage case study was chosen 
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from this shortlist of thirteen as it best met the four main criteria for selection: firstly, that 
it was located in an area subject to high housing pressures; secondly, that it was located in a 
politically contested  area; thirdly, that it contained areas with limited available brownfield; and 
finally, that it involved an underbounded local authority. As Hamiduddin and Gallent (2012: 
517) explain, ‘underbounded’ settlements are those “that have grown to the extent of their 
administrative boundaries but continue to experience pressure for further expansion.” The first 
criteria (high housing pressures) meant that the study area would come from the greater South 
East. Having identified a particularly interesting strategic development at Stevenage West, it 
was a logical extension to include the underbounded local authorities of Stevenage and Luton, 
along with the more rural (and politically contrasting) district of North Hertfordshire. The 
series of maps on the suceeding pages shows, in order, the location of the study area in relation 
to London and the wider South East, the town of Stevenage and the location of the strategic 
West of Stevenage site, aerial photography of the site itself, showing the zones located within 
Stevenage and North Hertfordshire, and, finally, the proposed masterplan of the site, had 
planning permission been obtained and the development been built.
Having selected the study area, qualitative interview material was gathered from eight 
in-depth interviews conducted with a range of built environment actors spanning planning 
practice (four senior local government and County Council planners), local government 
(three councillors representing both main political parties in England) and economic 
development (a senior official from a Local Enterprise Partnership). The principal strategic 
purpose of the interviews was, as Healey (2007: 182) describes, to achieve, “a fine-grained 
understanding of the instituional contexts and situated trajectories (pathways) of efforts at 
spatial strategy making for urban areas”. Put more prosaically, the main aim of the interviews 
with practitioners was to gain practical insights into the implementation of strategic spatial 
planning in practice, including issues of cross-boundary co-operation with neighbouring 
authorities, relations across and between the various tiers of governance and problems with 
ensuring that the necessary infrastructure for housing development was in place. Furthermore, 
one of the principal aims of the qualitative interviews was to link the desk-based research with 
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an attempt to decipher the “visual language of spatial planning” (Dühr, 2007), as it relates to 
the different strategies employed in strategic spatial planning. Three concepts are intrinsic to 
understanding these strategies: spatial practices (the material consequences of the exercise of 
socio-spatial power relations), symbolic meanings (the importance of representations, symbols 
and discourses in framing socio-spatial relations) and the politics of scale (how meaning is 
attached to spatial practices across a set of interconnected scales) (Ek, 2007). 
All of the participants hold (or held) senior roles within their respective organisations or 
political parties (this was a deliberate strategy as an important goal of the interview process 
was to hear from strategy makers and highly experienced professionals and politicians). 
Potential participants were identified from planning documentation, committee minutes, 
and local authority websites. They were approached by email and permission was requested 
to interview them. Once agreement had been obtained, further email exchanges established 
the date and time that the interviews would take place on. Each interview lasted between 
45 minutes and one hour. Prior to the start of each interview, the nature of the research was 
explained to each participant, and permission was obtained to make an audio recording5, 
which was later transcribed. Full transcriptions of all eight interviews are included in the 
Appendix. Although recent work based on semi-structured interviews (e.g. Boddy and 
Hickman, 2016) has stressed the benefits of using specialist software (e.g. NVIVO) to code and 
thematically analyse qualitatively harvested material, it was felt that the number of interviews 
was just within the bounds of manageability without the use of such software, which would 
have added an additional level of complexity. Imposing quasi-quantitative procedures, such 
as coding, to the material were rejected due to the manageable size of the material (51 322 
words across the eight interviews) and the fact that only one researcher (i.e. myself) was 
working with the text. In contrast, Boddy and Hickman (2016) interviewed a total of twenty 
participants in their work on strategic planning in the Cambridge sub-region. Each participant 
is identified only by their role, i.e. ‘Senior Planner’, ‘Senior Local Councillor’ or ‘Senior 
Exexcutive’. Permission to present the research in this way was obtained from all participants. 
5 Interviews were recorded using an Olympus Digital Voice Recorder, Model WS-450S.
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AUTHORITY NAME POSTCODE REFERENCE DECISION SCALE
Aylesbury Vale Land at Valley Farm, 
Leighton Road




Barnet Stonegrove & Spur Road 
Regeneration Project
EN5 1RH H/03635/11 Approved 999 dwellings
Basildon Land north of Station Ave, 
Wickford
SS11 7AY 07/00801/OUT Approved 150-200 dwellings




Refused Removal of 
tennis dome & 
replacement with 
hotel
Chelmsford Land at Temple Farm, Ship 
Lane, West Hanningfield
CM2 8XB 08/00476/OUT Approved 69 296 sq m 
employment 
development





Hounslow Bedfont Trading Estate, 
East Bedfont





Land west of A1 at 
Stevenage












Spelthorne London Irish RFC TW16 5EQ 12/00369/OUT Approved 206 dwellings & 
sports training 
facilities
St Albans Oaklands College AL1 3RX 5/08/0620 Approved 85 dwellings




Approved 350 dwellings 
Waltham Forest Land at Billet Works, 
Kimberley Industrial 
Estate, Walthamstow
E17 5DT 2008/1709 Refused 562 dwellings & 
retail floor space
Table 1: List of case-studies selected for further investigation
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Figure 1: The GSE, showing Greater London green belt and urbanized areas
© Crown Copyright Ordnance Survey (Digimap Licence)
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Figure 2: The study area local authorities in relation to the GLA
© Crown Copyright Ordnance Survey (Digimap Licence)
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Figure 3: The West of Stevenage site in relation to A1(M) 
© Crown Copyright Ordnance Survey (Digimap Licence)
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Figure 4: Ordnance Survey aerial image of the West of Stevenage site 
© Crown Copyright Ordnance Survey (Digimap Licence)
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Participant Organisation Date
Senior Planner Luton Borough Council 7 March 2014
Senior Labour Party Local 
Councillor
Luton Borough Council 7 March 2014
Senior Planner Hertfordshire County Council 11 March 2014
Senior Planner Stevenage Borough Council 12 March 2014
Senior Conservative Party Local 
Councillor
North Hertfordshire District 
Council
13 March 2014
Senior Planner North Hertfordshire District 
Council
14 March 2014
Senior Labour Party Local 
Councillor
Stevenage Borough Council 21 January 2015
Senior Local Enterprise Partnership 
Executive
South East Midlands LEP 
(SEMLEP)
25 February 2015
Senior Planner Stevenage Borough Council 15 March 2015
Table 2: List of interview participants and interview dates/locations
2.3: Measures
As Flyvbjerg (2006: 223) notes, “concrete, context-dependent knowledge” in the form of 
case-studies is perhaps the most important form of theory-development in the social sciences. 
This is principally because of the inherent difficulty of constructing reliable predictive theory 
across social-scientific disciplines, due mainly to the complexity, emergent properties and 
feedback loops that characterise many social systems (e.g. Beinhocker, 2006). Recalling Kuhn 
and the development of paradigms, ‘normal’ science and scientific revolutions, Flyvbjerg 
(ibid.) also argues that in-depth case-studies facilitate the development of the type of tacit, 
context-dependent knowledge necessary to allow researchers to “develop from rule-based 
beginners to virtuoso experts”. According to Walton, 1992: 129), “case studies are likely 
to produce the best theory”. Although lack of generalizability is a valid criticism made of 
certain types of case study research, what Massey (1994: 156) describes as the ‘uniqueness’ or 
“specificity of place…the product of layer upon layer of different sets of linkages, both local 
and to the wider world” means that place-based research which employs carefully selected 
case-studies from a number of geographical contexts is capable of providing “a base for more 
ambitious synthesizing and generalizing” (Næss, 2004:156). 
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Methodologically, the case study involves two kinds of issues, those intrinsic to planning and 
wider questions relating to the framework within which strategic spatial projects are negotiated 
and progressed or retarded. Intrinsic planning issues include large-scale housing development, 
associated transport and travel implications and the greenfield/brownfield debate. Wider 
questions resulting from the evolving framework within which strategic spatial planning must 
operate include the under-boundedness of certain local planning authorities, and the resulting 
need for neighbours to work together to deliver large-scale housing developments.
2.4 Qualitative measures
Prior to the interviews, forensic analysis of, initially, the Stevenage West case study, and 
later expanded to cover the strategic spatial planning dilemmas faced by Luton and North 
Hertfordshire, was carried out over an 18 month period between September 2013 and March 
2015. This involved close reading of a range of council committee records, legal reports, 
academic journals, books, book chapters, newspaper articles and trade magazine pieces. 
Although not typically written with the rigour of academic research the latter two categories 
of sources were important to read since they reflected the intensity of the various elements 
of the debate within the policy cycle. This long period of research and reflection formed an 
important preparation in advance of going into the field to interview senior professionals and 
local politicians.
The interviews were loosely-structured and open-ended in order to allow participants 
freedom to express their viewpoints and explore tangential issues, many of which proved to 
be enlightening and of value to the research. However, the broad topics for discussion were 
prepared in advance and were tailored to each participant’s background and knowledge. 
Although it is common for post-graduate researchers to ‘outsource’ tasks like transcribing 
interviews to professional transcription agencies - often overseas, which therefore links the 
research process to global networks of accumulation (e.g. see Prasad and Prasad, 2012) - it was 
felt that doing this task ‘in-house’ would constitute a valuable part of the process of getting to 
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grips with the nuances of the material. 
2.5 Quantitative measures
One significant piece of quantitative analysis was carried out as part of this research project. 
A central question which goes to the heart of some of the issues introduced in Chapter 1, 
including planning doctrine, urban containment, and vested interests, is the issue of just 
how much land at a macro-level is developed. On the face of it, this appears to be relatively 
straightforward to answer, however, an exhaustive search of the literature reveals just one 
source, itself derived from an uncertain provenance6. The definitive and most accurate source 
of data relating to land use in Great Britain is the Ordnance Survey’s ‘MasterMap Topography 
Layer’ product, which is a vector representation of all permanent, above-ground features of the 
British landscape, divided into ten broad themes, four of which (buildings, land, roads, tracks 
and paths, and water) cover over 99.5% of all of the surface area of Great Britain. GB-wide 
coverage of the product was initially downloaded7 in 100km square chunks (the maximum 
permissable) in November 2014 and this took almost six months to process on a 32GB, quad 
core computer using ArcGIS and Productivity Suite software. Duplicates were removed and 
the Topography Layer product was split into its constituent themes. It is possible to derive the 
total surface area of domestic gardens from the ‘land’ category by using the following SQL 
syntax within ArcGIS’s ‘Select by Attributes’ dialogue box: “DescGroup = ‘General Surface’ 
AND DescTerm = ‘Multi Surface”. By subtracting the total surface area of domestic gardens 
from the total surface area of the ‘land’ theme, it is possible to create a second derived category, 
‘Undeveloped non-domestic land’. Calculations of the five categories of buildings, gardens, 
undeveloped non-domestic land, roads and water were made on a regional basis, in addition 
to Scotland and Wales. Similar data for Northern Ireland is not currently available to academic 
researchers. The results of these calculations are presented in Chapter 6, ‘Discussion’.
6 http://www.iea.org.uk/blog/land-use-planning-the-corn-laws-of-our-times
7 From http://digimap.edina.ac.uk/, available to registered academic users in the UK
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Chapter 3
Strategic spatial planning in the Greater South East
3.1 Introduction
Having set out, in ‘broad-brush’ fashion, the main issues associated with strategic spatial 
planning along with the research methods to be employed, it is useful at this point to explicitly 
recapitulate the aims and objectives of the research. By tackling the issue of strategic spatial 
planning - one of British planning’s thorniest problems - the overall aim is to highlight a range 
of disjunctures between planning theory and planning practice. Essentially, it seeks to link 
theory and practice through the prism of a multi-scalar, cross-disciplinary case study. Jessop et 
al’s (2008) influential essay which introduced the ‘TPSN model’ - Territory (T), Place (P), Scale 
(S) and Network (N) - can be regarded as a template for this research. Table 3 below shows the 
original TPSN model as depicted in Jessop et al (2008: 395), followed overleaf in Table 4 with a 




Territory Place Scale Networks
Territory Past, present and 
emergent frontiers, 
borders, boundaries













cities, sites, regions, 
localities, globalities
Division of labour 









Scale as area rather 
than level (local to 
global), Russian doll
Vertical ontology 
















networks, spaces of 
flows, rhizome
Table 3: Jessop et al’s original Territory, Place, Scale, Networks model (Jessop et al, 2008: 395)




Territory Place Scale Networks




NPPF, ‘localism’ ‘Duty to cooperate’
Place Vested interests, 
underboundedness
West of Stevenage 
site





















Table 4: Modified Territory, Place, Scale, Networks model as it applies to the current research
The four ‘dimensions’ of socio-spatial relations along the diagonal (in blue in the preceding 
tables) can be read as the key sites of negotiation/contestation/regulation of the built 
environment, from which a range of multi scalar/multi actor interactions take place. The 
salient point, as Jessop et al (2008: 392) argue, is to avoid the problems of ‘one-dimensionalism’ 
by, “combining different dimensions of sociospatial analysis with other features of the research 
object in question.” It will be seen that Jessop et al’s highly abstract model translates well into 
the more concrete issues tackled by this research. The authors’ advice (Jessop et al 2008: 392) is 
that:
 as one moves towards increasingly ‘thick description’ and/or tries to provide spatially  
 sensitive explanations of more concrete-complex phenomena, analyses should involve  
 the dynamic articulation of at least two or more among the four dimensions.
Following this advice, the focus in this research is primarily on issues at the interface of the 
dimensions of territory and place (i.e. issues of underboundedness, the impact of the NPPF, 
the ‘duty to cooperate’ and localism), but the overall coherence of the framework is recognized 
by reference to interactions between/across the other dimensions of scale and networks.
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3.2: The dismantling of the regional tier and the ascendancy of the sub-regional approach
It has been argued that strategic spatial planning in England has its genesis in the greater 
South East, expressed specifically through Sir Patrick Abercrombie’s Greater London Plan 
(Abercrombie, 1945), the New Towns programmes of the 1940s and 1960s and SERPLAN 
(the London and South East Regional Planning Conference), which ran from 1960-2001 
(Marshall, 2007: 115). All of these were, of course, attempts to cope with London’s expansion 
up to, and, in some cases, beyond its administrative limits8. Macmillan (1992: 18) argues 
that Abercrombie’s Plan was, “one of a kind...the product of a single mind...[a]s such, it had 
a coherence and ‘vision’ that subsequent plans have struggled to emulate.” However, being 
the product of a single, albeit brilliant, mind, Abercrombie’s vision failed to take account of 
the single most important consideration in strategic planning - uncertainty. Abercrombie, 
according to Macmillan (1992: 21) simply, “pretended it did not exist”. Instead, although the 
1947 Planning Act provided for quinquennial ‘reviews’ of Abercrombie’s Plan, his work, once 
implemented9, was envisaged as reaching the ideal ‘end-state’ for their areas (Saunders, 1992: 
7). SERPLAN (1990) recognised the scale of the housing problem a quarter of a century ago, 
in their report Access to Affordable Housing, which stated, “as we enter the 1990s a significant 
proportion of households in the South East is effectively excluded from market housing and 
dependent on a shrinking stock of affordable housing.” 
Having identified this problem in its relatively early stages, it is safe to conclude that they 
were unable to do much to tackle it, although it should be noted that SERPLAN did show 
remarkable prescience on at least two occasions. Firstly, after the successful 1962 Conference, 
it was agreed that the area it should cover should be that, “containing the principal daily 
movements of people into and out of inner London” (Buckle, 1992: 11). It thus tentatively 
anticipated the current vogue of FEA and city-region strategic spatial planning by around four 
decades. Secondly, the then Chairman of the GLC Planning Committee, George Nicholson 
(1992: 77), called for SERPLAN’s membership to be increased, “ to include representatives 
8  As defined by the GLA (Greater London Authority), which came into being on April 1st 1965. 
9 Of course, his vision was never fully realised.
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from Business, Community, Trade Union, Amenity and Recreational interests”, foreseeing the 
typical membership of Local Enterprise Partnerships by a good twenty years.
With the demise of SERPLAN (in 2001) and structure planning (in 2004), central government 
inherited a sub-regional vacuum and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) filled 
it with the Sustainable Communities Plan in 2003 (John, Tickell and Musson, 2005: 104). By 
identifying four major ‘Growth Areas’ across the Greater South East, (Thames Gateway, Milton 
Keynes-South Midlands (MKSM), Ashford-Kent and the London-Stanstead-Cambridge 
corridor), along with regeneration areas (nine ‘Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders’) in the 
North West of England, the SCP has been described as, “the closest the Labour government 
ever came to a national spatial strategy” (Pritchard, 2013: 38), although, like so many strategic 
spatial planning initiatives before and since, it carried no formal, legislative weight. The 
Growth Areas idea is a clear example of what Allmendinger and Haughton’ (2009) characterise 
as the ‘soft spaces’ and ‘fuzzy boundaries’ of neoliberal governance.
Recent work on MKSM by Allan Cochrane and colleagues has identified a number of 
problems with the Growth Area model, including the organisation’s lack of strategic leadership, 
or ‘brand’ (Cochrane et al, 2013: 796) and the serious disjuncture between MKSM’s ability to 
plan for growth as opposed to the powers it was (not) given to deliver this housing (Cochrane 
et al, 2015: 6). In effect, a number of ‘Local Delivery Vehicles’ were set up across MKSM’s 
‘patch’, with significant variation in their powers and responsibilities, relating for example, to 
land assembly. Thus the LDV responsible for delivering growth in Milton Keynes inherited 
land from the former Milton Keynes Development Corporation and had planning powers 
of its own, whereas the two equivalent LDVs covering Northampton had no such inherited 
assets, meaning that when it came to negotiating with central government for infrastructure 
funding they were at a significant disadvantage (ibid.). However, the use of ‘Strategic Land 
and Infrastructure Contracts’ (SLICs) from 2006 onwards in Milton Keynes was generally 
regarded as an innovative and effective means of funding the necessary infrastructure for 
18,000 new homes in the town (Cochrane et al, 2015: 8). The ‘Milton Keynes Tariff ’ worked 
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by borrowing money up front from the Treasury (equivalent to around £18,500 per new home 
built) and recouping this in the form of staged payments from the developers over a ten year 
period (later extended), in essence combining the site-specific elements of s106 Agreements 
and the strategic funding element of the Community Infrastructure Levy (Walker, 2012: 5). 
The success of the Milton Keynes Tariff was, however, the result of a specific bundle of path-
dependent factors (largely related to the area’s designation a New Town) and is therefore going 
to be difficult to reproduce on a wide scale elsewhere.
One of the principal problems with the Sustainable Communities Plan overall was a lack of 
County/local authority ‘buy-in’, with central government leading the way, a state of affairs 
which Marshall (2007: 121) argues, led to a “crisis of legitimacy”. For example, housing and 
employment projections were simply cascaded down from Regional Spatial Strategies (RSSs), 
through the Growth Areas and down to local authorities, with the latter having little or no say 
in the process. In the final analysis, what Cochrane et al (2013: 797) describe as “the implicit 
market utopianism” of the SCP largely failed to deliver on its promises as the impending 
shadow of global financial meltdown approached and housebuilders prepared for a lengthy 
period of rationalization and retrenchment.
Following the phasing-out of old-style structure plans (introduced by the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1968 and formally abolished in the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 
2004), along with most County-level responsibilities for strategic spatial planning, the only 
statutory mechanism for ‘larger than local’ planning was the embryonic regime of regional 
planning, of which RSSs were the spatial expression, and RESs10 the economic. Although 
many counties were opposed to the abolition of structure plans, it has been argued that their 
eradication provided some of the more proactive counties the opportunity to, “to intervene 
flexibly and effectively in the key areas, up, down and across the governance tree” (Marshall, 
2007: 122). However, the effect of s.4(4) of the 2004 Act, followed by the deletion of this 
section in the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, was to 
put this advisory role for the County Councils on an entirely voluntary basis and Catriona 
10 Regional Economic Strategy.
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Riddell (2013: 19), formerly Director of Planning at the South East Regional Assembly, 
argues that the transition from Structure Plans and Regional Planning Guidance to RSS and 
RES, “ignored the sensitivities around changing roles and was simply too fast”. The 2009 Act, 
although never enacted due to New Labour’s defeat in the 2010 General Election, also “re-
regulated” the importance of sustainable development, in effect relegating it below economic 
growth by replacing RSSs and RESs with an integrated ‘Regional Strategy’ (RS) (Lord and 
Tewdwr-Jones, 2014: 351-52). It is noteworthy that the abolition of structure plans and their 
replacement with RSSs was, in effect, a “dramatic scaling up of the whole system” (Marshall, 
2007: 107), whereas, in a form of reverse symmetry, the phasing out of regional planning and 
its replacement with ‘localism’ is, prima facie, an equally dramatic scaling down of the system. 
Perhaps the most important element of the coalition’s drive towards localism was the 
abolition of the regional tier of governance, in particular the Labour government’s Regional 
Spatial Strategies (RSS’s) which imposed centrally-derived housing targets on local planning 
authorities. From a situation in the early 1990s where the region, “was widely seen as an 
appropriate scale for policy intervention and regulation in Britain” (Baker and Wong, 2013: 
84), strategic spatial planning through regional governance was subjected to an extraordinarily 
vitriolic, ideologically driven attack. The housing figures imposed by RSSs were described 
in typically robust and colourful language by Communities Secretary Eric Pickles as “failed 
Soviet tractor-style top-down planning targets”, which “worst of all threatened the destruction 
of the green belt” (Hope, 2010). In in single sentence the former Secretary of State managed 
to attack the anti-localist tendencies of regional governance, while simultaneously accusing 
them of damaging the great centralising mechanism of the planning system. While such 
soundbites comprise the headlines of papers and magazines, it is worthwhile getting behind 
the rhetoric and analysing the rise and fall of regional spatial planning in England. Riddell 
(2013: 19) argues that the unseemly speed with which Regional Assemblies were put in place, 
well in advance of the 2004 legislation, risked losing local planning authority buy-in, both 
to the Assemblies and the plan preparation process. As noted above, the Regional Assembly 
structures were fatally undermined in any case by the disastrous North East England regional 
   83
RA referendum on 4th November 2004, which rejected the John Prescott championed 
devolution proposals with 77.9% of the electorate saying, ‘No’ on a turnout of 49%. England’s 
fate to remain “the gaping hole in the devolution settlement” (Hazell, 2000) was thus sealed 
for the foreseeable future. However, Harrison (2012b: 1244) argues that, “as the door closed 
on plans to establish elected regional governance the door to a framework of city-regional 
governance opened.”
The proposed Assemblies were just one element of a “mish-mash of sub-national initiatives” 
(Shaw and Greenhalgh, 2010: 458) including Local Authority Leader Boards (LALBs), Multi-
Area Agreements (MAAs), Economic Prosperity Boards (EPBs) and The Northern Way. 
The key question, then as now, was how to bridge the “historic fissure” (Baker et al, 1999: 
763) between (sub)regional planning and economic development. However, all too often the 
regional tier of government has been used aspatially, as a ‘means to an end’, rather than as “an 
appropriate level for the reconciliation of local and national concerns” (Cowell and Murdoch, 
1999: 665). For instance, it is easily forgotten that, during the 1980s, one of the main reasons 
for maintaining the policy of urban constraint across the wider south east was its use by the 
then Conservative government as a form of regional policy. The ‘bright idea’ behind this 
policy was that, by pushing land and house prices up through containment, firms would be 
encouraged to relocate to economically depressed areas such as the North East (Evans and 
Hartwich, 2007: 21-22). Of course, no government on either side of the political spectrum 
today would admit the efficacy of planning as regional economic policy nowadays, given its 
failure to attract many firms to economically depressed areas, as well as the extremes to which 
local housing markets across the Greater South East have overheated. 
Importantly, it should be noted that the Labour government diverted almost £400 million 
funding from RDA budgets in 2008/09 to other priorities (Ferry and Bachtler, 2013: 263), with 
further cuts planned had they remained in power. This was used by the coalition government 
as evidence that the outgoing Labour government had largely given up on regional governance 
(Spelman and Clarke, 2010). The process of revoking Regional Spatial Strategies took longer 
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than the Communities Secretary initially anticipated; after announcing the revocation of RSSs 
“with immediate effect” in May 2010, his decision was challenged through the law courts by 
CALA Homes until the building company’s claim that Pickles’ decision was unlawful was 
thrown out by the Court of Appeal in May 2011 (Marrs, 2011). After all the legal wrangling, 
the first Order revoking a RSS (the East of England RSS) was laid before Parliament on 11th 
December 2012; further such Orders relating to the other seven RSSs were laid over the course 
of the following weeks and months. Orders to officially revoke the final three RSS’s were laid 
before Parliament in May 2013. 
As noted above, RSSs had already been scrapped and replaced by integrated Regional 
Strategies through the Local Economy, Construction and Economic Development Act 2009. 
Interestingly, and this is possibly a function of the dying days of the last Labour government, 
this legislation attracted little attention at the time, even within government (Morphet and 
Pemberton, 2013: 387). The incoming coalition government was certainly unaware of the 
precise legal status of RSSs, since Mr Pickles’ initial attempts were to scrap them, rather than 
the RSs as they had become. Naturally, lawyers pounced on this misunderstanding and held 
up the process for a time, though it was merely a stay of execution for Regional Strategies. 
Steve Quartermain, the CLG’s Chief Planner, published a letter to all local planning authorities 
(LPAs) on 10th November 2010 (the same day as the CALA Homes judgment was handed 
down) reiterating the government’s intention to abolish RSs (the correct formulation this time) 
through a clause in the Localism Bill then working its way through Parliament. Importantly, 
he went on to advise LPAs that this intention was to be regarded as a ‘material consideration’ 
in deciding planning applications. Once the CLG’s lawyers had correctly identified the piece 
of legislation that they wanted to rescind, CALA Homes’ application for judicial review was 
dismissed on 7th February 2011 and a final, unsuccessful attempt to overturn this decision was 
made to the Court of Appeal on 27th May 2011.
The fact that CALA Homes was prepared to fight its case all the way to the Court of Appeal 
demonstrates the concerns of the housebuilding lobby when confronted with a move away 
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from centrally imposed housing targets towards ‘localism’ and generally lower new housing 
targets over much of the Greater South East. Rather hopefully (some might say foolishly), in 
the context of the south east of England, the coalition’s expectations were that by revoking 
the RS system and allowing local authorities to set their own housing targets would lead to 
higher levels of permissions and housebuilding. One can confidently conclude that the acuity 
of the housebuilding lobby somewhat trumped that of central government. A 2012 Report 
by planning consultancy Tetlow King (commissioned by the right leaning think-tank Policy 
Exchange) found that housing targets across England had been reduced by a total of 272,720 
dwellings since the demise of regional planning in 2010 (Tetlow King Planning, 2012). This 
figure was arrived at by examining each planning authority’s proposed housing targets under 
the old, regionally-derived targets and subtracting this figure from revised housing targets 
under the new, Local Plan system. It could be argued that this figure is somewhat spurious 
since housing targets were never achieved under the old system anyway. Even at the peak of 
the housing market in 2007, only 176,000 new homes were built (Morton, 2012b: 4). This 
research was questioned by Eric Pickles before the CLG (2011a: para. 90), drawing a rebuttal 
from Tetlow King, who stated that just 12% of the total figure of housing reductions came from 
“unofficial tip-offs or estimates” (CLG, 2011a: para. 91).
The coalition has come in for criticism, however, by eradicating almost every trace of regional 
governance, rather than just the RSSs and RDAs, even from within its own ranks. Michael 
Heseltine - who as Secretary of State for the Environment from 1990 - 1992 was largely 
responsible for driving through legislative instruments such as Enterprise Zones and Urban 
Development Corporations which bypassed the ‘normal’ planning system (Thornley, 1993: 
200) - bitterly complained about the coalition’s decision to the abolish the Government Offices 
for the Regions (GORs) along with the RSSs, stating that by doing so they “threw the baby 
out with the bath water” (Marrs, 2012). As Deputy Prime Minister during the last two years 
(1995 - 1997) of John Major’s Conservative government, Heseltine had overseen the creation 
of Government Offices for the Regions in 1994. It is also interesting to note that many private 
sector organisations, notably the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) continue to operate 
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on a regional basis, despite the dismantling of public sector regional governance (Fenwick, 
2015: 12). The absurdity of the government’s position was highlighted in a speech given by 
David Cameron to the Institute of Civil Engineering in London on 19th March 2012, in which 
the Prime Minister praised Abercrombie’s “visionary plan” of 1944, of which the best elements 
were the green belt and New Towns (Cameron, 2012). A Prime Minister, one of whose first 
priorities was to dismantle regional governance, praising the most regional piece of planning 
ever carried out in the UK, without which it is questionable whether any of the New Towns or 
the Greater London green belt would ever have been implemented. 
According to Riddell (2013: 26), the Labour government had, through endless tinkering, 
already destroyed the validity of strategic spatial planning as a concept. The final “nail in the 
coffin”, she argues, was the creation of the National Housing and Planning Advisory Unit 
(NHPAU) in 2006, which took over final responsibility for the setting of housing targets 
from local authorities. From a system which was a success “against all the odds” (ibid.), the 
formation of yet another QUANGO was seen by local authorities as further evidence of the 
government’s attempts to run localities from the centre. However, a different perspective on 
the NHPAU is provided by Leonora Rozee, a former Deputy Chief Executive of the Planning 
Inspectorate, who lamented the loss of this unit and the evidence base it had assembled, a state 
of affairs which brought ‘planning by appeal’ a step closer (Rozee, 2014: 12-13). Cheshire et al 
(2014: 132) merely note that the unit was not in existence long enough to allow for a rigorous 
evaluation of its merits. The Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA) also bemoaned 
the loss of the mechanisms that produced detailed research and data collection on strategic 
housing and transport issues (CLG Committee, 2011a: para. 21). However, it should be noted 
that spatial analysis, interpretation and monitoring under the regional system, “all too often...
degenerated into unfocussed data collection and ‘bean counting’ without any strategic purpose 
(Baker and Wong, 2006: 678). The human and financial cost of ending the regional governance 
experiment was significant, with redundancy costs for more than 2,000 RDA staff estimated at 
over £100 million (Ward, 2012), and overall winding-up costs estimated at £1.5 billion - more 
than the initial £1.4 billion value of its successor, the Regional Growth Fund (Tomaney, 2012).
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In practical terms, the speed with which higher-level (regional) policy changed (especially 
in relation to housing targets) compared with the glacial progress of lower-level (local) 
Core Strategies created further difficulties in central-local relations (Shaw and Lord, 2009: 
427-28). In effect, although the regional system made it easier to allocate land for strategic 
spatial planning, they manifestly failed in terms of implementation (new homes actually 
built). Cheshire et al (2014: 132) argue that the ‘bean-counting’ described above meant that, 
“targets could be met in ways which did little or nothing to satisfy demand.” Perhaps the most 
scathing criticism of the regional experiment is provided by Gordon (2012), who identifies the 
complete absence of any recognition of the ‘super region’ (i.e. the Greater South East) - “the 
nation’s economic heartland, and the scale at which the economic welfare of all its residents is 
determined” - in any regional plans or strategies (e.g. the London Plan, East of England Plan or 
South East England Plan). The current situation under localism means that a “gaping hole now 
exists between national planning (centrally orchestrated) and the 12 LEPs [Local Enterprise 
Partnerships] operating across this geography” (Harrison, 2012a: 93). This necessarily means 
that “the institutions for governance of the global mega-city region [i.e. the Greater South East] 
will be weaker under new, new localism” (Pain, 2011).
3.3: The new machinery of strategic spatial planning 
 3.3.1: The National Planning Policy Framework - Overview
Having largely unencumbered itself of the regional tier of governance - the ‘ghost of planning 
past’, the coalition then turned its attention to what it saw as planning’s future. Familiar themes 
- protection of the green belt, advancing the cause of sustainable transport and tackling the 
housing crisis - were reiterated. Battle lines were drawn in the summer of 2011, when the 
government published details of its vision for planning, the draft National Planning Policy 
Framework (NPPF) (CLG, 2012a) - or, as Bird (2013) somewhat facetiously dubbed it, the 
‘Nearly Perfect Policy Framework’). In fact, a leaked draft version of the NPPF dated 13th 
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June 2011 was seen by Planning Magazine on 1st July and was widely circulated. At the Tory 
party conference in October 2011, Eric Pickles, the Communities Secretary, emphasised 
that the government would “strengthen the green belt” while pressing ahead with plans to 
simplify and streamline the planning system by reducing guidance from over 1,000 pages to 50 
pages (Mulholland, 2011). In terms of the volume and complexity of planning literature and 
legislation, Lord Taylor’s External Review of Government Planning Practice Guidance (CLG, 
2012c) rubber-stamped the government’s intention to commit a benign form of libricide: over 
7,000 pages of outdated best-practice, ‘guidance’ and advisory material should be done away 
with, preferably by the first anniversary of the publication of the NPPF (28th March 2013). 
In its place will come ‘planning in the cloud’ - a constantly updated, “web-based guidance 
resource” (CLG, 2012a: para. 13), a fraction of the size of the old, paper based system. This is, 
of course, not the first time that Conservative government printers have minimised “damage 
to the world’s stock of trees” (Breheny, 1991: 238); the five-volume Strategic Plan for the South 
East (SEJPT, 1970) was reduced to two pages in 1980, doubling to four pages by 1986. As 
Breheny (1991: 235) went on to argue, this was a reflection of both the new government’s much 
reduced opinion of planning, as well as, “the timidity of the planning profession that...was 
willing to accept it.” 
The government published its draft version of the NPPF for public consultation on 25th July 
2011. This period of consultation (on a document which was slightly more compendious 
than Mr Pickles’ estimate at 65 pages in length) closed on 17th October 2011. Launching the 
document, the Chancellor, George Osborne, claimed that delays to development caused by 
the current planning system “cost the economy £3 billion a year” and were a “deterrent to 
international investment”, assertions derived from British Property Federation calculations and 
described as “ridiculous” by Sir Simon Jenkins, Chairman of the National Trust. Jenkins went 
on to describe the NPPF document as a “lawyer’s banquet”, as the presumption in favour of 
sustainable development appeared to give the green light to development where existing plans 
are incomplete or non-existent (Jenkins, 2011). There was widespread criticism of the draft 
NPPF from a broad front of environmental groups, as well as other organisations, including, 
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somewhat bizarrely, the Women’s Institute (Hope, 2011). Less surprisingly, various members 
of the Royal Family made public pronouncements on the draft legislation. Prince Charles, 
supported by Lord Rogers of Riverside, warned of the potential of the NPPF to unleash 
unrestricted, Los Angeles style sprawl that would destroy forever the country’s green belts 
(Bloxham, 2011) and the Duke of Cambridge took to YouTube to plead for the conservation 
of playing fields and parkland for future generations. In November 2011 it emerged that a 
consortium of Britain’s biggest house builders, including Barratt, Bovis and Redrow, had 
lobbied the government to get a clause setting out a default presumption in favour of planning 
applications written into the NPPF (Booth, 2011).
Shaun Spiers, Chief Executive of the Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE) said that 
the draft NPPF represented the biggest change in planning law since the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1947, except that this time the emphasis was weighted very heavily towards 
promoting economic growth rather than on protecting the countryside. Naturally, pro-
business lobby groups including the British Chambers of Commerce and the Confederation 
of British Industry (CBI) were very much in favour of the proposed legislation (Rowley, 
2012). As the summer progressed the pro- and anti- development lobbies became increasingly 
entrenched and strident in their criticisms of the other side. In August 2011, the then Planning 
Minister, Greg Clark, hit back at claims from the National Trust that large areas of green belts 
across England would be threatened by the NPPF, describing the organisation as being “guilty 
of nihilistic selfishness” and wanting only to “preserve in aspic” towns and villages up and 
down the country. Clarke went on to criticise the “risible idea” that the NPPF would usher 
in a wave of development akin to that of Los Angeles (Kirkup, 2011). Frank McDonald in 
The Telegraph (McDonald, 2011) argued that a further, sinister foreshadowing of the kind of 
development that the draft NPPF could allow could be seen in the Republic of Ireland, where 
individual, ‘one-off ’ houses account for more than half of Co. Kerry’s total building stock. At 
the height of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ boom, developers in Ireland were building 90,000 new homes 
a year - almost the same as in the UK despite the vast disparity in population (4.5 million 
versus 60 million). The Irish example serves as a warning to those who advocate building 
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willy-nilly as a solution to the housing crisis - many of the estates in Ireland currently stand 
empty or half-built, evoking images of urban and fringe development more akin to South East 
Asia during their crippling recession around the turn of the millennium than of a supposedly 
advanced economy in western Europe. The number of ‘ghost estates’ is estimated at 2,881 
containing 179,900 homes in various states of (in)completion. 
On the 8th September 2011, the government felt it necessary to issue a three page ‘Myth 
Buster’ document to counter what it viewed as some of the more egregious misunderstandings 
of the proposed NPPF. Foremost among these was the belief that the document was a 
“developer’s charter” where “every [planning] application has to be accepted” (CLG, 2011b: 
unpaginated). The root cause of these fears was the ‘presumption in favour of sustainable 
development’, which is described as a “golden thread running through both plan making and 
decision taking” (CLG, 2011a: para. 14). Both the draft NPPF and the final document deal 
with the issue of ‘sustainable development’ in an interesting way. The draft version references 
the Brundtland Commission definition of ‘sustainable development’ (i.e. “development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs” (Brundtland Commission, 1987)). However, as Cheshire (CLG, 2011c: Q48) 
pointed out in his evidence before the Communities and Local Government Select Committee, 
“who could be against the Brundtland formulation of sustainable development? My worry is: 
how do you translate that into actual decision making about parcels of land?” Dr Hugh Ellis, 
the Chief Planner of the TCPA complained before the same audience that Brundtland was 
“out of date” and that “it was very surprising to see it represented in the NPPF” (CLG, 2011c: 
Q48). The final version of the NPPF again references Brundtland, with the addition of the 
‘five guiding principles of sustainable development’ as set out in Securing the Future: the UK 
sustainable development strategy (HMG, 2005). Both of these definitions appear at the start 
of each document and are not referred to again. A rather more explicit definition of what 
‘sustainable development’ is appears in para. 6 of the final NPPF (CLG, 2012a):
  The purpose of the planning system is to contribute to the achievement of sustainable 
development. The policies in paragraphs 18 to 219, taken as a whole, constitute the 
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Government’s view of what sustainable development in England means in practice for 
the planning system.
As noted above, this quite simply appears to mean that sustainable development is no more 
and no less than what the government says it means. Another way this can be construed 
is to say that sustainable development, “is synonymous with what [central government 
believes] is necessary or desirable in the public interest” (Bird, 2013). Tony Barton of Civic 
Voice worried that the presumption in favour of sustainable development was effectively a 
double presumption in favour of development, since the local development plan already has 
a presupposition in favour of sustainable development locked into it (CLG, 2011b: Q223).
Significantly, the government declined to include the presumption in a clause in the Localism 
Bill, which would have given it legislative status (Bullock, 2011: 31). In fact, one of the 
criticisms of the draft NPPF was that it was not clear enough in recognizing its own status as 
national policy advice (as opposed to legislation) and therefore to be treated as no more and 
no less than a material consideration in determining planning applications (Ricketts and Field, 
2012: 152). It should of course be remembered that a presumption in favour of development 
(sustainable or not) is not a new concept in English planning. Margaret Thatcher’s 
Conservative government produced a White Paper, Lifting the Burden (DoE, 1985, para. 3), 
which stated:
  There is therefore always a presumption in favour of allowing applications for 
development, having regard to all material considerations, unless that development 
would cause demonstrable harm to interests of acknowledged importance.
This more permissive regime remained in place until s.54 of the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1990 changed the formulation in favour of determination to accordance with the 
development plan, unless material considerations indicate otherwise (Bullock, 2011: 10). 
Although there have been many changes to the ‘plan-led’ system over the past quarter of a 
century, it is important to remember that the NPPF does not have the status of law; instead, 
under s.38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Planning Act 2004:
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  where in making any determination under the planning Acts, regard is to be had to the 
development plan, the determination shall be made in accordance with the plan unless 
material consideration indicates otherwise.
It could be argued, then, that the current planning regime has not yet reached the limits of 
laissez-faire attained under the Thatcher government. In fact, by failing to attach legislative 
authority to the NPPF, the potential for uncertainty, delays and expense resulting from 
extensive appeals and judicial reviews has increased (Bullock, 2011: 31). Ricketts and Field 
(2012: 222) worry that instead of being a properly ‘plan-led’ system, many strategic planning 
decisions will “become led by the moment, i.e. the community’s reaction and the political 
priorities of the LPA at the relevant time.”
The final version of the NPPF was published on 27th March 2012 and was described as “a 
lesson in the art of politics” (Ricketts and Field, 2012: 161), since it managed to placate both 
the development industry and some of the fiercest critics of the draft version, such as the CPRE 
and the National Trust. By the time the NPPF Bill had passed through Parliament, the ‘Hands 
Off Our Land’ campaign run by The Telegraph, along with the lobbying of the groups described 
above, as well as a sizeable contingent of David Cameron’s backbenchers, could claim several 
important victories in terms of changes to the legislation. The most important of these was 
related to the ‘default yes’ which was dropped and replaced by a requirement that local 
authorities set out clearly where development can take place (Hope, 2012a). This, however, 
presumes that local authorities have a valid plan in place, a state of affairs not yet achieved by 
many councils. In fact, by the first anniversary of the publication of the final NPPF, only 48% 
of authorities had an adopted Core Strategy and just 7% of LPAs had a compliant Core Strategy 
(Millar, 2013). Where authorities have no such plan in place, the presumption in favour of 
sustainable development still exists, and carries significant weight (to the extent that it could be 
determinative). Ricketts and Field (2012: 152) describe the presumption as a kind of “cultural 
sign-post - an indication of the function that the planning system should be performing.” 
Finally, the inclusion of an explicit clause relating to the development of brownfield land before 
greenfield sites, where possible, was also heralded as an important triumph by protectionist 
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interest groups. 
Any sense that these were anything but pyrrhic victories by the protectionist lobby, however, 
was surely dispelled when Parliament reconvened after the summer recess in 2012. Following a 
television interview, rumours that the Chancellor was preparing to make it easier for councils 
to relax green belt protections in an attempt to kick-start the economy led Richard Harwood, 
a leading planning law barrister, to warn that any such moves would “have a paralysing effect 
on the rest of the planning process”, as councils would delay decisions on development and 
put their local plans on hold until more clarity began to emerge (Hope and Winnett, 2012). 
An online poll with the question ‘Should controls on green belt land be relaxed to encourage 
business growth?’ led to 80% of the 4,711 respondents voting ‘No, we must preserve the 
countryside for future generations’ (as opposed to 20% voting ‘Yes, the government needs 
to do everything it can to boost the economy’) (Hope and Winnett, 2012). Natalie Bennett 
(2012), the leader of the Green Party, described the Chancellor’s plan as:
  half-baked... [w]hat is most likely to be created is identikit suburban enclaves of 
expensive detached homes, predominantly in the southeast of England... likely to be 
car-dependent, and at the outer limits of energy-use regulations. 
Following the Chancellor’s comments Eric Pickles, the Communities Secretary, was quick 
to emphasise that green belts would be protected and pointed to the example of Cambridge, 
which had been “pretty smart” in its review of green belt boundaries, by releasing lower quality 
areas for development and reclassifying other pieces of land as protected (Parker, 2012). 
Pickles had recourse to the stick, as well as the carrot, though, when he vowed that councils 
who had a consistently poor track record in terms of the speed or quality of its development 
control decision making would be stripped of their planning responsibilities; planning 
decisions would instead be made by the Planning Inspectorate (Hope and Kirkup, 2012). As 
the NPPF entered its second year of operation and a number of test cases had been examined 
against its criteria, criticisms were voiced over its weaknesses when faced with ‘larger-than-
local’ planning issues (Garlick, 2013).
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3.3.2: The National Planning Policy Framework - The ‘duty to cooperate’
The act of planning spatially in any setting (urban/rural) and across all scales (neighbourhood/
urban/regional/national) necessarily entails cooperation between a wide range of professional 
and non-professional built environment actors (Lord, 2012). Strategic spatial planning in 
particular requires actors to work together across administrative boundaries, even though 
this may be a distasteful, even onerous, task in many circumstances. In recognition of these 
difficulties (or, perhaps, more indicative of a ‘head in the sand’ approach to them), previous 
Conservative government policy was designed to “focus almost exclusively on development 
agendas within...designated boundaries” (Raco, 2005: 143). In a form of what might be 
described as ‘anti-strategic spatial planning’, “cross-boundary connections and processes 
were downplayed as were the relationships between their development areas and the broader 
strategic planning frameworks in which they were embedded” (ibid.). Specifically, this 
approach was taken with the Urban Development Corporations, which began, bombastically, 
with the London Docklands UDC in 1981 and ended, ignominiously, with the Thurrock 
Thames Gateway UDC in 2014. 
However, this approach has, in principle, largely been abandoned, and a central plank of 
localism is to ‘enable’ such collaboration through the ‘duty to cooperate’ placed on local 
planning authorities, County Councils and small number of other public bodies by s.110 of 
the Localism Act 2011. ‘In principle’ because there is evidence that, in practice, and dispite the 
legal requirement to cooperate, there is an ongoing reluctance to address strategic planning 
issues and instead discussions have centred around single issues (Morphet and Pemberton, 
2013: 391). The duty to cooperate is being played out in practice on an ongoing basis, with 
new test cases coming to the courts on a regular basis (and thus becoming practical examples 
of what Allmendinger and Haughton (2012: 98) describe as the move of “genuine political 
oppositional debate” shifting from outside the planning system into the legal arena, alluded 
to in Chapter 1). In support of their contention, the original formulation of the duty in the 
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Localism Bill 2010 was heavily criticised by the CLG Select Committee (CLG, 2011a, para. 
69) as, “bad law, poorly conceived, shoddily drafted, and opening the door to judges, rather 
than democratically elected representatives, deciding on how the planning system operates.” It 
would therefore be fair to say that the description of the duty as “one of the great unknowns” 
by Ray Donson of Barratt Homes, who appeared before the CLG Select Committee (CLG, 
2011a: para. 63) is accurate. Fundamentally, as Hildreth and Bailey (2013: 246) point out, the 
question of how stronger authorities will be incentivised to work with weaker places has yet to 
be adequately addressed.
A number of LPA’s key development plans have failed examination by the Planning 
Inspectorate because of issues associated with the duty to co-operate, including several in the 
Greater South East. For example, Aylesbury Vale District Council’s Local Plan was found to be 
unsound. Reasons given by the Inspector included “minimal” evidence of engagement with 
neighbouring authorities on housing provision and a failure to participate “constructively, 
actively and on an ongoing basis” with these neighbours (Ward, 2014: para. 3). The Inspector 
who scrutinised Brighton and Hove City Council’s City Plan found it to have met the 
requirements of the duty to co-operate, although such co-operation, “has not led to a positive 
outcome, in the sense that [no neighbouring LPA] has offered to assist B&H by offering to 
meet all or part of the objectively assessed needs that cannot be met in [the city]” (Graham, 
2013: 1).
Brighton and Hove therefore finds itself in a situation analogous to that of Stevenage, 
i.e. underbounded and with little prospect of assistance in its attempts to expand from 
neighbouring councils. Mid Sussex District Council also failed on the duty to co-operate, 
with the Inspector stating that, “I would describe the foundations upon which the approach 
of the district council is based, as at best, shaky” (Hogger, 2013: 1). Mid Sussex happens to 
be one of Brighton and Hove’s neighbouring councils. As part of the materials submitted 
to the Inspector, Mid Sussex included a brief synopsis of what the authority considered 
to be three examples of fruitful collaborative involvement, but these exemplars (Gatwick 
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Diamond Memorandum of Understanding, Northern West Sussex Position Statement and 
Memorandum of Understanding between Mid Sussex and Lewes Council) received short shrift 
from the Inspector. As an indication of how seriously the duty to co-operate is being taken, 
despite the fact that Mid Sussex proposed to provide 10,600 new dwellings, thus exceeding 
the objectively assessed need within the authority’s boundaries, the fact that it had failed to 
properly engage with its neighbours (including Brighton and Hove) in meeting their needs was 
considered grounds for finding the Local Plan unsound. 
Outside the Greater South East, Coventry City Council subsequently withdrew the Core 
Strategy it had submitted for Inspection in October 2012 when it was found that it had “not 
engaged constructively with neighbouring local planning authorities on the strategic matter 
of the number of houses proposed in the Plan” (Yuille, 2013). This Plan proposed 11,373 
new homes between 2011 and 2028, a significant reduction from the 33,500 proposed in its 
previous plan approved three years ago (the previous plan having achieved notoriety by being 
itself withdrawn on the very day it was due to be adopted due to a change in political control 
of the city council, from Conservative-led no overall control to Labour overall control). A 
far more successful cross-boundary collaboration is occurring in East Anglia, where a group 
of eight East of England councils centred around Cambridge and Peterborough reached an 
agreement to provide 93,000 new homes by 2031, although this collaborative effort has yet to 
be tested at examination (Carpenter, 2013a). The current situation is confusing in that there is 
both a legal test of whether an authority can demonstrate that it has “engaged constructively” 
with its neighbours, as well as a stricter policy soundness test of “successful co-operation” 
(CLG, 2011c: Ev W21). This policy soundness test sounds suspiciously like an expectation that 
neighbouring councils will need to agree rather than merely co-operate.
Although laudable in its aims to get neighbouring authorities working together on strategic 
spatial projects, there is a fundamental problem with the duty to co-operate, which is simply 
that local councillors are not elected to collaborate across LA boundaries. They are elected, 
for the most part, to uphold local interests, which may well include ensuring that the nasty 
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neighbours next door do not get permission to build an urban extension on our hallowed 
turf. Under the duty to cooperate, planning authorities now need to have regard to the extent 
of how their development needs affect, and are affected by, neighbouring councils. As Paul 
Rogerson (2011: OP57), a former Chief Executive of Leeds City Council, succinctly points 
out, “a less tidy world may therefore, be upon us and, if this is the case, there are many who 
would say, ‘bring it on.’” Such people, Rogerson contends, believe that a high price has been 
paid for the rigid, single-model approach to strategic spatial planning espoused by successive 
governments since the 1980s (ibid.). Stuart Hylton, Head of Strategic Planning and Transport 
at the Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead drew an important distinction about the 
duty in his appearance before the Communities and Local Government Select Committee 
when he stated that, “a duty to co-operate is not the same thing as a duty to agree” (CLG, 
2011b: Q174). The small number of public bodies to which the duty applies11 is seen by some, 
including Dr Hugh Ellis, Chief Planner for the TCPA, to be problematic, since no private 
sector interests (especially infrastructure providers such as Network Rail) are bound by the 
duty (CLG, 2011b: Q61).
Shortly before the 2015 General Election, the Labour party espoused a ‘Right to Grow’ policy, 
which would have given underbounded authorities the right to compulsorily purchase land 
in neighbouring LPAs, a situation which would have been very much welcomed by Stevenage. 
Indeed, the Labour leader, Ed Miliband, visited the town on 16th December 2013 and, playing 
to the local gallery, complained that growth of the town had, “for decades” been, “thwarted by 
home blocking councils on its borders.” He went on to describe the principal culprit, North 
Herts District Council, as “a home blocking council, bad for its neighbours, bad for its own 
residents where the housing waiting list has got ever longer”, and finished with a flourish: 
“[North Herts] is a stick-in-the-mud council. But a Labour government will not let desperately 
needed housing be stuck in the mud of North Hertfordshire” (Carpenter, 2013b). Predictably, 
in a House of Commons debate, the Communities and Local Government Minister, Eric 
Pickles, described Miliband’s plans as a, “Labour land grab to allow Labour councils to dump 
11  Environment Agency, English Heritage, Natural England, Mayor of London, Civil Aviation Authority Homes and 
Communities Agency, Primary Care Trusts,  Office of the Rail Regulator,  Highways Agency, Transport for London, 
Integrated Transport Authorities, Highway Authorities, Marine Management Organisation and Local Authorities
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urban sprawl on their rural neighbours and rip up green belt protection” (Donnelly, 2014).  
The Labour MP for Luton South, Gavin Shuter countered with his support for the policy, 
stating that his town requires 30,000 new homes up to 2030 but only has space for 6,000 within 
the borough. Pickles, warming to his theme, invoked the Communistic imagery he reserves 
for his fiercest attacks on Labour and derided, “the return of Stalinist top-down planning, and 
the biggest threat to the green belt that the country faces.” He stated that he had visited North 
Herts and that neighbouring councils (presumably Stevenage and Luton) should “stop trying 
to bully NHDC...[by]...using terror tactics and being extremely unpleasant”(HC Deb 8th 
January 2014, vol. 573, col. 321).
3.3.3 The National Planning Policy Framework - The New Homes Bonus
Whereas the duty to cooperate can very much be described as the punitive element of the 
‘carrot and stick’ approach of the NPPF, the ‘carrot’ took the form of the New Homes Bonus 
(NHB). Closely aligned with Business Rates Retention (BRR), the NHB pays local authorities 
an annual grant equal to the Council Tax associated with each new house built, for an initial 
period of six years (Cheshire et al, 2014: 138). The CLG forecasted that this incentive would 
increase housing supply by 140,000 units over ten years, a contention which was scrutinised by 
the National Audit Office (NAO, 2013). The NAO criticised the assumptions underlying CLG 
modelling and pointed out a serious arithmetical error which, the NAO claimed, caused the 
CLG to overestimate the impact of the NHB by as much as 25 per cent.
A veritable torrent of criticism about the scheme was expressed to the CLG Committee, 
however, with Lawrence Revill, managing director of planning consultancy David Lock 
Associates, identifying a disconnect between national objectives for housing delivery and 
housing need (CLG, 2011a: para. 114), and Miles Butler, President of the Association of 
Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning and Transport, describing the NHB as, “what 
Sir Humphrey might call ‘a bold experiment, Minister’” (CLG, 2011a: para. 125). In effect, as 
evidence to the CLG Committee (CLG 2011a: Ev 73-74) given by Roger Tym & Partners sets 
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out, the NHB is a ‘quasi-market’, where central government attempts to ‘buy’ the consent of 
host authorities to satisfy housing demand, much of which is cross-boundary (i.e. households 
moving from one LPA to another). However, Stewart Baseley, Executive Chairman of the 
Home Builders Federation, stated that the NHB has the potential to become a significant 
income stream for many local authorities and could offset cuts from central government 
(Baseley, 2011). 
Senior figures within local government are more sceptical about the capacity of the NHB and 
are of the belief that the ‘legal stick’, rather than the ‘financial carrot’ will be required to deliver 
the necessary levels of housebuilding (Rogerson, 2011). Larkin et al (2011) argue that the level 
of NHB currently paid out would need to be doubled or even tripled for the policy to have a 
significant impact on the willingness of local authorities to allocate land for development in 
their areas. When considering green belt land, the sum paid for each new home would have 
to be multiplied even more. Financial and environmental considerations aside, there is also a 
signficant political risk for local councillors on planning committees who are seen to be pro-
development, because of the long time-lag between the granting of planning permission and 
the payment of NHB, which only occurs once homes are actually built (Bullock, 2011: 15). This 
gap can be decades for strategic housing developments of the type discussed in this research 
and is therefore completely ‘out of sync’ with the local political cycle.
3.3.4: Local Enterprise Partnerships
There has been a resurgence internationally of what Brenner (2009) describes as “state 
rescaling”, particularly in terms of sub-national economic development policy. In keeping with 
this trend, the second major initiative of the coalition government, besides the NPPF, was the 
creation of Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), formed during 2010-11 by the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). LEPs have been described by practitioners as ‘fleet-
of-foot’ partnerships (Pugalis, 2011), a term used to describe spatial coalitions which operate 
without a statutory basis, and which involve the coalescing of a small core of staff in pursuit 
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of common objectives (Pugalis and Townsend, 2013b: 699). Consistent with Clarke and 
Cochrane’s spatial liberalism hypothesis, LEPs are constituted as public-private partnerships, 
with 50 per cent private sector representation on LEP boards and private sector chairs 
(Cheshire et al, 2014: 174).
A short letter of less than two pages of guidance was released jointly by CLG/BIS on June 
29th 2010, with the deadline for initial proposals set for September 6th. A total of 62 bids 
were received by this date, of which 24 were accepted by central government. It was not until 
after this deadline that the Local Growth White Paper (HMG, 2010) fleshed out the scanty 
detail of the CLG/BIS letter. Pugalis and Townsend (2012: 164) contend that this delay was 
caused principally by inter-departmental clashes, particularly the “rabidly anti-regional” 
CLG Secretary of State, Eric Pickles, and his BIS counterpart, Vince Cable, who was far more 
amenable to the idea of maintaining some sort of regional economic governance structures 
(and indeed pushed through the creation of six ‘BIS Local’ headquarters in order to “provide 
the department with a ‘policy presence outside of Whitehall’”). However, this is arguably 
another attempt by the centre to manage and discipline the local, in much the same way 
that the Government Offices for English Regions (GOs), established under John Major’s 
Conservative government in 1994 and wound up in 2011, were described as reflecting, 
“the presence of central government in the regions - rather than a regional presence within 
government” (Fenwick, 2015: 7). According to Baker et al (1999: 768), the GOs did, though, 
have the virtue of:
  providing the degree of regional cohesion necessary to maximise financial assistance 
garnered through the EU structural funds, and, from within the Commission itself, as 
representing one of the building blocks around which embryonic EU spatial planning 
structures might be constructed.
Arguably, the coalition’s main priority was to save money, and savings were achieved by 
closing RDAs (which had a budget of just over £1.4 billion in 2010/11, down from £2.3 
billion in 2007/08), although closing these organisations resulted in significant transitional 
costs (National Audit Office, 2012). The disposal process was complicated by the fact that 
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BIS was responsible for the ‘business assets’ of the former RDAs, with CLG owning the 
physical infrastructure of the bodies (Pugalis and Townsend, 2012: 168). The news that these 
strategic and business assets would not be transferred across to them was a major source of 
disappointment to the nascent LEPs (and arguably a significant waste of resources), although 
it is understandable, given that the government would not want to be seen to be directly 
replacing one ‘Quangocracy’ with another.
As of now there are 39 LEPs, a number of which cross old GOR boundaries. Remarkably, 33 
of these LEPs closely match old 1974 County Council boundaries, including 17 with the same 
boundary and name, eight based on 1974 counties plus an expansion into adjoining lower-
tier districts, four comprising a pair of 1974 counties (e.g. Essex and Kent), three comprising 
a 1974 County with subtractions (e.g Solent) and one comprising three former counties (the 
North Eastern LEP). Initially viewed as the successors to RDAs, as well as carrying out the core 
competencies of their predecessors (i.e. local economic priorities and job growth) they took 
on responsibility for strategic spatial planning matters including housing and transport in late 
2014. 
The Essex-Kent LEP and its relation to its FEA is of particular interest; originally comprising 
just the two unitary authorities (neither of which have particularly strong travel-to-work flows 
across the Thames), it was expanded by the addition of East Sussex, Medway, Southend-on-Sea 
and Thurrock to become a ‘super-LEP’ (indeed the biggest LEP outside London). The resulting 
LEP was referred to by a participant in Pugalis and Townsend’s (2013c: 14) study as a “forced 
marriage” and a “behemoth”. However, the (pre-expansion) Essex-Kent LEP was singled 
out for praise by the then Planning Minister, Greg Clark, as better reflecting an economic 
geography that had artificially separated the two authorities under the old, regional system 
(CLG, 2011a: para. 62). The degree to which individual LEPs match the borders of their FEAs 
is therefore very much an ongoing topic for discussion. 
Although 39 LEPs is certainly an advance on 9 regions in terms of a better fit to FEAs, the 
   102
fact that the coalition government created the Regional Growth Fund is proof in the eyes 
of some commentators that they have not adopted, “the ‘functional vision’ of market forces 
shaping economic geography” (Ferry and Bachtler, 2013: 262). With current resources of £2.6 
billion, the RGF is one of the principal sources of funding for LEPs, although it has come in 
for criticism for not allocating funds quickly enough (Burn-Callander, 2014). The amount of 
political ‘horse-trading’ that went on during the period of LEP formation has, in some cases, 
reduced the functional fit at the expense of suspicion of “them lot over there” (Pugalis and 
Townsend, 2012: 167). 
The main criteria for determining whether a LEP bid was accepted or not appears to have 
been whether it had a minimum of 75% of people living and working in the proposed area. 
Interestingly, the least self-contained successful bid came from Hertfordshire where just 
69.9% of people live and work within the LEP’s boundaries (Townsend, 2012: 43). Examples of 
failed bids include Greater Lincolnshire, which fell victim to the curse of underboundedness, 
and rival bids from both sides of the river Humber, where old ‘turf wars’ threatened to derail 
the process (Pugalis and Bentley, 2013: 868). Humber LEP managed to put its differences 
behind it and now, rather grandly, sees its destiny as the ‘Aberdeen of the North’ [of England, 
presumably] (Shutt et al, 2012). Even Michael Heseltine, the guru of sub-regional economic 
development, has reservations about whether some LEPs match FEMAs as well as they can, 
although, as he concedes, delineating such boundaries is not an exact science (Heseltine, 2012: 
47-48). 
The verdict on LEPs from the nation’s capital was not altogether positive, with the late 
Deputy Mayor of London, Sir Simon Milton commenting acidly in October 2010 that, “the 
government has still not been entirely clear what problem LEPs are the solution to” (Ward, 
2012: 6). In fact, a review of the literature has identified no fewer than seven problems with 
LEPs in their current format. Firstly, they are not discrete entities - there are overlaps, in fact 
Pugalis and Townsend (2013b: 705) have estimated that 4.3 million people across 38 local 
authorities are located in two LEPs. Clearly, this has little or no effect on these individuals, 
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however, there are serious implications in terms of how funding is allocated to these LEPs 
and this can be the decisive factor in whether or not particular strategic spatial planning 
projects go ahead or not. Secondly, and directly correlated to the overlaps issue, is the amount 
of political infighting that went on across the country during the phase of LEP formation 
(alluded to above in the case of Humber), and which in some cases, is ongoing (as the 
interview material reveals). Cheshire et al (2014: 163) argue that “local political bargaining and 
coalitions” have, in some cases, hindered the creation of LEPs based on ‘true’ FEA geography, 
and one of the respondents involved in Pugalis and Townsend’s (2013b: 705) research went 
so far as to say that ‘too many local authorities want the LEP to fail’, blowing out of the water 
the “misguided assumption that all LEPs are composed of partners of the willing”. Joint 
committees, as LEPs are composed of, may be less likely to take difficult decisions and of 
course particular interests may be privileged over others (Morphet and Pemberton, 2013: 394). 
Thirdly, it is argued that there are simply too many LEPs. As noted above, there were originally 
62 LEP submissions across England, whereas central government had expected between 30-40 
bids, reflecting a “range of competing spatial visions to reflect their interests or interpretation 
of functional economic space (Pugalis and Townsend, 2013b: 705). Whereas the nine GORs 
provided a recognisable and easy fit with European funding mechanisms, this is no longer the 
case with the 39 LEPs, an issue that will be developed from the interview material. Fourthly, 
there is significant variability between LEPs, in terms of governance structures, monitoring 
frameworks and general accountability, with many of these processes still “shrouded in 
mystery” (Pugalis and Townsend, 2013b: 711). Fifthly, there are ongoing concerns about the 
ability of the planning profession to handle the simultaneous upward and downward rescaling 
responsibilities imposed by the move to LEPs, particularly in the light of significant, ongoing 
cuts to the sector (Pugalis and Townsend, 2012: 170). 
Sixthly, the non-statutory basis of LEPs means that they may be reduced to “toothless tigers” 
or “talking shops” (Pugalis and Townsend, 2013a: 115) when confronted with strategic 
spatial planning proposals with significant cross-boundary implications, since there will be 
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a reluctance to vitiate all the efforts put into carefully constructed relationships under the 
LEP banner. Finally, and most seriously, there is a palpable lack of democratic accountability 
associated with LEPs as they are currently constituted, since they have no direct (or even 
indirect) election procedures. As Morphet and Pemberton (2013: 393) explain, quite apart 
from people’s general aversion to such bodies, there are specific dilemmas to be confronted, 
particularly when it comes to strategic planning and transport. In those LEPs which have been 
created from former counties (a significant proportion, as noted above), planning powers 
reside with lower tier authorities which are represented as a single group and are consequently 
not involved in all the decision-making processes of the LEP. Democratic accountability is 
in any case a legal prerequisite of decentralised transport functions (Pugalis and Townsend, 
2013a: 116). 
However, it should be noted that, despite the problems enumerated above, LEPs are in some 
respects an advance on the previous regional system. Baker and Wong (2013: 99) argue that:
  A greater focus on more tightly drawn, and functionally-based, sub-regional  
geographical areas-as opposed to the more constraining dominance of traditional 
regional boundaries that were, arguably, too large to have any real meaning-could be a 
genuinely positive development. Equally, the more voluntary approach to sub-regional 
collaboration may mean a greater chance of innovative and visionary outcomes, jointly 
formulated and delivered by willing collaborators, as opposed to politically-driven 
lowest common denominator blandness.
Importantly, as Pugalis and Townsend (2013b: 709) posit, internal LEP relationships are 
generally better than the ‘spatial politics’ that were an unwelcome and widespread feature of 
the previous regional governance system (e.g. the conflict between Devon and Cornwall that 
hindered the South West of England). Somewhat more hopefully, the same authors (2012: 
171) offer the prospect that LEPs’, “greatest success may lie in arbitrating spatial competition 
between neighbouring localities, promoting the merits of cooperative advantage.” 
Despite (or perhaps because of) the rescinding of the regional apparatus, the Conservative 
government has affirmed its commitment to cross-boundary spatial planning, mainly, it 
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would appear, through the mechanism of LEPs. Morphet and Pemberton (2013: 392) raise 
the possibility that central government might increasingly be tempted to use LEPs as a means 
of delivering housing targets, since this would entail responsibility for unpopular decisions 
shifting from the centre to the local politicians who make up the LEPs. In other words, central 
government would prefer to avoid being tainted in the same way that malign central influence 
was blamed for unpopular housing targets under the RSS system. However, as Morphet 
and Pemberton (2013: 392) point out, this raises the possibility that LEPs might become “as 
stalemated as the RSS, and [this] will detrimentally impact on their economic functionality”. 
However, Larkin (2010: 6) argues that LEPs can help to avoid the “excessive localism” (another 
way to describe what Albrechts called ‘Balkanization’) of individual councils and deliver 
strategic spatial planning. 
How is the issue of partnership working tackled under the LEP system? Unlike the 
presumption in favour of sustainable development, the duty to co-operate has a legal basis, 
as set out in s.110 of the Localism Act 2011 (this section amends s.33(a) of the Planning 
and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004). However, although the legislation applies to planning 
authorities in that they must have regard to the activities of the relevant LEP(s), the duty to co-
operate does not apply to LEP activities themselves. Since a number of think-tanks have made 
the case for LEPs to have spatial planning powers (e.g. Larkin, 2010; Bolton, 2011) and a role 
in housing (e.g. Ward and Hardy (eds), 2012), it would be anomalous if the duty to co-operate 
were not to apply to LEPs if this indeed became the case. 
The short- to -medium term future of LEPs appears reasonably secure, although they merited 
just a single mention in the Conservative Party’s Election Manifesto. However, although they 
were described as such by more than one interview participant, they are not quite the ‘only 
show in town’, since, in following the classic central government tactic of ‘divide and rule’, ‘City 
Deals’ now cover two thirds of England’s population and tensions are now starting to appear 
between constituent members of LEP who now find themselves belonging to different (and 
thus opposing) City Deals (Pugalis and Townsend, 2013b: 709). The even more venerable 
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central government tactic of ‘fudging the issue’ appears to have been adopted in the City 
Deals process, which, due to a highly laissez faire process of boundary definition, are “not as 
credible” as FEAs (Pike et al (2012), as cited in Coombes (2013: 5)). They therefore fall far 
short of the principles and potentialities for city regions set out above.
Indeed, under the current arrangements, serious doubts as to the capacity of LEPs and 
‘City Deals’ to fulfil ‘larger than local’ planning functions were expressed by Cameron Watt, 
formerly Head of Neighbourhoods at the National Housing Federation. The reasons he gave 
for this were twofold: firstly, a mismatch between LEP boundaries and housing market areas 
(which raises the question - are HMAs more relevant than functional economic areas?), and, 
secondly, and reinforcing the point made above, the distinct lack of democratic accountability 
of LEP boards (CLG, 2011a: Q234). Shutt et al (2012) ask rhetorically, ‘How many people 
remember the fate of Training and Enterprise Councils?’, and see possible “institutional 
oblivion” for LEPs, with subregions “once again” the losers. To end this section on a rather 
grisly note, “the subnational economic development landscape is full of institutional corpses” 
(Pugalis and Bentley, 2013: 871) and LEPs, being a creature of central government, “will, in 
their turn, be either axed or mercilessly interfered with after the next turn in the political 
cycle” (Jones, 2010: 375).
3.3.5: Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL)
A consistent theme throughout this research has been the importance, and difficulty, of 
ensuring that the necessary infrastructure (transport, social - e.g. schools, health, sewage, and 
digital) is provided as an integral element of strategic spatial planning. Failure to adequately 
address the infrastructure issue can mean that it causes separation and segregation, rather 
than enhancing connectivity and opportunity (Graham and Marvin, 2001). Neuman (2014: 
796) argues that we have entered an ‘infrastructure emergency’, characterised by slow-
burning, incremental effects that take a long time to become apparent, analogous to the 
frog placed in warm water that is slowly brought to the boil. The government has attempted 
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on multiple occasions to tax increases in land value, without success, in 1947, 1967, 1973 
and 1976 (Cullingworth and Nadin, 2006). Quite simply, planners do not want to be seen 
as tax collectors and see CIL as merely another land tariff (Falco, 2015: 15). However, there 
is an important distinction between CIL and previous efforts to tax ‘uplift’ in land values 
which is that CIL is aimed specifically at mitigating the negative externalities associated with 
development and covering the costs of infrastructure. In effect, CIL and s106 Agreements are 
‘planning gain’ mechanisms, where a much higher proportion of monies raised remains within 
the local community, whereas the previous ‘betterment levies’ of 1947, 1967, 1973 and 1976 
typically result in most of the finances being channelled back to the centre (Bowers, 1992: 
1338). This meant that, initially, s106 Agreements were welcomed and the introduction of CIL 
has received a largely positive reception from local authorities (CLG, 2011).
Dissatisfaction with the system of Section 106 Agreements largely stemmed from the burdens 
they placed on developers and planning authorities alike in terms of administrative and 
financial costs (CLG, 2010). There were also widespread informational and skills asymmetries 
between public sector (i.e. local authority) planners and lawyers and their private sector 
counterparts representing the interests of developers, particularly when it came to negotiating 
the terms of s106 Agreements (CLG, 2011), with the advantage very much on the side of 
developers. Unfortunately, as Shostak and Houghton (2008: 122-23) argue, despite the folly 
of relying on a single mechanism, itself largely dependent on a buoyant housing market, 
s106 Agreements have come to be viewed by central government as the principal means 
of delivering affordable housing in England, and especially in the wider South East. The 
pragmatic decision to impose CIL while retaining s106 Agreements (and allowing local 
authorities to set their own rates of the former) has been described by Cheshire et al (2014: 
151) as “very counterproductive”, since this results in CIL being implemented, “in a piecemeal, 
apparently haphazard way” (Cheshire et al, 2014: 136). There is a further significant problem 
with the way CIL is calculated, namely that local authorities need to set out in advance what 
infrastructure is needed and how much it will cost (CLG, 2008). This makes the heroic 
assumption that such forecasts, involving a range of demographic, transport and economic 
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variables can be correctly identified (the traditional ‘predict and provide’ paradigm), whereas 
the transport planning sector long ago abandoned such methods (Goodwin, 1999). 
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Chapter 4
Strategic spatial planning at the site level: The West of Stevenage proposals
4.1: Overview of the development process
Late on the evening of Friday, 3rd April 1998 an Extraordinary Meeting of Hertfordshire 
County Council approached its climax. Only three out of a total of seventy-six Councillors 
were absent and the business at hand was a vote on a motion which proposed to postpone 
the adoption of the County Structure Plan until the Secretary of State for the Department 
of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) reduced Hertfordshire’s strategic 
housing requirement. This requirement currently stood at 65,000 new homes up to 2011 and 
the main reason that the proposer and seconder of the motion were arguing for a downwards 
revision of this target was that this would remove the need for green belt development to the 
west of the A1(M) – a site which straddled the boundaries between the two local authorities 
of North Hertfordshire and Stevenage. A minor revision to the motion was called for. Amidst 
scenes more reminiscent of a rowdy House of Commons session than a sleepy commuter 
belt County Council, the vote on the revised motion was taken: 37 Members in favour of 
the motion, and 37 Members against. The Chairman cast his deciding vote in favour of the 
amendment and a final vote on the substantive motion was taken, and carried unanimously. 
Hertfordshire County Council thus registered en bloc its disapproval of ‘top-down’ housing 
targets in general, and with the proposed strategic urban extension of Stevenage in particular. 
Hertfordshire’s hopes had been raised by a statement by the then Deputy Prime Minister, 
John Prescott, announcing the government’s intention to move away from producing 
housing forecasts based on ‘predict and provide’ towards a sequential approach, making use 
of Previously Developed Land (PDL). However, in answer to a letter from the Chairman 
of Hertfordshire County Council seeking, amongst other things, permission to delete the 
Stevenage West proposals from the Structure Plan, the then Deputy Prime Minister replied 
on 23rd April 1998 to the effect that he saw no reason to depart from the conclusions reached 
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by the Examination in Public in June 1997 (Lavender, 2004: 146). Therefore, on 30th April 
1998, the County Council’s Structure Plan was approved, containing an endorsement of the 
Stevenage West site as Policy 8. The site was described as:
  the best way forward to meeting the bulk of the remaining [housing] requirement 
not provided elsewhere and that none of the alternatives put forward come near, 
individually or collectively, to  matching the advantages of this location” (Hertfordshire, 
1998: 54).
It is scarcely credible that those Members involved in the April 1998 vote who remain active 
today are still dealing with the fallout of the Stevenage West proposals more than 15 years 
on, with not a spadeful of earth dug nor any resolution of the issue in sight; this despite the 
arguments having moved from the planning domain to the highest courts in the land. 
After the publication of the Hertfordshire Structure Plan in April 1998 there were still many 
months of wrangling before the applicant, known as the West of Stevenage Consortium (WSC 
– a group of development interests including Persimmon Homes, Taywood Homes, Bryant 
Homes and The Garden Village Partnership) resubmitted two pairs of proposals to North 
Herts and Stevenage.
The first pair of proposals, submitted on 24th July 2001, related to:
	 •	5,000	dwellings	and	business	premises,	shops,	leisure,	social	and	community	facilities,	
along with open space and landscaping and provision of infrastructure, highways and 
public transport facilities. These proposals were refused, on the grounds that Herts CC 
viewed any proposal over 3,600 dwellings as being in excess of its 1998 Structure Plan 
housing requirement for the period 1991-2011. 
Although WSC was not in agreement with Herts CC’s contention, in response to this, a second 
pair of proposals was submitted to North Herts and Stevenage on 31st August 2001, relating to:
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	 	•	3,600	dwellings	and	business	premises,	shops,	leisure,	social	and	community	facilities,	
along with open space and landscaping and provision of infrastructure, highways and 
public transport facilities. WSC views the applications relating to the 3,600 dwellings 
as ‘PA3’ and the remaining 1,400 dwellings as ‘PA5’ of the development, although ‘PA3’ 
was formulated as an application which could stand independent of ‘PA5’ if necessary. 
Of these homes, 2,600 are located on land in North Herts, with the remaining 1,000 
dwellings located on land in Stevenage.
‘PA3’ was originally intended to be completed by 2011, with ‘PA5’ due to be finished in 
2014. Due to the complexity of the proposals, and their tendency to polarise opinion, the 
applications were ‘called-in’ for adjudication on 7th November 2002 by the then Secretary 
of State. More than a year passed before the Inquiry convened on 20th January 2004, sitting 
for a total of 41 days up to 25th October 2004. The Inspector produced his compendious 
Report of 279 pages on 1st December 2004 (Lavender, 2004). This Report is by far the most 
comprehensive treatment of the proposals and the main arguments presented by the opposing 
sides. Although strategically important development proposals such as Stevenage West usually 
involve investigation of a wide range of issues, four particular topics are of especial importance 






A strong argument can be made in support of the proposition that these have also been the 
most critical issues in all of the arguments surrounding the Stevenage West proposals to date. 
It is important to note, as did North Herts DC in their submissions to the Inquiry, that this 
development is concerned with the “application and not the formulation of policy” (Lavender, 
2004: 166).
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4.2: The site
There have been proposals of one form or another for an urban extension of Stevenage 
since 1972. Much of the complexity surrounding the Stevenage West proposals stems 
from the fact that, as noted above, the site straddles two local authority boundaries, with a 
County Council (Hertfordshire) covering both authorities having responsibility for strategic 
planning matters. The entire site covers some 283.18 hectares, with 185.99 hectares located 
in North Hertfordshire District Council and the remaining 97.19 hectares coming under the 
jurisdiction of Stevenage Borough Council12. 
4.3: The local plans and their relationship to the Structure Plan
On December 8th 2004, exactly one week after the publication of the Inspector’s Report, in 
which permission was refused for ‘PA5’ (i.e. the development of 5,000 homes) but granted for 
‘PA3’ (i.e. the development of 3,600 homes), Stevenage Borough Council deposited its District 
Plan Second Review 1991 – 2001. As a result of the changing planning policy landscape at the 
time, in particular Planning Policy Guidance note 3 (PPG3) and the imminent introduction 
of Planning Policy Statement 3 (Housing), Policy H2 of Stevenage’s updated District Plan 
appeared to ‘row back’ from the local authority’s previously unequivocal support for the urban 
extension. Policy H2 refers to Policy 8 of the Hertfordshire Structure Plan, which earmarks 
land for 1,000 new homes on land owned by Stevenage BC and 2,600 dwellings on land 
owned by North Herts DC as “strategic locations for supplementary housing development” 
(Hertfordshire, 1998: 56). Stevenage’s updated Local Plan makes clear, in bold, capitalised 
letters, that the Stevenage West site is to be “safeguarded from development, pending 
reconsideration and acceptance of its strategic justification.” The explanatory text immediately 
below this statement goes on to say that, 
  only if that review of the structure plan…determines that Stevenage West is required 
to meet the County’s development needs up to 2011 can the site be considered as 
12 See Figures 1-4 on pages 70-73 for site maps.
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allocated and available to be released for development (Stevenage, 2004: para. 3.2.13). 
The most germane element of PPS3 which was probably responsible for Stevenage BC’s 
decision to ‘row back’ and ‘play for time’ was the target of at least 60% of new development to 
be located on ‘previously developed land’ (PDL) (CLG, 2006: para. 41). As so often happens, 
even the best-intentioned central government initiative usually leads to a period of paralysis, 
if not outright revolt, at the local level. Stevenage BC’s updated District Plan, was, in effect, 
‘passing the buck’ to Hertfordshire County Council by claiming that it was the duty of a 
Structure Plan Review to determine whether the Stevenage West site should be allocated 
and released for development, safe in the knowledge that such a Review was unlikely to be 
completed in the short to medium term.
4.4: Main issues connected with green belt designation
On occasion, questions which, at face value, seem to be relatively straightforward such as, ‘Is 
this proposed development in the green belt?’ actually turn out to be far more complex on 
further investigation. Such was the case with the Stevenage West proposals. At the national 
level, Planning Policy Guidance Note 2 (ODPM, 2001) set out the government’s position on 
green belts and this guidance is reflected in the relevant regional policies during the lengthy 
period required to determine the Stevenage West proposals. Regional Planning Guidance 9 
(RPG 9) for the South East acknowledged that where settlements are tightly constrained by 
the green belt (as Stevenage certainly is), there may be a case for boundary review provided an 
urban capacity study has been completed and all other alternative locations for development 
have been considered (GOSE, 1994). The Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS) for the East of 
England specifically mentions the need for “strategic reviews of green belt boundaries” at five 
locations, including Stevenage, “involving land in Stevenage and North Hertfordshire” (GOEE, 
2008: Policy SS7: 14). 
The relevant policy during this period at County Council level was the Hertfordshire Structure 
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Plan Review 1991 – 2011 (HSP), approved in April 1998 (Hertfordshire, 1998). Policy 5 of this 
document acknowledged the need for a review of green belt policies in the area west of the 
A1(M) at Stevenage to accommodate up to 10,000 new homes (Hertfordshire, 1998: 38-39). 
This land was selected, defended and allocated for this purpose by Hertfordshire CC at the 
Examination in Public. The Structure Plan was reviewed in 2003 and by now the possibility 
of “strategic scale development” west of the A1(M) at Stevenage had been put in abeyance 
(Hertfordshire, 2003: para. 68). Instead, there is a rather vague intention to allocate this land, 
in extremis, for 3,600 homes, with “at least” a further 1,400 to follow by 2011 (Hertfordshire, 
2003: para. 83(d)). Thus we can see that the plans for 10,000 new homes articulated in 1998 
had been slashed to 5,000 (or 3,600) by 2003.
At the local level, the relevant planning documents at this time were the North Herts District 
Local Plan (NHDLP), adopted in 1996 and the Stevenage District Plan (SDP), adopted in 1994. 
The NHDLP makes no mention of any potential development west of Stevenage and merely 
recapitulates national green belt policy as set out in PPG 2. The Proposals Map of the SDP 
includes an adjustment of green belt boundaries for that part of the Stevenage West site that 
falls under the Borough Council’s jurisdiction and emphasises the need for co-operation with 
North Herts to bring forward the rest of the site for development.
The wording of the County Council Structure Plan (Hertfordshire, 1998) was sufficiently 
ambiguous as to lead to differences in opinion between pro-development and anti-
development interests, over the question of whether the green belt boundary had, or had not, 
been adjusted to accommodate Stevenage West. What was not at issue were the implications 
arising from the application of green belt policy should it be held to apply, since such policy 
is clear from PPG 2. Indeed, the key issue of whether “very special circumstances” existed 
which would override the general presumption against development on green belt land was 
dealt with in a case brought by Chelmsford Borough Council against a traveller family in 
2003. When the defendant moved her family from an authorised site to an unauthorised 
site on the green belt she was refused planning permission to station caravans on the new 
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site. When she appealed, the planning Inspector concluded that ‘very special circumstances’ 
existed because the defendant’s children had settled in well to the local school within walking 
distance of the new (unauthorised) site. In other words, although ‘limited harm’ was caused 
to the green belt by the caravans, this was outweighed by the ‘very special circumstances’ 
of the children’s educational needs. The then Secretary of State agreed with the Inspector’s 
findings and Chelmsford Borough Council appealed to the Administrative Court to quash 
this decision. In Court in a judgment given on November 25th 2003, Justice Sullivan held that 
the then Secretary of State had been mistaken in agreeing with the Inspector that ‘very special 
circumstances’ existed. Justice Sullivan failed to see that the educational needs of two children 
constituted ‘special circumstances’, never mind ‘very special circumstances’. The key phrase 
‘very special circumstances’ should be given its “ordinary and natural meaning”, not merely 
ascribed to a situation because a decision-maker chose to describe it that way (The Weekly Law 
Reports, 2003). This judgment would therefore appear to have ‘raised the bar’ when ascribing 
‘very special circumstances’ to development in the green belt.
Before the publication of the Hertfordshire CC Structure Plan in 1998, all previous plans at 
County Council and local authority level had defined the Stevenage West site as being within 
the green belt. At the Examination in Public into the 1998 Structure Plan, it was successfully 
argued that ‘exceptional circumstances’ existed such that the land west of the A1(M) 
should be released for strategic development. It should be noted that the terms ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ and ‘very special circumstances’ are used interchangeably throughout PPG 
2. This allocation of the land west of the A1(M) for development by the EiP was used by the 
West of Stevenage Consortium as one of the central planks of their arguments in favour of 
development. However, matters were complicated by further ambiguities in depicting the 
site on the Key Diagram of the Hertfordshire CC Key Diagram. On this map, the Stevenage 
West site is simply overlaid on the existing green belt (in contrast to proposed development 
at Hemel Hempstead on the same map, where strategic development is shown as part of the 
built up area). Since Structure Plans were legally comprised of both a Written Statement 
and a Key Diagram, it would be very helpful if they were both in accord with each other. 
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Although the North Herts District Local Plan, as updated in 2000, acknowledged that, “with 
the adoption of [the Hertfordshire County Council Structure Plan 1998], the Green Belt in 
North Hertfordshire has been reduced to take account of the proposed development west of 
the A1(M) at Stevenage” (Lavender, 2004: 50), on the Key Diagram, only enough space for 
the ‘PA3’ (3,600 homes) and ‘PA5’ (1,400) developments was shown (i.e. no further room for 
the remaining 5,000 dwellings). In fact, this version of the Local Plan was rather hurriedly 
withdrawn and North Herts reverted to the anti-development stance set out in its 1996 Plan 
(NHDC, 1996). Naturally, the boundaries of the site on the Key Diagram of the Stevenage 
Local Plan clearly excluded the site west of the A1(M) from the green belt. 
As the Inspector at the first Inquiry noted, “[d]evelopment of greenfield sites is in some 
regards inherently unsustainable because of the irreversibility of permanent housing” 
(Lavender, 2004: 218). Accordingly, one of the few areas of common ground which emerged 
between the contending parties was the need to redesignate other land as green belt in the 
event of the Stevenage West proposals finally going ahead (so that the overall total of green 
belt land in Hertfordshire would not be reduced). The land to be redesignated was located 
between the Metropolitan Green Belt and Luton Green Belt. Something which emerged in 
the Inspector’s Report of 2004, and of interest to the current research, is how the same body 
(North Herts District Council) applied thee different approaches to the implementation of 
policy as it related to this green belt extension land:
	 	•From	April	1998	to	June	2000,	North	Herts	DC	took	the	view	that	the	area	for	
extension was not subject to green belt policy as the status of this area would be dealt 
with under Policy 5 of the North Herts District Local Plan 2000, then in preparation.
	 •	In	June	2000,	a	case	was	decided	on	appeal	by	an	Inspector	whose	opinion	was	that	
the Hertfordshire Structure Plan clearly intended that this land was in the green belt. 
Therefore, between June 2000 and March 2003, North Herts DC applied green belt 
policy to this land between the Metropolitan Green Belt and the Luton Green Belt.
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	 •	In	July	2002,	a	proposal	to	redevelop	a	garden	centre	was	refused	on	green	belt	
grounds. However, it was suggested to North Herts DC (presumably by the applicant) 
that the application of green belt policy was incorrect. North Herts DC therefore 
consulted with Hertfordshire County Council and took legal advice, the result of 
which advice was that the area between the Metropolitan Green Belt and the Luton 
Green Belt should not be subject to green belt policy. 
At the first Inquiry, the Inspector found that the question of whether it was the task of the 
Hertfordshire CC Structure Plan/emerging Regional Spatial Strategy/Local Plans/emerging 
Local Development Frameworks to provide the necessary adjustment to green belt boundaries 
to accommodate the Stevenage West proposals to be a matter of law (Lavender, 2004: 219). 
Accordingly, since it was the function of Local Plans to record the detailed boundaries, not the 
general extent, of green belts, the development site was held by the Inspector to remain within 
the green belt. The Inspector noted that this finding could lead to an inconsistency in the 
application of PPG2 (Green Belts), since the Inspector responsible for approving or rejecting 
the updated Stevenage District Plan recommended a detailed boundary readjustment of that 
part of the site that lay within Stevenage’s green belt. 
This Inspector also made a parallel recommendation that the whole principle of development 
west of the A1(M) should be the subject of a strategic review, thus opening the possibility 
for an early green belt boundary readjustment back to its original position if the strategic 
review came down against Stevenage West (Lavender, 2004: 249). Such ‘fiddling’ with green 
belt boundaries goes against Paragraph 2.1 of PPG2, which states that, “[t]he essential 
characteristic of Green Belts is their permanence. Their protection must be maintained as 
far as can be seen ahead” (ODPM, 2001). The Inspector at the first Inquiry concluded that 
both ‘PA3’ and ‘PA5’ of the proposed development lay within the green belt, and that to grant 
permission to either scheme would therefore be in “direct conflict with the aims, purposes and 
objectives of including land within Green Belts” (Lavender, 2004: 249). However, the Inspector 
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found that ‘very special circumstances’ existed, for ‘PA3’ of the proposed development only, 
since the Hertfordshire Structure Plan 1998 had made specific strategic provision for up to 
3,600 homes (Lavender, 2004: 249).
4.5: Persimmon Homes takes legal action against Stevenage BC
This state of affairs led, in April 2005, to what must have seemed extraordinary to those 
who had not been closely following the labyrinthine twists and turns of the development: 
Persimmon Homes (one of the members of the Stevenage West Consortium) taking Stevenage 
BC – previously Stevenage West’s staunchest supporter – to the High Court over whether 
the District Plan Second Review was ‘in general conformity’ with the Structure Plan, as well 
as an issue of law over where green belt boundaries had been drawn in relation to the site. 
This second issue was purely technical and a matter of common ground between the two 
parties, and merely required the Proposals Map to be corrected. Judge David Mole QC found, 
on the substantive issue of ‘general conformity’, that the prefix ‘general’ inferred a degree of 
flexibility in terms of the relationship between Structure and Local Plans. In effect, the judge 
found that Stevenage BC had committed no breach of law in its cautious wording of Policy 
H2. Reservations about the proposed development can be traced back to 2002, when political 
changes at Hertfordshire County Council, in the shape of a Conservative regime which 
had replaced the previous ‘No Overall Control’ administration in the 2001 local elections 
resulted in a sharp backlash against strategic sites, including Stevenage West. In parallel with 
Stevenage’s plans to update its District Plan, Hertfordshire County Council set in motion 
the process of updating the Structure Plan by publishing a first consultation draft alterations 
document which would cover the period 2001 – 2016. This document replaced Policy 8 with 
a bare statement that no strategic scale housing developments were necessary. Therefore, 
a combination of pressure from Hertfordshire County Council at the public Inquiry into 
Stevenage’s updated District Plan Second Review, as well as uncertainty surrounding the 
impact of PPS3 resulted in Stevenage rephrasing Policy H2 of its District Plan from an original 
form which clearly designated the site west of the A1(M) as suitable for development to the 
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much more ambiguous, ‘wait and see’ formulation detailed above. In actual fact, Hertfordshire 
abandoned its intentions to update its Structure Plan after adverse comments from the 
Government Office for the East of England (GoEE) during the summer of 2003. 
Undeterred, Persimmon Homes, along with other members of the WSC, pursued their case 
to the Court of Appeal, from whence judgment was handed down on November 22nd 2005. 
At issue was the phasing of the construction, with Persimmon Homes et al arguing that the 
rephrased Policy H2 of Stevenage’s District Plan effectively stretch the already long lead-time 
of the development beyond any realistic prospect of being built by the target date of 2011. In 
fact, Policy H4 of Stevenage’s District Plan sets out quite specifically that 400 of the intended 
1,000 homes to be built on Stevenage land are to be constructed during the period 2004 – 
2007, with the remaining 600 to be erected between 2008 – 2011 (Stevenage, 2004: Policy H4). 
In a 2-1 majority verdict which found against the claimants (i.e. Persimmon Homes et al), 
Laws LJ also found long lead-times to be the crux of the matter, although rather than pointing 
to the lengthy period required for planning delivery, as Persimmon Homes had done, he 
focused on the timeframes involved in the formulation and implementation of overlapping 
elements of planning policy. Laws LJ noted in his judgment that, as a consequence of these 
lengthy lead-times, “the needs and exigencies of good planning policy are likely to change over 
time” (The Weekly Law Reports, 2006).
In other words, just as Judge David Mole QC had done in the original case at the High Court, 
Laws LJ favoured a looser approach to the issue of ‘general conformity’ between structure and 
local plans. In his dissenting judgment, Lloyd LJ opined that Persimmon Homes was facing a 
situation akin to stalemate, since the Hertfordshire Structure Plan review was no longer going 
ahead and that therefore the issue of the availability or otherwise of the land at Stevenage West 
was deferred indefinitely – “to the Greek calends” in his own words (The Weekly Law Reports, 
2006). Once again, it is important to bear in mind the macro-policy situation at this time, 
with the sweeping planning reforms ushered in by the Planning and Compulsory Purchase 
Act 2004 resulting in many local planning authorities delaying or suspending work on their 
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local plans in order to see what the altered planning landscape might look like. Of course, if 
authority ‘A’ waits to see what authority ‘B’ might do, and authority ‘B’ is watching anxiously to 
see what the response of authority ‘C’ is to the changes, then it is quite obvious that the whole 
system may well grind to a halt as stakeholders play ‘the waiting game’. 
As a final comment on the legal action pursued by Persimmon Homes et al during 2005, 
it is interesting to note that one of the most senior legal minds in the country, Lane LJ, in 
his short judgment in support of Laws LJ’s opinion, stated that, “this is a highly specialist 
area…the function of the court under section 287 [of the Town and Country Planning Act 
1990] should be limited to review on Wednesbury principles” (The Weekly Law Reports, 
2006). ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ is defined as reasoning or decision-making that is so 
unreasonable that no reasonable person acting reasonably could have made it (EWCA, 1947) 
and refers to a more stringent test of common sense applicable to public bodies. This statement 
substantiates the widely held view that the interpretation of planning policy and legislation is 
very much a ‘black box’ activity, ergo an undertaking fraught with the potential for multiple, 
conflicting viewpoints where true consensus and common ground can be rare indeed.
4.6: Central government’s role in the Stevenage West proposals
Following the Inspector’s Report of December 2004, the Secretary of State’s Decision Letter 
was released on the 20th October 2005. This was an unusually lengthy period of time and 
reflects the ongoing uncertainty relating to the proposed development. The involvement of the 
Secretary of State can be traced back to 7th November 2002, when both the ‘PA3’ and ‘PA5’ 
proposals were ‘called-in’ by the ODPM for determination instead of being dealt with by the 
relevant local authorities, as are the vast majority of planning applications. It is an interesting 
exercise to follow the Secretary of State’s reasoning for and against the various elements of 
the proposals, as set out in his letter of 20th October 2005. Neither of the relevant local plans 
gave unqualified support for the urban extension (North Herts District Local Plan 1996 omits 
mention of the proposals entirely and, as noted above, support for both ‘PA3’ and ‘PA5’ in 
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the Stevenage Local Plan 2004 was ‘safeguarded’ from development until a strategic review 
had been carried out. Instead, the Secretary of State focused on the “considerable support” 
that proposal ‘PA3’ gained from Policies 8 and 9 of the Hertfordshire Structure Plan 1998 
(Macintyre, 2005: para. 19) – despite the fact that structure plans were formally abolished 
with the commencement of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 in mid-July 
of that year, and, more importantly, that Policies 8 and 9 no longer accurately reflected the 
current mood towards Stevenage West within Hertfordshire CC. It should be noted that late-
2005 was a time when regional planning bodies were busily preparing the documents that 
would become Regional Spatial Strategies (RSSs), and that transitional provisions enabled the 
prolongation of structure plans beyond their formal revocation date. 
The Secretary of State agreed with the Inspector that there was “no obstacle” to determining 
the applications before the Housing Capacity Study to be undertaken by the regional 
planning body had been completed (Macintyre, 2005: para. 21). There was, therefore, rather 
tenuous support for the proposals from the suite of documents that together comprised the 
‘development plan’ for the area (at that time, of course, in transition to the ‘Local Development 
Framework’ regime). One of the undoubtedly many perquisites of being a Minister of 
State, though, is that one can ‘magic away’ unpalatable instances of planning doctrine with 
phrases like ‘material considerations’ and ‘very special circumstances’. In this case, the ‘very 
special circumstances’ related to overriding green belt policy as set out in PPG2 and simply 
amounted to the need for strategic housing development at Stevenage West. Proposal ‘PA5’ 
fell victim to the novel concept of ‘prematurity’, whereby any development could conceivably 
compromise a development plan document in process of creation by dint of its sheer scale. 
The Secretary of State was concerned about the potential impacts of ‘PA5’ on the embryonic 
RSS (whereas ‘PA3’ apparently posed no threat to this process). In terms of housing need and 
provision, the Secretary of State judged that ‘PA3’ would accord with PPG3/PPS3 by “widening 
housing opportunity and choice” (Macintyre, 2005:  para. 47), whereas ‘PA5’ would cause “an 
overprovision of housing” (ibid., para. 47). In terms of the other principal issue, transport, 
the Secretary of State, echoing the Inspector, agreed that both ‘PA3’ and ‘PA5’ should not be 
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permitted without assurances that a range of measures would be taken to improve travel and 
transport in the wider urban area (Macintyre, 2005: para. 52). However, after this normative 
statement, the Secretary of State invokes the concept of fairness by acknowledging that such 
a programme of improvements would be outside the scope of the developers, and would 
therefore be “unreasonable to deny the applicant permission” (ibid., para. 52). 
As noted in the Chapter One, one of Eric Pickles’ first decisions was to announce the end, 
“with immediate effect”, of the Regional Spatial Strategies (RSSs). This pronouncement 
precipitated what can justly be described as a seismic shift in policies relating to strategic 
housing allocations.  At a North Herts Council Cabinet meeting on Tuesday 15th June 2010, it 
was resolved to cancel an upcoming meeting of SNAP (the Stevenage and North Herts Action 
Plan) due to be held on the following Tuesday, 22nd June, and indeed to cease all work on 
SNAP until there was “clarity on future numbers of new houses and jobs.”  North Herts took 
the view that, given the sudden revocation of the East of England RSS, a revised Core Strategy 
was necessary, which meant a new round of public consultation and updated housing capacity 
studies (SHLAA, SHMA, Housing Options) . Stevenage clung to the belief that the growth 
proposals outlined in its Core Strategy (based on figures in the East of England RSS) were still 
relevant and the basis upon which future development should be negotiated. Another impasse 
between the two LPAs was reached, one which in practice would mean a further delay of 
several years to the Stevenage West proposals.
4.7: Housing targets & ‘urban capacity’
The process whereby housing targets in England and Wales are produced must surely 
rank as one of the more arcane and abstruse elements of the discipline of spatial planning, 
regularly described as a ‘black box’ activity (Allmendinger, 2011: 41). In a statement on 24th 
July 2002, the then Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, announced the first steps in the 
government’s ‘Sustainable Communities’ initiative. One of the central planks of this policy 
was the identification of 42 strategic sites to be brought forward for regeneration, including 
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Stevenage West . It is interesting that this greenfield site was included in a list of predominantly 
brownfield sites.
In the updated RPG9, issued in March 2001, Policy H1 of Regional Policy Guidance 9 stated 
that the South East should provide 39,000 new homes annually during the period 2001 – 2006, 
of which 3,280 should be built each year in Hertfordshire (DETR, 2001: 48). Policy H5 of the 
same document states that local authorities should seek to build at least 60% of new housing 
on Previously Developed Land (PDL).
The Hertfordshire CC Structure Plan (Hertfordshire, 1998) grudgingly conceded that, “on 
balance”, guiding strategic development towards the County’s New Towns (i.e. Stevenage, 
Hemel Hempstead, Hatfield and Welwyn Garden City) was preferable to locating it in more 
rural areas or on the edges of older settlements, due mainly to the well planned road networks 
of the New Towns. The concession was grudging because there was a recognition that 
expansion of the New Towns would have consequences for the green belt because of the ‘under 
bounded’ nature of the New Towns, especially Stevenage. The Structure Plan (Hertfordshire, 
1998: 30) settled on a total of 65,000 new homes to be built during the period 1991 – 2011, 
with provision of this total divided among three ‘limbs’. The first limb was defined as “planned 
regeneration” (Policy 6) and focused on sites on Previously Developed Land within the 
boundaries of the County’s urban centres. This limb was the main development strategy. The 
second limb was defined as “limited peripheral development” (Policy 7) and was to kick in 
once all of the sites available through the first limb had been exhausted. The third limb was 
given the somewhat unwieldy title of “strategic green field locations for supplementary housing 
development” (Policy 8) and included ‘PA3’ and ‘PA5’ of Stevenage West. As the Inspector 
noted at the Inquiry, Hertfordshire CC, “never lent wholehearted support to the third limb of 
the strategy” (Lavender, 2004: 211), since they believed that the first two limbs were sufficient 
to provide the necessary housing capacity. Importantly, however, it had been established at 
the Examination in Public of the Hertfordshire CC Structure Plan in June 1997 that the third 
limb (strategic greenfield sites) was not included merely on a ‘contingent’ basis (i.e. only to be 
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used if the first two limbs failed to deliver the necessary capacity), but was an important, ‘free-
standing’ element of the overall provision of new housing (Lavender, 2004: 211).
By 1995, as the Structure Plan explains, 44,000 new homes had either been built or had sites 
identified, leaving a total of 21,000 homes outstanding for the remainder of the Plan period 
up to 2011 (Hertfordshire, 1998: 50). At a rate of just over 1,300 new homes per year, this 
could have been achieved without the need for strategic greenfield sites such as Stevenage 
West. However, for reasons yet to be fully explained, the Government Office for the East of 
England (GOEE) stepped in at this point and mandated that it would be impractical for more 
than 10,000 out of the 21,000 shortfall to be provided in existing built-up areas by 2011. It 
would appear that the GOEE felt that it was desirable that around 11,000 new homes should 
be earmarked for strategic, greenfield sites. It was also the case that there was disagreement 
between Hertfordshire CC and the local authorities in the County, with the local authorities 
siding with the GOEE in support of a ceiling of 10,000 new homes that planned regeneration 
on PDL could deliver. 
During the Examination in Public of the Hertfordshire Structure Plan in March 1997 a 
compromise of sorts between the County and the local authorities was reached, with the 
Panel concluding that it would be prudent to plan to achieve 14,000 new homes on Previously 
Developed Land (PDL), thus leaving a shortfall of 7,000 new homes to be built on strategic 
greenfield sites. However, due to the delays in reaching agreement on Stevenage West, the 
proportion of housing that the development could deliver by 2011 fell from 3,600 (‘PA3’) to 
1,600, with none of the 1,400 homes planned for ‘PA5’ able to be delivered by 2011. North 
Herts DC used this as an argument against the proposals, since the Structure Plan only ran 
until 2011 and a new Plan would have to be drawn up (Lavender, 2004: 172). In reality, by this 
time Structure Plans were being phased out and replaced by Regional Spatial Strategies (RSSs), 
of which the East of England RSS was germane to the Stevenage West proposals.
A number of issues arose during the Inquiry concerning housing targets and the manner in 
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which they were arrived at. The West of Stevenage Consortium argued that the target of 65,000 
mentioned in the Structure Plan was “not a maximum limit on provision but a minimum or 
near minimum requirement” (Lavender, 2004: 145). Stevenage Borough Council argued in 
support of the development, citing figures from the Chelmer Population and Housing Model 
which suggested in 2004 that Stevenage needed to build another 6,000 homes up to 2021 to 
meet natural population change, a figure which rose to 8,000 if recent migration patterns were 
taken into account (Lavender, 2004: 157). Given the under-bounded nature of Stevenage, the 
Council argued, this growth could only be accommodated on strategic greenfield sites. At 
this time, during the first Inquiry, a further source of argument was the weight that should 
be given to the draft Regional Spatial Strategy for the East of England. Hertfordshire CC and 
North Herts argued that very little, if any, weight should be given to the housing targets in 
this document as it had not yet been put out for public consultation. After weighing all the 
arguments concerning housing targets and urban capacity, the Inspector at the Inquiry found 
that there were no reasons to “inhibit or delay” construction of  ‘PA3’ (3,600 dwellings), 
although he found that ‘PA5’ (1,400 dwellings) could not “be held to accord with present 
strategy” (Lavender, 2004: 218).
The Inspector at the 2004 Inquiry found that ‘PA3’ of the proposed development would 
contribute to the provision of housing in Hertfordshire in a way that was consistent with 
PPG3 (Housing). Although not giving approval to ‘PA5’ at this time may have created issues 
concerning the ability of ‘PA3’ to become fully self-sufficient, the Inspector decided that it 
would be wrong to “over-provide” by permitting ‘PA5’ at this stage. The Inspector further 
found that the government’s emerging approach to ‘sustainable development’ “would not be 
compromised by a comprehensively planned urban extension at Stevenage West” (Lavender, 
2004: 252). 
4.8: (Non) cooperation and planning doctrine
Even though Policy 8 of the Hertfordshire Structure Plan 1998 was quite clear in designating 
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land west of the A1(M) for strategic development, there was disagreement as to whether 
permission could be granted for ‘PA3’ or ‘PA5’ before both of the Local Plans, relating to North 
Herts and Stevenage had been adopted, as well as what weight to give to each of these three 
plans in the decision-making process. Hertfordshire CC argued that, according to Section 
38(6) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the valid development plan comprised 
both the Structure Plan(s) and Local Plan(s). In other words, the valid development plan for 
Stevenage West was comprised of the Hertfordshire CC Structure Plan 1998, the Stevenage BC 
Local Plan 1994 and the North Herts District Plan 1996.They pointed to the precise wording 
of Policy 8 of their Structure Plan, which set out that the land will be (not is) identified in the 
relevant Local Plans – an indication that the development could only proceed once the two 
Local Plans – not in existence when the Structure Plan came into being – had been written, 
approved and adopted. Hertfordshire CC argued that it is the role of the Structure Plan to 
set out general policies with an approximate Key Diagram and that it is the purpose of Local 
Plans to present detailed proposals with specific development site boundaries. Even if the 
Structure Plan clearly set out the rationale for development at Stevenage West, Hertfordshire 
CC reasoned, since neither of the Local Plans were in place, the applications by the West of 
Stevenage Consortium were invalid (Lavender, 2004: 159). This requirement, however, leaves 
open the possibility (which was acknowledged by Hertfordshire CC) that a local authority 
hostile to development could simply neglect to bring forward a Local Plan review. In the event, 
the High Court ruled that North Herts was within its rights to withdraw its Local Plan in 2000 
because of the need to assimilate changes to PPG3 (Housing). In any case, according to Section 
46(10) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, unless a Local Plan has been found to be 
not in general conformity with the Structure Plan, in the event of a conflict between Structure 
and Local Plans, Local Plans are to prevail. Hertfordshire CC also contended that the entire 
issue of the necessity of the urban extension to Stevenage had come under question as a result 
of the move away from ‘predict and provide’ to a ‘plan, monitor and manage’ regime (Lavender, 
2004: 166), since this policy shift emphasised the primacy of brownfield sites over greenfield/
green belt development.
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A number of people who appeared before the Inquiry suspected a ‘hidden agenda’ whereby 
Stevenage Borough Council was supporting the proposals as a means to obtaining ‘Unitary 
Authority’ status (e.g. Lavender, 2004: 187, 190, 191). In the subsequent case which Persimmon 
Homes et al pursued to the Court of Appeal, Lloyd LJ, in his dissenting judgment, explicitly 
condemned Hertfordshire County Council for attempting (and, as it transpired, succeeding) 
to “subvert” Stevenage’s local plan process by having the wording of Policy H2 changed, as 
discussed above (Weekly Law Reports, 2006). Few, if any, signs of cooperation were thus 
apparent during this stage of the narrative. 
4.9: Main strategic transport policy issues 
As the first New Town, Stevenage underwent dramatic redevelopment in the early 1950s, 
a time when the motor car was firmly in the ascendant, and therefore the road network is 
impressive, with many broad streets, roundabouts and a high degree of separation of modes 
(e.g. foot-paths, cycle-paths). The pedestrianised town centre was the first in the UK, opened 
by the Queen in 1959 (McKean, 1982: 174). Indeed the Inspector’s opinion at the first Inquiry 
was that “the existing travel and transport network deriving from the period of New Town 
development [was]…a significant advantage over most towns in Hertfordshire” (Lavender, 
2004: 228)
Regional policy as expressed in RPG 9 enunciated a range of normative transport and travel 
goals, three of which have direct relevance to the current research. These are: 
	 •		Firstly,	the	need	to	plan	development	“holistically	to	minimise	the	need	for	
movement and to facilitate and encourage safe movement on foot, by cycle and public 
transport” (DETR, 2001: Policy T1 (a) (ii)). 
	 	•	Secondly,	a	shift	towards	non-motorised	modes	of	travel	should	be	encouraged,	
especially in urban areas (GOSE, 2001: Policy T1 (b) (i)). Walking and cycling are to be 
“vigorously promoted” with the aim of creating a fourfold increase in cycling trips on 
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1996 levels by 2012 (DETR, 2001: Policy T4). 
	 	•	Finally,	public	transport	to	be	improved	to	enable	it	to	compete	more	effectively	with	
private  vehicle-based travel (DETR, 2001: Policy T5). 
These three goals – integrated land-use and transport planning, nudges towards an increasing 
proportion of non-motorised travel modes and improved public transport – can be viewed as 
the ‘holy trinity’ of more sustainable travel-to-work. In the East of England Regional Spatial 
Strategy, Stevenage is designated as a ‘Regional Transport Node’ (thus becoming a focus area 
for improved public transport) and is located along the ‘London – Huntingdonshire Corridor’, 
which brings it into the category of ‘Transport Investment Priorities’. Such areas are recognised 
as likely to come under increasing transport pressure, primarily as a result of other policies in 
the RSS (GOEE, 2008: 48). 
At the sub-regional level, Hertfordshire County Council is required to publish a Local 
Transport Plan, to be updated every five years. In the second iteration of this document 
(covering the period 2006/7 – 2010/11), the proposed development west of the A1(M) 
is merely described as a “potential challenge” (Hertfordshire, 2005: 20). An indication of 
Hertfordshire CC’s lack of enthusiasm for the Stevenage West proposals can be glimpsed 
in the Consultation Report produced after publication of the Local Transport Plan. As one 
of the stakeholders of the Plan, Stevenage Borough Council was approached for feedback. 
Buried within this Consultation Report, there is a trenchant complaint from Stevenage, to the 
effect that, given Hertfordshire CC’s “disinclination” to support the proposals for Stevenage’s 
expansion, SBC has had to spend £60,000+ on a report from Arup investigating the transport 
and highways implications of the strategic development on land west of the A1(M). A rather 
sheepish response from Hertfordshire CC is noted beside this complaint, to the effect that, 
“It is recognised that there is a need for HCC and SDC [sic] to better co-ordinate all of its 
transport related work that is being undertaken. The urban plan will work towards this” 
(Hertfordshire, 2006: 41).
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Regional policy throughout the ten-year period from 2000-2010 aspired to bring the East of 
England from a position of 34th in 2000 into the top 20 regions in Europe in terms of GDP by 
2010 (GOEE, 2000: para. 4.12). WSG argued that the Stevenage West proposals would directly 
contribute to this aim (Lavender, 2004: para. 12.7). Principle MP15 of WSG’s Masterplanning 
Principles states that land allocated for employment in the proposals will be located close 
to passenger transport routes and will be served by a network of footpaths and cycle lanes 
linked to residential areas (WSG, 2000: 16). WSG argued that the development would increase 
Stevenage’s local labour force by at least 5,000 and thus that “there is every likelihood that 
out-commuting from Stevenage would reduce” (Lavender, 2004: para. 12.11). They further 
contended that, rather than dissipating new housing throughout the town, concentrating 
development at Stevenage West would create the ‘critical mass’ necessary to stimulate local 
economic development. In their arguments against the development, a local action group, 
CASE (Case Against Stevenage Expansion), argued that in-commuting would only increase 
if employment was provided at a level for ‘PA5’ proposals (i.e. 5,000 dwellings), thus not 
if permission was only granted for ‘PA3’ (i.e. 3,600 homes). Paradoxically, this could be 
interpreted as backhanded support for the larger development from the action group fighting 
tooth and nail against any development of the site.
A strategic objection was raised by CASE (Case Against Stevenage Expansion), the gist of 
which was that, since one of the main aims of the Stevenage West proposals was to satisfy 
regional housing demand, they would necessarily create regional travel demand (i.e. long-
distance commuting and other trips). In other words, due to the proximity of the proposed 
development to the A1(M), regional commuting patterns between Stevenage, Cambridge, 
London and Peterborough would become more established. They further argued that the 
demographic profile of the development (fewer elderly people than in the rest of Stevenage), 
levels of bus ridership would be lower (Lavender, 2004: 128). The West of Stevenage 
consortium refuted this by pointing to the proposed development’s proximity to the town’s 
existing employment areas, and by arguing that most home moves are local in character, and 
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that people tend to move closer to their place of work.
4.10: Site-specific transport issues
Stevenage, along with the other New Towns differs from most other settlements in the wider 
South East because of its highly planned nature, whereby most of the residential areas are 
located east of the town centre and the majority of the commercial/industrial /entertainment 
areas, along with the principal transport nodes (railway and bus stations) are situated west of 
the town centre. The only areas that are currently served by bus to the west of Stevenage town 
centre are the residential neighbourhood of Symonds Green and the Gunnels Wood industrial 
estate (Lavender, 2004: 121). The sharp distinction between residential and employment 
areas in Stevenage means that much of the town is not conducive to shorter, more sustainable 
travel patterns. This should not be confused with the excellent travel networks, described 
above, which emerged from Stevenage’s New Town development, since at that time vehicular 
transport (especially by private car) was king. Hertfordshire CC argued in their submissions 
to the Planning Inspector at the first Inquiry that, “[e]ven if HCC is held to be wrong on wider 
strategic issues, refusal of planning permission would be warranted on [site-specific] transport 
issues alone” (Lavender, 2004: 118).
Since the A1(M) creates a great deal of severance between the Stevenage West site and the rest 
of the town, one of the key issues was how best to link the development with the rest of the 
built-up area. The proposals for Stevenage West took the form of a linear development, with a 
main road (‘Central Transport Spine’- CTS) from which two main links (underpasses under 
the A1(M)) were intended to provide access between the site and the rest of the town. To avoid 
further burdening of the already overstretched key road infrastructure, there was to be no 
direct access from the site to the A1(M) or B656. However, it was argued that, even without 
direct access to the A1(M), the proposals would result in an increase of some 20% of vehicles 
on the motorway, a figure which equates to an extra 8,000 – 10,000 vehicles daily (Lavender, 
2004: 185; 192). 
   131
Hertfordshire CC argued that the proposed two links between the Stevenage West 
development and the rest of town were inadequate, given that ‘PA3’ (3,600 homes) equates 
to three existing neighbourhood areas (Lavender, 2004: 117). There was disagreement over 
whether the CTS should be for buses only, or at least have a dedicated lane for buses. In his 
appearance before the Inquiry, Peter Lilley, the MP for Harpenden and Hitchin, argued against 
the proposals on the grounds that the A1(M) would create too much of a barrier between the 
urban extension and Stevenage town, with residents of the new development likely to seek 
their employment and leisure opportunities in neighbouring towns other than Stevenage, 
causing increased traffic and congestion on the area’s road network (Lavender, 2004: 183).
As part of their submissions in support of the development, the West Stevenage Consortium 
argued that the development lent itself to meeting wider sustainability objectives by creating a 
new sub-centre which would lead to a better balance between residential and non-residential 
uses. Hertfordshire CC’s Structure Plan also explicitly linked the planned development at 
Stevenage West with shorter journeys overall and an increase in the proportion of non-private 
car-based trips (Hertfordshire, 1998: 55). This, however, was a position the County Council 
retreated from subsequently. In her appearance at the Inquiry in support of the development, 
the then MP for the area, Barbara Follett, argued that the proposals should be approved 
because they would bring much needed diversity to the types of housing currently on offer 
in Stevenage. As the first New Town, most of the town’s housing stock was of the same age, 
size and type. She argued that more high quality housing for skilled personnel would help 
to reduce congestion on the A1(M) as well as ‘rat-running’ through neighbouring villages 
(Lavender, 2004: 182).
When it came to forecasting mode share and traffic modelling, there was, unsurprisingly, 
much scope for disagreement between the three warring parties, a situation exacerbated 
due to the fact that they each used differently specified models to support their perspectives. 
The inherent fuzziness of transport modelling (especially for a new development built on 
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undeveloped land) is surely an area where, to paraphrase Flyvbjerg (1998), rationalization 
trumps reality and rationality is replaced by Realpolitik. The West of Stevenage Consortium 
argued that their ‘Local Model’ was considerably more sophisticated than both Stevenage’s 
spreadsheet based calculations (produced for them by engineering consulting firm KBR as a 
‘check’ on Local Model forecasts) and the model created by Harrison Webb for Hertfordshire 
CC. WSC pointed to what they believed were errors in the Harrison Webb model, such as their 
prediction that just 45% of Stevenage residents would work in the town, when the 1991, 2001 
and 2011 Census produced results of 61%, 57% and 59% respectively. 
Hertfordshire CC countered by complaining that access to the assumptions and methodology 
behind the Local Model were far too closely guarded, leading to charges of a ‘black box’ 
approach to the forecasting process with too many ‘fudge factors’ obscuring and obfuscating 
the final outputs. Not so, retorted the West of Stevenage Consortium; access to the internal 
workings of the model were restricted simply to allow for operator training and for reasons of 
simple commercial confidentiality (Lavender, 2004: 105). At issue was the proportion of car 
drivers who could be persuaded to use bus services and the level of bus ridership. To this end, 
and somewhat oddly, the West of Stevenage Consortium used Cambridge as a comparator, 
describing the ancient university town as a “medium-sized, self-contained town with a strong 
rail service and a substantial existing employment and social base” (Lavender, 2004: 108), 
where the share of car trips for the journey-to-work was less than 40%. Hertfordshire CC were 
quick to dismiss the relevance of this comparison between Stevenage and Cambridge, arguing 
(quite correctly and factually) that the university town had a unique travel-to-work profile 
based largely on non-motorised modes (i.e. cycling and walking). In a further parallel with 
Flyvbjerg’s analysis of the redevelopment of Aalborg, there were disagreements at this stage 
over the need to replace/renew Stevenage’s existing bus station, in particular the type/amount 
of contribution that should be paid by the West of Stevenage Consortium in order to remodel 
the existing bus station and to increase capacity at the bus/rail station interchange (Lavender, 
2004: 208). 
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It was finally agreed that there would be two bus routes along the Central Transport Spine of 
the development, one of which would operate all day at 10 minute intervals between Stevenage 
West and the Lister Hospital (‘the principal route’), and the second which would operate at 
peak hours only, connecting Stevenage West with the town’s principal employment areas off 
Gunnells Wood Road (Lavender, 2004: 232). The West of Stevenage Consortium was prepared 
to subsidise bus patronage to the tune of £1 million, until the development was fully populated 
and the bus services became self-supporting. However, Hertfordshire CC argued that the 
operating deficit would be closer to £5 million (Lavender, 2004: 234). At the heart of the issue 
was the extent to which a “step change” would be achieved in travel behaviour, in terms of a 
modal shift from private car to bus use. 
The Masterplanning principles of the Stevenage West development stipulated that 98% of the 
development would be within 800 m of a local centre, 92% within 600 m of a primary school, 
88% within 1500 m of the proposed secondary school and 95% within 800 m of useable open 
space (Lavender, 2004: 103). It should be noted that these figures are based on ‘as the crow flies’ 
(i.e. straight line) distances. Real life (i.e. network) distances mean that people need to travel 
further to reach their destination). Based on forecasts produced by their bespoke software (the 
‘Local Model’), the West of Stevenage Consortium predicted that this configuration of homes 
and workplaces would allow the development to achieve three key sustainability goals related 




   the development site and built-up area of Stevenage (Lavender, 2004: 117-18)
Hertfordshire CC strongly disputed these projected transport benefits, arguing that, due to an 
error in calibrating the ‘Local Model’ (whereby the model failed to recognise that most pupils 
would travel to school on foot or by bicycle, thus grossly overestimating the proportion of trips 
   134
by bus), there would be no such “step change” or “decisive shift” in travel behaviour (Lavender, 
2004: 121). Perhaps because it took so long to correct, having been identified in 2001 but only 
remedied in 2004, the error actually acquired its own identity (the ‘education mistake’), a state 
of affairs very much in keeping with a Flyvbjergian reading of the ongoing battle between 
rationality and rationalisation. Interestingly, Hertfordshire CC argued that they were not 
opposed in principle to a development which properly exploited the “significant locational 
advantages” of the site and which delivered a development which could really result in a step 
change in terms of modal shift away from the car. Instead, they argued, the West of Stevenage 
Consortium proposals were merely “tinkering at the edges”, with virtually no changes to 
car travel off-site (Lavender, 2004: 122). The West of Stevenage Consortium argued that the 
proposals would strengthen Stevenage Railway Station’s role as a regional interchange centre, 
with high quality transport links between the site and the station (Lavender, 2004: 155).
In terms of the modal split that the proposed development would generate between car, 
bus and non-motorised journeys, Hertfordshire CC contended that the figures produced 
by the Local Model, of 49% of trips by car, 13% by bus and 34% on foot/by bicycle were too 
unrealistic and rosy (Lavender, 2004: 107-08). Pointing to the recent closure of the BAe factory 
as well as a high vacancy rate among the warehouse and office stock of Stevenage, Councillor 
Morgan, representing Codicote Parish Council, argued that the trend was towards more people 
working outside the town than within it, and that the proposals would merely exacerbate this 
trend, rather than alleviate it (Lavender, 2004: 186-87).
In his Report, the Inspector at the first Inquiry found that the number and location of 
the access points and their crossing points of the A1(M) to be acceptable. Interestingly, 
he distanced himself from the arguments concerning the validity of each side’s transport 
modelling techniques, giving five detailed reasons which all cast doubt on the efficacy of 
such ‘black box’ processes (Lavender, 2004: 233). In terms of the expected “step change” 
from private car to bus use, the Inspector professed himself disappointed with the figure of 
13% bus mode share predicted by the West of Stevenage Consortium. He went on to state 
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that a figure of 20% bus share (as originally intended) would have been more appropriate 
(Lavender, 2004: 234), as well as making the important point that off-site measures to facilitate 
bus travel might be equally, if not more important, than on-site measures. The Inspector 
concluded by stating that the traffic, transport and travel measures put forward by the West of 
Stevenage Consortium, “do as much as can reasonably be expected to satisfy the specific aim 
of maximising the locational advantages of the site” (Lavender, 2004: 239), with the caveat that 
he remained “unconvinced” about the potential for more sustainable travel beyond the site 
and the town centre. In any case, as he noted, responsibility for these wider goals is “largely in 
hands other than those of WSC” (Lavender, 2004: 239).
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Chapter 5 
Strategic spatial planning at the sub-regional level: Stevenage, Luton and 
North Hertfordshire
5.1: Cross-boundary co-operation
This chapter begins with a second, short lexicographical note. Just as ‘green belt’ is a highly 
loaded concept at the national level, during my research in the Hertfordshire/Bedfordshire 
sub-region, the manner in which one referred to the development to the west of Stevenage 
gave a clear indication of one’s opinion of it. Thus those opposed to it merely refer to it as, 
‘West of the A1(M)’ (with the clear implication, ‘Why would you want to build a settlement 
right beside a motorway?) and those more amenable to it usually call it, ‘West of Stevenage’ 
or ‘Stevenage West’. In order to present as neutral a position as possible, all of these forms are 
used.
The overwhelming message to emerge from the interviews was that the duty to cooperate 
is not working, at least in its current guise. Responses ranged from “incredibly difficult to 
operate” (Senior Planner, Hertfordshire CC) to “wholly inadequate” (Senior Planner, Luton 
BC). This type of response is neither particularly original nor limited to the Greater South 
East. However, some interesting nuances regarding the duty to cooperate emerged from 
two respondents in particular. According to a Conservative politician, the duty to cooperate 
is “nothing new” (Senior Local Councillor, North Herts). He, quite correctly, pointed to 
bodies like the Hertfordshire Infrastructure and Planning Group and Hertfordshire Planners’ 
Group, which have been operating for decades as examples of strategic spatial planning. This 
Conservative politician did concede that what was new about the duty was the legal test – of 
which there have been a number of interesting examples – which, he argued, made the duty, 
“a bit of a misnomer”. Instead, according to him, the essence of the duty is shared Housing 
Market Areas and the technical concept of ‘unmet need’ (situation particularly affecting 
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‘under-bounded’ authorities like Stevenage and Luton). This sentiment reflected an interesting 
tendency during the interviews of the politicians to emphasise the rational/technical aspects 
of planning, and the contrasting propensity of the planning practitioners to focus on the 
political nature of the process. Perhaps the most insightful comment on the nature of the duty 
to cooperate was provided by a Senior Planner at North Herts DC, who described it as “a non-
redistributive policy” compared to the previous, Regional Plan led system, where growth was 
distributed across regions in a top-down fashion. Interestingly, this officer was unsure if this 
non-redistributive quality of the new system, “was the government’s intention or not”. This 
notion of unintended consequences was a recurring feature to emerge from the interviews. 
As he went on to point out, if you were an authority whose growth was being redistributed 
elsewhere under the Regional Plan (such as Stevenage), “you were actually doing all right”. 
Now, for these authorities, the duty “has come home to roost”, causing a wide variation in 
attitudes and approaches to the duty. 
Intrinsic to, and inseparable from, the duty to cooperate is the notion of ‘unmet need’. What 
emerged from the interviews is that both politicians and practitioners are keenly conscious of 
the different types of housing need to affect their areas. Overall housing targets are based on an 
authority’s ‘own’ projected need, as well as an element of ‘unmet need’ from one’s neighbours – 
and not necessarily one’s immediate neighbours. It was explained that a significant component 
of housing targets under the previous system were to “mop-up needs from across the whole 
region” (Senior Planning Officer, North Herts). It was quite apparent from the interviews that 
one’s ‘own’ needs were of an entirely different order of importance than ‘unmet need’ from 
other, perhaps quite far away authorities, especially for net receivers like North Herts. 
Although, as noted above, there was an attempt by at least one of the politicians interviewed to 
‘de-politicise’ the issues associated with the duty to cooperate, the “intensely political” (Senior 
Planner, Hertfordshire CC) nature of the process was a recurring theme. Labour-run Luton 
felt particularly vulnerable because they were surrounded by Conservative authorities (around 
85% of their border is Central Bedfordshire, with the remaining 15% North Herts). The latest 
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figures for their need were estimated at 18,000 new houses up to 2031, of which 6,000 can be 
accommodated within the borough boundaries. Thus, “even if it wasn’t opposing politics, are 
you thinking one council is suddenly welcoming 12,000 houses?” (Senior Planner, Luton BC). 
Recent interventions by senior politicians were particularly bemoaned – specifically the recent 
letter by the Planning Minister, Nick Boles, in which he professed himself to be “disturbed” by 
what he perceived to be an attack on the green belt in Reigate and Banstead (Boles, 2014) as 
well as Ed Miliband’s December 2013 speech in Stevenage, as noted in Chapter One – this type 
of activity was branded as “political mischief ” (Senior Planner, North Herts DC). 
In effect this type of activity highlights one of the many fissures in central-local relations as 
well as the fact that what may be viewed as ‘helpful interventions’ from the centre can have 
unhelpful consequences at the local level (again recalling the phenomenon of unintended 
consequences). Ed Miliband’s Stevenage speech was described as “Sharon Taylor’s [Labour 
Leader of Stevenage BC] election campaign starting a year early” (Senior Conservative Local 
Councillor, North Herts), and was met with a distinct lack of enthusiasm by the Senior Planner 
at Stevenage, who believed that it would be little different in practice to the previous, regional 
system, in fact he described himself as “…totally pessimistic. The ‘Right to Grow’ as currently 
constructed will be no better than the duty to cooperate.”
Nick Boles’ intervention to defend the sanctity of the green belt, although a probable vote-
winner at national level, could, in the opinion of the Senior Planner at North Herts, have even 
more pernicious effects than Miliband’s electioneering in Stevenage. Having reminded his 
elected members, “a few times” that:
  Green belt is only half a policy – if you want to stop growth going somewhere you have 
got to say where growth is going – don’t just say, ‘We’re green belt, that’s our policy, 
we defend that’. It’s too weak, the trouble is you get Nick Boles’ letter coming out and 
effectively saying, ‘Well, it’s green belt’.
A number of interesting and contradictory views regarding the green belt emerged from the 
interviews. The Senior Local Councillor from Luton was forthright in her view that much 
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of what is currently designated as green belt around her town is in fact low-grade disused 
agricultural land and should thus be reviewed. The Senior Planner at Stevenage extended this 
line of thought by contending that,
  …a lot of the arguments we’ve had over the years about West of Stevenage have not 
been about green belt or any of those environmental arguments, they’ve been, ‘These 
are our fields, these are not Stevenage’s fields, these are North Herts’ fields, how dare 
you think that you can build on North Herts’ fields.
The Senior Planner at Luton focused on the level of variation that individual Secretaries of 
State/Ministers can have on the interpretation of green belt policy by noting the enhanced 
level of protection currently afforded it by both Mr Pickles and Mr Boles. He also referenced 
Mr Boles’ intervention, three days after ‘clarifying’ his position on the green belt, by directly 
refuting Ed Miliband’s ‘Right to Grow’ policy in a series of bullet points published online, 
specifically:
  …we have considered and rejected the proposals of HM opposition to allow councils 
to undermine green belt protection and dump development on their neighbours’ 
doorstep.
Although housing, and specifically the crisis of affordability affecting first-time buyers, 
was a significant issue across the political spectrum in the run-up to the 2015 General 
Election, specific policies relating to the green belt, urban expansion and strategic transport 
infrastructure were very thin on the ground beyond general assurances to build x hundred 
thousand new homes by 2020 (x being gradually ramped up as the respective campaigns 
progressed). 
The Senior Planner at Luton made the astute point that, with the loss of the regional tier 
of governance, a “mega-strategic policy like the green belt” is now being reviewed, “on an 
individual borough basis…it needs a more strategic approach.” This vacuum reveals a serious 
disjuncture affecting strategic spatial planning, namely the inability of either central or local 
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government to adequately manage and implement urban containment policy, since central 
government is usually unaware of the particular local circumstances and amenity value of 
land classified as green belt, with individual local authorities unable to take a sufficiently 
strategic approach to reviews, for a range of obvious reasons. It is clear, however, that the 
centre still exerts huge control over green belt policy, acting as, “the final arbiter” on strategic 
development proposals in affected locations, as the Senior Labour Local Councillor at 
Stevenage put it.
A “massive conflict” between the duty to cooperate and green belt policy was identified by the 
Senior Local Councillor in Luton, specifically between the need for varied, creative approaches 
to strategic housing needs (i.e. urban extensions, entirely new settlements), which, in the 
Greater South East would almost certainly require green belt land. It would appear that the 
more pro-growth authorities have undertaken recent green belt reviews, whereas a persistent 
tactic of those opposed to new strategic development is to “hunker down and put the blinkers 
on” (Senior Planner, Stevenage) – i.e. to keep the status quo and put off any green belt reviews 
until the last possible minute. 
Since the interviews were held across a period of over one year, and involved a repeat visit (to 
talk to the Senior Planner at Stevenage), it was possible to hear directly from the principal 
actors of interesting developments. The biggest of these was undoubtedly the “epiphany” 
(Senior Planner, Stevenage) experienced by North Herts, who had taken, “a major intellectual 
step forward” (Senior Labour Local Councillor, Stevenage) in their attitude towards strategic 
housing development, progressing their Local Plan, and agreeing to a green belt review. These 
were, of course, all seen as very positive developments by the Stevenage participants, although 
the optimism was tempered by the realisation that any concrete decisions were still a long way 
off and that North Herts would have to, “keep their nerve” (Senior Labour Local Councillor, 
Stevenage). When asked in the repeat interview about possible reasons for North Herts’ change 
of heart, the Senior Planner at Stevenage conjectured that there were two principal drivers; 
firstly, the impact of the NPPF, and specifically the presumption in favour of development 
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where there was no up-to-date Local Plan or five year supply of land, and, secondly, the 
difference between North Herts’ buoyant housing market and Stevenage’s, which he described 
as, “dead as a dodo”. He believed that, after not having an updated, adopted Local Plan since 
1996, North Herts was fearful that key strategic development control decisions might be taken 
out of their hands, especially in the context of a highly pressured housing market. However, 
despite this breakthrough in cross-boundary relations, Stevenage have crafted an entirely new 
strategic development focus, putting the West of Stevenage proposals on the ‘back-burner’ and 
focusing instead on a town-centre first policy (branded ‘Stevenage First’), which is projected 
to yield between 2,000 and 2,500 new homes, as opposed to the 1,300 unit total possible 
on that portion of the Stevenage West site within the council’s boundaries. This change of 
focus has been brought about largely by infrastructure concerns, since the West of Stevenage 
development will need a £10 million underpass to connect it with the town, whether 1,300, 
3,600 or 5,000 homes are built, and so, without public money, “you can kiss that particular 
development goodbye” (Senior Planner at Stevenage, repeat interview).
5.2: Creative solutions to the strategic spatial planning conundrum
In the face of such difficulties with cross-boundary co-operation, there were two rather 
creative solutions suggested by representatives of both Labour and Conservative run councils. 
The Senior Planner at Stevenage, immediately after noting North Herts’ rage that Stevenage 
should “have the temerity to want to build on their fields”, suggested that, “if that’s the 
principal obstacle, why don’t we make your fields our fields?”
In other words he was suggesting no less than a redrawing of local authority boundaries and 
he provided two examples to back up his argument. Pointing first to Luton, he argued that this 
was a good example of the – often arbitrary – nature of local authority boundaries. Luton and 
Dunstable are one and the same built-up area, with the boundary between the two running, 
“just down the middle of a road, 1930’s houses on each side and so Dunstable is just really part 
of the conurbation” (Senior Planner, Luton). Due to this quirk of boundary-fixing, Luton is 
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incredibly under-bounded and is becoming one of the biggest problems in the Greater South 
East in terms of strategic spatial planning, even more so than Stevenage (Senior Conservative 
Local Councillor, North Herts). The Senior Planner at Stevenage then pointed to Bedford as 
an eminently sensible example of how to draw local authority boundaries, with the town in 
the centre surrounded by a significant hinterland, meaning that decisions on where to expand 
can be made by Bedford with little need to consult its neighbours. When this comparison was 
put the Senior Planner at North Herts, he pointed out that, “planning is not the driver of how 
boundaries get redrawn”, but, referring to the last Labour government’s 2009 redrawing of 
boundaries in Bedfordshire, agreed that:
…what they should have done is put South Bedfordshire with Luton and then Luton, 
Dunstable, Houghton Regis would have been one Unitary [authority] dominated 
by Luton, but it would also have covered most of the Luton hinterland and it would 
certainly have covered all of that urban area…but political reasons, financial reasons, all 
get in the way of what might make sense in planning terms…
However, the Senior Conservative Local Councillor at North Herts made a valid analogy that, 
for some authorities, agreeing to boundary changes meant they would cease to exist or be 
largely swallowed up by a neighbour, so this would be a case of “turkeys voting for Christmas”. 
This politician offered a rather different solution to the problem of unmet need for places like 
Stevenage, which according to him, could be met by building in the most appropriate place, 
not necessarily adjacent to their boundaries:
…there isn’t necessarily the assumption that it has to be immediately adjacent to 
Stevenage, and if it is adjacent to Stevenage it doesn’t have to be to the west of it. It may 
well be that there is a better solution somewhere else because it will deliver affordable 
housing.
Although he did not explicitly draw the link, this Senior Conservative Local Councillor 
was perhaps anticipating Chancellor George Osborne’s announcement on Monday 17th 
March 2014 that Ebbsfleet had been chosen as the site of a ‘proper’ 15,000 home garden city 
announced on the BBC’s Andrew Marr Show (Carpenter, 2014). The article relating to this 
story on the BBC News website quickly attracted over 500 comments, largely split down the 
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middle between support and opposition (BBC, 2014).
5.3: Using strategic spatial planning as a tool to achieve political goals
Although these two creative solutions to strategic spatial planning problems were offered 
during the interview process, there were also some indications of planning being used to 
achieve political goals, which of course operate over a much shorter cycle than strategic 
development. It is hard to see that the duty to cooperate has been in any way successful in 
the Hertfordshire/Bedfordshire sub-region when there are utterly opposing positions to what 
should be straightforward, factual questions such as, ‘Does Stevenage have unmet housing 
need?’ Clearly there are nuances to this question, such as whether one is referring to a 
particular five-year cycle, but the Senior Planner at Stevenage was adamant that:
…at the moment we don’t believe we can meet the borough’s requirement within the 
borough boundary…so currently if I don’t get some cooperation from one or other of 
our immediate neighbours, I’m in deep, deep difficulty. Deep difficulty, because I can’t 
deliver a Local Plan which is compliant with the NPPF. So we too will be sitting on our 
hands.
This was refuted thus by the Senior Conservative Local Councillor at North Herts:
Well, at the moment Stevenage have no requirement for expansion into North Herts, 
because they have no requirement that they can’t meet. There will be new figures 
coming out…Who knows what they’ll say? Maybe they’ll say that Stevenage does have 
some unmet need.
This exchange touches on two further matters of importance: Stevenage’s long-term goals, 
including whether it is using strategic developments like West of the A1(M) to achieve Unitary 
Authority status (which would free it from the shackles of Hertfordshire County Council) and 
the manner in which highly technical sub-national population projections, initially provided 
by the ONS and subsequently converted into household estimates by CLG, become highly 
politicised and one of the principal battlegrounds of the duty to cooperate.
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Three written representations to the 2004 Inquiry specifically mentioned Stevenage’s use of the 
West of the A1(M) proposals as a means to help it achieve Unitary Authority status (Lavender, 
2004: 187, 188, 190). This assertion was put to the Senior Planner at Stevenage who responded 
as follows:
I think that, if push came to shove, and you asked my members, ‘Would you like to be 
free of the shackles of Hertfordshire County Council’, I’ve no doubt they would say, 
‘Yes, absolutely, we’d love to embrace that’…[but] the threshold for becoming a Unitary 
Authority has tended to shift over the years.
The officer’s reference to ‘thresholds’ was a tacit acceptance that it would be difficult for 
Stevenage – with a current population of around 82,000 – to achieve Unitary Authority status, 
even if it reaches its aspired population of 100,000 – 120,000. The prospect of Stevenage 
achieving Unitary Authority status was met firstly with hilarity, then with a counter-proposal, 
by the Senior Conservative Local Councillor:
Well Stevenage will never get Unitary status! It’s tiny, Stevenage is only 80,000 people. 
North Hertfordshire has got 120,000 – we’re much bigger! But put Stevenage and North 
Hertfordshire and East Hertfordshire together, perhaps throw in Welwyn Hatfield – 
then you’ve got a Unitary worth having!
The Senior Labour Local Councillor gave a more nuanced answer to the question of 
Stevenage’s Unitary Authority aspirations by stating that, “the answer is, would Stevenage 
like to be a Unitary Authority – yes. Is it basing its planning policy on becoming a UA, the 
answer is no.” This would appear to reveal once again the ‘de-politicisation’ of planning by local 
politicians, with this figure then going on to explicitly link UA status with the ONS population 
projections, from which household formation forecasts are calculated and which ultimately 
will determine the speed and direction of travel Stevenage Borough Council will take on its 
journey towards Unitary Authority status.
5.4: The ‘alchemy’ of turning historical trends into future projections
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The thorny issue of the ONS/CLG population projections, which play such a contested role in 
the duty to cooperate, was a recurring theme throughout the interviews. The principal point 
of contention was whether they really are merely ‘a starting point’ as the ONS stress, or if the 
Planning Inspectorate as is treating them as de facto housing targets, as was argued by the 
Senior Planning Officer at North Herts:
Certainly the Planning Inspectorate are treating those CLG projections as de facto 
housing targets unless you’ve got exceedingly good evidence as to something else, and 
I’ve yet to see a Plan that gets through with exceedingly good evidence as to why there 
should be something else.
Interestingly, the Senior Conservative Local Councillor at North Herts took the opposite view 
to his officer, attempting to convince me that:
The Inspectors have been told very clearly that the ONS numbers are projections, not 
targets. Now, it would appear from the early cases that some Inspectors appeared to 
treat them as targets, but that’s because there was no evidence to show them that they 
weren’t.
This would seem to be another example of politicians involved in the planning process 
attempting to ‘depoliticise’ the process, emphasising the technical, rational characteristics of 
the system. Somewhat paradoxically though, this same politician succinctly summarised the 
essential problem with forecasting demographic trends as the “alchemic process of attempting 
to turn projections based on the past into targets based on the future”.  That is not to say that 
the current system cannot be improved, however. The Senior Planning Officer at Hertfordshire 
County Council referenced a meeting in which the Planning Minister, Nick Boles, had visited 
Hertfordshire to issue a ‘rap over the knuckles’ about a failure to identify ‘correct’ housing 
targets:
…last year a number of the districts got called into a meeting with Nick Boles. And 
it was, ‘You’re not doing very well here, are you? Get on with it!’ It was a typical 
Ministerial meeting in terms of Nick Boles coming in for ten minutes then jumping out 
of the meeting. Then we had a big discussion in terms of politicians there, leaders of 
councils, and they’re saying, ‘We don’t understand this, the guidance says it should be a 
starting point, so why are you bashing us over the head with it? If we can come up with 
reasons why we can’t do that, isn’t that good enough?
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The evidence coming from recent duty to cooperate cases like Brighton and Hove and Mid 
Sussex would strongly suggest that Inspectors are placing a very high value on the ‘starting 
point’ projections produced by ONS/CLG. The key phrase in the process of transforming 
these numbers into spatially differentiated housing targets is ‘objectively assessed need’, which 
sounds like a technical, non-political process. Not so, according to the Senior Planning Officer 
at Hertfordshire County Council:
…it’s a sham, sadly… The problem comes back to ‘objectively assessed needs’ and the 
interpretation of those. ‘Objectively assessed needs’ and ONS population projections 
are a ‘starting point’ – well, no they’re not, they’re not being treated as a starting point, 
they’re being treated as, ‘This is what you will do on an individual district basis’, unless 
you can come up with the most incredible reason why you shouldn’t do them, unless 
you can come up with someone else to take your housing levels for you.
The population estimates are comprised of two elements: ‘natural change’ (i.e. births minus 
deaths) and net migration. Clearly migration is much more susceptible to fluctuations than 
natural change, particularly if a strategic development such as an urban extension is built 
onto an existing urban area. The important issue of what complexity scientists describe as 
‘sensitivity to initial conditions’ was raised by this officer, when he noted the convention to 
calculate net migration from five year ‘chunks’:
Whoa! Hold on a minute! Your population projection is done then, if it’s done two years 
later it’s like that! So you’re saying that we plan on the basis of the next twenty years in 
terms of those numbers? That can’t be right, can it?
It was clear from the interviews that the population experts at both ONS and CLG were very 
unwilling to get involved in the ‘nitty-gritty’ business of extrapolating housing targets on an 
individual district level. For example, it is well known that there are particular population 
‘anomalies’ in Hertfordshire. The Senior Planning Officer at Hertfordshire County Council 
takes up the story:
So they [CLG] said, ‘Feedback these anomalies and we’ll take them to ONS’, but 
there was no ownership of the issue, it was, ‘Yeah, yeah, we know there’s problems, 
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we know there’s issues’, but still they wouldn’t go that extra mile to say, ‘Yes, we see 
you’ve got some anomalies, we’ll make a note to the effect that you should have your 
Examination on whether those are actually the right numbers for you’. It was, ‘Oh well, 
put something in and I’m sure that ONS will do something about it’. Well, ONS have 
had the recent round of consultation on their latest draft numbers where they actually 
narrowed down the basis upon which you could comment’. So we couldn’t even raise 
the things that we wanted to raise.
It would appear that ONS produce the projections as that – purely straight-line projections – 
and in the process at CLG where these numbers are transformed into household formation 
forecasts they take on the quality of “Gospel truth” (Senior Planning Officer, Stevenage). 
Whereas previously the regional bodies would ‘play’ with the CLG numbers, and could lobby 
central government far more powerfully, in their absence local planning authorities are told 
by CLG, “Yes, that’s what we want, that’s what your housing requirement is” (Senior Planning 
Officer, Stevenage). In any event, quite significant discrepancies were discovered in the ONS 
population projections when the 2011 Census data was released. In effect, most districts in 
Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire had to revise upwards their housing targets; in Stevenage’s case 
that meant going from 5,300 to 7,800 and in Luton from 18,000 to 26,000 – “so everybody…
is looking appalled at these projections” (Senior Planning Officer, Stevenage). The Senior 
Planning Officer at Hertfordshire felt that planning was returning to the “bad old days of 
‘predict and provide’” and felt that there was surprisingly little resistance to this, “the planning 
profession just bent over really, just swayed with it.” 
The Senior Labour Local Councillor at Stevenage substantiated this by questioning the 
impartiality of the Planning Inspectorate, opining that, “this idea that the Inspectorate is 
independent is quite wrong, there are ground rules under which they operate and they’re set 
by the Department [CLG].” Therefore housing figures, in tandem with green belt policy, appear 
to be ongoing techniques and instruments through which the centre disciplines and exerts 
control over the local in key areas. This disciplining is often expressed informal channels; 
the same Senior Labour Local Councillor recounted an anecdote relating to a recently 
retired Inspector who was subsequently employed by the CLG to visit authorities who were 
experiencing difficulties with cross-boundary co-operation and have ‘chats’ with them. The 
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essence of these ‘chats’ was that central government would not even entertain any housing 
figures arrived at by local authorities which were less than those published in the (by now 
defunct) Regional Plan. In this way, the ‘ghost’ of regional planning lingers on and we are still 
rather far away from the truly localist scenario of housing need being determined from the 
bottom up.
5.5: Cross-scalar governance relations
What emerged time and again from the interviews was the inherently people-centred nature 
of strategic spatial planning which completely gave the lie to the discipline as a purely (or even 
principally) technocratic-rational activity (Campbell and Marshall, 1999: 469). These ‘glimpses 
of humanity’ tended to emerge when the participant was talking about interactions with other 
professionals or politicians working at a different spatial or governance scale. For example, an 
assertion made by the Senior Planning Officer at Stevenage was that few, if any, of the people 
with responsibility for spatial planning at the CLG actually have any planning qualifications or 
background in planning:
I’m not making this up, and I’m not making a rude assertion, but all of the planning 
officials at CLG are not planners. None of them are planners. I went to a presentation, 
it must have been about two-and-a-half/three years ago now, organised by CLG to talk 
about population, it was actually about neighbourhood planning in truth. There were 
several young members of the planning team there – who were all remarkably senior 
for such young planners – and the person who was in charge opened the day in front of 
a room full of qualified town planners from local authorities all over the UK by saying, 
‘I’m the Senior Planner yadda yadda, I don’t have any planning qualification, I’ve never 
worked in planning, I’ve never worked in a local authority’. And then proceeded to tell 
us what we were expected to do. I thought to myself, ‘What kind of authority do you 
carry when you are not a qualified planner, you patently don’t understand the issues, 
you’ve never worked in a local authority, and you know nothing about the subject 
you’re talking about?’
The Senior Planning Officer in Luton gave a potential explanation for the hard-line approach 
taken by many Planning Inspectors:
The other thing that I don’t think was ever expected was how the Planning Inspectorate 
would finally interpret what’s written into those four paragraphs [in the NPPF]. I 
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personally think that their views weren’t taken into consideration when the thing was 
being drafted. I think they said, ‘This is unworkable’, and the Planning Minister said, 
‘We’re going to do it anyway’. So therefore, I think they’re taking a bit of revenge, to a 
certain extent. They are doing it literally, so when it says, you’ve got to discuss with all 
your neighbours on a continuing basis, all the time, which essentially is what it says – 
that’s impossible, right?
One of the major bones of contention between Stevenage and Hertfordshire County Council/
North Herts District Council was whether the West of Stevenage proposals were a genuine 
urban extension or virtually a new settlement, given the huge barrier effect of the A1(M) and 
the fact that only two underground tunnels were planned to link the development to the rest of 
the town. After asking me where “I heard that from?”, the Senior Planning Officer at Stevenage 
was genuinely annoyed that his colleague at Hertfordshire County Council was, “not still 
peddling that old number is he? Dear me. I know [him] very well, but he shouldn’t be peddling 
that kind of idea.”
Drawing on his thirty years of experience in public sector planning, the Senior Planner 
at Stevenage, in our repeat interview, outlined some of the difficulties inherent under the 
old regional system, which, he argued, were, “a recipe for argument, disagreement, delay, 
obfuscation and outright lying on occasion.” This was particularly the case at a point around 
2000, under New Labour, where strategic spatial planning was subject to Regional Plans, 
Structure Plans and Local Development Frameworks, “and that was an absolute nightmare”. He 
went on to recount some of the strategies employed by local authorities and County councils 
against their regional overlords at the East of England Regional Assembly, including feeding 
them:
  literally thousands of pieces of information to EERA and not tell them what it meant, 
and not to give them any decision about where it should go, and, if they were asked a 
difficult question, well, basically they’d lie to them.
Since the Regional Planning Bodies responsible for drawing up RSSs contained private sector 
representatives on their boards, they were criticised by local authorities and County councils 
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as lacking democratic accountability, and the Senior Planner at Stevenage raised the question 
of why they haven’t been complaining as vociferously about LEPs - as he put it, “because they 
don’t have planning powers.” In other words, this participant concluded, planning:
  works best when you’ve just got one planning authority. As soon as you start having 
two or more you’ve got a recipe for argument, disagreement, delay, obfuscation and 
outright lying on occasion. There came one point when we had regional planning, 
structure plans and local plans and that was an absolute nightmare. You certainly didn’t 
need three tiers.
An interesting facet of local-regional regions to emerge from the interviews, and not as much 
discussed in the literature as central-local relations, was the rather fearful attitude of the local 
authority actors (both professional and political) towards London, which is of course the 
only area of England to have some form of regional governance. The Senior Labour Local 
Councillor at Stevenage confessed that, “the sheer London factor [and] the way London is 
operated [is] a bigger fear for all of Hertfordshire and to Luton...exactly how many of their 
people is Boris [Johnson, Mayor of London] going to house?”
5.6: The new machinery of strategic spatial planning: LEPs, the NHB and CIL
Each interview respondent was asked for his/her opinion on how the Local Enterprise 
Partnerships were functioning, particularly in regard to strategic spatial planning and cross-
boundary cooperation. The principal message to emerge was that LEPs are not particularly 
well suited to strategic spatial planning as it relates to housing. LEPs are potentially much 
better to suited to strategic transport matters, as discussed below. The Senior Executive at 
SEMLEP admitted that, “when the LEP was set up there wasn’t a great deal of thinking about 
strategic planning.” Phrases used to describe LEPs as they related to strategic spatial planning 
were “clunky” (Senior Planner, Luton) and “curious” (Senior Planner, North Herts). The two 
main problems are the weak elected member and public sector involvement in LEPs and the 
lack of ownership of strategic spatial planning. There were also concerns raised by the Senior 
Planner at North Herts that the private sector were involved mainly to follow their own 
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agendas:
The private sector have gone into it with the mindset of, ‘Oh, this might be something 
that we might be able to get something out of ’, in terms of plugging something here, or 
promoting something there. 
There appears to have been a bifurcation in the strategic direction taken by most LEPs, which, 
according to the Senior Executive at SEMLEP, either became largely driven by their local 
authority members (this was particularly the case for those LEPs which were created from 
County council boundaries) or adopted a private sector driven ethos. The latter approach 
was taken by SEMLEP, which made the conscious decision, “to be completely separate from 
the local authorities” (Senior Executive, SEMLEP) and so based itself in the science and 
technology ‘innovation hub’ of Cranfield University. The geography of LEPs across the study 
area is rather complex, with North Herts a member of both the South Cambridgeshire LEP 
and the Hertfordshire LEP, and Luton in the South East Midlands LEP (SEMLEP). Those 
authorities, like North Herts, in more than one LEP therefore “look both ways” and the process 
of extracting funding is certainly made more difficult, “when we go to Hertfordshire for things, 
they say, ‘Oh, well, you’re only getting half funding’, because the other half of our funding 
comes from Cambridge (Senior Planner, North Herts). 
SEMLEP’s strategy of distancing itself from its constituent local authorities was by no means 
unique, with the Senior Planner at North Herts complaining (in respect of the Hertfordshire 
LEP) that local authorities “were almost discouraged from being put on it”. It was therefore 
no surprise to hear that Luton’s experience as members of SEMLEP was largely negative and 
confirms Pugalis and Townsend’s (2013a: 115) perception of LEPs as “toothless tigers” or 
“talking shops”, as noted in Chapter Three:
Well, I go to the planners’ SEMLEP coordination meeting and all that I read, see is 
them moaning about the inadequacy of the duty to cooperate, so we all agree that we’ll 
produce a complicated spreadsheet of all our cross-boundary issues, and somehow 
that’ll do it? Of course it won’t! All it does is raise the problem, all we’re doing is 
collating the problem.
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A more serious problem is the fact that LEPs in general, and the Hertfordshire LEP in 
particular, “has got no stomach at all for promoting levels of growth” (Senior Planner, 
Hertfordshire County Council). The draft version of the Hertfordshire LEP’s vision for the 
future – the Strategic Economic Plan (thus, in the unavoidable jargon of planning, ‘LEP SEP’) 
– was recently criticised by central government:
It’s all about economic growth but then as soon as LEPs start preparing their Strategic 
Economic Plans or whatever they might be, the government are saying, ‘Well, where are 
all your houses?’ Well, we weren’t set up to be housing bodies! They are finding their 
way, and I think the government is trying to find their way, but in effect they actually 
replaced one unaccountable, unelected setup with another at which you can level 
almost all the same criticisms, just at a different scale of geography. (Senior Planner, 
North Herts).
Virtually the same complaint was made by the County Council:
The feedback that they’ve had on the draft LEP SEP has been, ‘Great analysis, not a bad 
idea in terms of where you want to go in terms of the economy, but you, LEP, should be 
pushing the housing agenda in Hertfordshire and getting more houses built’. The LEP 
have basically gone, ‘What? So you tell me everything that I’m here to do in terms of the 
analysis is fine, but you want me to do something else entirely, which you’ve taken the 
machinery away yourself.’ (Senior Planner, Hertfordshire County Council).
The Senior Planner at Stevenage, in our repeat interview, went so far as to describe this change 
of focus as, “interesting abuse of a body that government had set up for one purpose and then 
gave it another.” He explicitly linked this change in emphasis to the national political cycle, 
noting that:
  When this government first came in in 2010, it was, ‘Build all over the green belt, 
don’t worry, just build all over it. It’s housing, housing, housing, housing.’ Then about 
two years ago it was a case of, ‘This is down to local councils, it’s up to them to make 
decisions about the balance’. In the last twelve months, it’s been, ‘No, no, no, you never, 
ever build in the green belt.’ And of course, a lot of LAs are not nimble enough to keep 
up with that. If you’re in a fairly inflexible plan-making process and you started out 
when it was, ‘Build all over the green belt’, and suddenly you’re now finding that you’re 
having to say to your members, ‘You know we told you we had to build all over the 
green belt, well, you don’t!’
This requirement to be agile, reflecting Allmendinger and Haughton’s (2009) ‘soft spaces’ of 
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Figure 5: LEP 2015 Growth Fund per capita spend (DCLG, 2014)
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governance and Pugalis and Townsend’s (2013b) ‘fleet of foot’ partnerships was particularly 
difficult for some elected members to grasp, as recounted by the Senior Planning Officer at 
Stevenage, in our repeat interview:
  There are a couple of authorities in Hertfordshire which have found themselves with 
their pants pulled down around their ankles – Broxbourne, St Albans, where their 
members have had a presentation from somebody from central government and 
suddenly the members are turning round to their officers and saying, ‘What the bloody 
hell’s going on here, you told us we had to build on the green belt and now we’re being 
told we don’t have to!’
This same participant also argued that the behaviour of the Planning Inspectorate in relation 
to approving Local Plans was also affected by the political cycle, citing the period between 
2010-2013 where, “clearly the briefing that had been given to PINS was, ‘It doesn’t matter 
what housing numbers are in them, just approve them, get them through.’” Therefore many 
Local Plans were approved, including some in Hertfordshire, “where the housing numbers 
[were] abominably low.” However, as the parties jockeyed for position in the long run up to the 
2015 General Election, the system was “sharply tightened up” and this resulted in the non-
compliance or outright rejection of a large number of Plans. This participant concluded that 
the Inspectorate was, “clearly being told something very different today from what they were 
being told at the beginning of this government”, and that they were, “serving their masters 
well.”
Lack of funding was also mentioned as a problem, or, even where funding appears to be 
available, the difficulty in ‘unlocking’ it. As noted in Chapter One, the funding landscape 
is complex, with the Growing Places Fund (“relatively small beer” according to the Senior 
Planner at Hertfordshire County Council), Regional Growth Fund and the Heseltine-Report 
inspired Single Growth Pot. This latter source of funding was expected to be significant, of 
the order of £8 - £10 billion, however it is no more than £2 billion at present. As the Senior 
Planner at Hertfordshire County Council went on to explain about the Single Growth Pot:
 In Year 1 nearly all of it has been allocated, but with, it’s not even a string, it’s more like 
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a rope attached to it by the donating department, and a lot of it is already committed, 
so it’s not even new money. So it’s not going to make a great deal of difference. It’s 
going to be used and highlighted and badged as unlocking ‘x’ number of jobs and ‘x’ 
number of houses, but it’s really by the looks of it and the feedback that we’ve got is 
that government is looking for very, very, very short-term gains and short-term wins in 
terms of unlocking sites that are all ready to go and are just stalled on the basis of a little 
bit more infrastructure money. To be honest, we haven’t really got that type of site in 
Hertfordshire.
The perception that policy was very much made ‘on the hoof ’ in the early days was confirmed 
by the Senior Executive at SEMLEP, who described the confusion over the purpose of the 
Strategic Economic Plans that each LEP was asked to produce. Were they, as their name 
would seem to suggest, long term planning documents or were they actually part of the 
bidding process for the first round of the Heseltine-inspired Growth Pot funding? The Senior 
Executive admitted that not much further clarity had been reached on this question. In fact, 
by the time the scanty guidance on producing Strategic Economic Plans had been issued in 
July 2013, SEMLEP had already produced an Infrastructure Plan, based on the Local Plans of 
its constituent authorities (although these were at various stages of progression). Creating this 
Infrastructure Plan was no easy task, as the Senior Executive at SEMLEP admitted, although 
it was indicative of the proactive and technocratic approach taken by her organisation, which 
went on to produce a detailed Transport Strategy in collaboration with global engineering 
consultancy WYG (SEMLEP/WYG, 2014). This focus on transport appeared to be a sensible 
strategy, since almost half of the initial £2 billion available to bid for from the first year of the 
Growth Deal was provided by the Department for Transport. 
However, SEMLEP’s tactic of bidding for this funding for four prioritised transport projects, 
supported by detailed modelling and appraisal documentation produced by ARUP did not 
pay off as expected, with a disappointing per capita allocation, as detailed on the map overleaf. 
It is quite clear from the map that funding on a per capita basis was directed to the north of 
England, with the wider South East generally losing out (with the exception of Hertfordshire 
LEP). Hertfordshire LEP pursued a different strategy of producing a much more general, 
high level Strategic Economic Plan, without any supporting detailed modelling and appraisal 
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documentation, which was used to bid for a larger range of “small beer” projects, such as 
putting a roof over a pedestrian bridge, according to the Senior Planning Officer at Stevenage 
in our repeat interview. This ‘shotgun’ strategy appears to have paid off, with Hertfordshire 
LEP awarded per capita funding equivalent to £54.22 as opposed to the per capita allocation 
of £22.73 to SEMLEP. When questioned about the possible reasons for this disappointing 
allocation, the Senior Executive at SEMLEP expressed disappointment with the opacity of 
the process, which, “was handled in a very odd way”, with, “a lot of politics involved”. She 
intimated that central government had a bias in favour of certain projects, a number of which 
were, “barely developed yet, which I’m just amazed at.” 
A more tangible issue which negatively affected SEMLEP and a number of other LEPs was that 
of overlaps. In funding terms, areas in two LEPs were paid funds on the basis of half of the 
population of the affected areas, but the Senior Executive at SEMLEP alluded to the political 
differences and difficulties in cross-boundary co-operation that overlaps created, providing 
the example of Aylesbury Vale, which was, “being pulled towards Buckinghamshire; Bucks 
South Thames LEP are openly hostile to the fact that Aylesbury Vale is part of SEMLEP”. They 
apparently pursued this hostile agenda by writing letters to local newspapers insinuating 
that Aylesbury Vale, through its membership of SEMLEP, was ‘taking money away’ from 
Buckinghamshire South Thames LEP, specifically European funding. The unsuitability of LEPs 
as a vehicle to disburse European funding was conceded by the Senior SEMLEP Executive, 
who noted that, “basically the EU doesn’t recognise LEPs and to some extent I can understand 
why”, going on to list their lack of democratic accountability, widely varying governance 
arrangements and sheer number as reasons for this.
It would thus appear that any expectation in the short- to medium-term that LEPs are going 
to be the decisive factor in whether strategic sites like West of Stevenage get past the drawing-
board appears to be a pipedream. This question was put to the Senior Planner at North Herts:
I’m not sure that they’ll go that far. I think they’ll talk far more about overall housing 
numbers. That’s just my experience of the local LEP we have here, it might be that other 
LEPs elsewhere in the country are more imposing.
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His use of the verb ‘talk’ in this answer is rather telling: a combination of the Hertfordshire 
LEP’s unwillingness to ‘roll up its sleeves’, ‘get its hands’ dirty’ in deciding on strategic sites and 
the local authorities’ refusal to be dictated to by LEPs would seem to confirm the Stevenage 
Senior Planner’s pessimism about any positive action on West of Stevenage. In a further twist, 
it appears that LEPs are now being cast as ‘the baddies’ pushing a pro-development agenda; 
the Senior Executive at SEMLEP recounted how she had recently had a deputation from the 
Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE), who had been told by a group of local authorities 
that, “all these new homes that they didn’t want built across the patch” were down to LEPs, 
something she found, “slightly mischievous”.
Even if LEPs were to be given much wider powers in respect of strategic spatial planning in 
the future, early indications are that their ambitions in respect of housing are much more 
limited than those of the old Growth Areas or Regional Plans. This was certainly the case with 
SEMLEP, which, although it covers a much larger area than the former MKSM, had a target of 
224,000 new homes by 2021 compared with SEMLEP’s target of 86,700, albeit over a shorter 
time span. The effects of the recession which started to appear in 2008 should also be factored 
in to the equation. In any case, by focusing prioritising strategic infrastructure over housing it 
could be argued that SEMLEP is putting the ‘horse before the cart’ and taking a common sense 
approach that will pay off over the long term.
When questioned on the practicalities of the NHB, respondents were, once again, generally 
negative on its efficacy. The main problem was that, just like the Single Pot, it was not ‘new’ 
money, rather it was funding rechannelled from central government grants to local authorities. 
In this sense it is not strictly a ‘bonus’. In fact, the Senior Labour Local Councillor at Stevenage 
explicitly linked the NHB to processes of ‘austerity urbanism’ when he stated that, “southern 
[English] councils, regardless of their political complexion, have probably found it as quite 
useful during this period when we’ve been facing 27% cuts”, although he noted that a number 
of councils had got themselves into difficulties by using NHB funds for revenue (i.e. day-today 
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running costs) instead of for capital projects (ideally building new homes, although this is not 
compulsory since the NHB is not ‘ring fenced’). As the Senior Executive at SEMLEP pointed 
out to me, this was a risky strategy since authorities need to borrow against this income 
stream as it is ‘future funding’, paid out only on completion of new properties. This same local 
politician agreed with my assertion that, in any case, the NHB was more suited to small-scale 
development, particularly through the community ‘Right to Build’ mechanism. The Senior 
Conservative Local Councillor at North Herts was privy to the embryonic development of the 
NHB:
When Grant Shapps first announced it, which was long before the coalition 
government, and I know because he told me about it in Tesco’s car-park in Hatfield. He 
said, ‘Effectively we’re going to bribe you, we’re going to pay you to build houses’. But in 
fact, no, it’s not that. You could argue that it’s the other way round, ‘We’re going to fine 
you if you don’t build houses, because we’ve taken it away from the core funding to get 
it back’.
Both Senior Planning Officers at Stevenage and North Herts confirmed that the NHB “would 
not be a decisive factor” in stimulating them to build more housing. In another interesting 
appeal to planning ethics and the ‘rights and wrongs’ of strategic spatial planning, the Senior 
Planner at North Herts went on to say:
Just pragmatically, it feels wrong, because s106 Agreements – it’s a fundamental 
principle of the planning system that you shall not buy a planning permission – well, 
what is New Homes Bonus? I know they put in clause 142 of the Localism Act saying, 
‘Local finance considerations are a material consideration’, but I don’t think it’s likely, 
certainly locally in my experience, it is not a determining factor.
The same Senior Executive also noted that a significant failing of Business Rates Retention 
(BRR), the NHB’s ‘sister’ policy, was that it lacked an assessment of needs element; in other 
words, the policy was unresponsive to attractive places like Milton Keynes, the fastest growing 
urban centre in the country according to the Centre for Cities (2015) and which are facing 
“step change” in terms of the facilities such as schools and hospitals that they need to provide.
The Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) did not emerge as a particularly pertinent issue 
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for participants across the study area, an indication perhaps of its unsuitability for national 
implementation. The Senior Labour Local Councillor at Stevenage did note that, “six out of 
ten authorities don’t think they’ll operate CIL in Hertfordshire, because there just isn’t any 
money to take out”, and that work done by the Hertfordshire Infrastructure Partnership (HIP) 
indicated that, “CIL would never have raised more than a third of general infrastructure costs”. 
The Senior Executive at SEMLEP was also critical of CIL, stating that, “it’s not a good way 
of providing the necessary forward funding.” She compared CIL unfavourably to the Milton 
Keynes tariff, discussed in Chapter 3 in the context of Growth Areas, and which raised around 
£18,000 per new home and which was used to forward fund the necessary infrastructure, 
as the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) was able to pay local authorities up front 
in anticipation of completions. The timing of payments from mechanisms designed to fund 
infrastructure, such as CIL or NHB, is therefore key, with funding which was injected into the 
development far earlier much more preferable. 
5.7: Strategic transport issues
As noted above, the LEPs in Hertfordshire/Bedfordshire were seen to be quite a useful forum 
for the identification of strategic transport issues, far more so than for housing. This was 
principally because there was widespread acceptance across the political spectrum that the 
sub-region needed significant investment in infrastructure before/in order to support housing 
developments like West of Stevenage, as stated by the Senior Conservative Local Councillor at 
North Herts:
One of the reasons, of course, that we can’t be much more aggressive [in building 
housing] is because of infrastructure, and that’s the problem we have in Hertfordshire. 
We have an infrastructure deficit, we’ve had it for years, and it’s got bigger. So if we can’t 
tackle the deficit, how are we ever going to tackle the future? 
The transport network was identified as the most serious infrastructure problem, with the 
bottleneck between Junctions 6 and 8 of the A1(M) a particular problem, and a similar 
bottleneck in the rail network north of Stevenage. Plans to widen the A1(M) from two to 
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three lanes were progressed under the last Conservative government (John Major), at a cost 
of around £167 million (“peanuts…compared to the damage it’s caused now”, according to the 
Senior Conservative Local Councillor), but these plans were quickly shelved by the incoming 
Labour government. There was widespread acceptance that these types of transport problems 
would have to be solved by central government; therefore early in 2014 a lobbying body called 
the Hertfordshire A1 Corridor Consortium was created, its membership consisting of local 
authority elected members, officers, LEP Board members and the Highways Agency.
A problem with using LEPs as a vehicle to deliver transport infrastructure was identified by the 
Senior Planner at Luton:
Now the logic of having Local Economic [sic] Partnerships is that it would be the 
top-tier authorities that would deliver infrastructure, so the districts, they’re not going 
to benefit from this, because the money’s not going to go to them. So actually Luton, 
Central Beds, Bedfordshire and Milton Keynes could apply for some money from a big 
piece of infrastructure kit, because they’re doing the transport. So that could be logical, 
but the others, that are in theory part of the LEP, well they’re not going to get the 
money, it’s going to go to the County.
The Senior Planner at North Herts brought up the issue of commuting patterns, particularly 
the sub-region’s links with London, and the increasing pressure that new development 
would put on already strained road and rail networks. The most illuminating responses to 
questions related to strategic transport and the duty to cooperate were given by the Senior 
Planner at Hertfordshire County Council; unsurprisingly, since the County Council still has 
responsibility for these matters. In yet another example of unintended consequences at central 
government level, this officer claimed that:
I’m quite sure that the government doesn’t realise that they’ve still left things like Local 
Transport Plan requirements on the statute. It’s one of those things where I’m sure if 
someone nudged them and they knew it they’d sweep them all away.
Interestingly, having been “side-lined” from more mainstream strategic spatial planning 
activities since the abolition of, first, Structure Plans and, subsequently, the Regional Plan 
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system, the County Council seised on the need to update its Local Transport Plan as an 
opportunity to:
stitch some of these strategic issues together via the medium of transport. Which is a 
strange way of doing it, but it’s the only game in town in terms of it covering the whole 
County (Senior Planner, Hertfordshire County Council).
5.8: Other strategic infrastructure issues
During the interview process, transport was by no means the only infrastructural deficit 
identified. Education, sewage and broadband were also mentioned as significant stumbling 
blocks on the road to strategic housing developments. One of the legal grounds on which the 
High Court judge ruled against the West of Stevenage Consortium was improper education 
provision. It was at this point that further information, not accessible from the documentary 
evidence, relating to non-cooperation between the landowners emerged. The West of the 
A1(M) site was split between eight or nine owners, but they had failed to agree amongst 
themselves a satisfactory land value equalization process. So, the person(s) who owned the 
land upon which the schools (one secondary, two primary) were to be built stood to make 
significantly less profit than other landowners whose land was principally to be used for 
housing. This was “sloppy practice in putting together the Consortium, to be frank” (Senior 
Planner, North Herts) and was the main cause in the delay between permission for PA3 
being granted in 2005 and 2009, when a Unilateral Undertaking (as opposed to a full s106 
Agreement to which the local authorities involved were also signatories) was finally agreed by 
the Consortium. This four year gap was the key delay, since, if the developers had been able 
to agree matters somewhat quicker, the final approval for going ahead would have occurred 
under the much more favourable Regional Plan system. The Senior Labour Local Councillor at 
Stevenage gave the example of a school in the Old Town which, under the old East of England 
Regional Plan, was to have been closed and reopened in Great Ashby, a new development 
a the northern tip of the town (and which was built uncontroversially as part of the ‘SNAP’ 
arrangements between Stevenage and North Herts). However, the demise of regional planning 
meant that ownership of the site reverted to the County Council, who then handed it over 
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to North Herts, who themselves proceeded to grant planning permission for (much more 
profitable) housing, meaning that Great Ashby still needs a school.
The sewage issue concerned the capacity of the major water recycling works at Rye Meads in 
the Lee Valley, which the Senior Planner at North Herts argued had set back the publication of 
their Local Plan by two years from 2008-2010, due to a European Directive on bird protection 
which forced the council to undertake a “stupidly expensive” water cycle study. He offered this 
as an example of being surprised at how far back the ‘ripple effects’ of the duty to cooperate 
(before it was officially known as such) operated. These ‘ripple effects’ were also identified by 
both the Senior Planner and Senior Labour Local Councillor at Luton as another example of 
the unintended consequences of the duty to cooperate:
 Going back to the Planning Inspectorate, they want you to consider the wider 
implications, the cross-border issues. Where is too far? Where is far enough? Let’s say 
we are asking our neighbour to deliver 5,000 houses; if they did it they are delivering 
5,000 more than they wanted, or were going to plan for. Does that mean they’ll try to 
get their neighbour on the other side to do 5,000 more? So, potentially, this duty to 
cooperate ripples up and down the country, east, west, north, south” (Senior Planner, 
Luton).
The response of the Senior Labour Local Councillor at Luton on this issue can be seen as a 
direct rebuttal of the ‘creative solution’ offered by the Senior Conservative Local Councillor at 
North Herts that unmet need from a particular urban area need not be provided adjacent to 
that area:
I think [he] is right about the ripple effect as well, that kind of makes it nonsensical, so 
if we’ve got a need, which we have, unmet need around Luton, we need the new housing 
as near as possible to Luton, that’s our view, and our neighbour says, ‘We can deliver ‘x’ 
number, but then our neighbour going to deliver ‘x’ number’, then they become further 
and further away – how does that help us, actually? When does it get to the point 
where we say, ‘Well, it’s very nice that we’ve got houses on the other side of Bedford, but 
actually, people in Luton need a place close to where they work and their children go to 
school etcetera etcetera, and we’re having to relocate them.
This touches on an intensely party political issue which reverberates around the practical issue 
of the duty to cooperate as well as the ‘technical’ process of transforming projections into 
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targets: the demographic trends of particular urban areas based on migration patterns. Luton 
was described to me by the Senior Conservative Local Councillor at North Herts as:
…a very unusual case in that, its growth over the last thirty years particularly has been 
largely through immigration and it’s a ‘port’ where people come in. We think about 
ports as being, you know, around the coast but this is a port. So people come in there, 
and the first thing they’re going to do, they’re going to stay. But then they’ll start to 
migrate out, and the next generation – we’re now into the next generation – will also 
move out. So a first generation may come in, they have a family, that family grows up, 
they go to university in Bristol. Well, they may like to stay in Bristol! Or perhaps they 
may find that they have links that go up to Northampton, or Bradford, or Glasgow! And 
so that one off effect has changed migration over the last thirty years.
A key idea which emerged strongly from the interview material is that planning is essentially a 
cyclical activity, with the unfortunate characteristic that planning’s cycles – around ten years to 
allow a policy to properly ‘bed-in’, according to the Senior Planner at Luton (himself a former 
planning policy advisor to central government) – are very much out of sync with the much 
shorter political cycles of central and local government:
...so we go in cycles. Some governments say they just want to remove regulation and red 
tape, which actually just undermines the ability of the planning system to function…
unfortunately in this country we don’t believe enough in planning just to say, ‘Leave it 
alone’. If it’s not working very well then just work at it a bit harder rather than change it 
all…So you end up with botched reform, not a long enough time, and then a reaction 
against that, and so we end up with this cause and effect – it’s virtually impossible at the 
national level to work out what the cause and effect is.
5.9: Moral, ethical and professional issues associated with strategic spatial planning
Issues associated with professionalism, pride, ethics and even morally correct behaviour 
emerged from the interviews. The question ‘How do you, as a local politician elected to serve 
the needs and interests of your constituents, reconcile this with the new duty to consider the 
needs and interests of areas outside – sometimes very far outside – your constituency?’ was 
asked of both the Labour and Conservative local councillors. The Luton Labour councillor 
reported that at meetings with Central Bedfordshire, local councillors there told her that it was 
“morally wrong to ask our council tax payers to pay for houses for people who live in Luton.” 
She went on to disavow this way of thinking, stating that, “I think if we need houses, we need 
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houses, and where the people end up living is neither here nor there.” It could be argued 
that this statement sounds like something that a central government politician might say, 
rather than a local councillor defending his/her ‘turf ’ and once again reflects the enormous 
differences in outlook between councils who were previously ‘net recipients’ or ‘net exporters’ 
of housing need. Indeed, the Luton councillor’s statement that “where people end up living is 
neither here nor there” rather strongly supports a criticism of ‘net exporter’ authorities made 
by the Senior Planner at North Herts, when he said:
  …some of our neighbours who were previously giving their growth elsewhere and it 
was, ‘out of sight, out of mind’, they frankly didn’t care where it was going, it just wasn’t 
met by them.”
This type of disjuncture would suggest that more work needs to be done by both sides, with 
former ‘net exporter’ authorities needing to be more realistic about where their unmet housing 
need can be accommodated, and previously ‘net importing’ councils in their turn being more 
understanding of the difficult situation faced by those areas who cannot meet their own needs 
within their boundaries.
Councils on both sides of the political divide raised issues relating to professional competence. 
The Senior Planner at North Herts, when talking about SNAP (Stevenage and North Herts 
Action Plan), the joint working arrangements with Stevenage which ended abruptly in 2010, 
complained that: 
  to be frank, Stevenage did not do a particularly good job of the first drafts…They didn’t 
include any maps, and fundamentally, as a planner, I like to see maps in documents and 
it was a series of wishy-washy statements.
When questioned on the same issue, the Senior Planner at Stevenage felt that working on 
SNAP was the, “worst experience of my life” and accused officers and elected members at 
North Herts of a serious lack of professionalism when they failed to turn up for an arranged 
meeting, instead phoning Stevenage an hour later to say, “Oh yeah, we’re not coming after all, 
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we’ve decided to stop work” (Senior Planner, Stevenage). This same officer went on to describe 
the “real vitriol” involved in the West of Stevenage application:
  Some of the political discussions over the years have been extremely bitter – really 
bitter – some of the angriest and bitterest that I’ve ever seen in the best part of thirty 
years working in local  government.
When describing the work on the green belt review that Stevenage undertook in the summer 
of 2013, the Senior Planner at Stevenage was highly critical of his neighbours, who, he alleged, 
had refused to cooperate with his team:
  We offered them the opportunity at the outset, ‘Do you want to come in, do you want 
this to be a joint study?’ And both sets of officers said,  ‘No, we’re not prepared to touch 
this with a barge pole. If our members ever found out that we were involved in this, 
they will crucify us, so we’re not getting involved in this.’
This comment provides a fairly obvious clue to the influence exerted by the elected members 
in what the officers know to be ‘politically unacceptable’ issues. Clearly it is crucial that 
democratically accountable councillors should be the final arbiters of decisions across the 
entire gamut of local government. However, this example appears to reveal a scenario in which 
qualified experts (i.e. planning officers) are being prevented from even initiating investigation 
into an issue. Herein lies the crux of the issue. Remove the politicization from the issue and 
planners are generally content, nay happy, to get on with the technical essence of an activity, 
whether that be a green belt review, a Strategic Housing Market Assessment (SHMA) or a 
transport impact study. It occurred to me that cross-boundary co-operation, as currently 
expressed in the ‘duty to cooperate’ is essentially a version of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ - the 
strand of game theory developed by, among others, Rapoport and Chammah (1965) and 
Axelrod (1984) – where mutual cooperation, although it yields a better outcome than mutual 
betrayal, is not actually the rational outcome because cooperation at the level of individual 
authorities is not rational from a purely self-interested viewpoint. 
   166
This struggle between rational/irrational behaviour at different spatial scales can lead to 
some actors engaging in so-called ‘gaming the system’ practices, such as ‘sitting on their 
hands’ in terms of (non) plan preparation, dishonest practices in meeting targets or even 
the ‘rule setters’ (i.e. central government) using rules against another part of the system that 
they themselves created. An example of this would be the discordance between the duty to 
cooperate and green belt protection. The Senior Planner at Stevenage gave a back-handed 
compliment to North Herts’ tactics in managing to stall development on the West of the A(1) 
site for well over a decade when he said, “it is an example of how you can manipulate a system 
that is supposed to be about delivering new development to ensure that development is never 
delivered.” Supporting this contention, the Senior Labour Local Councillor at Stevenage 
stated that, “I think it’s a very good example of how, under the current system, those who 
object to something have significantly more possibility of success than those who want to do 
something.”
The Senior Planner at Stevenage, at the end of our conversation, allowed himself to reminisce 
about the ‘good old days’ of planning:
  Plan-making these days is so difficult as to be almost impossible. It’s significantly 
changed since I first came into local planning. It used to be quite an enjoyable 
and a relatively simple straight-line process. Nowadays you’re expected to know 
everything about everything and you’re expected to be able to square the circle and 
you’re expected to be able to shove a square peg into a round hole simultaneously. 
It’s no wonder that so many of my colleagues are now retiring early, having nervous 
breakdowns, leaving the profession – I don’t blame them.
The other noteworthy aspect of this issue to do with green belt reviews was one of professional 
ethics. The Senior Planner at Stevenage noted that, after refusing to cooperate with his 
borough on a joint review, the neighbouring authorities (North Herts and East Herts) had 
done their own, in-house reviews. Having brought in external consultants to carry out the 
Stevenage green belt review, the Senior Planner there was irked that, “at least we went through 
the motions of hiring external consultants to do it, they’ve not even had that fig-leaf.”
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The idea inherent in this statement - that commercial consultants brought in from ‘outside’ 
are, by definition, more objective, and produce work that is somehow more ‘trustworthy’ than 
that done in-house - is an interesting one. Its most important expression is in the Strategic 
Housing Market Assessments (SHMAs) that are an important building block in determining 
whom one needs to cooperate with, and the spatial extent of such cooperation. From the 
interviews it became apparent that one consulting company, ORS (Opinion Research Services) 
was responsible for the delineation of Housing Market Areas in most of Hertfordshire and 
all of Bedfordshire. Whilst one could argue that it is useful in terms of continuity for one 
organization to produce these boundaries for a larger area, surely it is of greater importance to 
hear a second, or third, or even fourth opinion in what actually constitutes a Housing Market 
Area? There was an interesting exchange with the Senior Conservative Local Councillor, who 
was under the (mistaken) belief that these boundaries were drawn up by central government. It 
is true that a particular methodology for determining HMAs designed by CURDs (Centre for 
Urban and Regional Development at Newcastle University), and funded by the now defunct 
National Housing and Planning Advisory Unit (NHPAU), appears on the CLG website, but 
this is merely one methodology among several, albeit perhaps the most well known and 
certainly the most detailed in terms of methodological explication. Commercial confidentiality 
would appear to prevent some commercial consultants from even going into detail in terms 
of their methodology. To return to ORS and their activities in determining most of the 
Housing Market Areas in Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire: it emerged from the interview with 
the Senior Planner in Stevenage that HMAs had been written “on district boundaries”, thus 
defeating the entire purpose of these cross-boundary entities:
  East Herts, for instance, have done a Strategic Housing Market study for East Herts 
district, and then they’ve simply apportioned that figure to the different HMAs. So 
they haven’t done a SHMA for the Cheshunt corridor, for the Harlow corridor, for 
Welwyn Garden City, they haven’t been partners thus far for the work we’ve been doing 
with North Herts and with Central Beds. They’ve simply said, ‘Yeah, we’re not really 
terribly interested’, because from their perspective why would you bother, it’s all far too 
difficult. People don’t want to learn the lessons which are coming out of decisions like 
Aylesbury Vale and Coventry. What they want to do is pretend that it’s not happening, 
and then they’re slowly coming to a realisation that, ‘Oh my God, what the hell do we 
do?’ But a lot of them, like Central Beds, are still pressing on. A lot of them, like East 
Herts, are still pressing on, despite the fact that they’ve done no work on Functioning 
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Economic Market Areas, they’ve not done any genuine work on SHMAs, they’ve not 
done genuine greenbelt reviews or any of the basic work that you would expect to find 
underpinning a modern Local Plan. They’ve basically just put the blinkers on, ‘This is 
what we’re going to do, this is a spatial strategy that we can sell to our politicians, and it 
doesn’t really matter whether there’s an evidence base to underpin it or not, because I’d 
rather go ahead with something, rather than go ahead with nothing’” (Senior Planner, 
Stevenage).
5.10: The art of the possible: strategic spatial planning in the Cambridge sub-region
This chapter ends with a brief look at current developments in strategic spatial planning, in a 
sub-region not geographically distant from the study area, but which is quite some distance 
away in terms of issues like cross-boundary co-operation, infrastructure funding, and, 
perhaps the most joyful element of planning, visioning. The constraint of development around 
Cambridge can be traced back to the establishment of its green belt in 1950 and the Report 
of that year which argued that, “one cannot make a good expanding plan for Cambridge” 
(Holford, 1950: viii). This anti-expansionist attitude prevailed until the Structure Plan process 
which culminated in the publication of a joint plan with Peterborough City Council in 2003 
(Cambridgeshire CC, 2003). One of the principal points of interest of the Cambridge sub-
region case study is the fact that a not-for-profit organization called ‘Cambridge Futures’ which 
operated from 2004 - 2011, was instrumental in the Structure Plan process. Described by 
Echenique (2005: 114) as, “a group of local business leaders, politicians, government officers, 
professionals and academics investigating possible planning alternatives for Cambridge 
and its surrounding area”, its membership bore a striking resemblance to the range of actors 
Sir George Nicholson had called for years before in relation to SERPLAN (Nicholson, 
1992: 77). By producing seven options ranging from ‘Minimum Growth’ to ‘Green Swap’ 
(exchanging parts of the green belt) through to ‘Densification’, Cambridge Futures “was widely 
considered…to have provided the basis for those that favoured future growth” (Boddy and 
Hickman, 2014). 
According to Patsy Healey (2007: 163), one of the reasons why the Cambridge sub-region is 
important is because it has become:
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  …a key economic driver in a regional and national context, an important locale in the 
wider economic nexus of southern England, positioned in a group of locales globally 
significant for a particular industrial form that emerged around new technologies in
 the late twentieth century.” 
In fact, as Moules and Pickford (2013) argue, with its world-class university and ‘silicon fen’ 
coterie of science firms, Cambridge and its sub-region is “Europe’s leading high-tech start-up 
cluster.” There are around 80,000 jobs in the city, with less than half of these held by residents, 
therefore creating some congestion issues in and around Cambridge (Baker, 2010: 296)
As one of the four sub-regions selected for major growth in the Labour government’s 
Sustainable Communities Plan (ODPM, 2003), the Cambridge sub-region was one of the 
few places to have ‘bucked the trend’ and continued to grow during the recession (Centre 
for Cities, 2013: 29). In common with places like Stevenage and Luton, Cambridge is under-
bounded (the city is entirely surrounded by South Cambridgeshire District Council, of which 
much is green belt land). Politically too, there are similarities between the case-studies, with 
urban Cambridge City Council controlled by the Liberal Democrats, with Labour close 
behind, and the city’s rural hinterland very much a Tory heartland. As in Hertfordshire, a 
two-tier system is in operation, with Cambridgeshire County Council above the local districts, 
although, again in common with various parts of Hertfordshire, there have been calls to create 
a single, Unitary Authority embracing Cambridge and its hinterland (Boddy and Hickman, 
2014). However, not everything is rosy, with the Centre for Cities (2013: 23) identifying 2,188 
‘stalled sites’ in the city and a 60% slump in house-building between 2007 - 2011 exacerbating 
an already serious affordability crisis (Havergal, 2012). 
There was wide variance between the Cambridge’s 2006 Local Plan which anticipated building 
12,500 new homes up to 2016 and the requirement of the East of England Plan, which was 
19,000 houses up to 2021, with a further 1,000 minimum per year up to 2025. Cambridge 
City Council is currently working on a draft Local Plan which is at the internal scrutiny stage 
before being submitted to the Secretary of State for examination. Just as protest organisations 
like CASE (Campaign Against Stevenage Expansion) and GASP (Graveley Against Stevenage 
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Proposals) sprang up in Hertfordshire, so similar protest groups like Stop BAD (Borne Airfield 
Development) and Greenbelt SOS (Save the Cambridge Greenbelt) have come into being. 
Where the Cambridge sub-region differs significantly from the Hertfordshire/Bedfordshire 
case study is the much greater willingness of Cambridgeshire and Peterborough local 
authorities to work together under the duty to cooperate to produce a Memorandum 
of Understanding on growth figures (90,500 by 2031). A group of eight rural and urban 
authorities struck a “pioneering deal” in September 2013 (Carpenter, 2013a). The total number 
of houses is 2,500 less than the 93,000 identified by the Strategic Housing Market Assessment 
(SHMA), so it remains to be seen whether the Planning Inspectorate consider that the legal 
requirements of the duty to cooperate have indeed been met. Developers are not impressed by 
this seeming display of unity, with Marcia Whitehead, Bidwells Head of Cambridge Planning, 
describing the 90,500 target as, “woefully short of what is required. In addition the distribution 
is not right” (Carpenter, 2013a). While it is safe to conclude that Cambridge is, “undoubtedly 
the leader and exemplar of the housing growth agenda” (IPPR/Shelter, 2015: 24), actual output 
remains low (despite having one of the most buoyant housing markets in the UK) and this 
merely reinforces the gulf between aspiration and delivery in strategic spatial planning.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
6.1: Significant findings of the study
This research has examined the difficult issue of strategic spatial planning through the prism of 
the history and recent developments of the discipline. Successive governments have tinkered 
with the system in an effort to stimulate housebuilding, although most of these attempts have 
been described as ineffective. The first principal finding of the study has been that boundaries 
still matter a great deal; despite attempts to create ‘soft’ spaces with fuzzier boundaries, at some 
point lines of demarcation still have to be drawn and these lines can have significant impacts 
on whether strategic development goes ahead or not. Secondly, delays and long lead times are 
very much an inherent part of the system. This may be no bad thing; indeed, it is prudent to 
weigh up the potential impacts of significant over period of months (or in very complex cases, 
perhaps one or two years). However, to take over twenty years over a development with no 
final resolution in sight is clearly not what the planning system was intended to do. Most of the 
planners and politicians involved with the West of Stevenage proposals in the early 1990s have 
either moved on to new jobs elsewhere or retired. It cannot be sound strategic planning that 
a generation of built environment professionals spent the best part of their careers on a single 
development proposal, which still remains undecided as they approach retirement or move 
on in their careers. Thirdly, an interesting reversal of roles was observed during the interview 
process, with the local politicians keen to emphasise the rational, technical elements of the 
planning process (e.g. housing projections, transport modelling), whereas the professional 
planners instead stressed the highly political, human-centred aspects of the development 
process. 
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6.2: Suggestions for reform of strategic spatial planning in England
This research draws to a conclusion by briefly identifying, in an explicitly normative fashion 
(and thus somewhat against the grain of recent trends in qualitative research, but which 
reflects the work of a previous generation of planning theorists including Healey (1997) and 
Friedmann (1973)), the most promising areas for future research in the field of strategic spatial 
planning. A total of five steps - four policy-related, and one theoretical, are suggested as ways 
of making strategic spatial planning more effective.
6.2.1: Unit of governance for strategic spatial planning
The single most important direction for future research is undoubtedly further investigation 
into the most appropriate spatial level to plan and implement strategic spatial planning. This is 
one of the most intractable problems, spanning the political, economic and technical domains. 
Storper (2014: 120) provides a succinct summary of the nature and scale of the problem when 
he says:
  metropolitan areas will always have political geographies where our preferences and 
needs are going to be bundled so as to conflict with those of others. As a result, the 
agents or authorities set up to govern or provide public goods are going to satisfy only 
some of these preferences and will have to compromise on what they give us. There is 
no single geography or organization of governance that could ever resolve this innate 
problem of bundling in a definitive way. There is also no voting system that can ever 
resolve it.
However, whilst accepting that there is unlikely to be a definitive solution to this problem any 
time soon, there are ‘better’ and ‘worse’ ways of coping with it. Steps in the right direction 
will need to address two issues: firstly, the disjuncture between ‘ambition’ and ‘delivery’ (e.g. 
plans on paper which confidently state that x thousand homes will be built over the coming 
twenty years; twenty years later few, if any of these homes have actually been built). Secondly, 
as Cheshire et al (2014: 227) note, policy mechanisms need to be developed and implemented 
which are better at matching the scale at which costs and benefits are incurred (as noted below, 
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these scales are often very different).
One such mechanism which was suggested by one of the interview participants was that of 
redrawing boundaries when, as in the case of underbounded authorities such as Stevenage and 
Luton, their ability to meet their strategic development needs is seriously compromised. In 
fact such as mechanism currently exists - known as a Principal Area Boundary Review - but 
the fact that boundary changes cannot currently be implemented without the consensus of all 
affected authorities means that it is rarely used (LGBC, 2011). The recent IPPR/Shelter Report 
into housing therefore argues that, “if all other reasonable options are exhausted and the city’s 
administrative boundaries continue to impede sufficient new development then there must be 
the ultimate backstop of a boundary review” (IPPR/Shelter, 2015: 12).
6.2.2: Development control
It is quite clear that the twin pillars of development control and what is still known in many 
local authorities as ‘forward’ (i.e. strategic) planning are becoming increasingly mutually 
incompatible, since they address different spatial and temporal scales of development. This 
is evidenced by the historic and ongoing failure of the English planning system to facilitate 
the necessary levels of housebuilding to keep affordability for first-time buyers within 
reasonable limits, and to compensate for the precipitous decline of the social housing sector. 
As noted throughout this research, the problem is by no means caused by or confined to 
public sector planning alone (developers, institutional investors and housebuilders also play 
significant roles in perpetuating and deepening the crisis). However, the work that forward 
planners do in identifying and allocating land for development all too rarely translates into 
positive development control decisions; as the recent IPPR/Shelter Report into housing puts 
it, “housing ambition is often penalised by poor housing delivery” (IPPR/Shelter, 2015: 26). 
This need not be the case; if one takes the example of the Netherlands, the ten year VINEX 
programme increased the national stock of housing by 7.5%, building 450,000 new homes in 
90 new settlements, of which 285,000 were on greenfield sites or urban extensions between 
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1996 and 2005 (Falk, 2008: 13-14). 
Cheshire et al (2014) argue for two things: firstly, a rescaling of the planning system, since, 
while the costs of developments are localised, the benefits they create (such as lower house 
prices and more jobs) are dispersed over a larger area, thus creating weak incentives for 
supporting new development. Instead of keeping strategic spatial planning at the local 
authority level, Cheshire et al (2014: 176) argue, it should be rescaled to the city region level, 
since this would lead to a pooling of incentives across administrative boundaries and mitigate 
the negative impacts. The second suggestion they make is to replace development control 
with rule-based local plans drawn up to national specifications, thus removing much of the 
uncertainty and local variability from strategic development decision making (Cheshire et al, 
2014: 152).
6.2.3: Urban containment
In addition to dealing with the problems of poorly-drawn local government boundaries, 
a coherent, reasoned and strategic reappraisal of the main centralising and disciplining 
tool of central government - green belt policy - is widely recognised as a necessary step to 
addressing the housing problem from a range of commentators across the political spectrum 
(e.g. Cheshire et al, 2014; IPPR/Shelter, 2015). It is at this point that the significant piece of 
quantitative analysis alluded to in Chapter 2 (‘Methods’) is introduced. 
Table 3 overleaf shows the proportion of Great Britain’s surface area covered by, respectively, 
undeveloped non-domestic land, domestic gardens, buildings (domestic and non-domestic), 
transport infrastructure (roads, railways, paths and tracks), and inland water. Taking Great 
Britain as a whole, this analysis tells us that over nine tenths of the island’s surface area is 
undeveloped, non-domestic land. Focusing on the Greater South East, this figure is almost 
85 per cent, and far higher than the 54 per cent of people who believed the country was 
more than 50 per cent developed cited in the Barker Review. The key figure, however, is the 
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proportion of undeveloped, non-domestic land available across the wider South East, ranging 
from 46.3 per cent in London to 87.5 per cent in the East of England. Of this undeveloped, 
non-domestic land, 22.1 per cent is designated as green belt in London, 12.5 per cent is 
designated as green belt in South East England and 10.2 per cent is designated as green belt in 
the East of England. Quite simply, central government must not only refrain from using green 
belt policy as a disciplining tool to be used at the appropriate stage of the electoral cycle, but 
must take the lead in encouraging local authorities, many of whom are likely to be hesitant 
initially, to conduct green belt reviews and release low-grade, low amenity value land for 
development.
6.2.4: Infrastructure
It is well known that providing increased road capacity tends to result in an increased volume 
of traffic (Goodwin, 1996), in much the same way that Parkinson’s law somewhat facetiously 
suggests that, “work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion” (Parkinson, 
1970). Consequently road pricing is widely regarded by many transport specialists as the best 
way of dealing with negative externalities including increased greenhouse gas emissions from 
vehicles, noise, time delays from congestion, accidents and damage to infrastructure (Anas 
and Lindsey, 2011: 66). On the face of it, introducing congestion charging across the wider 
South East would be deeply unpopular and would probably be regarded as political suicide; 
nevertheless, as the current leadership election for the Labour Party shows, there appears to be 
an appetite across large swathes of the electorate for taking decisions that would have seemed 
unthinkable a just a few years previously. One is reminded of the words of Niccolo Machiavelli 
(2005 [1532]: 22), which he used to describe the difficulties of introducing any political 
innovation:
  One should bear in mind that there is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more 
dubious of success, nor more dangerous to administer, than to introduce new political 
orders. For the one who introduces them has as his enemies all those who profit from 
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the old order, and he has only lukewarm defenders in all those who might profit from 
the new order.
The key difficulty with congestion charging is ensuring that benefits are concentrated amongst 
and visible to road users, rather than dispersed and thus largely invisible (King et al, 2007: 
111). By allowing the revenues raised from congestion charging to fund the construction of 
new infrastructure (not necessarily more roads) and support public transport (Manville and 
King, 2013), to be disbursed at a sub-regional level - i.e. through the mechanism of genuine 
city regions - road users could start to see tangible benefits that have a direct influence on 
improving their journeys.
6.2.5: Theoretical development of strategic spatial planning
This research concludes with a conundrum: in order to make cities and their hinterlands better 
places to live, we need to conduct a certain amount of experimentation. This issue can lead 
to conflicted opinions even among some of our most eminent urban thinkers. For example, 
Cheshire et al (2014: 229) point out near the end of their recent book that, “cities are too 
important to be treated as sandpits for policymakers”, yet, in an earlier chapter, in relation to 
their suggestion that development control be replaced by a more rule-based system based on a 
set of national guidelines, they propose that, “the changes should be introduced in a randomly 
selected set of perhaps 50 to 60 LAs” (Cheshire et al, 2014: 152). This is a good example of 
what Storper (2014: 124) describes as ‘bricolage’ or ‘tinkering’. This need not necessarily be a 
bad thing, since, as Storper argues, “when there is little or no tinkering, it is probably a sign of 
a paralyzed political system” (ibid.). However, utopian idealism tends to affect policymakers, 
leading to extreme forms of bricolage such as Brasilia (Holston, 1989) or the planned £100 
billion ‘King Abdullah Economic City’ on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast (Moser et al, 2015). 
Bricolage can be inspiring and change peoples’ lives for the better, and at the very least it 
shows some recognition that the current system is not working. When planning strategically 
however, difficult decisions will always need to be made and for too long government (both 
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central and local) has been content to muddle along. Targeted reform of the green belt, the 
rescaling of the planning system as it relates to strategic development, a recognition that there 
needs to be more of a direct link between infrastructure costs and infrastructure users and, 
finally, a recognition that we need to move beyond outdated concepts of governance and 
‘reheated fudge’ as LEPs and the current incarnation of city regions are, will mean that future 
generations will have a better chance of finding somewhere to live that they can afford and 
which is suitable for their needs.
6.3: Limitations of the research
Despite the advantages of the case-study approach, as set out in Chapter 2, there are clearly 
limitations with this method of research to be borne in mind. Principal amongst these is the 
small sample size of interview participants. A further dimension to the research would have 
been added by interviewing one or more central government actors, but ultimately this was 
not possible due to time constraints. When carrying out qualitative interview research, one is 
of course always aware of the highly subjective nature of the material gathered and the value 
judgements made according to the participant’s beliefs and understanding of particular issues. 
In additi, any ‘filtering’ process employed by the interviewer exposes him/her to the charge 
of ‘researcher bias’ (Chenail, 2011). Poggenpoel and Myburgh (2003: 419-20) enumerate a 
number of possible causes of researcher bias, including, “the researcher not being sufficiently 
prepared to conduct the field research”, “the researcher not being able to analyse interviews 
in depth” and “the researcher not being able to do member checking on findings” (i.e. repeat 
interviews). 
These issues can affect much, if not all, sociological research, however their deleterious effects 
can be lessened by a range of strategies, including having a thorough theoretical and practical 
grasp of the subject material and taking sufficient time to let the interview material ‘percolate’. 
As noted in Chapter 2, ‘Methods’, it was possible to carry out one repeat interview with a 
participant and this was a valuable experience and worth the extra effort. The fact that the 
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interview process was carried out over a one year period was beneficial to the ‘percolation’ 
process. One of the most insidious problems, however, with qualitative material, and one 
which unfortunately tends to correlate linearly with an increased knowledge of the subject, is 
that of approaching the data with preconceived ideas (Sax, 1968). To someone trained in urban 
planning, it is difficult not to have opinions on subjects of broad importance such as the green 
belt, sustainable travel and affordable housing. Having worked intensively with the interview 
material over many months, and having included it in its entirety in the pages that follow, it 
can only be hoped that it is difficult to detect any noticeable political or sociological bias from 
the questions asked of the participants.
6.4 Discussion and reflections on the research
One of the major issues facing any social scientist is the generalizability of their research. This 
is especially so in the context of place-based studies, bound as they are to the particular bundle 
of attributes that, together, create the uniqueness and specificity of an area. It could be argued 
that the Stevenage West proposals, involving a tightly-underbounded authority, a severely 
disconnected site as a result of the motorway, and a particular set of political circumstances, 
were doomed from the outset and thus do not provide us with an especially enlightening set of 
lessons which we can apply in other situations. However, by framing the research within Jessop 
et al’s (2008) ‘TPSN’ model, with an explicit focus on territory-place interactions, it is hoped 
that, although the West of Stevenage and wider sub-region is itself the result of a unique set of 
circumstances, the methodology employed by this research is reproducible in other contexts, 
perhaps with a focus on a different pair of socio-spatial dimensions (e.g. scale-networks or 
territory-scale).
As Boddy and Hickman (2016: 32) have pointed out, the impacts of localism have resulted in 
“opportunistic reductions” in both housing targets and completions in precisely those areas 
across southern England, “with the potential to boost national economic growth” (ibid.). 
These authors are in no doubt that it is not a coincidence that the majority of these areas are 
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Conservative Party heartlands, and this research reinforces the highly ideological nature of 
the debate surrounding strategic spatial planning. However, the evidence from this research 
and elsewhere suggests that strategic spatial planning in England has entered a paradigm 
shift in terms of changing attitudes to previously sacrosanct tenets of planning doctrine, with 
particular reference to the green belt. This research has illustrated the seismic shift in relations 
between Stevenage and North Herts in terms of their approach to underboundedness and 
housing shortages that ocurred in just a single year, made apparent during the follow-up 
interview with the Senior Planner at Stevenage. Although little progress has been made on the 
impasse at the West of Stevenage site, there has been much progress made on other sites and, 
more generally, of a belated recognition to work together more effectively and in better faith. 
More generally, there has been an increasing acceptance of the need to ‘think the unthinkable’ 
in terms of selective reviews of the green belt (e.g. Lyons, 2014: 22). Work by Bramley (2015: 
159) has forecast significant housing supply and affordability increases from releasing 1-2 
per cent of existing green belt land for development (of the order of a 32 per cent increase in 
supply and a 13 per cent increase in affordability year-on-year).
The localist narrative has been accompanied by a radical move away from the highly 
structured regional governance under New Labour towards much more ad-hoc asymmetrical 
and transactional ‘deal-making’ characterized by Local Enterprise Partnerships and City Deals. 
This has resulted in “highly uneven and inequitable social and spatial outcomes across the UK” 
(O’Brien and Pike, 2015: R15). Central to the formation of these spatial coalitions is the issue 
of boundedness, with urbanized local authorities such as Manchester increasingly wishing 
to expand their tax base in order to capture (usually) higher-income suburban populations 
(Ward et al, 2016: 4) as well as providing new opportunities for housing development. While 
Stevenage’s aspirations are clearly not as grandiose as those of Manchester, the issue of 
boundedness will remain important for the foreseeable future, since there are no guarantees of 
continuing cooperation with neighbouring authorities. 
In conclusion, looming large over all of the sub-regional dynamics described throughout 
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this research are the power politics played out in the London arena. While selective reviews 
of green belt land seem to many commentators to be an eminently sensible approach to take 
to the housing issue, both principal contenders in the upcoming London Mayoral elections 
have explicitly ruled out development on the city’s green belt, with the Conservative Party 
candidate, Zac Goldsmith, claiming that its protection is “top of his list” (Hill, 2016). The 
Labour Party candidate, Sadiq Khan, has stated in his manifesto that the green belt, “is even 
more important today than when it was created” (Khan, 2016: 66). These statements are of 
course no surprise, considering the political appeal of protectionist rhetoric towards the green 
belt and they illustrate the widening divide between London’s core and its suburbs. As Holman 
and Thornley (2015: 496) argue, the current Mayor’s election victories were largely fought on a 
platform of fighting for the city’s ‘neglected’ suburbs by devolving powers, including planning 
decision making, to the boroughs - localism in action. 
Additionally, the biggest ‘ripple effect’ (discussed above in Chapter Five in the context of 
Stevenage/Luton/North Herts) is caused by London, with protectionist attitudes putting 
increasing pressure on already overheated housing markets beyond the M25. Furthermore, UK 
infrastructure strategy (if such a thing exists in a coherent form) is largely London led, with 
the multi-billion pound investments in HS2, Crossrail and Crossrail 2 clear examples of this 
line of thinking. This cannot fail to have deleterious consequences for infrastructure proposals 
beyond the capital city. So, although London is often presented as a beacon of enlightenment 
in terms of its structures of governance, there are significant disjunctures betweens its strategic 
priorities and those of the authorities within its sphere of influence, but without the benefit 
of a voice at its table. It is therefore clear that all of the site level, extra-local and sub-regional 
processes described above need to be viewed within a larger context (just as London itself is a 
container of and is contained by networks of national, supra-national and global socio-spatial 
interactions). 
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Appendix
The Interviews
The eight interviews, carried out between March 2014 and March 2015, have been transcribed 
in full and are reproduced in the pages overleaf. Throughout the interviews, the following 
abbreviations have been used:
 DC     David Church (the Interviewer)
 SP     Senior Planner
 SC     Senior Local Councillor
 SE     Senior LEP Executive
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INTERVIEW ONE
Participants: Senior Labour Party Local Councillor 
and Senior Planner, Luton Borough Council
Date: 7 March 2014
Location: Luton Borough Council, Planning Offices
DC  If I could just begin by asking about the 
duty to cooperate, what’s happening around 
it at the moment?
SP  Well, if we put in context Luton’s situation, 
then it’ll provide a context for everything 
else we talk about. Luton, as you can see, is 
incredibly tightly under bounded, so there’s 
basically no more space to expand. We’ve 
got some industrial sites, the old Vauxhall 
site, which we’ve just given permission 
for – a mixed use scheme – there’s Power 
Court, the sort of rugby-ball shaped one in 
the town centre. Those are probably the two 
biggest sites. We’ve got some employment 
areas which are slowly being built out, one 
or two other bits and pieces of sites, we’ve 
got nothing else to play with basically. 
  We’ve got a housing requirement over the 
plan period, we’re doing a Plan from 2011 
to 2031 – actually, this morning we’ve 
just got our latest figure for our Strategic 
Housing Market Assessment, and it’s 
saying a minimum of 18,000 houses is 
needed during the Plan period. We think 
we can do 6,000 over the Plan period, and 
that is a whole mixture of stuff – bringing 
forward employment land and actually 
the Councillors are, let’s say, not entirely 
convinced that we can do 6,000. So, let’s 
just call 6,000 a maximum. We need three 
times what we can do. So, we were working 
on a [sub]regional plan, because it’s a bigger 
issue, the conurbation actually, you’ve got…
this is the boundary of Luton, and it’s just 
down the middle of a road, 1930’s houses on 
each side and so Dunstable is just really part 
of the conurbation.
  So, we were doing a joint Core Strategy with 
Central Beds, which actually surrounds us 
on three sides, so all the way round past the 
airport, and so it’s only really one quarter 
of it, probably less geographically, that’s 
North Herts. So we were doing a joint Core 
Strategy with them, delivering the regional 
plan, and the [sub]regional plan just looked 
at this saying…to deliver the sort of growth 
that the whole area needed and that was 
being effectively set by government or the 
[East of England] region as being the way 
forward, and we were all contributing to a 
wider picture, given Luton’s circumstances.
  So, the duty to cooperate, being a 
replacement for it, is wholly inadequate, 
because Luton is surrounded by opposing 
politics, and even if it wasn’t opposing 
politics, are you thinking, one council is 
suddenly welcoming 12,000 houses? So, it’s 
a wholly inadequate response, and I think 
the origin of the duty to cooperate…there’s 
two bits of the Conservative Party’s thinking 
on this stuff, one is the suburban, Tory 
voting NIMBYs, who the localism agenda 
came out of. So it was, ‘Give local control on 
planning decisions and you’ll get the votes’.
DC Basically, to restrict new housing?
SP  Exactly, so that’s what some of the localism 
debate was about. When they got into 
government, Treasury said, ‘you’re not 
having that, because do you realise no 
houses will get built, we’ll have a massive 
problem’. So therefore that localism idea 
ended up being changed in the NPPF 
and other stuff. It was an uncomfortable 
setup, and also the RTPI and a few other 
organisations said that, ‘what you’ve written 
in your draft NPPF is inadequate. So it 
was done much tighter, and Greg Clark 
[the then Housing Minister] wrote a much 
tighter four paragraphs on the duty to 
cooperate. That has actually caused no end 
of problems. The Planning Inspectorate said, 
‘This is unworkable’, but they were ignored, 
I would guess. So, the duty to cooperate is 
wholly inadequate for the sorts of places like 
Luton. I don’t know what other angle you 
would like to put on it, SC?
SC  From our point of view, from the politician’s 
point of view, the duty to cooperate is an 
easy thing to say, but not such an easy thing 
to do, because there’s nothing concrete 
around it in terms of, ‘Ok, we need houses 
and you’ve got land, what are you going to 
do to help us? Are we going to give you that 
land, are we going to gift you those houses, 
what’s coming back the other way?’
 
DC  There’s a very real conflict, you’re elected 
by your local area to represent your local 
area’s interests, but now you have this new 
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situation where you have to look beyond 
your borders.
SC  Exactly. Some of the comments coming 
back from Central Beds councillors were, 
‘It’s morally wrong to ask our council tax 
payers to pay for houses for people who live 
in Luton.’ I don’t see it that way, I think if 
we need houses, we need houses, and where 
the people end up living is neither here 
nor there. Of course we’re constrained by 
boundaries and we’re elected by different 
authorities, so we’ve had some difficulties 
there because, although it sounds like a 
nice idea, there’s no substance behind it. 
What does it actually mean in real terms? 
Can we force them to give us land? Can 
we force them to build houses for us? And 
then we’ve got the difficulties around how 
much do they have to do to meet the duty to 
cooperate? So they will make an offer of, say, 
‘We’re going to build x number of houses 
and you can have x number of those over 
the [Plan] period.’ It’s a really small figure, 
less than double figures, and we’ve got to 
pay for them!
SP  We’ll have to come onto that, the delivery 
of affordable housing, because the duty to 
cooperate, when it was drafted, I’m quite 
sure no-one worked through the legal 
implications or the issues involved with 
that. The duty to cooperate, I think, was 
drafted with the idea that a small county 
town might need a few hundred houses in 
a neighbouring authority simply because 
it couldn’t be accommodated anywhere 
else. Something like that. I don’t think it 
was ever really ‘road-tested’ on the sorts of 
figures we’re talking about, Birmingham, 
Coventry…
SC   It’s massive, SP is right, we’re in different 
political arenas. So we’re a Labour council 
surrounded by Conservative councils, 
we’ve had meetings with them, we’ve had 
discussions with them. It’s like, ‘Well, we 
can offer you a few houses but you’re going 
to have to pay for them’, or, ‘Let’s not bother 
meeting at all because we don’t even want to 
talk about it’. I think we’ve moved on from 
there now because there are Plans that are 
being found unsound, the reasoning being a 
failure to cooperate.
DC  Places like Aylesbury Vale, Brighton and 
Hove…
SC  Exactly. It starts to give you a bit more teeth. 
So some of these authorities now who are 
writing their Plans are thinking, ‘Oooh, 
hang on a minute, maybe we will have to do 
something’, but there’s no guidance, there’s 
no law there’s nothing that says how much 
that’s got to be or how the finances work 
and who pays for it. It’s kind of like having 
a discussion without any real background 
guidance.
DC  So in terms of central-local relations, 
you’re not really getting very much help or 
guidance from DCLG?
SC Well…
SP  A number of things that we’re trying to do, 
because we’re pretty high on their Richter 
scale in central government, we’ve had 
a number of meetings with them, we’ve 
even met Ministers. We raised a number 
of issues, for instance, the fault lines with 
this duty to cooperate is that the national 
guidance says you have to do ‘objectively 
assessed need’. So that has been a nightmare. 
We’re doing a SMHA with Central Beds, 
we’ve actually got a steering group with 
seven authorities in total, because they’re 
all potentially affected, and in fact even 
beyond. The assumptions that go in to a 
SHMA can affect, probably by 50% what 
the [final housing] figure will be. There’s no 
hard and fast rule about what is in those 
assumptions. So North Herts, Central Beds 
and Luton went off to see the population 
experts in CLG and ONS to ask, because 
we can’t agree, ‘What assumptions should 
we have?’ and the look on their faces was, 
‘We don’t want to get involved’. The fact is 
that CLG had written this guidance that 
you have to do this, we’re asking, ‘Could 
you help us please’, and it was, ‘Ohhh, we 
don’t really want to’. Anyway, we’re trying to, 
we’re writing, we’re keeping them involved 
etcetera etcetera. In the end, Central Beds 
and us have just agreed that we’ll get in a 
bunch of independent consultants to write 
it.
  Coming back to the problems with the 
duty to cooperate, because I don’t think it 
was ever really thought through in terms 
of the scale of unmet need, probably what 
also wasn’t thought through was the fact 
it wouldn’t just be housing numbers that 
would have to be delivered next door, it 
would have to be affordable housing. So 
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we’ve got, roughly, a need for affordable 
housing that equates to our urban capacity, 
and yet the viability of development in 
Luton is very low, because of its brownfield 
land, house values are quite low, land values 
are quite low. There’s no way we can do 
more than 15-20%, so therefore a huge 
amount of affordable housing has got to 
be delivered elsewhere. Local government 
has got a ‘best value’ requirement, set in 
law that they’ve got to deliver best value 
for their residents. So that law, or that 
interpretation of it, is being thrown at us, to 
say, ‘You might have a need for affordable 
housing in the neighbouring authority, 
but we can’t possibly provide it for you 
ourselves’. So actually, what we’re saying is, 
if you’ve got a duty to cooperate, if you can’t 
meet your needs, and affordable housing 
needs have to be met in the neighbouring 
authority, you’ve got to pay for it as well. 
An authority like Luton is not in a position 
to pay for affordable housing in its own 
borough, let alone anywhere else. So we 
just haven’t got the money and yet we’ve 
got the need. Therefore it’s a manifestly 
unworkable system, whereas if we’d being 
doing it through the sub-regional Plan, 
the government would be essentially 
taking ownership of this, and they’d be 
going, ‘Well, let’s talk to the Homes and 
Communities Agency or whoever and work 
out how we deliver it’. So it would be an 
overall approach, so you’d put in for funding 
from the HCA or from the DfT Capital 
Programme or whoever, whatever is needed 
would have to be part and parcel of it. 
  The other thing that I don’t think was ever 
expected was how the Planning Inspectorate 
would finally interpret what’s written into 
those four paragraphs [in the NPPF]. I 
personally think that their views weren’t 
taken into consideration when the thing 
was being drafted. I think they [the PI] 
said, ‘This is unworkable’, and the Planning 
Minister said, ‘We’re going to do it anyway’. 
So therefore, I think they’re taking a bit 
of revenge, to a certain extent. They are 
doing it literally, so when it says, you’ve 
got to discuss with all your neighbours 
on a continuing basis, all the time, which 
essentially is what it says – that’s impossible, 
right? Therefore, unless you have absolutely 
talked with everybody, all through the 
processes, then potentially you’re going 
to be found unsound. If you look at the 
Aylesbury Vale decision recently, we weren’t 
the primary reason why that was found 
unsound, we were a subsidiary reason. But 
even then we had four or five paragraphs 
saying Luton tried to talk to them. We said 
can we have a discussion about unmet need, 
because our housing market area just creeps 
into Aylesbury Vale. They said, ‘Not really, 
we’re not interested, we’re not interesting 
in talking just with you, we might talk in 
general terms’, but they didn’t start that duty 
to cooperate debate to inform the plan, they 
just did what they had worked out based on 
their own figures.
SC  The [Inspector’s] Report is quite stark, 
there’s some quite strong language in it as 
well. The Inspector has written, ‘A complete 
failure under the duty to cooperate’. In 
Luton’s case, Aylesbury’s contact amounted 
to one phone call, I think that’s the actual 
sentence. It really lays it out on stark ground 
that you’ve actually really failed on this. It’s 
quite strong wording that probably I’ve not 
seen anything in that kind of way before 
and it makes you wonder what the reason is 
behind it? When we met Nick Boles, he did 
say that actually, this was something he was 
really going to push on. 
SP  ‘No stone unturned’, was the phrase that was 
used.
SC  So that kind of gives us a bit of 
encouragement.
SP  They [Aylesbury Vale] are part of the wider 
steering group for our SHMA, and they’ll 
be invited to a meeting with us next week 
to discuss this latest piece of work. Going 
back to the Planning Inspectorate, they 
want you to consider the wider implications, 
the cross-border issues. Where is too far? 
Where is far enough? Let’s say we are asking 
our neighbour to deliver 5,000 houses; if 
they did it they are delivering 5,000 more 
than they wanted, or were going to plan 
for. Does that mean they’ll try to get their 
neighbour on the other side to do 5,000 
more? So, potentially, this duty to cooperate 
ripples up and down the country, east, west, 
north, south. Ok, so for instance, Bedford, 
they’re not directly affected by our housing 
market area, but they’re sitting there looking 
at our SHMA work, because, if Central Beds 
takes more, Central Beds might try to put 
more into their [Bedfordshire’s] area, right?
SC The knock-on effect.
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SP  How far is enough to prove to the Planning 
Inspector that you’ve done the duty to 
cooperate? No answer is the point, there’s 
no way of knowing. So you don’t know what 
is enough until you’ve had your Plan found 
unsound, that’s rather late, you’ve probably 
spent a million quid writing the Plan only 
to find out that, no, that wasn’t enough. So 
it’s a very blunt instrument and, I think, in 
2013, definitely 50% of Plans were stopped 
either because of the duty to cooperate or 
that the SHMA wasn’t an adequate, broad 
enough SHMA. They’re essentially the same 
issues, where’s housing needed and where is 
it going to be provided? I think it’s more like 
70 or 80% of Plans were stopped, it just that 
the reasoning is not obvious; the Planning 
Inspectorate don’t write in a sort of honest 
reason, it’s just ‘delay’ or whatever. But I 
know that 50% have been delayed because 
of that, it might be more. I don’t think CLG, 
when they finalised NPPF, had in mind 
the Planning Inspectorate stopping 50% or 
more of the Plans in the subsequent year on 
the grounds it didn’t meet this test. I don’t 
think anyone would have written it that way.
SC  I think Chris is right about the ripple effect 
as well, that kind of makes it nonsensical, 
so if we’ve got a need, which we have, 
unmet need around Luton, we need the new 
housing as near as possible to Luton, that’s 
our view, and our neighbour says, ‘We can 
deliver x number, but then our neighbour 
going to deliver x number’, then they 
become further and further away – how 
does that help us, actually? When does it 
get to the point where we say, ‘Well, it’s very 
nice that we’ve got houses on the other side 
of Bedford, but actually, people in Luton 
need a place close to where they work and 
their children go to school etcetera etcetera, 
and we’re having to relocate them. One of 
the councillors I’ve spoken to from one of 
the other counties said, ‘There’s plenty of 
homes available up north’, so it’s kind of like 
this idea that we’ve got a need for housing 
and they’re saying, ‘Up north there’s empty 
properties, why don’t we start shifting 
people’, well the whole idea away from their 
jobs, away from their families, that seems 
to be, ‘Well that’s an answer’, rather than 
having anything built on our ‘green belt’ – I 
don’t believe a lot of it is green belt.
SP  So, coming back to the PINS, how much 
is enough. We have informal sessions with 
them, where we talk about where we’re 
getting to and they give us advice, and we 
said, ‘Well, in reality, how are you going to 
test this?’ During this particular meeting, I 
think they said, ‘Uncharted waters’ at least 
four times in the legal context because of 
unusual circumstances, the scale of what 
we’re dealing with, there are so many issues. 
‘Uncharted waters’ was the thing they kept 
coming back with, and it was, ‘Well, we’d 
expect you to keep working with your 
neighbours to have some sort of formal 
arrangements as to how you’re going to do 
this, so a Memorandum of Understanding 
or something like that’. And we’re saying, 
‘Well, the chances of every authority, let’s say 
you’ve got four or five authorities that you’re 
working with, all being at the right stage of 
their plan, where they can actually secure 
an MoU, even if they wanted to – write an 
MoU saying we’ll deliver 2,000 houses or a 
thousand houses – is that worth the paper 
it’s written on, because they might be at 
the wrong stage, or the elections might be 
coming up and the next lot might say, ‘No, 
we’re not doing that’. So the practicality, 
even if they wanted to, of securing this in 
order to get this council to get its plan found 
sound…
  We might prove to a Planning Inspector 
that we’ve actually got exactly the right 
number – 6,000 houses or whatever it might 
be – we might say our role for the sub-
regional economy is proven, we’ve published 
an employment land study which shows 
the role that we play and therefore why 
we need our employment land. Also, how 
the neighbouring authorities, how people 
come in from there and take the better 
jobs, that’s all documented and so therefore 
we are providing a role to the wider area, 
but we haven’t got the space and it would 
be the wrong thing to do to build on our 
employment land because of the proximity 
to the railway line, the motorway, the 
airport. 
  You wouldn’t want to lose the whole of 
Napier Park, we have put in quite a lot of 
high-quality offices there – you might get 
four or five headquarter office buildings in 
the next ten years. If you wanted to have 
access to four hundred million people 
within three hours you probably couldn’t 
find a better location, because you can get 
to the whole of Europe. So the location is 
fantastic, but it does mean that housing 
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– which is actually easier to do because 
you can turn a field into a housing area 
– needs to be done, but the pressure, the 
mechanism is so back-ended that the Plan 
might have been found unsound two years 
down the line. Well, there might have been 
a change of government by then. Even 
a different Secretary of State might have 
taken a slightly different view of the green 
belt versus another one. Our current SoS is 
currently getting really, really excited about 
the green belt, well, another SoS might say, 
‘I’m more relaxed about that’. I think he’s 
[Eric Pickles] holding on to a whole load of 
travellers’ sites in the green belt. I think the 
Planning Inspectorate has got a backlog of 
about 200 gypsies and travellers’ sites in the 
green belt, I just think he’s sitting on them 
because he doesn’t want to do anything 
before the next election. 
  The evidence that we’re required to produce 
is quite large, even though it just says in 
the NPPF that it’s got to be ‘satisfactory’ 
or some phrase like that, actually then the 
Planning Inspectorate is asking for an awful 
lot. If you have any delays you’ve got to do 
the stuff again, so it’s actually really quite 
complicated. The duty to cooperate has 
just made it exponentially that much more 
difficult.
SC There’s a huge amount of bureaucracy. 
SP  And then if you factor in that there are 
different politics, so if they don’t want to do 
it you’re looking at a virtual impossibility.
DC  SC, you mentioned a moment ago about the 
green belt, could you expand on that please?
SC  Yes, well I have my suspicions that a lot 
of land that’s labelled as ‘green belt’ is not 
actually green belt, in that it’s not green, 
rolling, luscious hills or anything like 
that. There is a lot of land around the 
area in Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire 
that’s disused agricultural land. There is 
some beautiful green belt, some Areas 
of Outstanding Natural Beauty, that’s 
absolutely fine, I don’t have a problem with 
that, but I think that people use the phrase 
‘green belt’ to cover any land that’s not built 
on, in order that it might be offered some 
protection. There’s a lot of it that’s disused, 
there’s a lot of it that farmers are quite happy 
to get rid of if they had the opportunity. 
And there’s areas where people just wander 
through and walk their dogs and things 
like that. Although it’s important to have 
open green space, whenever a planning 
application comes in anywhere around 
Luton, they’re always jumping up and down 
about how we’re building on their beautiful 
green land, when, if you went out and had 
a look at it, it’s just scrubland and disused 
agricultural land.
DC   Stevenage did a recent review of their green 
belt land, are there any strategic green belt 
reviews upcoming around Luton?
SP  Well, we have done a review of our green 
belt land, but it’s tuppenny ha’penny, a little 
bit round the airport, some slivers up there 
etcetera. Stocksley Common is the biggest 
bit. I don’t think that Central Beds have 
done a strategic green belt review. I think 
the plan that they’re proposing is more of 
a single issue, these are the developments 
we want, this is where we’re going to. On 
the guidance that’s come out yesterday, the 
NPPF guidance notes, there are some bullet 
points that Nick Boles on the website has 
done. It’s quite interesting because it’s quite 
a political set of bullet points. The bottom 
one says, ‘Contrary to the Opposition, we 
are not going to allow urban authorities to 
dump…
DC It’s all very evocative language isn’t it…
SP  It’s the CLG website! Somewhere else 
in it, they’re saying, ‘Unmet need is not 
necessarily a satisfactory reason to remove 
the green belt’ – it’s just emphasizing your 
point SC that green belt has this mythical 
status that everyone latches onto. It was 
originally designed to provide a bit of 
structure for urban areas. That was set I 
don’t know how many years ago, thirty, 
forty, whatever and it needs to be reviewed 
fairly regularly because when they did it 
the population was probably half of what 
it is now, the problems were very different. 
The green belt is now requiring a mega-
strategic policy and yet we’ve been asked to 
review it on an individual borough basis! 
We don’t have much to review, so according 
to the original logic of the green belt it 
doesn’t really make much sense. It needs a 
more strategic approach and anyway it is 
quite logical to build, let’s say for the South 
East they need 100,000 houses – given 
what’s happened over the last 200 years 
you’d say, ‘Right, we need some urban 
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extensions, some new settlements, we 
need this mixture’. Well, how can you get 
this mixture? You can’t, you’re into urban 
extensions and urban sites. You’re not into 
anything else, because new settlements are 
almost impossible to come through unless 
it just so happens that one borough decides 
that it’s almost the whole of its solution. In 
that context, that urban authority is going 
to have a few sites and a few locations 
where you can do it and therefore they’re 
going to argue against it, because almost by 
definition it’s not going to be big enough to 
deliver the sort of scale of infrastructure that 
would be required. So therefore, inevitably, 
this duty to cooperate, this lack of a regional 
approach is meaning that we haven’t got the 
menu that we need as a region.
SC  Well, it’s conflicting policies, isn’t it? The 
duty to cooperate conflicts massively 
with what they’re saying about the green 
belt, because, as Chris has quite rightly 
pointed out, we need a mixture of different 
developments in order to get the kind 
of housing numbers we need. But if the 
authorities are saying, ‘No, no, no’, we’re not 
building on any of the green belt, where do 
we go? The duty to cooperate is telling them 
that they’ve got to consider unmet need, but 
where are they going to put it? They’re two 
massively conflicting policies, and I think 
the fact that he’s [Boles] writing stuff on 
there that you can’t be dumping housing…
what he’s trying to do is appease his Tory 
councillors who’ve been saying, ‘What the 
bloody hell are you doing!?’ And he’s trying 
to say, ‘It’s ok’…
SP  It’s the same ones who wanted the localism 
agenda at the beginning – that bullet point 
is aiming precisely at them.
DC Next year it could all be very different…
SC  But the removal of the green belt, it’s 
possible, because that was part of the 
deal with regional strategies, because the 
justification was the need for houses for 
the removal of the green belt, so what’s 
different?
SP  But you need to do it at a scale that’s big 
enough. If you took what’s going on in the 
South East to its logical conclusion, the 
investment that’s going in, the business 
opportunities, you’ve got a lot of new 
businesses coming into Cambridge, you’ve 
got infrastructure, you’ve got Stanstead 
Airport. You’d put a Milton Keynes near 
Stanstead Airport if you really, really wanted 
to deal with the scale of what’s going on. 
That would be logical, it would strengthen 
the investment in the transport network, 
as well as whatever else we’re doing. It’s just 
that that’s not available, is it? Because you’re 
not doing anything at a regional scale, so 
therefore you can’t actually consider…a 
Milton Keynes can’t come through this 
process, a Stevenage can’t come through this 
process, you’ve just got a thousand house 
village really, well that’s not even enough to 
build a primary school off. The solutions are 
– unless you’re bolting it onto an existing 
town – you haven’t got…
SC  Stevenage have had the same problem as 
us for a longer period, really. They’ve been 
battling with North Herts…forever! They 
haven’t got anywhere.
DC  Ok, so what about Local Enterprise 
Partnerships? I’ve actually tried, pretty hard 
in fact, to get in touch with someone from 
the South East Midlands LEP. These are 
supposed to be the solution to the sub-
regional quandary…
SP  Well, if you look at that map up there, that 
is the SEMLEP area. You’ve got Corby up 
at the top there, Kettering, Daventry, South 
Northants, Milton Keynes, Aylesbury Vale, 
Central Beds, Bedford and Luton. There are 
four unitaries in that, so Bedford, Central 
Beds, Milton Keynes and Luton. That 
would probably make a more sensible Local 
Economic [sic] Partnership, with three cities 
and a town to deal with, to get a proper 
strategy going.
DC  Do you know why they decided on this 
particular LEP boundary?
SC  Why did they decide on it…I don’t know, 
but I do know that Northampton have got 
another LEP, the Northamptonshire LEP, 
so it’s got really complicated in terms of the 
stuff that’s coming through from Northants, 
you know, should that actually go through 
the Northampton LEP? Chris is right, it 
should have been a much tighter thing it 
would have made much more sense. I’m not 
sure about the history, about why it became 
like that, but SEMLEP has been up and 
running for three years…
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SP  It was to do with the Milton Keynes/South 
Midlands sub-regional plan – that was its 
origin. But what you’ve got here are quite 
a lot of districts almost on their own. Now 
the logic of having Local Economic [sic] 
Partnerships is that it would be the top-tier 
authorities that would deliver infrastructure, 
so the districts, they’re not going to benefit 
from this, because the money’s not going to 
go to them. So actually Luton, Central Beds, 
Bedfordshire and Milton Keynes could 
apply for some money from a big piece of 
infrastructure kit, because they’re doing the 
transport. So that could be logical, but the 
others, that are in theory part of the LEP, 
well they’re not going to get the money, it’s 
going to go to the county.
SC  And then you add the complexity of politics, 
when you all sit round the table, there’s still 
that kind of, ‘Well there’s some money there, 
we want some of that, you want some of 
that’. I find it massively frustrating, the most 
frustrating committee I’ve ever sat on. We 
go there, and we’re three years down the line 
– and what have we had out of it?
DC  I get the impression that planning 
and transport are down the list of LEP 
priorities…
SP  Well, I go to the planners’ SEMLEP 
coordination meeting and all that I read, see 
is them moaning about the inadequacy of 
the duty to cooperate, so we all agree that 
we’ll produce a complicated spreadsheet 
of all our cross-boundary issues, and 
somehow that’ll do it? Of course it won’t! 
All it does is raise the problem, all we’re 
doing is collating the problem. You end up 
with a bilateral discussion, say between us 
and Central Beds, but if you think about 
bilateral discussions that have to go on in 
order to get a bigger area working…The 
way the Local Economic [sic] Partnerships 
are meant to work is that they promise a 
load more housing and they’ll get given 
infrastructure money by the government. So 
we can’t promise them any of our housing, 
we haven’t got any space for it. So we can’t 
be part of the deal if it’s just us, therefore we 
need to work together with our neighbours, 
they need to deliver the housing and 
between us we’ll deliver the infrastructure. 
We’ve got the airport, we’ve got the train 
station, and we’ve got the motorway 
junction, so actually we’re helping! But if 
they don’t want to deliver extra housing on 
our behalf in order for us all to qualify for 
extra money, it’s not going to work, is it? It’s 
a really clunky, difficult…
SC  It is clunky. You’ve got the strategic idea 
that we can all work together, so the 
infrastructure that affects the whole of the 
SEMLEP area and everyone benefits and 
blahdy blahdy blah. But the bottom line 
is, and I can say this – it’s politicians from 
opposing parties trying to agree. Everyone 
becomes parochial – Bedford needs this, 
Milton Keynes needs that, and then they 
form little cliques, so Milton Keynes gets 
together with Central Beds…
DC  I’ve read in various places that some local 
authorities want LEPs to fail!
SP  Yes, if Luton had much more space, if it 
was like a Bedford, a proper town with a 
surrounding hinterland, if we were in the 
same position, then it might work a lot 
better for us, because effectively we could 
be in control of the extra growth and 
then we could say, ‘Right, ok, we’ll be part 
of that deal, as long as we get whatever 
infrastructure is needed, we will contribute 
to that. We’ll try to persuade the local 
people to accept more housing in order to 
be part of that overall deal and therefore 
we’ll explain to them that we’ll be getting 
extra infrastructure for it. But because we 
haven’t we rely on our neighbours, and if 
our neighbours don’t want to agree to it, the 
whole lots falls down.
SC  We’re constantly reviewing in our minds, 
you know, what’s the value of being in 
SEMLEP? We’re being told constantly 
that any money that’s going to come will 
be through SEMLEP, so you’ve got to 
be in it to win it kind of thing. Equally, 
we’re constantly re-evaluating it, because 
SEMLEP itself is a whole growth industry, 
the number of meetings, there’s something 
like 27 separate groups underneath 
SEMLEP that actually meet, and where have 
we got?
DC  It’s also dramatically underfunded 
compared to the previous regional system, 
isn’t it?
SC  Yes, I think they’ve got five full-time 
employees that work for SEMLEP, which is 
probably not enough for the kind of work 
they want to do, so it’s slow progress, I 
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know these things are always slow progress 
anyway. You have to constantly question, 
I know we’re putting a lot of time into it, 
we’ve got our officers working on unending 
piles of documentation that is being asked 
for. Where do you say, ‘Well, you know 
what, we’re not getting anything out of this’.
SP  The problem is, all the government 
money for regeneration and investment in 
transport and whatever is coming through 
the LEPs, so therefore, even if you feel that 
you’re hitting your head against a brick wall, 
you’ve got to be in there, because otherwise 
you actually will not get any.
SC  As an aside, European funding is now 
coming through SEMLEP as well. It’s 
just going to be that that’s going to be the 
holding pot, but they don’t even have the ok 
to dish out the money – it’s still going to be 
government that decides where the money’s 
going to go.
SP  I think the problem of the Local Economic 
[sic] Partnerships was that there was no 
great logic, there were no rules about what 
your average one should be. It could be as 
big or as small as you liked, so we’ve got 
a huge great mixture, it makes sense to 
have a Hertfordshire LEP, where there’s 
ten authorities, a million people, they’re all 
within the administrative boundary of the 
county – that’s easy, that’s straightforward. 
It probably isn’t big enough but it’s going 
to work. I know they’ve got about ten 
staff, whereas ours is a hotchpotch, and 
so you had some bizarre discussions as to 
whether or not Cherwell – what’s Cherwell 
got to do with the rest of it? I think it was 
more a border issue, that they didn’t want 
anything to do with the Thames Valley. So 
you’ve got some really silly stuff, whereas 
if they had set out some clear criteria, but 
they didn’t want to do that, because they 
wanted it to be localism. So probably the 
idea that you just leave everyone to sort it 
out wasn’t necessarily going to deliver you 
a logical set of outcomes, so probably it 
was compromised from the start. If they’d 
said, ‘We want LEPs to be roughly this 
population, therefore we want 20 of them 
in the country, and we actually want to 
work together with you, but ultimately we’ll 
create them’. For instance, in the South East 
we probably should have had three or four, 
something like that.
SC  A really good example is the most recent 
meetings we’ve been having which have 
been about what the priorities of the 
projects that we want to deliver within the 
SEMLEP area, and they’ve got a private 
company to look at all the different projects 
that people have come up with, and graded 
them. So, ones that are spade-ready, ones 
that deliver a benefit across a wider, across 
the whole of the SEMLEP area, ones that 
deliver more jobs, how much they cost, 
where the money is coming from. They 
looked at all these different criteria and 
they’ve given them all a ranking and the 
whole meeting was just arguing the toss 
about whether that was actually right or not 
because that wasn’t fair…
SP We do that all the time SC!
SC  So it’s not strategic at all! It’s about, ‘Well, we 
need this road’, that’s the kind of thing you 
get down to. How we’re ever going to get 
down to this consensus…
DC  Then you look at somewhere like 
Cambridge, I think there’s eight authorities, 
they seem to be able to work together quite 
well, is that just local circumstances, or…?
SC  Yes, I mean you’re always going to have 
that, especially when you’ve got an outside 
organisation, and they’ve done the criteria-
setting and evaluation of it, then what 
comes out of it comes out of it and you’ll 
have to live with it. But when something 
comes out and people are questioning it, 
like, ‘That’s already got £10 million funding 
from the Transport Board’, you know, hang 
on a minute, how can that be a priority, 
it’s just a road, where are the jobs? So we 
ended up just arguing and it makes you 
wonder how they ended up actually coming 
to that view. I have grave misgivings about 
SEMLEP, but like I said, we have to be part 
of it.
DC  Ok, so about transport, I’m very interested 
in the strategic picture as far as transport is 
concerned, now that the regions have gone, 
how are transport issues getting picked up, 
or not getting picked up?
SP  Well, we’ve got someone who is very 
strategic who runs my Transport Strategy 
unit, and they basically put quite a lot 
of their time into leading with the other 
all-SEMLEP authorities. So, they had the 
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Local Transport Board, which was the four 
authorities I’ve mentioned, so Central Beds, 
Milton Keynes, Bedford and us. Originally 
we set up a Local Transport Board for that, 
and out officer effectively wrote the Terms 
of Reference and so we were engaging 
on that, and we were quite capable as a 
group of four authorities of drafting an 
infrastructure investment strategy for 
transport. We were going to have the 
governance of the transport investment 
for that Local Transport Board, and then 
the government changed the ball-game, 
they changed the rules when they said, ‘No, 
we’re not going to have Local Transport 
Boards, they’re going to be one and the 
same with the LEPs’. So now actually, we’ve 
got, in theory, a load of districts who have 
got nothing to do with this – so the four 
authorities who actually had the top-order 
powers – we’re sort of merging that into 
whatever it now is, and our person is going 
on to that. But it’s just a bit of a mess really, 
because we had set it all up and then they 
changed the rules. Actually we’re quite 
capable, between us all, of doing some 
reasonable, joined-up approach.
SC  And a lot of the high-level discussions 
there about East-West rail and that type 
of discussion, they still ongoing, but 
they’re going on more positively because 
everybody’s signed up to the same idea. 
There are a few small differences…
SP  So transport’s not too difficult, it’s partly 
because the government has had so much 
involvement in transport, you know with 
Highways Agency doing the roads and 
Network Rail, so there’s a bit more national 
involvement in transport. It’s housing that’s 
a more local issue.
DC  You’ve got Philip Hammond saying that 
transport is damaged by the localist agenda, 
it’s another conflict…
SC  Yes, it is conflict again, more policies that 
are kind of antagonistic against each other.
DC   So, just to hypothesise, say there’s a change 
of government next year, would the sub-
regional plan be picked up again?
SC  To be honest, I don’t know, I don’t know 
what would happen, and I think that that’s 
always difficult when there’s a change of 
government, everyone’s kind of saying, 
‘Reverse this, but keep that’, and it never 
really goes the way that you expect or want 
it to be.
DC  Planning has changed so much in the last 20 
years…
SC   I mean, the ‘Right to Grow’ thing, we’re like, 
‘Yes, that’s a great idea’, obviously we would, 
wouldn’t we? Obviously the people around 
us would be saying, ‘That’s terrible’. But I’m 
not sure how far they’ll get with that.
DC  These things take so long to implement 
anyway…
SC  Yes, it’ll be years…we’ll still be running 
down this route for some considerable time 
yet.
SP  I’ve worked in central government writing 
national guidance for ten tears, and I’ve 
watched how Ministers decide what they’re 
going to do. So they write guidance, and 
then within about nine months they’re 
irritated that things haven’t happened in the 
country, and yet the guidance was about 
plan-making. So all that’s likely to happen 
in nine months is that the local authorities 
have read the thing, worked out that they’re 
going to have to plan something…
DC  Wait for the first one to make the move…
SP  Exactly, so actually there’s a big time lag. 
So if you change the planning system, and 
say, ‘Right, this is going to be a different set 
of rules’, unless you’ve drafted it perfectly, 
there’s going to be a lot of questions that 
need answered and they’re going to be 
answered through case law, so who wants 
to be the first guinea-pig to hit the case law? 
So therefore there’s going to be a little bit of 
a lapse of time, so you might get a few plans 
through in five years and then there’ll be a 
bunch over the ten year period. Well, we’ve 
had three changes to the planning system 
in about ten years haven’t we, so from the 
old Local Plan to a new system and then 
we’ve actually been changing from that into 
yet another system. So actually that ten 
year period wasn’t enough, they were just 
beginning to come through, weren’t they? 
  Unfortunately, in this country, we have a 
really odd relationship with the planning 
system. In somewhere like Germany, or 
France, or Holland, there’s a national psyche 
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that they think planning is a good thing, 
and they understand that you have to do 
this as a collective thing and that you have 
to do it together and that it’s for the public 
good. There’s different ways of doing it, but 
they actually believe that it’s ok and that 
they’re going to do it, however much hassle 
it feels. They actually want to do it, whereas 
we’ve got this attitude in this country that 
there’s this tussle between business and 
intervention in the market, and you go in 
cycles.
DC ‘Jobs locked in filing cabinets’ type thing?
SP  Yeah, so we go in cycles. Some governments 
say they just want to remove regulation and 
red tape, which actually just undermines the 
ability of the planning system to function. 
Therefore in the eighties we ended up with 
a load of out of town business parks because 
there was just this presumption in favour of 
development, so therefore stuff that was not 
a logical thing to do ended up happening. 
So in the nineties we had traffic jams on 
ring roads because of…right? The wrong 
decisions were taken then about what you’re 
going to do about that, and then it [policy] 
isn’t allowed a long enough time to bed in 
and then someone’s changed it again, so 
you get all these odd, perverse decisions. 
So, unfortunately in this country we don’t 
believe in planning enough just so say, 
‘Leave it alone’, if it’s not working very well, 
then just work at it a bit harder rather than 
change it all. 
  Instead of tinkering with the Local Plan 
system, because they could have just said, 
‘The Local Plan system is getting a bit too 
detailed, let’s just say it could be a little bit 
simpler’. We don’t need legislation and they 
could have delivered some of the stuff that 
was needed. Just say, ‘We don’t need that 
much detail at the Planning Inquiries’, but 
no, we had to change it all. So you end up 
with botched reform, not a long enough 
time, and then a reaction against that, and 
so we end up with this cause and effect – it’s 
virtually impossible at the national level 
to work out what the cause and effect is – 
but someone summarizes it for a minister. 
I used to do it, you put it on a page, you 
know, this isn’t working because, and you 
throw a few facts in and somehow that is the 
truth? I was just about leaving at that point 
when they were bringing in the legislation 
about 2001 for the last changes, and the 
House of Lords absolutely ambushed it and 
put a load of extra caveats in there, which 
was the downfall of that particular ten year 
period of the planning system. They put so 
much in it because they weren’t happy with 
the principle so that was its downfall. So 
you just get this mess, cause and effect.
DC  Last thing, and you may not even have an 
opinion on it, but as you know the duty 
to cooperate is a legal requirement – s. 
110 of the Localism Act – but peppered 
throughout the NPPF you have the 
recurring phrase, ‘sustainable development’ 
which is basically defined as being what the 
48 pages of the NPPF say it is, but this has 
not been made into a legal requirement. So 
my question is why did they go down the 
legal route for the duty to cooperate and not 
for sustainable development, why not do 
both one way or both neither way?
SC  My guess is because to legislate for some 
of the other stuff, that upsets all the 
businessmen and the developers. The 
government are very good at doing this, 
they’ll legislate on some things and they’ll 
tell the councils what they’ve got to do, but 
they won’t do it to big business and a prime 
example of that is the fire service. They 
want it written into the law that sprinklers 
should be fitted in commercial premises, 
if you just had it written into the law that 
that’s what the developers have to put, you 
wouldn’t have the argument, they’d just have 
to do it. They’d have to bite the cost. Well, 
the developers don’t want that because they 
don’t want to bite the cost and accordingly 
the government don’t want to upset the 
big players, so it’s kind of a bit like that. It 
depends how many people are pulling your 
strings before you decide…
SP  I think the reason why is because they were 
removing regional guidance, which was a 
statutory thing, and therefore they felt that 
they had to make it a statutory requirement 
in order to fill the void, because the 
duty to cooperate just being a policy 
thing, someone would have challenged it 
legally. So I think it’s why they had to put 
something in there. On the sustainable 
development stuff, what they’re saying, what 
they’re defining sustainable development as 
– the 50 pages of the NPPF taken as a whole 
– it just means effectively that if they wanted 
to rewrite that slightly, that would be a 
new definition of sustainable development. 
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Defining a concept like that is fraught with 
difficulty because it changes over time…
SC  So it’s too difficult to do, how can you 
legislate for it?
SP  If you just take shopping as an example, 
sometimes everyone drives to a big 
supermarket, ten years later half of them 
still drive to the supermarket and the other 
half do stuff online. Well, that land use then 
has changed its nature, and so the definition 
of what it is probably needs to change over 
time. So trying to define what sustainable 
development is – we could be in a different 
ball game if the sea rises by another metre – 
we might say, ‘You know what, we’ll define 
sustainable development slightly differently 
now’. So it’s just a changing thing, you can’t 
legislate for it.
INTERVIEW TWO
Participant: Senior Planner, Hertfordshire County 
Council
Date: 11 March 2014
Location: Hertfordshire County Council, County 
Hall
DC  Ok, so the focus of my research is on the 
duty to cooperate, examined through two 
main case studies – Hertfordshire and the 
Cambridge sub-region – so contrasting 
case studies, one where people are finding 
it more difficult to work together and 
obviously Cambridge is a little bit different. 
What are your initial feelings on the duty to 
cooperate?
SP  I think in practice it’s proving to be 
incredibly difficult to operate. It’s quite 
interesting that, as an authority, the county 
council was very heavily engaged in 
regional planning and was very critical of 
a lot of aspects of it and I suppose the new 
government came in, we heard all these 
words and everything was swept away. It 
was a case of, ‘Ok then, off you go and do it 
yourself ’. I don’t think that, as a concept, it 
was ever really thought through properly, 
so my take on it was that it was pretty much 
a political reaction to a system which there 
were a number of problems, in terms of its 
operation – it wasn’t perfect…
DC  It would be good to hear your opinions on 
the previous regional regime…
SP   No problem, we can go back to that. So 
it wasn’t a perfect system, but sadly it’s a 
combination of the complete pendulum 
swing of approach and the fact that the new 
approach really wasn’t thought through and 
was probably a political initiative rather 
than it being a technical response to the 
issues of how you plan strategically and 
deal with bigger issues. So, as usual with 
these things, the planning authorities and 
local government are having to try to find a 
way through it, and that varies completely 
as your research will pick up according to 
local circumstances and history across the 
country. So I’m not impressed, basically. 
The other thing is, I have to kind of say, I 
work for a county council, I was in charge 
of the strategic planning function. Strategic 
planning, in terms of a requirement and a 
responsibility got swept away, so I would 
feel aggrieved, wouldn’t I? Certainly we’re 
struggling with the new system.
DC  Ok. It would be good to get your take on the 
whole Stevenage situation…
SP  Sure, so it started off back in the 90’s with 
the county council preparing its Structure 
Plan, so regional planning numbers to deal 
with and we had issues in terms of where 
it was going to put development or how to 
cope with the development. Because we’re 
very heavily constrained in terms of green 
belt, which there was both a political and 
professional line to try to preserve as far as 
possible and a policy imperative to keep it 
unless you really have strong reasons to take 
land out of the green belt. The Structure 
Plan was struggling – it went for a policy 
of identifying two specific locations to deal 
with the shortage of sites for housing – a 
fairly predictable approach really inasmuch 
as for a county with a lot of dispersed, 
medium-sized settlements, it identified 
Stevenage and Hemel Hempstead as the 
places which had the most potential for 
coping with growth. So for Stevenage, a 
big step, development west of the A1(M), 
that was included in the Structure Plan. A 
lot of work then went on jointly between 
the county council, North Herts and 
Stevenage to try and deliver that, something 
called ‘Garden City 21’ as a project in 
terms of bringing this forward in the most 
sustainable way, because it was recognised 
that this was quite challenging. It’s almost 
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going to be a new community separated 
from Stevenage by the A1(M), there was 
going to have to be a need for it to have a 
high level of sustainability.
DC  That’s interesting that you describe it as a 
new settlement, rather than as an urban 
extension…
SP  Well, the best of the schemes boiled down 
to two access points underneath the 
motorway, so I think that psychologically 
and physically it was always going to be 
a difficulty overcoming that barrier and 
I think it was being planned on the basis 
of trying to achieve a high level of self-
containment. You know, its own secondary 
school, two primary schools and trying 
to ensure that it didn’t generate huge 
amounts of movement out almost. So it was 
challenging, everyone working together, 
and then, not to put too fine a point on it, 
a change of political leadership at county 
level, we had a new Conservative regime 
who came in. They had campaigned on 
minimizing the impact of development 
on greenfield/green belt land, and were 
committed to trying to stop West of 
Stevenage, so from that point onwards the 
county council withdrew its support and 
opposed the development and North Herts 
took the same position as well. From that 
point onwards, then, Stevenage was trying 
to push something upwards up a very steep 
hill. During the early noughties, Stevenage 
tried to get their Local Plan through, that 
didn’t go through so the West of Stevenage 
development got bogged down in the 
superb bureaucracy of the planning system 
and eventually everything just fell apart.
DC  Ok, could you talk a little bit about SNAP 
[Stevenage and North Herts Action Plan]?
SP  Oh yeah, and what happened there? I 
think the thing is, by that time, when we 
had a Structure Plan and when West of 
Stevenage was in the Structure Plan, the 
county council was very active in terms of 
promoting…during 2005/2006 when SNAP 
was starting to come forward our role was 
actually far less and we were engaged in it in 
terms of Highways Authority and education 
planning and strategic transportation 
planning. But SNAP really was an attempt 
by the two districts to try to get a joined up 
approach.
DC  Was SNAP primarily central government 
led?
SP  No, as far as I’m aware that was a local 
response to the fact that the two authorities 
had to try and work together to deal with 
the issues. You’ll go to Stevenage and 
they’ll say, ‘Well, North Herts never really 
committed, we had years and years and 
years of meetings and then eventually 
they walked away’, and North Herts will 
say, ‘We were never really happy with the 
content of the development proposals’. It is 
quite difficult, I think politically the county 
council’s position changed in relation to 
not driving it forward and trying to find 
solutions. I think it is genuinely true that 
the form of development that came forward 
in the planning application, and the issues 
that that raised in terms of trying to get the 
right infrastructure in there meant that the 
county council withdrew its support for the 
development on a technical basis. We could 
never quite get the developers to a position 
where we felt we needed to in terms of the 
sustainability of the overall scheme.
DC  Would it be fair to say that county councils 
– we had the Structure Plans, then the 
regional system, where the county councils 
were very much involved – now it seems 
that they’ve been somewhat side-lined or 
left out of the strategic spatial planning 
process?
SP  We are side-lined. It was 2004, Structure 
Plans gone, 2008 we had the changes to 
sub-regional planning were it was decided 
that the initial input should come from 
the strategic planning authorities. We 
had a statutory role in terms of taking 
the initiative there and then 2008 and 
the changes to Regional Spatial Strategies 
from Regional Plans effectively and the 
RDA taking a far stronger role in the 
development of the overall Plan. We’ve 
really been side-lined since that point.
DC  Maybe next year, with a change of 
government the cycle will repeat again?
SP  Ha ha ha! Going back to where we are, the 
Localism Act system based on the District 
Plan being the unit of plan-making in the 
country and no statutory role for us in 
planning. To be honest, the fact that there’s 
any resource left here at all which could 
be badged as strategic planning is almost 
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due to the respect Members have for me, 
they could have stripped it out and lots of 
other authorities have done. For a variety 
of reasons we can’t play a strategic role in 
the county as of right, we can only play a 
role if we’re invited in by the districts, and 
we haven’t been invited in. But we still play 
a leading role in strategic planning issues 
outside of the county, so districts look to 
us to take the lead on things like aviation, 
the airports, the London Plan, so that’s the 
reason that we’ve retained a little bit of the 
strategic planning resource.
DC  Under the previous regional system, the 
county council was very much involved 
housing targets, and coming to those 
figures?
SP  Yes, exactly. The way the system was 
meant to work, obviously different regions 
operated in different ways, in the first 
instance our Regional Assembly would turn 
to the county and the county groupings of 
authorities and say, ‘What are you going to 
put on the table, what’s your vision?’ We 
weren’t particularly good at that I’ve got to 
say, the county as a whole has always been 
ambivalent about growth and the impacts 
that that would have. But we were very 
heavily engaged in the discussions.
DC  Ok, the other main part of my work is the 
Local Enterprise Partnerships, which of 
course are supposed to take up the mantle 
of strategic planning. How are things going 
with the LEP? I’ve tried to get in touch a 
number of times without success but I’ll 
keep trying…
SP  Try in April, because they’re so snowed 
under in terms of their SEP [Strategic 
Economic Plan]. Well, we’ve obviously got 
a county based LEP, which makes life in 
some ways a lot easier, in as much as you’re 
not trying to work with a number of other 
geographies. It’s exactly the same as the 
county boundary. The county council has 
been instrumental in the establishment of 
the LEP, in so far as we funded it and in 
fact the staff it has got was our Economic 
Development Unit.
DC  There are around ten full-time staff, 
something like that?
SP  Well, there won’t be as many as that, they’re 
cutting back so it will be about six I think. 
So, the county council put up a lot of 
money, gave its Economic Development 
Unit effectively to the LEP and basically 
supported the initiative. But I think, and I 
don’t want to put words in the mouths of 
the LEP, the LEP has got a clear idea of what 
their role should be. Obviously the business 
component of the LEP, it’s something 
like three public sector representatives 
and seven business people. Their remit is 
basically economic development, economic 
growth and bringing what businesses can 
do to influence investment…
DC  Another way to put that is to say that spatial 
planning is some way down the list…
SP  Yep, they don’t want to do it.
DC  One of the early documents the LEP 
produced, I think near the end of it, there’s 
something very bland along the lines of, 
‘We want to see the county develop in a 
sustainable way’…
SP  Yes, exactly. The Chairman of the LEP, 
John Gould, he’s like, ‘No, we’re business, 
we want to talk about growth, economic 
development, getting the right conditions 
for that and there are other people who 
are better placed, better resourced, who 
have got far more skills and experience and 
so decisions about quantities of housing 
growth should be the remit of the local 
authorities’. The feedback that they’ve had 
on the draft LEP SEP has been, ‘Great 
analysis, not a bad idea in terms of where 
you want to go in terms of the economy, but 
you, LEP, should be pushing the housing 
agenda in Hertfordshire and getting more 
houses built’. The LEP have basically gone, 
‘What? So you tell me everything that I’m 
here to do in terms of the analysis is fine, 
but you want me to do something else 
entirely, which you’ve taken the machinery 
away yourself.’
DC  So the phrase ‘West of Stevenage’ is pretty 
much taboo at the LEP then?
SP  Well, what the LEP would say is, ‘If the 
authorities come to the table, and they 
want to grow and they want to discuss 
with us how we can support them, then of 
course we’ll look to influence government 
about investment or doing that sort of 
joining up. The LEP has got no stomach 
at all for promoting levels of growth. I 
   214
think it was very much a case that their 
strategy, their vision was very much on 
the basis of, ‘We want an economic vision 
for the future of Hertfordshire that’s not 
based on shedloads more jobs at any cost’. 
Hertfordshire’s strengths looking forward, 
the types of sectors that have the potential 
for growth means that we want to retain 
a good environment. We’ve got high skills 
levels, we need to build on that. We want 
to concentrate on increasing the GVA per 
head, rather than just total GVA at any cost, 
and we want smart growth because we’re 
not interested in destroying Hertfordshire’s 
attractiveness. So the sorts of industries that 
we’ve got, the bioscience sector or whatever, 
in a lot of ways in relation to the geography 
of Cambridge and Oxford and London 
they could go in loads of places but they’ve 
developed here, but we could piss off the 
people who’ve decided to locate here by just 
letting growth go unchecked.
DC  I was in Luton last week, they’re in the 
South East Midlands LEP, and they were 
saying that, first of all it’s far too big and 
secondly there is money there, but it hasn’t 
been unlocked, they can’t spend it. Is that 
the same scenario here in Hertfordshire?
SP  The LEPs have had a very small amount of 
money so far – it’s only just got some core 
funding to fund its own staff – the county 
council will still be funding a big chunk of 
staff time. So there’s the Growing Places 
Fund, which is relatively small beer, the 
Regional Growth Fund and then finally the 
Single Growth Pot which the LEP’s now 
bidding into via the SEP.
DC Then there’s European money as well?
SP  Yes, we’ve got a reasonable chunk of 
European money which is almost a 
continuation of the levels that would have 
been drawn down through the regional 
level in the past decade, so they’ve got 
some funding there. But the Single Growth 
Pot, you know, Heseltine’s single pot into 
which LEPs are going to bid for funding, 
it’s nowhere near the sort of levels that he 
envisaged, £8 billion, £10 billion a year, 
it’s £2 billion and in Year 1 nearly all of it 
has been allocated, but with, it’s not even 
a string, it’s more like a rope attached to it 
by the donating department, and a lot of it 
is already committed, so it’s not even new 
money. So it’s not going to make a great 
deal of difference. It’s going to be used and 
highlighted and badged as unlocking ‘x’ 
number of jobs and ‘x’ number of houses, 
but it’s really by the looks of it and the 
feedback that we’ve got is that government 
is looking for very, very, very short-term 
gains and short-term wins in terms of 
unlocking sites that are all ready to go and 
are just stalled on the basis of a little bit 
more infrastructure money. To be honest, 
we haven’t really got that type of site in 
Hertfordshire. 
  I think in the Greater South East the 
economy pushes a lot of sites forward 
because the level of viability is that much 
higher. The issue that we have is that if you 
did want to increase housing levels big time 
and you could get that agreed politically 
– overcome strategic planning issues like 
green belt – you’re into very, very big 
infrastructure investment because there’s 
very little capacity left really in the existing 
infrastructure. So a couple of million for 
an access road isn’t the issue, you’re talking 
about places like Broxbourne in the east of 
the county, they’re up for growth, they will 
push back, they will develop on greenfield 
sites, but their major spine is the A10 and it 
needs tens of millions of pounds worth of 
investment to actually unlock the capacity.
DC  Ok. To go back to the old regional system, 
would it be fair to say that a fair chunk of 
the resources and output of that system 
were about data collection, intelligence 
gathering as opposed to actually doing…
SP  Creative planning! It was a pretty slim 
organisation and regional planning in this 
country always has been pretty slim. Going 
from the almost voluntary arrangements 
like SERPLAN, where everybody 
voluntarily chipped in, yeah, EERA had 
a very small team. It did have money, so 
consultancy thinking time if you like which 
was bought in. As a body, I think you have 
to remember that the Regional Assembly 
was tasked with a lot of other things, you 
know, the whole employer-employee liaison 
thing and a lot of employment law, all sorts 
of rafts of things which government just 
devolved to the RA, you know, ‘You can 
take care of that’. In that sense, they were 
slim. The body that had the clout to actually 
deliver was the RDA and that was a different 
beast. That had the people, the expertise, the 
money…
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DC  Yes, if Labour had remained in power, the 
RSSs would have become RSs under the 
RDAs.
SP  Well, that’s the ultimate irony – it’s almost 
one of the biggest lessons you can learn 
from the last fifteen years in planning in this 
country. Every policy change in planning, in 
plan making has a long term delaying effect, 
and you really, really – rather than it being a 
political football, or like a tennis ball going 
backwards and forwards – an incoming 
administration needs to think long and hard 
before you reach for a policy change or legal 
change in terms of the system. It causes an 
immense disruption. Our district councils 
are being beaten up at the moment by 
government, who’re saying, ‘You’re rubbish! 
You’re not delivering, you can’t get your 
plans out the door, what’s wrong with you, 
you’re awful’. The fact is that being a planner 
at a local level is almost like being a doctor 
in the NHS. It’s been ten years of constant 
change. 
  One thing that was totally and utterly 
underestimated was the 2004 changes and 
the introduction of Local Development 
Frameworks, and how disruptive that 
was, and how much time it took to bed 
in. That came in with the evidence-based 
approach to planning, so a new regime of 
plans, the Structure Plan gone, new regional 
plans to be developed, a new plan-making 
system at the local level based on a lot 
more information gathering than those 
authorities had done in the past. I mean, it’s 
not the wrong thing to do, but in doing that 
you almost have to do a risk assessment to 
see actually how many authorities are going 
to be capable of making these changes, 
gearing up budgets, employing people who 
can do this sort of work. So that all slowed 
things down. Then regional plans were 
being fought and challenged, we challenged 
the East of England Plan, you know took 
it to the High Court and won, got bits of it 
squashed…
DC Could you go into the details of that please?
SP  Yes, sure. We were fighting the levels of 
development that were being proposed for 
in particular the Central Herts area and 
our rationale was that there hadn’t been 
sufficient work done to actually assess 
the impacts of that development, both in 
sustainability i.e. environmental and in 
infrastructure terms. So that was our case, 
that the Plan had not adopted a responsible 
and reasonable approach to plan-making. 
What happened, and this is the way that 
legal challenges go, so we agreed, should 
we legally challenge, yes, in principle that’s 
what the politicians said. We didn’t think 
that they [EERA] understood what the 
impacts of these levels of development are, 
and they can’t articulate it, so let’s challenge 
on that basis. We won the case, but we won 
the case on the basis that they’d missed steps 
in the SEA regulations. You go to court and 
you need a bit of law that they’ve missed 
rather than…it can be the worst plan in 
the world, but if you’ve done everything 
that the law says you’ve got to do, it’s not 
about quality sadly it’s all about process 
and legal requirements. And the Regional 
Assembly had not actually done the right 
assessment in terms of SEA, so they hadn’t 
gone through the process of modelling 
alternatives to that pattern of development 
and comparing the environmental impacts 
of all of those scenarios. So that was 
what we did to the regional plan, and 
unfortunately that was part of the ‘noise’ 
that the opposition party were hearing. 
Obviously we’re a Conservative authority, 
there are messages going out to the Tory 
opposition, ‘Look, this system doesn’t 
work, they’ve screwed up on that, they’re 
not listening to us in terms of what we can 
tell them about the impacts locally.’ So that 
all transferred itself through to the entire 
system being swept away.
  As you rightly said, if things had been 
left alone, we’d be three and a half years 
into the next Labour administration, the 
Regional Plan would have been there 
substantially, local plans would have had 
to have been prepared in conformity with 
it, and the RDA would have been pushing 
forward and actually getting investment 
and unlocking sites as they went along. So 
the housing numbers – obviously you’ve got 
the recession to factor into this – but the 
housing numbers would have been higher 
and certainly the plans would have been a 
lot further forward. But now some of them 
have had to stop because the regional plan 
had big holes in it, others, like Stevenage, 
just ran afoul of the duty to cooperate.
DC  Recently we had Ed Miliband in Stevenage 
saying, ‘If we get into power next year then 
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towns like Stevenage will have the ‘Right to 
Grow’ and then Nick Boles popped up in 
North Herts basically saying the opposite. 
So next year is going to be interesting…
SP Yes, it is, yes.
DC  I read that the National Housing and 
Planning Advisory Unit was seen by 
counties and local authorities as a really 
retrograde step, central government taking 
yet more power into its hands. Previously 
the local authorities had fed a lot of their 
housing targets work directly into the 
regional plan. Then this NHPAU comes 
along and the local authorities largely 
disengage from strategic spatial planning?
SP  I totally agree. It is intensely political. 
So, basically you had a regional planning 
system which in the great tradition of 
English planning fudged a way forward. 
If you think about the way the system was 
set up, you’d have government coming 
along saying, ‘Well, here are our population 
projections, go away and play with them, 
test them’, and so at a regional level you 
would test them. Our Regional Assembly 
actually looked at the numbers and said, 
‘Pffft, I don’t think we can do those, we just 
don’t have the capacity, the environmental 
consequences are so big’. You actually had a 
discussion at the Regional Assembly and the 
Regional Assembly came up with a fudge 
figure which it could get agreement on 
largely across the region and then that was 
tested through an EiP. Then usually with the 
Inspector it would be another fudge, with 
him saying, ‘Oh, I think you can do a bit 
more lads, I really think you can, but I hear 
what you’re saying about these numbers, 
they are awfully high aren’t they – I can see 
you’ll never deliver them and you’ve got 
environmental problems there and there 
and there and climate change there – so 
how about I go back to government and 
recommend this figure, which is slightly 
higher than yours but lower than my 
original?’. 
  So that’s where we would have been – it’s 
an old school, almost civil servant way of 
doing the deal. It was even more ‘soft’ before 
that with voluntary Regional Assemblies of 
course. That ‘soft’ – government set these 
numbers, go away and talk about them, 
Regional Assemblies talk about them have 
some discussion and you end up with a 
number. The NHPAU – yeah, it was top-
down, ‘These are the numbers and you’ve 
got to deliver them’. And so, at the regional 
level these were non-negotiable. Of course, 
that approach just got everybody’s backs 
up. It’s a number of things: it’s ‘predict and 
provide’. What I find very interesting is 
that the current system of planning under 
the NPPF is ‘predict and provide’ – I’ve 
been brought up in an era when ‘predict 
and provide’ was the worst thing you could 
possibly do, but effectively that’s what 
NHPAU were doing, government were 
getting more and more frustrated that the 
housing numbers weren’t getting delivered, 
so they put in a degree of compulsion – 
‘These are the numbers, you’re going to do 
them’.
DC  That’s really interesting what you’ve just 
said about the NPPF being ‘predict and 
provide’. The key phrase in the document is 
‘sustainable development’…
SP  But it’s not, it’s a sham sadly. If you take 
the words of the NPPF and its focus on 
sustainable development, you’d end up in 
a completely different place to where we 
are. The problem comes back to ‘objectively 
assessed needs’ and the interpretation of 
those. ‘Objectively assessed needs’ and 
ONS population projections are a ‘starting 
point’ – well, no they’re not, they’re not 
being treated as a starting point, they’re 
being treated as, ‘This is what you will do on 
an individual district basis’, unless you can 
come up with the most incredible reason 
why you shouldn’t do them, unless you can 
come up with someone else to take your 
housing levels for you. It’s effectively ‘predict 
and provide’ through the back door. 
  We’ve been wrestling with this in North 
Herts collectively, so much so that last year 
a number of the districts got called into a 
meeting with Nick Boles. And it was, ‘You’re 
not doing very well here, are you? Get on 
with it’, and it was a typical ministerial 
meeting in terms of Nick Boles coming in 
for ten minutes then jumping out of the 
meeting. Then we had a big discussion 
in terms of politicians there, leaders of 
councils, and they’re saying, ‘We don’t 
understand this, the guidance says it should 
be a starting point, so why are you bashing 
us over the head with it? If we then come 
up with reasons why we can’t do that, isn’t 
that good enough?’ We had a subsequent 
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meeting with CLG and their population 
expert, and again, to our faces the CLG 
have said, ‘Of course, ONS is the starting 
point and you can come up with your own 
projections – if you come up with your own 
projections which say this is not the case 
then they have to be taken into account.’
DC   Luton said that the ONS and the CLG 
population people really didn’t want to get 
involved…
SP  No, of course not, they just repeat the same 
mantra. Even at that population session 
there were Executive Members of planning 
who were saying, ‘But that’s not how you’re 
treating it, that’s not how Inspectors are 
interpreting it – what don’t you hear about 
what we’re saying’. What confuses me about 
‘predict and provide’ is that this approach 
would have been vilified by the profession 
ten years or fifteen years ago and nothing 
is said about it at the moment. Similarly, 
when the NHPAU came in the planning 
profession just bent over really, just swayed 
with it.
DC  Would you agree that ‘spatial planning’ as 
opposed to mere land use planning has had 
its day for the moment?
SP  I think that’s right. Again, the kind of 
confusion is, you read the planning 
framework and it says a lot of the right 
things in there, but actually that’s not the 
way it’s being interpreted when it comes 
to plans trying to get over the hurdles and 
through Examinations. The second thing 
is, going back to this meeting with CLG 
and the population numbers, so we had 
discussions with them about the basis of 
some of the ONS population projections 
and their household projections and there 
were some ‘anomalies’ in Hertfordshire. So 
they said, ‘Feedback these anomalies and 
we’ll take them to ONS’, but there was no 
ownership of the issue, it was, ‘Yeah, yeah 
we know there’s problems, we know there’s 
issues’, but still they wouldn’t go that extra 
mile to say, ‘Yes, we see you’ve got some 
anomalies, we’ll make a note to the effect 
that you should have your Examination 
on whether those are actually the right 
numbers for you’. It was, ‘Oh well, put 
something in and I’m sure that ONS will 
do something about it’. Well, ONS have had 
the recent round of consultation on their 
latest draft numbers where they actually 
narrowed down the basis upon which you 
could comment’. 
  So we couldn’t even raise the things 
that we wanted to raise. A big issue in 
Hertfordshire is, ‘How far back do you base 
your projections on?’ Migration trends 
in Hertfordshire have been going up and 
down like that. The convention is to take a 
five year migration trend! Whoa, hold on 
a minute! Your population projection is 
done then, if it’s done two years later you’ve 
got a projection like that! So you’re saying 
that we plan on the basis of the next twenty 
years and there’s no negotiation in terms 
of those numbers? That can’t be right, can 
it? I think that goes back to relying too 
heavily, and again, the words in the NPPF 
are right, they should be the ‘starting point’. 
Your objectively assessed needs should be 
a starting point. So you do a piece of work 
which says, ‘If the world stays the same as 
its been over the next five years, it’s likely 
that this number is going to be the issue.’ 
What does that say about the future that 
we’re trying to achieve in this area? Sadly, 
it’s just this slavish reliance on, ‘There’s the 
number and that’s what you’ve got to do’. It 
calls into question why planning is here at 
all to be honest.
DC  Ok, the last main area, and I think this is 
very relevant to yourselves as the county 
council, is strategic transport and travel. 
So we have Philip Hammond saying that 
transport is being damaged by the localist 
agenda…could you say something about 
Hertfordshire CC’s role in transport?
SP  Sure. It’s the area where there is at least 
some form of strategic function. I’m quite 
sure that the government doesn’t realise that 
they’ve still left things like Local Transport 
Plan requirements on the statute. It’s one 
of those things where I’m sure if someone 
nudged them and they knew it they’d sweep 
them all away. So we are still a Transport 
Authority as a county, we are still trying 
to think more strategically, and in fact 
one of the things we’re trying to do this 
year, we’re going to refresh the vision and 
strategy end of our LTP. And it is going 
to be our attempt to stitch some of these 
strategic issues together via the medium of 
transport. Which is a strange way of doing 
it, but it’s the only game in town in terms 
of it covering the whole county. The only 
other document we have is the LEP SEP so 
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it’s an excuse to produce something which 
does have a bit of vision about the future of 
the county and at least gives us a transport 
response to it.
DC  It’s interesting that you can use this strategic 
transport document to highlight other 
issues.
SP  I think the debate is going to be around 
LEP SEPs insofar as, almost their very being 
will create a discussion about whether 
there should be an alternative vision, or 
whether we should seek to influence the 
future iterations of the LEP SEP, to take 
on board the conventional sustainability 
agenda of spatial planning. I think this 
time round it’s been so quick, the system’s 
almost been written as LEPs are doing it. 
They were promised guidance on what 
the SEPs should be and it’s never arrived. I 
think it’s going to be an interesting summer 
as there’ll be a whole load of SEPs out 
there – somebody painting a vision of the 
future, supposedly an economic future, but 
they’ve been pushed to cover other things. 
It will be interesting to see whether there is 
a response by the local authorities to sort 
of say, ‘All right, we’re not required to come 
together to think like this but perhaps we 
need to come together to think like this’, 
and plan a different level of resolution to 
actually get the things that we want to get. 
That’s a hope, if you like. We’ve just had, 
ten days ago, a duty to cooperate workshop 
facilitated by Catriona Riddell. That was 
driven very largely by the fact that, as a 
county, we’ve got four districts that have got 
Core Strategies adopted, but the others are 
sort of struggling really. 
  So North Herts haven’t got one, East Herts, 
Stevenage, Welwyn Hatfield…it’s easier to 
do the ones that have got their Strategy! 
Hertsmere, Dacorum, Watford and Three 
Rivers have got them. So the discussion 
was, ‘Housing numbers are a problem’, but 
almost it was a kind of discussion of, very 
similar to your piece of work, ‘We have this 
duty to cooperate, lots of plans are falling 
foul of it’ – the Aylesbury Vale one which 
almost terrified a lot of them – so it was, 
‘What do you have to do, how far do you 
have to cast the net? What sort of timeline 
do you have to consider?’ It was almost an 
exploration of would it be an idea for the 
Hertfordshire authorities to think of trying 
to work together to actually get a measure 
of protection on the duty to cooperate 
issue in the county? Get some fundamental 
principles agreed that everybody would 
sign up to and which could offer some 
protection at Examination, so that if you 
went into an Examination with nine other 
authorities, ten including the county 
council, were sitting there saying, ‘Yes, we 
agree with them, Inspector, and yes we 
have cooperated and we have discussed 
this issue’. Aylesbury Vale would say, ‘Well, 
that’s Hertfordshire, but you need to take on 
board South Cambridgeshire and Luton and 
whatever’, but almost trying to make some 
form of sense of it. 
  You’ve got this geography, you talk a lot, you 
have talked a lot in the past, try and use this 
to try to get some sort of traction with the 
duty to cooperate issue, so you’ve got more 
of a chance of getting over the finishing line 
with your plans. It’s better to have a plan 
with a bigger number in it than just be on 
the receiving end of loads of appeals. Places 
like Hertfordshire, once the economy picks 
up, you’ll be under enormous pressure. 
So, that’s the nature of the discussions that 
we’re having at the moment. An adjunct to 
that was, ‘Well, it may be worth having that 
work being used in terms of a discussion 
with the LEP, coming from an economic 
perspective. If the planning authorities have 
got a common view on some of these issues 
then why don’t we seek to influence the LEP 
and its investment patterns and its influence 
with government as well? It’s basically about 
trying to make the best of a system that’s 
almost structurally impossible to work with.
INTERVIEW THREE
Participant: Senior Planner, Stevenage Borough 
Council
Date: 12 March 2014
Location: Stevenage Borough Council, Planning 
Offices
DC  Could I just kick off by asking you what 
your initial feelings are on the duty to 
cooperate?
SP  It doesn’t work, basically. I don’t think 
that’s a particularly original thought, 
a lot of us thought that would be the 
case as soon as we saw the Draft NPPF 
come out. The problem is as we all know, 
particularly in this part of the world, people 
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do not want to see new development. 
The public are strongly resistant to it, 
so their elected councillors are resistant 
to it. People have an expectation, not 
unreasonable in a democracy, that their 
elected representatives will mirror their 
feelings. So if you’re an authority that wants 
to grow, like Stevenage, or needs to grow, 
like Stevenage or Luton and you can’t grow 
within your own administrative boundaries, 
you are reliant upon your neighbours. 
We have the two largest authorities in 
Hertfordshire as our immediate neighbours 
and they’ve made it pretty clear over a 
number of years that they’re not willing to 
cooperate with Stevenage, certainly in the 
context of helping it to expand or meeting 
its development needs. East Herts have 
continually said, ‘No’, to us, they’re still 
saying, ‘No’, at the moment. North Herts – 
well you know the long and sordid history 
of our relationship with North Herts going 
back more than twenty years – where, 
despite the fact that they’ve had Stevenage 
growth forced upon them, first of all by the 
county Structure Plan and then by the East 
of England Plan, they’ve staunchly resisted 
it every step of the way. There was a pair 
of planning applications from the summer 
of 2001 and they’ve successfully staved off 
all the development plans for Stevenage 
West, they’ve successfully staved off the 
two planning applications. It is an example 
of how you can manipulate a system that 
is supposed to be about delivering new 
development to ensure that development is 
never delivered.
DC  Ok. Could you talk a little bit about the 
political machinations involved in the 
Stevenage West development?
SP  Ok, I shall refer to my notes. This effectively 
covers the history of the New Town, so it 
covers the previous two attempts to develop 
to the west of Stevenage. Because the New 
Town was designated in 1946 we’re talking 
about the area to the west of the designated 
area. So there was a proposal in ‘62/’63 
which was ultimately spiked by government 
and then there was another attempt, again 
at the behest of government in ‘71/’72 
which was then subsequently spiked by 
another government which came into office. 
So the most recent scheme was actually 
initiated here in Hertfordshire. It began 
back in the early ‘90s – ’92,’93,’94 – when 
the new Hertfordshire CC Structure Plan 
Review to 2011 began to be put together. 
Then, as now, the county council and all of 
the district councils got together, sought 
to identify what the housing requirement 
was Hertfordshire, identified that the 
housing requirement could not be met 
within the existing urban areas. At the 
time the concentration was purely on 
brownfield development. Stevenage was 
being promoted by the Borough Council 
as being a place that would like to grow, 
but that could only happen by greenfield 
development which would cross the 
boundary between Stevenage and North 
Herts DC. North Herts opposed that from 
the off but the county council, at that point, 
supported it together with all of the other 
districts, so it was essentially everybody else 
in Hertfordshire against North Herts…
DC  Right, so the situation then was almost a 
mirror image of what we have today?
SP  Yes, almost, yes. Essentially the role that 
Stevenage was then performing was all of 
the growth that was not being taken in the 
south of Hertfordshire ended up partly 
going to Hemel – there should have been 
an urban extension at Hemel but that didn’t 
happen – and a larger urban extension here 
at Stevenage, which was originally supposed 
to be 5,000 homes. I won’t go into the sordid 
details of how it ended up being 3,600, 
suffice to say that it was considered that 
there was only a need for 3,600 by the end 
of the Structure Plan which was 2011, as 
part of an overall 5,000 unit development. 
When it came to the Structure Plan 
Examination, the Panel said, ‘Actually, we 
think there’s potential for up to 10,000 in 
the longer term’. So, that was in 1997 – by 
that point we’d seen a change in political 
control at North Herts DC – the previous 
Labour administration had been, ‘Ok, 
we might go along with this’, to be much 
more strongly anti-development. There 
was a by-election in 1999 which changed 
the political control of the county council. 
Up to that point it had been a Labour/
Liberal Democrat coalition which had 
been supportive of Stevenage West. After 
that it was a violently anti-Stevenage West 
Conservative administration. So they were 
looking to kill our Local Plan, which we 
had submitted to them as we were required 
to do in order to obtain a certification 
that it was in ‘general conformity’ with the 
Structure Plan. Again, I won’t go into all 
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of the details surrounding that, but suffice 
to say they tried every trick in the book 
to ensure they didn’t have to give such a 
certificate. In the meantime, in 2001, we had 
two pairs of planning applications…
DC PA3 and PA5…
SP  Yes. Basically because the development 
crosses the boundary you have to submit 
a planning application to each of the 
two planning authorities. The WSC 
originally only lodged a pair of 5,000 home 
applications and we said to them, ‘No, you 
need to submit 3,600 homes applications, 
because 3,600 homes is all that the Structure 
Plan says should be provided’. It turns out 
that that was sound advice, because the 
Secretary of State ultimately refused the 
5,000 applications, saying that they were 
premature. Then basically, you have the 
whole process as set out in the timeline – 
the District Plan Inquiry, where the county 
council and North Herts were arguing 
against the West of Stevenage allocation. 
  In the meantime, the planning applications 
were chugging their way towards the 
Secretary of State calling them in for his 
own determination, which led to a call-
in Inquiry in 2004, which was the same 
year that we adopted the District Plan. 
The West of Stevenage application in there 
was made on a contingent basis, because 
the argument that the county council had 
made, and which we were not able to refute, 
was that Stevenage West was no longer 
needed in the new, emerging Structure Plan 
that was being prepared at that time. That 
there was enough land within the existing 
urban areas of Hertfordshire – something 
that we contested – but plainly we couldn’t 
give evidence about something that was 
happening in Dacorum or Three Rivers. 
The Inspector said, ‘Well, I haven’t heard 
any evidence to that fact, so instead of 
making a ‘pure’ allocation as the Structure 
Plan requires, I’m going to make this a 
contingent allocation’, which we then spent 
a lot of time and effort lobbying EERA and 
we got them to include a specific wording 
to a scope of development to the west of 
Stevenage in the emerging East of England 
Plan which ended up being the adopted 
version. 
  In the meantime the Secretary of State had 
refused the 5,000 dwellings applications; 
he said he was minded to grant the 3,600 
applications, but that was subject to a 
revised s106 undertaking. We’d not been 
able to agree a s106 because of obstacles put 
in our way by North Herts and the county 
council, so the developers had put in a 
unilateral undertaking. The Inspector was 
generally happy with the agreement, as was 
John Prescott, but there were some things 
that he didn’t like about it, and I think it 
took from October 2005 when the ‘minded 
to grant’ letter came out until December 
2009 to vary the unilateral undertaking. So 
we lost four years. Then the new Secretary 
of State granted planning permission. North 
Herts DC and the county council both 
objected and took the SoS to court. 
  There was no great rush in anybody’s minds 
to get it into the courts. So, that didn’t 
finally happen until March 2011, with a 
decision coming out in June 2011, by which 
point we had moved on from the District 
Plan and were preparing a Core Strategy in 
alignment with current legislation. Where 
the District Plan said that we and North 
Herts should prepare joint and coordinated 
plans for development to the north and 
the west of Stevenage – by this time north 
of Stevenage had been added into the mix 
by the East of England Plan – a larger 
scale development, so 15,000 rather than 
5,000. When we got to the Core Strategy 
Examination it was quite clear, even before 
the day opened, that the Inspector had been 
briefed to ensure that he found the Core 
Strategy unsound.
DC Briefed by…?
SP  Well, I think it was clear he had been briefed 
by [Conservative] Ministers. Stevenage 
West had been a party political issue right 
from the late 1990s. I think when William 
Hague was Leader of the Conservative Party 
he launched their [1997] election campaign 
standing on Stevenage West saying, ‘This is 
the kind of development that I will never 
allow to happen when I’m Prime Minister’ 
– tee hee. Some of the political discussions 
over the years have been extremely bitter 
– really bitter – some of the angriest and 
bitterest that I’ve ever seen in the best part 
of thirty years working in local government. 
There was real vitriol involved in the 
expansion of Stevenage, and in particular 
the West of Stevenage proposals. So, 
anyway, the Inspector said to us, ‘Your Core 
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Strategy is unsound, because North Herts 
aren’t willing to cooperate with you’. So we 
said, ‘They’re legally obligated to cooperate 
with us, they don’t have any choice in the 
matter so you’re wrong’. We took him, and 
the SoS who sits behind him, to the High 
Court. Unfortunately the judge agreed with 
them rather than with us. So the whole of 
our LDF got canned at that point. In parallel 
with that we have the decision of the High 
Court in respect of the applications, where 
the High Court judge said, ‘Hmmm, yes, 
there are a couple of things I’m not happy 
about here, I’m sending this back to the SoS’, 
at which point, after the best part of a year 
the SoS says, ‘It’s now been eight years since 
the original call-in Inquiry, life has moved 
on, things have changed, I want to hold a 
new call-in Inquiry’, and of course by this 
point, the developers had lost their options 
with the land-owners. They couldn’t deliver 
a new unilateral undertaking – they’d 
already spent a seven-figure sum trying to 
deliver this scheme, they weren’t willing 
to spend any more money attempting to 
deliver it, so eventually last summer they 
withdrew the planning applications. 
  So the current situation is, planning 
applications: none. We are currently holding 
pre-application meetings with the same 
consortium of land owners and developers 
about a smaller-scale West of Stevenage 
scheme purely within the borough 
boundary. So that’s going moderately well. 
We’ve paused work on our new Local Plan, 
because of the decisions that we’ve seen 
coming out in terms of Aylesbury Vale and 
Brighton and Hove, because there hasn’t 
been any serious duty to cooperate work in 
terms of Hertfordshire. If you talk to most 
of the districts in Hertfordshire they’ll say, 
‘Of course, it’s the cornerstone of our work’. 
Actually, it isn’t. We sit down as a group 
once a quarter and chew the cud about 
various issues, but we don’t actually agree 
anything or even discuss housing numbers 
or how we’re going to apportion housing 
numbers. There’s no consensus on Strategic 
Housing Market Areas, for example, across 
Hertfordshire, but we have in the last six 
months been working with North Herts 
and Central Beds to create a sort of faux 
Housing Market Area for the A1 HMA, 
which is this green area here.
DC  Would this be a successor to SNAP, in some 
ways?
SP No, well, this is an evidence study as 
opposed to a joint plan. Having worked with North 
Herts on SNAP, I think I would rather resign than 
attempt to work with North Herts again on a joint 
plan. It was the worst experience of my life. They 
didn’t even have the courtesy to tell us that they 
were contemplating stopping work on SNAP back in 
June 2010. Their officers were due to come here the 
next morning after they’d made their decision, us 
being unaware that such a decision was in the offing, 
and I got a phone-call about an hour into when the 
meeting should have been occurring saying, ‘Oh 
yeah, we’re not coming after all, we’ve decided to stop 
work’, and I thought, ‘Well!’
DC  This was on the basis of the CALA Homes 
decision?
SP  Yes. Well, it was done on the basis that the 
SoS the East of England Plan and all other 
Regional Strategies within the next 20 
seconds, then he found out that he couldn’t.
DC  Yes, they were Regional Strategies by this 
time instead of Regional Spatial Strategies 
and he had got a bit mixed up! I heard 
something pretty interesting yesterday 
from Hertfordshire. They considered the 
West of Stevenage more as an entirely new 
community rather than an urban extension, 
because there were only two links under 
the A1(M) joining it to the rest of the 
community.
SP  Well, it’s not linked to anywhere else. It’s 
an urban extension and that’s clearly how 
it was designed to be. That’s how they 
promoted it to us when they were the 
strategic planning authority. They said, 
‘This is a sustainable urban extension’. I’d be 
interested to hear who you heard that from?
DC [SP Hertfordshire CC].
SP  [He’s] not still peddling that old number is 
he? Dear me. I know [him] very well, but 
he really shouldn’t be peddling that kind of 
idea.
DC  Ok, so these Local Enterprise Partnerships 
were supposed to take up the mantle of sub-
regional strategic planning. What are your 
experiences of the LEP so far?
SP  Well I think that came as something 
of a surprise to the LEP as it did to the 
Hertfordshire Local Authorities, because 
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we’d all been working on the premise 
that it was about economic development, 
including the LEP. The bids that we had 
suggested we would like to make to the 
LEP had primarily been orientated around 
employment or regenerating the town 
centre here. We had suggested to them, 
because we were aware that there was some 
interest in housing delivery, and we were 
also then talking to the developers that if 
you want to deliver a larger scheme than 
1,300 units to the West of Stevenage – in 
other words to go across the border into 
North Herts – that you need to build a new 
underpass at one of the principal crossing 
points. That means Meadway, which we 
know from the developers is expensive…
DC Tens of million?
SP  Well, around the £10 million mark. 
That was one of the principal drags on 
development, even had it received planning 
permission which had not been overturned. 
So, we’d suggested that to the LEP, that 
that was something that they might like to 
support, and then they had their feedback 
from government, which was basically, 
‘Don’t worry about economic development, 
just concentrate on delivering large 
numbers of houses, which didn’t go down 
terribly well with the Hertfordshire districts 
when they were told about it a month or 
so ago, because the LEP has no statutory 
responsibilities in that direction. I think that 
most of the districts thought that the LEP 
telling them how many housing units to 
build was totally unacceptable, in the sense 
that the district’s members feel, quite rightly, 
that they are directly elected whereas the 
LEP is not democratically accountable to 
anybody. So all the kind of arguments about 
democratic deficit which were used here 
as criticisms of Regional Planning Boards, 
we’re now starting to hear from the LEPs. 
I mean there’s a couple of councillors on 
them, the RPB used to be dominated by 
councillors – they made up two thirds of 
the membership. On the LEP Boards they 
represent a quarter.
DC  I heard that the Hertfordshire LEP would 
prefer that the local authorities thrash out 
housing issues between them?
SP  They’ve certainly made no attempt to steer 
the process. I mean, all of us, the districts, 
the county council and the LEP, all meet 
together on a regular basis and chew the 
cud. The LEP is well aware of the difficulties 
the districts have in agreeing a development 
strategy for Hertfordshire, let alone agreeing 
a development strategy which has much 
more housing in it. In North Herts you 
have a local authority that hasn’t produced 
a valid Local Plan since 1996, in St Albans 
you have a local planning authority that 
hasn’t produced a valid plan since 1994, 
in East Herts, our other neighbours, you 
have a local planning authority that until 
a month ago was saying, ‘We don’t have a 
Local Plan and we don’t have any intentions 
of producing one’ – now it’s gone out for 
consultation.
DC  Surely, under the NPPF areas without a 
valid plan, it’s ‘sustainable development’ that 
trumps all?
SP  I think if your St Albans or North Herts 
you look at your track record over the last 
twenty years and think to yourself, ‘Well, 
life hasn’t been that bad’. In fact, green belt 
protection is still very strong, St Albans is 
all green belt where it isn’t development, 
North Herts is either green belt or AONB, 
there’s relatively little of North Herts 
which isn’t one or the other. So, if you’re 
St Albans or North Herts you can think 
to yourself, ‘Well, does it matter? We don’t 
have a five-year housing supply but this 
government isn’t helping us any more than 
the previous government, why don’t we just 
hunker down and wait for another change 
of government and see whether they are any 
more help to us’.
DC  Didn’t we have Ed Miliband in Stevenage a 
few weeks ago, with his ‘Right to Grow’?
SP Yep. 
DC  So things could swing around again very 
much in Stevenage’s favour?
SP  It depends how it works. From what I 
understand of it, it won’t be any different to 
the situation that we had when we had the 
East of England Plan in reality.
DC So there would still be an impasse?
SP  Yes, because North Herts would remain the 
local planning authority. So they might have 
Stevenage housing numbers foisted upon 
them, they might be told that they’ve got to 
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have 5,000 homes to the West of Stevenage, 
but if they’re determining the planning 
application, they can do what they did 
between 2001 and 2011, they can just say, 
‘No, we’re not going to determine this in any 
hurry and if we do it’ll be refused. We’ll wait 
for a call-in Inquiry and oppose it every 
step of the way. We’ll take any permission 
to the High Court. We’ll slow the entire 
process down and at some point there’ll be a 
Conservative government which will come 
along and be much more sympathetic to our 
position’.
DC  So basically you’re rather pessimistic about 
Stevenage West?
SP  Oh, I’m totally pessimistic. The ‘Right to 
Grow’ as it’s currently constructed will be 
no better than the duty to cooperate. The 
only thing that is going to change for under-
bounded authorities like Stevenage, like 
Luton, like Norwich, like Nottingham, is if 
you move the boundaries. That’s interesting, 
because a lot of the arguments that we’ve 
had over the years about West of Stevenage 
have not been about green belt or about any 
of those ‘environmental’ arguments, they’ve 
been, ‘These are our fields, these are not 
Stevenage’s fields, these are North Herts’ 
fields, how dare you think that you can 
build on North Herts’ fields’. 
DC  So whether it’s on green belt or not…
obviously the green belt helps?
SP  Yes. They then deploy the green belt 
argument and all the rest of it that sits 
behind that. The real outrage is that we 
should have the temerity to want to build 
on their fields, which of course holds no 
planning weight whatsoever. But I have 
thought to myself, ‘Well, if that’s the 
principal obstacle, why don’t we make 
your fields our fields’, and then there isn’t a 
problem, is there?
DC  But then what do North Herts get out of 
that?
SP  I don’t really care what they get out of it! 
I’m charged with delivering Stevenage’s 
development requirements, principally 
housing, but at the moment we don’t 
believe we can meet the borough’s housing 
requirement within the borough boundary, 
we don’t believe we can deliver the 
borough’s employment requirement within 
the borough boundary, we’re struggling to 
find sites to meet our retail requirements 
within the borough boundary, so currently 
if I don’t get some cooperation from one 
or other of our immediate neighbours, I’m 
in deep, deep difficulty. Deep difficulty, 
because I can’t deliver a Local Plan which is 
compliant with the NPPF. So we too will be 
sitting on our hands.
DC  This is where the duty to cooperate 
completely falls down.
SP  If you have an authority that does not want 
to cooperate with you, that will block you 
at every turn, that will use every means in 
the book, fair or foul to stop you, you are 
not going anywhere. What is happening at 
the moment is effectively that North Herts’ 
unwillingness to prepare a Local Plan, 
because of the implications of that which 
they’re not willing to address, is stopping 
us from preparing a Local Plan. That’s all 
because of the duty to cooperate. If we had a 
higher tier of planning, or we had different 
boundaries so you didn’t have under-
bounded authorities – when you consider 
that, for the most part, local authority 
boundaries were redrawn in 1974 – they 
were done on the basis of the previous 
administrative boundaries for rural and 
urban districts. Those boundaries in turn go 
all the way back to the Poor Law Boards of 
the 1840s! So you think to yourself, ‘Well, 
how relevant is it that Luton’s boundary is 
as tight on the edge of Luton as it is? How 
ludicrous is it that Dunstable, obviously a 
part of the urban conurbation, is in Central 
Bedfordshire, rather than with Luton?’ 
That’s entirely because Luton is Labour 
controlled and Dunstable and Central 
Bedfordshire are strongly Tory controlled. 
So the politicians just say, ‘I am not willing 
to go into an organisation with an authority 
controlled by an opposition party’. And 
that’s a very similar situation to Stevenage 
and its relationship with North Herts and 
with East Herts. It does very much come 
down to party politics. You can sit in behind 
all the environmental and the planning 
arguments, but the basic reality is it comes 
down to party politics. If the will was there 
to make it happen, it would have happened. 
The will is not there.
DC  The boroughs in London are under a 
compulsion to work together…
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SP  Yes, they’ve still got regional planning in 
terms of the Greater London Plan.
DC  So, despite all its flaws, the previous regional 
system was working?
SP  We were quite happy with the regional plan, 
because it gave us what we wanted.
DC  So West of Stevenage would have been built 
if the previous system had continued?
SP  Well, North Herts would have been required 
– I don’t imagine for a second that even had 
there not been a change of government in 
May/June 2010 – if we’d still had a Labour 
government the situation would still have 
been…the East of England Plan would 
still be in situ, our Inspector would have 
been briefed presumably to find our Core 
Strategy sound, despite the fact that North 
Herts were not prepared to cooperate. The 
High Court would still have overturned 
the planning permissions and would have 
reverted them to the SoS, but a Labour 
SoS would have found a way, presumably, 
of granting planning permission. It would 
not have changed North Herts’ stance in 
terms of opposition to Stevenage expansion, 
the process isn’t going to get any easier or 
shorter or quicker and it isn’t going to lead 
to delivery. You’ll still have to go through 
the process of: it has to be allocated in 
a Local Plan, then you’ve got to have a 
planning application, then that’s got to be 
called-in by the SoS, then you get the legal 
challenge. So you’ve still got to go through 
that process. Given the volatility of the 
political climate at the moment you’re going 
to have another government in place by the 
time you’ve gone through all of that process. 
When you consider that Stevenage West was 
first mooted in the current era in 1994 and 
here we are, twenty years later, not a single 
brick has been laid, not a single dollop 
of tarmac has been put onto the roads – 
nothing has happened, but millions of 
pounds have been spent by local authorities 
and by the developers, either to make it 
happen or not to make it happen. It’s just a 
huge waste of money and effort and it is not 
productive effort.
DC  Can I ask you about the New Homes 
Bonus? Is that likely to be a significant 
incentive to spur house-building in the 
borough?
SP  It won’t be an incentive to us, because 
most of the Stevenage West development 
is actually in North Herts, so they will get 
the New Homes Bonus and won’t pass it 
to us. But nonetheless, all those people in 
Stevenage West – despite the fact that Jon 
Tiley seems to think that it’s a new village 
that we’re building – all of those people 
will have to drive into and then go out of 
Stevenage. They will look to Stevenage 
for all the facilities that they will use but 
Stevenage Borough Council will not be able 
to provide any of those facilities because 
it doesn’t have the money from the New 
Homes Bonus – that will all be retained by 
North Herts. So in that sense, no, it’s not an 
incentive. I don’t think it’s an incentive to 
any local authority to be frank. I mean, what 
happened with the NHB, as you’re probably 
aware, is that local authorities got money 
taken away from their basic grant which 
was then going to be doled back out to them 
in the form of NHB…
DC Non-ring fenced…
SP  Non-ring fenced, so you could do what you 
liked with it, but of course you were using 
it to plug holes because you’ve already lost 
money, but most local authorities have just 
said, ‘Sod that for a game of soldiers, we’ll 
just take that as being money lost. If we get 
anything from the NHB, well, marvellous, 
but we’re not going to bend over backwards 
to make development happen’. I’ve never 
heard anyone in Hertfordshire suggest, 
‘Yeah, we’ll allow this development to 
happen because we’ll get a lot of NHB’. I 
think it just doesn’t work that way. I suspect 
you could offer authorities in Hertfordshire 
a million pounds per new house and they 
still would not take it. The opposition to 
new development is so strong a financial 
incentive is not going to be enough to make 
it happen. As far as people are concerned, 
‘I’ve got my house, I’m going to pull up the 
drawbridge, and I don’t want anyone living 
near me’. Even very intelligent people who 
understand the arguments, ‘Well, you must 
have children or grandchildren – where 
are they going to live’. ‘Well they’ll live 
somewhere else, somebody else will provide 
a house for them. I’m prepared to help 
them buy a house, but I’m not prepared to 
let other people’s kids live anywhere near 
me.’ They don’t make that connection, they 
don’t see the bigger picture, but they’re 
clever enough to see that there is a bigger 
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picture, but they choose to blind themselves 
to it. That’s the scale of the self-deception 
that is going on in this process. The NHB 
has absolutely no influence on the scale of 
development that we’re proposing or any 
of our neighbours are proposing, in my 
opinion.
DC  Could you talk about the methods that you 
use to calculate ‘objectively assessed need’? 
Have you had meetings with ONS and/or 
CLG regarding this?
SP  I haven’t personally, but our members 
have and our Strategic Director has. We’ve 
not had a one-to-one meeting between 
Stevenage and representatives of ONS, 
but I know what CLG’s line is and I know 
that CLS’s line is slightly different from the 
line given out by the ONS. The ONS say, 
‘These are population projections, they are 
purely straight-line projections, they take 
no account of changes of policy, they take 
no account of planning considerations, 
they are purely straight-line population 
projections based on trends in the last 
five years. But then CLG turns round and 
says, ‘Yes, that’s what we want, that’s what 
your housing requirement is’, and that’s 
the message that they give to the Planning 
Inspectorate and that’s why you’re getting 
the decisions that you’re getting coming out 
on Core Strategies and Local Plans. There is 
a crude acceptance that these equally crude 
population projections are just the Gospel, 
and you cannot stray from them.
DC  And of course it very much depends on 
what set of five years you take in terms of 
what the projections will tell you.
SP  Yes. And because we only have Censuses 
every ten years – I understand the 
government is now contemplating doing 
away entirely with them – but that’s 
something that I would be opposed to, 
as I think most authorities would in 
Hertfordshire, because one of the things 
that has come out of the ONS population 
projections, which we’ve been using until 
the 2011 Census results came out, proved to 
be quite significantly wrong. Certainly here 
in Hertfordshire, they were projecting our 
population far too low. So, currently, in the 
Local Plan that we put out for consultation 
last summer, based on best advice from 
the ONS at the time, we said our preferred 
housing target was 5,300 which just so 
happened we could build within the 
borough boundary with some new urban 
extensions to the west, the east and the 
north of the town. Now we are advised that 
the latest population projections which will 
come out in a few months’ time, will say, 
‘No, your housing requirement is about 
7,800’, which is a big change for a small local 
authority like Stevenage. 
  If you go to Luton you’ll find that their 
figure is even bigger, because they can only 
accommodate something like 6,000 but 
their requirement is 26/28,000 something 
like that. So everybody in Hertfordshire is 
looking appalled at these projections, quite 
rightly in my view, because the projections 
are a guide, they’re not Gospel, and when 
you consider the scale of housing under-
provision that has been made certainly 
here in Stevenage since 1980, when the 
Development Corporation was wound up, 
you’ve got this huge backlog of housing 
requirement to meet, which is wrapped up 
in your housing need. The development 
industry hasn’t even been building a fifth of 
the quantum of development that was being 
built by the Development Corporation, 
which is even smaller than what is needed, 
and you think to yourself, ‘Well, who’s 
going to build all these houses, even if 
we identified the land?’ There aren’t the 
developers out there, there isn’t the money 
out there, there aren’t the mortgages out 
there, and there aren’t the skills out there. 
Even if we allocate the land, even if we go 
through all of that pain – the politicians of 
course are the ones who have to go through 
the pain – unless they force us officers to 
go along to public meetings and justify 
proposals, which they quite often do – how 
is this ever going to happen? 
  The gap between what the government says 
and reality is just getting ever further and 
further apart. They’re living in a fantasy 
world entirely of their own creation. I’m 
not making this up, and I’m not making 
a rude assertion, but all of the planning 
officials at CLG are not planners. None of 
them are planners. I went to a presentation, 
it must have been about two-and-a-half/
three years ago now, organised by CLG 
to talk about population, it was actually 
about neighbourhood planning in truth. 
There were several young members of 
the planning team there – who were all 
remarkably senior for such young planners 
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– and the person who was in charge opened 
the day in front of a room full of qualified 
town planners from local authorities all over 
the UK by saying, ‘I’m the Senior Planner 
yadda yadda, I don’t have any planning 
qualification, I’ve never worked in planning, 
I’ve never worked in a local authority’. And 
then proceeded to tell us what we were 
expected to do. I thought to myself, ‘What 
kind of authority do you carry when you are 
not a qualified planner, you patently don’t 
understand the issues, you’ve never worked 
in a local authority, and you know nothing 
about the subject you’re talking about?’ 
And because they then make these naïve 
assumptions that population projections are 
the Gospel you end up in the situation that 
we’re currently in. 
  My suspicion is that plan-making in the 
UK is about to grind to a total halt, because 
local authorities will look at the figures that 
they’ve been given and they’ll say, ‘These 
are totally undeliverable, they’re politically 
unacceptable, they’re poison, why on earth 
would we want to go close to this’. I suspect 
that most local planning authorities will dig 
their heels in, cross their arms and say, ‘You 
want us to do something, you change the 
population projections’.
DC  Yes, the previous fall-guys for housing 
targets would have been the regions…
SP  Yes, but I think the regions would have 
acted as a powerful lobby to go back 
to government and say, ‘You can’t use 
population projections in this crude 
fashion, but because the government has, 
quite cleverly, done away with the regional 
bodies, what have you got, three hundred 
and odd local planning authorities, all of 
them small, and the government can just 
say, ‘Well, you’re just small, you’re not 
important, I’m not listening to you’. That’s 
exactly the message that’s coming out of the 
meetings that CLG and ONS officials have 
had with elected members and with senior 
officers here in Hertfordshire. Basically 
they’re saying, ‘Yes, it’s a terribly interesting 
idea, but, you know, so what?’
DC  You said something briefly earlier about 
disagreement over Housing Market Areas. 
How do you go about delineating these 
important boundaries? Is it a case of an 
external consultant coming in?
SP  Well, what you’ve got here are the local 
authority boundaries, and these are the 
Housing Market Areas that were identified 
by one firm of consultants. Now, that firm 
of consultants have worked for Luton, 
Central Beds and North Herts. They’ve 
also worked for some others elsewhere in 
Hertfordshire. They haven’t worked for us, 
but we have agreed with North Herts and 
Central Beds that that is a Housing Market 
Area. So the three of us are talking about 
how we identify and then satisfy the needs 
generated in the Stevenage and A1 corridor 
Housing Market Area. There is no such 
consensus anywhere else in Hertfordshire.
DC  But there are a number of SHMAs that have 
been written across Hertfordshire? 
SP  But they are all written on district 
boundaries. So they’re either whole districts 
or multiples of districts.
DC  Surely that defeats the purpose of genuine 
Housing Market Areas which cut across 
administrative boundaries?
SP  That’s my view, but I cannot persuade the 
rest of my colleagues in Hertfordshire that 
that is right. East Herts, for instance, have 
done a Strategic Housing Market study for 
East Herts district, and then they’ve simply 
apportioned that figure to the different 
HMAs. So they haven’t done a SHMA for 
the Cheshunt corridor, for the Harlow 
corridor, for Welwyn Garden City, they 
haven’t been partners thus far for the work 
we’ve been doing with North Herts and with 
Central Beds. They’ve simply said, ‘Yeah, 
we’re not really terribly interested’, because 
from their perspective why would you 
bother, it’s all far too difficult. People don’t 
want to learn the lessons which are coming 
out of decisions like Aylesbury Vale and 
Coventry. What they want to do is pretend 
that it’s not happening, and then they’re 
slowly coming to a realisation that, ‘Oh my 
God, what the hell do we do?’ But a lot of 
them, like Central Beds, are still pressing 
on. A lot of them, like East Herts, are still 
pressing on, despite the fact that they’ve 
done no work on Functioning Economic 
Market Areas, they’ve not done any genuine 
work on SHMAs, they’ve not done genuine 
green belt reviews or any of the basic work 
that you would expect to find underpinning 
a modern Local Plan. They’ve basically just 
put the blinkers on, ‘This is what we’re going 
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to do, this is a spatial strategy that we can 
sell to our politicians, and it doesn’t really 
matter whether there’s an evidence base to 
underpin it or not, because I’d rather go 
ahead with something, rather than go ahead 
with nothing’.
DC  Last year Stevenage undertook a strategic 
review of its green belt – although you don’t 
have a significant amount of green belt…
SP  We did, which also looked at bits of the 
green belt in North Herts and East Herts 
around us, because, as you say, we’ve got so 
little and the quantum of development we 
require would entail roll-back of the green 
belt in North and/or East Herts.
DC  Did you get cooperation on that review 
from your neighbours?
SP  No. We offered them the opportunity right 
at the outset, ‘Do you want to come in, 
do you want this to be a joint study?’ And 
both sets of officers said, ‘No, we’re not 
prepared to touch this with a barge-pole. If 
our members ever found out that we were 
involved in this, they will crucify us, so 
we’re not getting involved in this’. We got 
no comments from either of them when 
we published the methodology. We haven’t 
had significant comments back from them 
since we published the results of the green 
belt study and our proposals last month in 
our Local Plan. I mean, plainly, they’ve both 
said to us, ‘We don’t accept the findings 
of your green belt study’, but they’ve not 
challenged them in the sense that they’ve 
actually said, ‘This methodology was 
wrong, that part of the study was wrong’, 
they just don’t like the findings, although, 
interestingly, both of them claim that they 
are doing their own green belt reviews in-
house, which come to different conclusions 
which suggest that there’s no need to roll-
back the green belt around Stevenage. At 
least we went through the motions of hiring 
external consultants to do it, they’ve not 
even had that fig-leaf.
DC  That’s interesting. The last main area I’m 
interested in is the transport and travel 
implications, first of all at the site level at 
West of Stevenage.
SP Ok. 
DC  I know there was a lot of disagreement 
between the Harrison Webb model used 
by the county council and the WSC’s Local 
Model, can you say something about the 
transport implications of the proposed 
development?
SP  That’s an area I know relatively little 
about. I should say I wasn’t involved in the 
determination of the West of Stevenage 
planning applications, but all of the staff 
who were are no longer here. So I know 
about it from the Local Plan side primarily. 
I’ve picked up bits and pieces about what 
happened on the planning applications side 
over the years, so I can’t speak in-depth 
about the transport side of things. But yes, 
you’re quite right, there was quite strong 
disagreement between the county council 
and the Consortium’s transport consultants 
over what was being proposed in terms of 
transport mitigation. My understanding 
is that the developers were suggesting 
quite high, one might almost say heroic, 
levels of modal shift in order to make the 
development ‘stack up’. However, although 
the Inspector heard all these arguments at 
the call-in Inquiry, and there’s a lengthy 
Report from him which discusses all the 
issues, and transport was not one of the 
issues where he said, ‘I side with the county 
council’. So, for the county council to still 
be saying, and I know they’re still saying, 
‘It was all wrong, it was a bodge, guv’nor, 
you can’t make this work’, doesn’t stack up, 
because an independent Inspector said that 
they were wrong and the developers were 
right.
DC  I read somewhere that Stevenage were 
allegedly using West of Stevenage as a 
means to achieve Unitary Authority status. 
Could you comment on this please?
SP  That’s an argument that’s always been 
thrown at us. 
DC  How would that even work? How would 
building a new development at West of 
Stevenage, would that take you above a 
certain threshold?
SP  It would be fair to say that our members 
do have aspirations, irrespective of 
any arguments which might be based 
on population projections. They have 
aspirations to be the size of about 100,000 to 
120,000…
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DC From a current population of…?
SP  Currently we’re about 82,000. So they 
believe that a town of 100,000 to 120,000 
will be more self-sustaining, it will be 
able to support a range of facilities which 
Stevenage currently is not, it would act as 
a genuine anchor for this part of northern 
Hertfordshire. I think that, if push came 
to shove, and you asked my members, 
‘Would you like to be free of the shackles 
of Hertfordshire CC’, I’ve no doubt that 
they would say, ‘Yes, absolutely, we’d love 
to embrace that’, but no, none of them 
have ever said to me that they want to be 
a Unitary Authority in those terms, and of 
course, as you’ve identified, the threshold 
for becoming a UA has tended to shift over 
the years. If you look at the UAs that were 
being created under local government 
reorganisation under the Labour 
government, the thresholds seemed to shift 
from about 150,000 to about 250,000 and 
by the time they left office and the process 
ended, you were up to about half a million, 
700,000, which is why you ended up with 
sort of ‘unitary counties’ in some parts of 
the country, which, to my mind, makes 
no sense whatsoever. It’s a completely 
irrational basis for a Unitary Authority in 
my experience, I’ve worked in a Unitary 
Council. So no, I don’t think that is a fair 
accusation, but if you’d said that Stevenage 
members want Stevenage to be a city, that 
they want it to be a significantly bigger place 
than it is today, that’s absolutely true, and 
that’s something that’s always been violently 
resisted by all of our neighbours.
DC  I’d just like to tidy up a couple of small 
matters before we finish.
SP Sure, that’s ok, go ahead.
DC  Under the old regional system, was 
there a big difference in the involvement 
of local authorities when the National 
Housing Planning Advisory Unit came 
into operation in terms of setting housing 
targets?
SP  I remember that there was something of 
a furore at the time when it was proposed 
that they should be abolished. I think there 
probably is a need for a more informed 
and intelligent understanding at central 
government level of what population 
projections mean, and how they can be 
applied and used, and their relationship 
to household numbers and their use in 
the planning process. Which perhaps the 
[NHPAU] would have provided in the old 
days. There seems to be a level of ignorance/
arrogance at central government level at 
the moment, which just says, ‘Take the 
population projection levels as they are, 
stop whinging, just start building the 
number of houses that it tells you to build. 
If you want to build lots more houses than 
that, whoop-de-do, we’ll be foursquare 
behind you’. I mean, it’s just fantastical, that 
the government, and I mean it was equally 
true of the Labour government before them, 
attempting to face in two entirely different 
directions simultaneously. One is, ‘Let’s not 
build on green belt and maintain greenfield 
sites, but in parallel with that, let’s build lots 
of houses’. I don’t see how you square that 
away, to be frank.
  Until that dichotomy is addressed in central 
government guidance and the advice they 
hand down to local authorities, I really don’t 
see that this problem is going to be resolved. 
You can tinker with ‘Right to Grow’, duty 
to cooperate, you can call it whatever name 
you like, but until you resolve the advice 
that is coming down to local authorities 
and you can establish a reasonable and 
realistic and deliverable level of housing 
numbers for local authorities to provide, 
which is to some extent what the regional 
tier of planning used to provide, we’re 
going nowhere. Plan-making these days 
is so difficult as to be almost impossible. 
It’s significantly changed since I first came 
into local planning. It used to be quite an 
enjoyable and a relatively simple straight-
line process. Nowadays you’re expected 
to know everything about everything 
and you’re expected to be able to square 
the circle and you’re expected to be able 
to shove a square peg into a round hole 
simultaneously. It’s no wonder that so many 
of my colleagues are now retiring early, 
having nervous breakdowns, leaving the 
profession – I don’t blame them.
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DC  My research is basically about the duty to 
cooperate, in particular how it relates to 
strategic spatial planning issues like new 
housing development and transport. Could 
you just outline to me your initial feelings 
on the duty to cooperate, as a politician?
SC  Well, I think it’s essential that, when 
you’re doing planning, you take into 
consideration the whole area, because we 
don’t actually have spatial plans as such 
now, we have local plans and they have 
to fit together. Where Housing Market 
Areas cross boundaries, which they do 
all the time, then yes, it is very important 
there. And it’s not new either, we have 
always consulted with neighbouring 
authorities on planning matters and on 
strategic matters like transport, and we 
work together. Hertfordshire is particularly 
good at this I think, because we have ten 
local authorities and the county council, 
and in terms of planning, particularly, 
we’ve had joint meetings, forums, for 
years. So Hertfordshire Infrastructure and 
Planning Panel is the member group, and 
then the Herts Planners’ Group which is 
the officers’ group. So that’s being going 
on long before duty to cooperate. So duty 
to cooperate is nothing new. We also have 
to work across county boundaries, so in 
North Hertfordshire we work with Central 
Bedfordshire and Luton, we do have a small 
boundary with Uttlesford in Essex, but it’s a 
few hundred metres so it doesn’t actually…
Cambridgeshire is the other one of course, 
we have a very close relationship with parts 
of Cambridgeshire, in particular Royston. 
So the idea of duty to cooperate is nothing 
new.
  What is new is the legal test that’s being put 
in place around duty to cooperate. I think 
that what’s becoming clearer now is that 
duty to cooperate is a bit of a misnomer. It’s 
not really what it’s about. What it’s about 
is shared market areas, so if one authority 
needs more houses than it’s got capacity 
for then it looks around to the others, and 
that’s not about cooperation – ok, it’s partly 
about cooperation – it’s a bit more specific 
than that, so I think that’s become very clear 
lately. 
DC  Ok. Obviously the particular development 
that has caused a lot of conflict over the 
years is West of Stevenage.
SC  No, completely wrong! Absolutely wrong! 
West of Stevenage is often used as an 
example of bad cooperation – it’s rubbish. 
First of all, when the Regional Spatial 
Strategies were in place, we cooperated 
with Stevenage very closely. We had a lot 
of joint planning meetings, we were doing 
joint Masterplanning and all the time that 
we were compelled by the RSS and after 
Denham granted the permission, then we 
worked very closely. We didn’t believe that 
it was needed, and actually, Stevenage knew 
that it wasn’t needed for them. What it was 
– it was to take unmet need from Norwich 
and Essex and the whole – because the 
region was so large. And Stevenage said, 
‘Oh, we’d like to grow, we’d like to expand, 
we’ll take some extra housing – we haven’t 
got anywhere to put it, so we’ll put it in 
North Hertfordshire’. We didn’t support 
that idea because, at the time, it wasn’t 
required. On the specifics of the west of 
the A1(M) site, the developers, instead of 
negotiating a s106 Agreement, put forward 
a Unilateral Undertaking, which wasn’t fit 
for purpose. It would not have provided 
sufficient infrastructure, it meant that they 
put some money over, but then it was up 
to the county to build the schools. Well, if 
the money they put over wasn’t enough, the 
county would have to make up the shortfall. 
So, it was never fit for purpose, and that was 
the reason we objected to it. We withdrew 
from SNAP, which was the joint working 
party, we never cancelled it, we never 
stopped, we simply said, ‘We won’t progress 
this any further until the uncertainties have 
gone’.
DC  I was in Stevenage yesterday speaking 
with Richard Javes, and he said that SNAP 
came to a very abrupt end, it was a case of 
North Herts not turning up to a meeting 
and phoning an hour later to say, ‘We’re not 
doing this anymore’.
SC  Well…essentially, the moment that we 
could see that we were no longer compelled 
to do it, because we didn’t think it was 
the right thing to do, we said, ‘We’ll just 
stop work on this, because we don’t want 
to put effort into stuff that might not go 
anywhere’. And it hasn’t done so far, so all 
those resources can be put into other things, 
which they have been. So it was the right 
decision to make, and, also at the time, 
Stevenage clearly wasn’t meeting their own 
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‘objectively assessed needs’ to use the jargon 
and they’ve since done their own study and 
agreed that they don’t require it. So, they 
have no need for it, it would be completely 
additional to their needs. Now, they may 
have aspirations, and that’s up to them or 
any authority to have aspirations to do 
things, but the idea that the article that was 
in Inside Housing – I don’t know if you’ve 
seen that one from a few years ago – 
DC   The cartoon depicting the fight across the 
hedge!
SC  Yes, I’ve got it up on my wall [chuckles]…
DC  So it wasn’t like that then?
SC  No, journalistic fun. [SC, Stevenage] and 
I have a very good relationship and we 
meet regularly. In fact, I was over there 
a few weeks ago. We are continuing that 
dialogue. What sites will be put out – the 
west of the A1(M) has come back in, from a 
different consortium, with a different plan, 
and it’s being considered. Having said that, 
clearly we recognise that, were that site 
to be developed, the particular bit of land 
that’s in North Hertfordshire would not be 
deliverable if it wasn’t done in conjunction 
with the Stevenage side. So, should that be 
one of our chosen sites – and we haven’t 
declared our chosen sites yet – but were 
that to be included, it is certainly in the 
candidate list, then we would want to do 
some joint masterplanning with Stevenage. 
But the developers, of course, would have 
to prove that it was deliverable, and that 
includes a tunnel under the A1, which 
doesn’t come cheap. Now with all the 
questions on viability, my fear would be 
that they say, ‘Oh, we can develop this, but 
you won’t get any affordable housing there’, 
because all the money would have gone into 
a tunnel under the A1. Well that doesn’t 
really meet anybody’s needs.
DC  Could you talk a little bit about the Local 
Plan? There hasn’t been an updated Local 
Plan in North Herts since 1996.
SC  No, well we did go out with a draft Core 
Strategy but we had to withdraw that when 
there were changes of rules and changes 
of government. At the moment though, 
and this is where the duty to cooperate is 
working very well – it’s Luton. Because we 
don’t have any requirement from Stevenage, 
we’ve met with them and they’ve made it 
very clear from their published figures that 
they can meet all their unmet need within 
their boundaries, based on current figures. 
We have looked to Luton, and Luton is the 
reason. We were going to publish our Local 
Plan in January, and the reason we didn’t is 
clearly in the Cabinet Reports. There were 
two reasons, one we wanted to understand 
what the implications of the judgment 
on Castle Point were going to be – you’re 
familiar with Castle Point? – 
DC Yes.
SC  So the confirmation was, greenbelt is 
greenbelt and, as long as you’ve got a Local 
Plan or are working towards one, then 
greenbelt stays as greenbelt until you’ve 
done your greenbelt review. So that was 
one of the reasons we delayed, but the other 
one was Luton’s need, and Luton have been 
recalculating the numbers that they were 
assigned by the ONS. We’ve had meetings 
with DCLG, they’ve had meetings with 
DCLG. We’re expecting them to come out 
any day now with a revised number, which 
we are confident will be lower than the 
ONS numbers and that they will have the 
back-up evidence to support that. Once 
we’ve got that number, then we can start 
working with Central Beds, with Luton, 
with Aylesbury Vale, with all the other local 
authorities, St Albans, Dacorum, even as far 
away as East Herts, Bedford…
DC  That’s what Luton were saying, it’s difficult 
to know how far away you need to go under 
the duty to cooperate…
SC No, and the further out you go, the less…
DC The ‘ripple effect’…
SC  Yes, and it will be there, because Luton 
is a very unusual case in that, its growth 
over the last thirty years particularly has 
been largely through immigration and it’s 
a ‘port’ where people come in. We think 
about ports as being, you know, around the 
coast but this is a port. So people come in 
there, and the first thing they’re going to do, 
they’re going to stay. But then they’ll start to 
migrate out, and the next generation – we’re 
now into the next generation – will also 
move out. So a first generation may come 
in, they have a family, that family grows up, 
they go to university in Bristol. Well, they 
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may like to stay in Bristol! Or perhaps they 
may find that they have links that go up to 
Northampton, or Bradford, or Glasgow! 
And so, that one off effect has changed 
migration over the last thirty years. New 
migration coming forward is much more 
from the European Union and they’re not so 
attracted to Luton, because that’s not their 
natural place. They tend to go somewhere 
else. So all these things Luton are aware of 
and they’re doing their sums there. So, once 
we’ve got that number, we will then sit down 
and basically carve up the cake and say, 
‘Ok, Luton, you’ve got this, and we’ll check 
that’ – and we think that they will be able to 
squeeze in a bit more than what they’ve said 
they can – 
DC They mentioned a figure of 6,000…
SC  Yeah, they might be able to…you put a few 
more, they’ve got height, they’re a town, 
there’s no reason why they can’t go up a bit. 
Look at some of their industrial areas and 
say, ‘Well, do you really need all that empty 
land there?’
DC They’re convinced that they do need it all…
SC  Well, there’s a bit of discussion to be had 
there, but at the same time, we certainly 
accept that we’ve got two numbers to meet. 
We’ve got our own numbers and we’ve got 
‘x’ and ‘x’ is the unmet need from Luton. 
We will contribute towards that. We will 
not solve their problem, and I doubt that 
all the authorities around, joined together, 
will solve the problem. There will still be 
some unmet need, that’s just the nature of 
planning, that you can never be that precise. 
What we’ve got to do is ensure that we can 
meet the need for the next five years, and 
have that as a rolling five year programme, 
because actually in twenty years’ time, who 
knows what the situation will be then? So 
we need to be solid on the five years, pretty 
solid on the next five years and then the last 
five years, we can say, ‘We’ve got ideas for 
there, but of course we will address those 
ideas as we come closer’. I’m quite confident 
that working with Luton, and with Central 
Bedfordshire and with the other local 
authorities…
DC  So the Stevenage situation is closed for the 
moment, as far as you’re concerned?
SC  Well, at the moment Stevenage have no 
requirement for expansion into North 
Herts, because they have no requirement 
that they can’t meet. There will be new 
figures coming out, they’re always coming 
out round about October when we’re 
expecting the next release of ONS figures. 
Who knows what they’ll say? Maybe they’ll 
say that Stevenage does have some unmet 
need. If we’ve published our Local Plan by 
then, clearly we’ll have to look at it and say, 
‘Is there anything in reserve?’ There may be 
some sites which we don’t want to develop, 
we don’t think they’re the best to be 
developed, we don’t think they’re necessary 
to be developed, but they could be brought 
forward if they were actually required. 
Again, it’s the unmet need, and Stevenage 
can certainly meet its unmet need for the 
next five years. It may be the five years after 
that, and the five years after that, it starts to 
look like it. 
  We’re only one, of course, bordering 
Stevenage. There’s also East Herts. It’s 
the same thing again though – to meet 
Stevenage’s unmet need, should there be 
any, there isn’t necessarily the assumption 
that it has to be immediately adjacent to 
Stevenage, and if it is adjacent to Stevenage 
it doesn’t have to be to the west of it. It may 
be that there is a better solution somewhere 
else because it will deliver affordable 
housing.
DC  That’s interesting, but surely if people are 
directed to a wholly different area it no 
longer counts as Stevenage’s unmet need?
SC  But that’s what migration is – what unmet 
need is! Everything outside Stevenage is not 
Stevenage. When people look around, they 
do migrate. Codicote, the village you’re in 
now, has got nowhere near enough houses 
for its youth to live in, so they migrate 
out. My children all live in Hitchin. It’s 
a different scale, but it’s the same issue. 
So the answer is, yes, we could grow 
Codicote to accommodate it, but actually 
it’s probably better to, it’s more efficient, it’s 
more sustainable, it’s more cost effective 
to grow Hitchin a little bit. Because it’s a 
tiny little growth on Hitchin, rather than 
a massive one on Codicote. Now, they’re 
just examples to show that I don’t believe 
that it is necessary, and I don’t believe the 
NPPF or the guidelines require you to have 
the unmet need directly adjacent. I’m not 
saying it’s not appropriate – it may well 
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be – but the sites have to be looked at and 
assessed, particularly if there’s a sustainable 
site ten miles away which may be much 
better to bring forward than a SSSI adjacent, 
for example. 
DC  You’ve had meetings with ONS and CLG 
population experts. What came out of those 
meetings?
SC  The ONS people are very clear that ONS 
figures are projections, they are not targets, 
and they are projections based on history. 
Of course, what we’ve got to do is meet 
targets based on the future, and there is the 
problem. You can look at your ONS figures, 
and they will give you one story, or you 
can look in your crystal ball and that will 
give you another one. All DCLG is saying 
is, ‘You can’t ignore the ONS figures, they 
should be your starting point’, but they’re 
not a magic number! If you think that your 
needs are going to be higher (or lower) then 
fine, as long as you can come up with the 
evidence base, that’s ok.
DC  These ONS numbers seem to be important 
to the Inspectors…
SC  But they’re not! The Inspectors have been 
told very clearly that the ONS numbers 
are projections, not targets. Now, it would 
appear from the early cases that some 
Inspectors appeared to treat them as targets, 
but that’s because there was no evidence 
to show them that they weren’t. You can’t 
just say, ‘The ONS figure is 10,000 but we’re 
going to do 8,000’ and end it there, that 
doesn’t work. In that case I would expect 
the Inspector to throw it out, or go back 
and say, ‘No, go back and do it again’. But if 
you said, ‘The ONS figures are 10,000 but 
we can do 8,000 and the reason is because 
we actually built a new 2,000 settlement, 
so that’s distorted the figures’. And if you 
build a new settlement – 3,000 houses, 
4,000 houses – that is going to be a one-off 
growth. If you then project against that, 
you’ve got a false figure, because it was a 
one-off. It will have some growth associated 
with it, but not the whole amount again. 
So I genuinely believe that, as long as the 
evidence base is there, then the ONS figures 
are simply that, they are very informative, 
very useful, very helpful, we will always take 
account of them, but we will not take them 
as being targets, because they’re not.
DC  That’s very clear. The Local Enterprise 
Partnerships are the new sub-regional 
mechanism for delivering economic growth 
certainly…
SC  I wouldn’t use the word sub-regional, 
I suppose it depends how ‘sub’ you go. 
No, Local Enterprise Partnerships are an 
excellent idea, good concept. We’re very 
much involved with the LEP, we work very 
closely. I sat on the Strategic Infrastructure 
Board until a couple of months ago when 
they reorganised it and they made it more 
private sector. We work with them on the 
Strategic Enterprise [sic] Plan. We are aware 
that there was a little bit of criticism on 
the Hertfordshire LEP SEP in that it wasn’t 
quite aggressive enough on housing, that 
was an observation that was made. That 
was a comment that was on there, although 
overall it was felt to be a bit of a ‘beacon’ 
plan, but that was the one thing that 
came out from there. One of the reasons, 
of course, that we can’t be much more 
aggressive is because of infrastructure, and 
that’s the problem we have in Hertfordshire. 
We have an infrastructure deficit, we’ve had 
it for years, and it’s got bigger. So if we can’t 
tackle the deficit, how are we ever going to 
tackle the future?
DC Specifically, the road network?
SC  Yes, the road network is a major part of it. 
Education is another challenge, the schools 
are pretty much fit to bursting and the 
money for building new ones is not there 
anymore. That’s the biggest challenge there 
– it’s all very well saying, ‘Well, we’ll just 
build another school’, but there either isn’t 
enough land and even if there is, is there the 
money? We don’t see hordes of Academies 
coming in with funding, so that’s another 
one there. Sewage has been an issue, and 
water. Now, I believe there are statutory 
responsibilities on water companies and 
electricity companies and gas companies to 
provide all these things, but they don’t plan 
that far ahead. So it would be poor planning 
to just assume that they can take care of it 
unless they’ve got some evidence there. 
  So there are infrastructure deficits there, 
but I think road and rail are perhaps the key 
ones. We’ve got a major rail restriction in 
the two-lane section at Digswell, both the 
bridge and the tunnel, which is a bottleneck. 
The A1 should have been widened, it was 
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all set to be widened twenty years ago, all 
the land was bought, it was all ready to 
go – and I’ll be political here – the Labour 
government came in and John Prescott 
cancelled it.
DC That’s something that would have cost tens 
of millions?
SC It was going to cost £167 million at the time 
– peanuts, it really was, compared to the damage 
it’s caused now. It would cost far more now – all the 
land has been sold back off again. So that’s a huge 
one there, that’s in our part of the country. Of course 
we have the M1 and the A10 and lots of other roads 
and the east-west links are very poor. Trying to get 
from Stanstead to Luton is very difficult, getting from 
Stevenage to Luton is pretty difficult, you’ve got to go 
through Hitchin, Hitchin needs a bypass and even a 
huge development there wouldn’t provide a sufficient 
bypass. None of this is going to be done with local 
money, it’s got to be done with external money, and 
we’ve got to draw that in.
DC That’s where the LEP – theoretically – 
comes in?
SC Yes. Yes. But other infrastructure – we are 
a rural community, Hertfordshire is a rural country 
[sic]. Although it is the most highly populated of the 
Shire Counties, in terms of density, that tends to be 
concentrated in the South and further out we have 
a lot of rural communities and broadband is a huge 
issue there. So because people can’t work at home, 
or can’t work locally, businesses are moving out and 
so there’s a lot more commuting. If we had proper 
broadband, proper superfast broadband across the 
county…
DC That would have an impact on travel 
patterns?
SC A huge impact, it would reduce the 
journeys massively. Companies could work more 
locally, people could work more locally from home, 
and it’s got worse because more and more people are 
logging on to the network. So infrastructure is a big 
issue which the LEP has to solve and it can only solve 
it huge amounts of money, a lot more than is being 
offered at the moment.
DC Ok. I’m jumping around a little bit here, but 
this is something I asked Sian Timoney from Luton. 
As a local councillor, how do you reconcile the 
duty to cooperate i.e. across all sorts of boundaries 
with your need to represent the local interests of 
the people who elect you, often on an issue like 
Stevenage West?
SC Actually we’ve got to represent the long-
term interests of the people and sometimes – and 
it’s a difficult message to put across – sometimes you 
have to see the bigger picture and the longer-term 
picture and that’s where one’s skill as a politician 
comes in. We have to put persuasive arguments 
forward to bring the people with us – that’s a fact! I 
can’t get a Local Plan through my council if I can’t 
convince my councillors and my councillors won’t 
be there if they can’t convince their electorate. So 
absolutely, the people are the important ones there, 
but that doesn’t mean they have to be a barrier. We 
have to educate them and demonstrate to them the 
need. In Hertfordshire and North Hertfordshire 
we are not anti-growth. We recognise the need for 
growth, but we want to have the right amount of 
growth in the right place, and that’s where we work 
with the people, and that can be done through 
debates and discussions and education. They can 
do it through Neighbourhood Plans, if they feel 
that’s an appropriate way. I like to think that a 
Neighbourhood Plan is not required, because if 
anyone wants a Neighbourhood Plan they should 
come and talk to us and we’ll put it in the main Plan! 
In the first place, why do you need a Neighbourhood 
Plan? I love the principle of Neighbourhood Plans, 
but the practicality of it in small areas…I think they 
work very well in Thame, but that was a bit of a 
special case.
DC These recent cases – Aylesbury Vale, 
Brighton and Hove, Mid Sussex – they’ve been 
sending shockwaves throughout the rest of the 
Greater South East, haven’t they?
SC No, not shockwaves! Cases where Plans 
have either been found unsound – actually there 
are very few cases of Plans being found unsound 
– mostly they’re sent away to do more work. These 
cases are where local authorities have tried to 
short-cut, tried to turn a blind eye, things like that. 
If you watch, of course we watch these cases and as 
more and more come out we enlarge our evidence 
base, but if you follow the guidelines and do what 
is required and work with your neighbours to solve 
problems – and that can be in inventive ways – so 
it’s not a ‘duty to agree’, but it’s not a ‘duty to argue’ 
either. In most cases, I think, with proper negotiation 
and with a realistic attitude from all parties then 
these things can be solved. But it has to be inventive, 
the solution is not always, and in many cases not at 
all, the first one that is put on the table.
DC Right. A few weeks ago Ed Miliband was in 
Stevenage…
SC He was!
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DC …proclaiming that places like Stevenage…
SC  The ‘Right to Grow’! I don’t believe they 
have any right to grow. If growth is the 
appropriate way of developing, then that’s 
fine, and if they’ve got the land to do it and 
the land is appropriate, then that’s fine. I’m 
very much against coalescence of towns 
and that’s one of the concerns – I would 
not want to see ‘Lutonage’. About a year ago 
I spent some time in Bradford and other 
towns around there and, frankly, you can’t 
tell which town you’re in, because they are 
one continuous urban sprawl and I do not 
want to see that happen. That’s the purpose 
of the greenbelt – the main purpose – it’s 
very important. That may be a constraint on 
growth, and it may well be that Stevenage 
– and I’m not saying that it is, but it may 
be that Stevenage has reached its capacity, 
so the next solution isn’t to grow it any 
further, it’s to start again somewhere else. 
That’s been done very successfully in Milton 
Keynes. I know that, because I moved to 
Milton Keynes in 1976, before it was built! 
It had some roads but very few houses, my 
house wasn’t built when I moved there, 
I worked in an air tent. But it’s been very 
successful, Stevenage itself wasn’t there 
fifty or sixty years ago, and before that 
Letchworth, of course, which is in my own 
patch, was one of the very first of these new 
settlements. So there are other alternatives 
– I don’t believe there’s a right to growth, 
but it may be that growth is appropriate. Ed 
Miliband was simply – it was very political. 
That was Sharon Taylor’s [Labour leader 
of Stevenage council] election campaign 
starting a year early.
DC  Ok. I visited Hertfordshire County Council 
earlier this week, that was interesting.
SC Who did you meet with there?
DC  [SP, Hertfordshire CC]. He’s disappointed 
that the county council has been ‘side-
lined’ in his words from a more hands-on 
approach to strategic spatial planning.
SC Well, that’s not true at all.
DC  All right, they still have responsibility for 
particular matters like minerals and waste 
planning…
SC  No, no, no…also [he] knows his job 
well enough to know that he’s not being 
removed. They don’t have the responsibility 
for the spatial plan, that’s not to say they 
don’t have a huge amount of influence, 
and they do. They are a full member of the 
Hertfordshire Infrastructure and Planning 
Partnership and the LEP, so, no, we work 
very closely with the county and I don’t 
believe they have been side-lined at all. 
Of course they would like it to still be the 
Hertfordshire Structure Plan, that may 
even be a good thing. But we haven’t got 
that at the moment, so we have to work 
with what we have got. I could argue – I 
have argued, and continue to argue – that, 
actually, I don’t like two-tier authorities. I 
think Unitary Authorities are a much more 
sensible way of doing things. Hertfordshire 
would be too big as one, but it would make 
two very good Unitaries.
DC  I’ve heard it argued that Stevenage were 
using strategic developments like West of 
Stevenage as a way to get Unitary status…
SC  Well Stevenage will never get Unitary status! 
It’s tiny, Stevenage is only 80,000 people. 
North Hertfordshire has got 120,000 – 
we’re much bigger! But put Stevenage and 
North Hertfordshire and East Hertfordshire 
together, perhaps throw in Welwyn Hatfield 
– then you’ve got a Unitary that’s worth 
having!
DC  But how would you overcome the political 
differences?
SC  That’ll never happen, of course it wouldn’t, 
not locally! You would need a reform like 
that which was done in 1974, when most 
of the urban district councils and rural 
district councils disappeared, and they were 
brought together. But that would never 
have happened if it had been left to the 
individual councils because, what do they 
say, ‘turkeys voting for Christmas’, so of 
course it would never happen. That doesn’t 
mean it shouldn’t happen, or won’t. In fact, 
the last Labour government was actually 
doing that, they did force some Unitaries 
through – one of the few things I agreed 
with them on!
DC You’re reasonably satisfied with the NPPF?
SC  Hmmm, like any document like this it’s 
worded such that it can be interpreted 
in a way that gives lots of work to the 
lawyers. No, overall the principle of the 
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NPPF, absolutely – ‘sustainable growth’! 
But the key word there is ‘sustainable’, you 
mustn’t just go for the growth without 
the sustainable part. It’s interesting that 
that’s all there was going to be and all 
these thousands of pages were going to be 
destroyed. Well, now they’ve brought more 
back in the NPPG website! Because it’s a 
website, of course, you can’t count the pages. 
I think that’s because there was a bit of a 
vacuum left with the NPPF. At least they’re 
more searchable than lots of documents, 
but it does mean that you have to consult 
them, you just can’t look at the NPPF, you’ve 
got to look at these guidelines as well. If 
you’ve got a fifty-page detailed document 
replaced by one page, it’s not going to cover 
everything. With the website now, I think 
a lot of that detail is coming back in, which 
is probably a good thing, it makes it easier 
for the planners. Consistency is important; 
we don’t want everything the same, but we 
don’t want radically different situations in 
different parts of the country, certainly not 
in neighbouring authorities.
DC  Will the New Homes Bonus play any kind 
of significant role in a place like North 
Herts?
SC  It’s very significant because it’s part of our 
funding!
DC  Stevenage basically told me, ‘No’, it wouldn’t 
for them…
SC  No, it’s very, very important because it’s part 
of our funding. Will it affect the number 
of houses we build, no, probably not. You 
could say, ‘Well, it’s a ‘bribe’’, well, it’s not, 
it’s actually core funding, and that’s the 
thing. If the New Homes Bonus had been 
genuinely a bonus, i.e. it was completely 
separate – new money – that would have 
been one thing, but it’s not. When Grant 
Shapps first announced it, which was long 
before the Coalition government, and I 
know because he told me about it in Tesco’s 
car-park in Hatfield. He said, ‘Effectively 
we’re going to bribe you, we’re going to 
pay you to build houses’. But in fact, no, 
it’s not that. You could argue that it’s the 
other way round, ‘We’re going to fine you 
if you don’t build houses, because we’ve 
taken it away from the core funding to get 
it back’. Unfortunately, it gets a bad name 
because a lot of organisations believe that, 
‘Oh, it’s New Homes Bonus, so it should 
be reinvested in homes’. Well, that means 
you’re not going to get your waste collected 
or something else like that, because it isn’t 
‘new’ money. Now, were it new money, then 
yes, for every house you build we’ll give you 
this much and with that you can then go 
and build some more houses, yes that might 
be a good thing. But that’s not the way it’s 
done. The government is no longer, or only 
in a very limited way, subsidising affordable 
housing.
DC  Ok. You spoke near the start about Housing 
Market Areas. How did you go about 
defining those in North Herts?
SC  Well, we don’t have a Housing Market Area, 
we have several HMAs. And yes, we use 
consultants, we particularly use ORS and 
they define the HMA and look at its need. 
Actually, aren’t HMAs defined by the ONS?
DC  No, there are various definitions of HMAs 
depending on who you talk to.
SC  Humph…well, that’s a technical detail that I 
don’t know much about. Somebody defines 
them, I only get to see what they define. We 
straddle them, of course, we have the Luton 
HMA which we have a little bit to do with, 
but not a lot. The whole of the A1 corridor 
is a HMA, because it’s the easiest thing to 
do, if you’re working at one point and you 
move north you can still commute from 
there to there. And then of course Royston, 
for us, is quite a separate HMA because 
it’s much more linked towards Cambridge. 
Stevenage is really part of the A1(M) 
corridor. That HMA goes from Hatfield, 
Welwyn Garden City, Stevenage, Hitchin 
to certainly Letchworth and Baldock. I 
suppose Letchworth and Hitchin link in to 
a certain extent with Central Bedfordshire. 
But they are a bit fluid, and there are plans 
that the Thameslink service will go, and 
you’ll be able to get on a train at Stevenage 
and get off at the south coast, maybe even 
Paris, and certainly into and beyond central 
London, so south London, Croydon, 
places like that can become commuting 
destinations. So actually, you could argue 
that we’ll be linked with their Housing 
Market Areas because we may well work 
there and live here!
DC  Well, Luton said they were linked with 400 
million people…
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SC Well exactly!
DC …within three hours…
SC  So yes, to that extent HMAs are a bit 
meaningless.
DC  Ok. You’re pretty much of the opinion that 
this new system is much better than the old, 
regional way of doing things…
SC I didn’t say that! 
DC  Sorry, don’t let me put words into your 
mouth…
SC No, please don’t…
DC Ok, let me rephrase that…
SC  I think that inevitably there was a bit of 
throwing the baby out with the bath water. 
It was a huge leap to go from Regional 
Spatial Strategies which were unwieldy, 
far too large, far too complicated and very 
dictatorial to what we have now, where if 
you did it wrong, there is no link. The duty 
to cooperate brings some incentive, but it’s 
still, it is limiting, and this is where I do 
have some sympathy with the county. Some 
umbrella planning, some strategic planning 
across a larger area is important, so, yes, to 
some extent, perhaps that went. So their 
abolition was welcome but what’s replaced 
it isn’t ideal, we will work with it, we’ll 
continue to work with it until it changes, 
which it will. Whatever happens, it’s going 
to change. What’s the old adage, ‘The only 
constant is change’? But no, what we’ve got, 
we work with and make the best of. 
DC  Well, that’s pretty much it, unless you 
wanted to go into more detail into the 
political machinations surrounding West of 
Stevenage or planning in general?
SC  No, I…Planning isn’t really political – it 
isn’t party political anyway – all right, 
everything’s political. I don’t believe that’s 
a productive way to go. When I meet with 
John Gardner in Stevenage or Sian Timoney 
in Luton, I don’t think, ‘Ooh, they’re Labour 
members’, they’re councillors trying to do 
their job the same as I am, and I hope they 
respect me in the same way!
INTERVIEW FIVE
Participant: Senior Planner, North Herts District 
Council
Date: 14 March 2014
Location: North Herts District Council, Planning 
Offices
DC  Ok, if I could just start off by asking you 
what your initial feelings are about the duty 
to cooperate?
SP  It’s a very different concept to clearly a 
Regional Strategy system or even a county 
structure plan system and I think the 
thing that has thrown a lot of councils, 
particularly in the south east, is that is a 
non-redistributive policy. I don’t know if 
that was the government’s intention or not, 
but that is in effect what they’ve given us 
with the duty to cooperate. So, whereas 
until 2010/11 we had the Regional Plans 
effectively redistributing growth over the 
place, which wound up various authorities 
for various reasons; they objected because 
they were being recipients of growth that 
was being redistributed from elsewhere. 
Now they’re having to meet their own 
needs, and if you are an authority whose 
growth was being redistributed to someone 
else, you were actually doing all right under 
the regional strategy as far as most local 
politicians in the south east were concerned. 
So the bit that has come home to roost, 
particularly for the authorities in the south 
east close to London – whose growth was 
always affected by the greenbelt – it was a 
case of, ‘Oh, your growth will have to go to a 
Mark I New Town’, whatever it might be. So 
the duty to cooperate has taken a fair length 
of time to bed in, because authorities were 
coming at it from very different starting 
points. 
  So an authority like mine, which was 
effectively one of the recipients of growth 
under the Regional Strategies – we were 
taking growth that wasn’t to meet local 
need, it wasn’t even to meet the needs of 
our neighbours – it was to ‘mop up’ needs 
from across the whole region. We are going 
into it knowing that our [housing] numbers 
are coming down because we’re effectively 
having to meet only our own needs, but 
they are still high and demanding and 
the rest of it. But some of our neighbours 
who were previously giving their growth 
elsewhere and it was ‘out of sight, out of 
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mind’, they frankly didn’t care where it was 
going, it just wasn’t being met by them, 
thinking particularly of the southern 
Hertfordshire authorities, the St Albanses 
and Hatfields and all them. They are coming 
at it with a very different point of view. 
Suddenly they’ve been told, ‘Well, you’ve got 
an objectively assessed need for housing, 
greenbelt, well, yes you’ve got a greenbelt 
but you’ve got to consider whether 
reviewing it might be the way of delivering 
it’, and that is such a radical change of 
mindset for them that it’s quite interesting 
how we managed to piece together what’s 
going on.
DC  Ok. Could I ask you specifically about the 
West of Stevenage development? I’ve read 
all that I can get my hands on and I’ve asked 
everyone I’ve met during this past week for 
their version of the story.
SP  Ok, my version of the story. All right. 
Again, it goes back to this redistributive 
point. The 1998 Structure Plan couldn’t 
find enough land within Hertfordshire, so 
there was a quick look around at the urban 
capacity and we ended up with West of 
Stevenage and East of Hemel Hempstead as 
the two strategic locations. So they got into 
the 1998 Structure Plan and at the time, yes, 
this authority opposed West of Stevenage. 
That was for various reasons but essentially 
boils down to politics, it was a redistributive 
thing, we didn’t like the idea that we were 
taking lots of other people’s growth. We 
weren’t that keen on the site, because of its 
separation from Stevenage by the motorway 
and the industrial estate.
DC  [SP, Hertfordshire CC] emphasized this 
point, that the county considered West of 
Stevenage as virtually a new urban village 
because it would be linked to Stevenage 
only by the two links under the A1(M). 
However, Richard Javes at Stevenage totally 
refuted this assertion by asking where else 
were the people going to travel into and out 
of on their way to work and leisure.
SP  Yes, that sort of thing does still get quite 
heated today. My politicians insist on calling 
it ‘West of the A1(M)’, Stevenage politicians 
insist on calling it ‘West of Stevenage’…
DC  Emphasizing its disconnect from the 
town…
SP  Yes, we don’t name the town that it 
joins, it’s West of the A1(M), it adjoins a 
motorway, why would you want to…? So 
there’s all sorts of political spin like that, 
it’s very difficult and delicate. Anyway, it 
was redistributing growth. Stevenage never 
needed it for its own needs but there was 
a lot of rhetoric coming out of particularly 
Stevenage politicians, saying that this was 
to meet their housing waiting list and the 
rest of it. Then PPG3 came out in 2000 
saying, ‘You shall not release greenbelt 
land unless you’ve done the capacity study’. 
Neither the county council in preparing the 
Structure Plan nor us nor Stevenage had 
at that point. So it took a good couple of 
years to do the urban capacity study, but we 
did a fairly rigorous urban capacity study 
then and found that there was actually a lot 
more urban capacity in Hertfordshire than 
previously thought. 
  This has been borne out by the fact that 
the county Structure Plan was originally 
predicated on in 1998 delivered its 
numbers, and more, early without West 
of Stevenage or East of Hemel Hempstead 
ever having been built. In part that is 
because of the encouragement for the use of 
brownfield urban sites and the rest of it that 
came round, ‘Tapping the Urban Potential’, 
the Rogers Report and things like that that 
came round in the early 2000s. This did 
lead to much better use of the urban land 
within existing settlements. Maybe we went 
too far down that route, and I know that 
some areas are now feeling that they’ve 
had so many flats squeezed in all over the 
place that it’s gone too far, and to an extent 
we’ve seen a reaction against that with PPS3 
being changed almost as soon as the current 
government came to power.
  Anyway, I digress slightly. We had the 
planning applications in 2001 I think it 
was. 3,600 or 5,000 – a lengthy public 
Inquiry took up most of 2004. The Planning 
Inspector refused the 5,000 in 2005…
DC  On the basis that the maximum permissible 
in the Structure Plan was 3,600?
SP  Yes, the Structure Plan shortfall after 
lengthy evidence was decided at 3,600 
which was deemed to go towards meeting 
Structure Plan needs by 2011…
DC  With the remaining 1,400 to come after 
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2011…
SP  Well, the application for 5,000 was actually 
refused, and that was in 2005. The 3,600 
was ‘minded to grant’ because of its role in 
meeting the shortfall to 2011 which was the 
end of the Plan period. In effect, once they’d 
gone to the 3,600 that might pave the way 
for more but the big scheme was refused. 
At this point, in late 2005, we had this 
letter from the SoS saying he was ‘minded 
to grant’ the scheme. Politically, of course, 
we didn’t like it, but Regional Plans were 
coming in, the East of England Plan was on 
its way and the drafts of that consistently 
had the site at the West of Stevenage. 
But again, it was redistributive, not just 
mopping up just the needs of Hertfordshire 
but the whole of the East of England which, 
as far as most of the residents of North 
Hertfordshire were concerned was such a 
nebulous area that we don’t feel we have 
much connection with East Anglia.
DC  Yes, you moved from South East England to 
the East of England in 2000.
SP   That’s right, Herts, Beds and Essex were 
transferred. We don’t feel we have a 
huge connection with the East Anglian 
authorities, but nevertheless that’s where 
we found ourselves. So in 2008 the East of 
England Plan was adopted and that says, 
‘We’ll have Stevenage’, again to mop up 
other needs from elsewhere, not to meet 
local needs. So we were actually given a split 
housing target, we were given 6,200 for our 
own needs and 9,600 as a footnote to the 
Stevenage thing…Stevenage’s housing target 
in the East of England Plan was expressed 
as 16,000 dwellings, but then there was a 
footnote saying, ‘Of these 16,000, 6,400 will 
actually be in the borough, the remaining 
9,600 will be in North Hertfordshire’. 
  By this time it had become apparent that 
for Stevenage to grow to the extent that the 
Regional Assembly thought it was useful for 
it to grow to, on the basis that they couldn’t 
find enough land anywhere else, it had to be 
west and north of Stevenage and so, from 
that point onwards we started talking about 
not just West of Stevenage but actually 
quite substantial west, north and then later 
northeast as well. We have been looking 
at west, north and northeast of Stevenage 
since 2008 as options. I think the interesting 
thing between 2005 and about 2009 is what 
the landowners and people there did.
DC The Unilateral Undertaking…
SP  Yes, they really struggled to get together a 
coherent package of measures.
DC Infrastructure related?
SP  Yes, particularly…education was one of 
the main ones, but the whole package of 
infrastructure. I think there were quite a 
few problems, in particular the tunnel at 
Meadway. Tunnelling under the A1 is, as 
you’d imagine, a very costly business…
DC  I heard it would have cost around £10 
million, something like that?
SP  If not more, but yes. So there was that. 
There was also this secondary school, 
which they’d put out on the edge of the 
development here, but with its playing fields 
essentially going down the slopes towards 
the Langley Valley. Now playing fields on 
slopes, not great…
DC  The first half it’s all right, but the second 
half, going uphill…
SP  Yes, you’d have to swap sides each half, the 
‘uppers’ and the ‘downers’…but in landscape 
terms you could see why somebody would 
put the playing fields there, it’s on the edge 
of the development and the rest of it. But it 
just didn’t work, and the cost of terracing 
the land sufficiently to make it work 
was high and actually would completely 
undermine why you’d put the school there 
in the first place. But underlying that sort 
of landscape, land use planning side of it, 
it had a land ownership function in that 
the site is not in one ownership. It’s split 
between a good eight or nine, if not more, 
land owners, some of whom are more gung-
ho than others…
DC  Well they all stand to make a considerable 
profit…
SP  But they hadn’t managed to sort out, at 
least this is my understanding, the land 
equalisation agreements properly between 
themselves. So whoever was getting the 
secondary school on their land was actually 
getting a relatively low return, whereas 
those whose land was mostly being given 
towards housing were getting quite good 
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returns. Now that is sloppy practice in 
putting together the Consortium, to be 
frank. You need to accept that you are all 
dependent on somebody putting in a bit of 
land that the school can go on. You don’t 
then tell that person that they have to take a 
lower level of profit than the rest of you. For 
that reason it took a good four years after 
the SoS’s ‘minded to grant’ letter in 2005 
before they could finally do a Unilateral 
Undertaking in 2009. By the time they did, 
we suspect, we’ve never been able to prove 
– that some of the options on the land had 
lapsed. I mean, options are not a public 
document, we don’t know that for certain, 
but that is the rumour, and certainly that is 
borne out by the way they were behaving 
around 2009...
DC Were they sort of desperate or in a big rush?
SP  We were not engaged to the extent that we 
would expect to be engaged in discussions. 
Ideally, of course, with a development of 
this size, you would expect it to be a full 
s106 Agreement to which the landowners, 
the developers and the councils would have 
been party. The fact that it was a Unilateral 
Agreement already suggests that there was 
a degree of fall-out between them. Our 
council had opposed it on principle, but 
I don’t think that that was a reason not to 
engage properly in the putting together of 
the financial package, because whilst the 
county Structure Plan was in place and 
while the East of England Plan was in place 
we were able to say politically, ‘This has 
been imposed on us from above’ and we 
were producing Local Plans, we produced 
one in 2000, but had it in as an allocated 
site, but that got withdrawn after PPG3 
came out and we were doing joint work 
with Stevenage Borough on…
DC The SNAP…
SP The SNAP, around 2007/8/9/10
DC  SNAP was described to me as a very painful 
process, it could have been much better…
SP  I’m sure it could have been better, but 
we were engaged with it. I think, moving 
forward, we will be able to do some sort of 
joint working again, be it with Stevenage, 
Luton, any other of our neighbours and 
we will probably end up doing joint 
masterplans again at some point in the 
future. At the moment, of course, I can’t 
say for certain whether it might or might 
not include this particular site, because I’ve 
got a long list that we’re working through. I 
think, SNAP as well…to be frank, Stevenage 
did not do a particularly good job of the 
first drafts. We had said, ‘Fine, this is your 
thing, you do it’, and they produced some 
drafts which were frankly appalling.
DC Appalling, because…?
SP  They didn’t include any maps, and 
fundamentally, as a planner I like to see 
maps in documents and it was a series of 
wishy-washy statements. Professionally, 
we were not happy with that, we wanted to 
have much stronger things, and we did do a 
lot of work jointly. Politically, it was always, 
‘We don’t like doing this, but we recognise 
that it is incumbent on us to do it’. That of 
course all fell apart, I think it was both the 
end of the last government and the start of 
this one, they were both partly to blame for 
the demise of SNAP.
DC In what sense…
SP  In 2009, the last government was in a bit 
of a ‘slash and burn’ mood I think, frankly, 
and we had…I think it was John Denham 
who was SoS in 2009, who actually granted 
it towards the end of 2009, I think within 
48 hours of receiving the final Unilateral 
Undertaking from the landowners.
DC  So it basically hadn’t been properly 
considered?
SP  It hadn’t been properly scrutinised and I 
think it was very much a case of, ‘Well, this 
is a planning application, let’s grant it, let’s 
get it on the books and then see what they 
do with it’. It wasn’t properly scrutinised and 
that Unilateral Undertaking didn’t do the 
job properly and we ended up taking it to 
court, along with the county council. It got 
quashed.
DC  Various elements of it were found 
unsound…
SP  Yes, I think we challenged it on about nine 
grounds, and three of them were successful, 
something like that.
DC  And of course you only need one of them to 
go in your favour.
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SP  Yes. The main one was temporary education 
facilities, which I think Jon Tiley may be 
better to advise you on, but there were 
problems with it, it hadn’t been properly 
scrutinised, even though it had taken them 
four years to put together. Part of that was 
they hadn’t negotiated properly with the 
bodies that would have to implement it. 
So that all fell away. Then of course the 
government changed and the new one 
came in and they also put spanners in the 
works in terms of trying to actually get 
housing growth delivered by saying, ‘It’s 
localism, Regional Plans all torn up’, and 
then it took them three years to tear up 
the Regional Plans, as I’m sure you know, 
all that saga and CALA Homes and all the 
rest of it. In which time we did not feel 
able to proceed with SNAP, because we 
had this thing saying, ‘Localism is coming 
in, provided you’ve got evidence you can 
choose your own number’. And from our 
point of view, that was a very attractive offer 
for our politicians, because of course, you’re 
moving from a redistributive thing, where 
we were the recipients of a lot of growth 
from Hertfordshire and the wider East of 
England to a situation where we can meet 
our own needs.
  Now our own needs have been consistently 
assessed fairly modestly. Natural change 
rates are about 6,000 or so; our old East of 
England target was 6,200 for ourselves plus 
whatever we ended up taking for Stevenage, 
so we thought that it would be something 
like 6,000, 7,000, something of that order. 
That meets our own needs, we’re not having 
to mop up needs from anywhere else, and 
therefore that’ll do. But then of course 
gradually the duty to cooperate has been 
talked about, then legislated for and with 
the Planning Inspectorate starting to get, 
as you say, Aylesbury Vale, Mid Sussex…
there are some interesting decisions coming 
out, and we recognise that, and we also 
recognise the greater emphasis being given 
to ONS projections, or CLG household 
projections based on ONS sub-national 
population projections. 
  The National Planning Practice Guidance, 
they slightly softened it in the final draft that 
came out last week, but the original draft 
was very much, ‘Well, that’s your starting 
point, if you want to do something different, 
you’ve got to have really good evidence as 
to why’. I think they have softened it slightly 
in the final version, but not a lot. Certainly 
the Planning Inspectorate are treating those 
CLG projections as de facto housing targets 
unless you’ve got exceedingly good evidence 
as to something else, and I’ve yet to see a 
Plan that gets through with exceedingly 
good evidence as to why there should be 
something else. I’ve seen a lot of Plans that 
tried for something lower, the joint South 
Worcestershire authorities, and Wiltshire 
and all sorts of other places who’ve tried for 
something lower. 
DC  There is quite a large difference between 
the CLG projections for the next five years 
and the evidence coming out from the 2011 
Census in certain parts of the country…
SP  Not for us, I mean ours have been going 
up, and I think the particular thing is that 
we had thought, when we were doing 
Consultations and things around 2011, we 
did a natural change thing, so births minus 
deaths. Clearly the NPPF came out and 
said, ‘You’ve got to take into consideration 
migration and the NPPG said, ‘You’ve got 
to take into account unmet need from 
neighbours’. When you take into account 
migration, ours go up to more like the 
10-12,000 mark and that’s what we’ve been 
planning for. We did a consultation last year 
which said 10,700. Just as we closed that, 
the ONS projections came out and said 
12,000. So, 10-11-12,000; something of that 
order for our own needs. That in itself will 
be exacting for my councillors to take. It’s a 
relatively strong level of growth over twenty 
years if you consider that the district only 
has about 53,000 houses at the moment, so 
it’s approaching a quarter increase. So, over 
a twenty year period, you can understand 
the concerns that the politicians have and 
indeed the public, and we have to consult 
on, explain and talk to.
  But the unmet need from other 
authorities, you asked about whether the 
projections have changed…yes for Luton, 
no for Stevenage. Stevenage, still, can 
accommodate all their needs within the 
borough boundaries. So this is where there’s 
a bit of a mismatch between the Stevenage 
rhetoric and reality. They need something 
like 5,500 dwellings and at the moment 
they can fit them all within the borough 
boundary.
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DC  I’ve read in a couple of places that Stevenage 
viewed strategic developments like West of 
the A1(M) as a means to achieve Unitary 
Authority status.
SP  I haven’t heard that. Their boundaries are 
already tightly constrained, I recognise that, 
but they still do have some sizeable chunks 
of greenfield sites. The southern third 
of [the A1(M)] site is within Stevenage. 
They’ve also got a tract of land to the north 
and to the southeast. They aren’t what you’d 
call vast swathes of rolling countryside 
but they are decent sized for a modest 
urban extension and they certainly can 
accommodate the needs for the next twenty 
years. Beyond that, then, yes, they might 
be full, but for the time being they’re ok. 
Luton, on the other hand, who we also 
border, has such different demographics to 
Stevenage, it’s much more akin to parts of 
central London…
DC  Yes, I’ve heard it described by Cllr Brindley 
as a ‘port’ – you think of ports as being 
coastal, but no, this is an inland port.
SP  Yes. It is a port of entry and it’s a very 
curious town, the way I’ve heard it 
described is that it’s like a doughnut, the 
outer ring very much behaves like virtually 
anywhere else in the south east in terms of 
its demographic make-up and behaviour. 
The inner, Victorian suburbs of Luton 
are like parts of East London – it’s such 
a radically different mismatch between 
the town and its suburb. Then again, the 
difference between Luton and North Herts 
and Central Beds who border it, is marked.
DC  It was mentioned to me by [SP, Stevenage]
that many local government boundaries are 
an anachronism. He gave the example of 
Luton, where there is the bizarre situation 
that the boundary between Luton and 
Dunstable runs down a street even though 
they are one and the same built-up area. 
His only hope, he told me, was that the 
boundaries around under-bounded towns 
like his would be redrawn so that Stevenage 
would have more land to play with.
SP  Yes, well they did redraw the boundaries 
in Bedfordshire of course, in 2009, 
but planning is not the driver of how 
boundaries get redrawn. I quite agree, 
when they abolished Bedfordshire county 
council, what they should have done is 
put South Bedfordshire with Luton and 
then Luton, Dunstable, Houghton Regis 
would have been one Unitary dominated by 
Luton, but it would also have covered most 
of the Luton hinterland and it would have 
certainly covered all of that urban area. And 
then they would have put Mid Bedfordshire 
with Bedford, similar strong relationships, 
but political reasons, financial reasons, all 
get in the way of what might make sense in 
planning terms, and so we end up with this 
thing where you have Bedford and Luton as 
Unitaries and then the rest of Bedfordshire 
is Central Bedfordshire in between. So 
Central Bedfordshire goes right up to the 
edges of Bedford, right up to the edges 
of Luton, it doesn’t have a major town of 
its own, Dunstable is its major town and 
Dunstable is de facto a suburb of Luton, not 
that I’d say that in Dunstable…So I don’t 
think boundary change is likely in the near 
future and we have to do our best to work 
together.
DC  Can I ask you about the New Homes 
Bonus? Obviously if West of Stevenage did 
go ahead, most of it would be in North 
Herts and therefore you would potentially 
receive a larger share of NHB. Would that 
be a significant, even decisive factor, in any 
decision to go ahead with development?
SP  I don’t think it would be a deciding factor, 
and for that reason it’s not really doing the 
job that government intended. Part of the 
reason for that is that it is almost entirely 
recycled money. If it was genuine, ‘new’ 
money on the table that was on top of our 
previous levels of grant that we receive 
from central government – although we 
collect council tax, most of the money still 
comes from central government – if it was 
genuinely on top of that, that would be ok, 
but they reduced all those grants and then 
took the money they saved from that to 
fund the New Homes Bonus. It’s recycling 
old money that we probably would have 
had, had they not changed it, but we now 
have to work harder to get it. So it’s not seen 
as the determining factor around here. Just 
pragmatically, it feels wrong, because s106 
Agreements – it’s a fundamental principle 
of the planning system that you shall not 
buy a planning permission – well, what 
is New Homes Bonus? I know they put 
in clause 142 of the Localism Act saying, 
‘Local finance considerations are a material 
consideration’, but I don’t think it’s likely, 
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certainly locally in my experience, it is not 
a determining factor. It’s nice to have, we 
are pleased to have the New Homes Bonus, 
but in some ways we would have been even 
more pleased had they kept our old grants 
the way they had been.
DC  Ok. So the Local Enterprise Partnerships, 
they’re supposed to be taking over sub-
regional strategic planning. What are your 
impressions of these bodies?
SP  Ok, well we straddle two Local Enterprise 
Partnerships. We’re in the Hertfordshire 
one, but we’re also members of the Greater 
Cambridge/Peterborough LEP. So we look 
two ways.
DC  In a way does that sort of double your 
chances of drawing down LEP funding for 
different areas?
SP  Not entirely, because the LEP’s funding 
that they receive is factored downwards to 
account for the fact that we straddle two…
DC  Of course, otherwise everyone would be in 
three and four LEPs!
SP  That’s right. So when we go to Hertfordshire 
for things, they say, ‘Oh, well, you’re only 
getting half funding’, because the other half 
of our funding comes from Cambridge. 
I think they’ve got different degrees of 
working, I’m not too much involved with 
the Cambridge one myself, my colleague 
deals with that more. The Hertfordshire 
one is…I think the difficulty of having one 
here is that the LEPs, for a start, when they 
came in we weren’t sure what they were for. 
And they came in just as the government 
abolished the Regional Assemblies, the 
Economic Development Agencies, so EERA 
and EEDA, the two East of England ones 
disappeared. And part of the reason they 
went was criticisms about, ‘Well, these aren’t 
democratically accountable, they aren’t 
accessible to local people’, and all the rest of 
it. Effectively, they were ‘talking shops’ for 
whoever wanted to be a part of it. 
  So we introduce a Local Enterprise 
Partnership to be about the economy, and 
businesses can be on it, local authorities 
were almost discouraged from being put 
on it. They have to have a private sector 
chair. Fine, ok, but what are they doing? 
It’s all about economic growth but then as 
soon as LEPs start preparing their Strategic 
Economic Plans or whatever they might be, 
the government are saying, ‘Well, where are 
all your houses?’ Well, we weren’t set up to 
be housing bodies! They are finding their 
way, and I think the government is trying 
to find their way, but in effect they actually 
replaced one unaccountable, unelected 
setup with another at which you can level 
almost all the same criticisms, just at a 
different scale of geography. Indeed, more 
so, in that whilst people were not elected to 
be on the regional body, lots of people who 
went on it were elected local councillors 
representing an area, even if they weren’t 
formally elected to that. 
  The elected and public sector input to 
the LEPs at the moment is weak. Ok, the 
public sector is not the main deliverer of 
houses on the ground, but we are critical to 
the delivery of infrastructure – the roads, 
the education and all the rest of it. They 
have got to work with the public sector 
to deliver, and at the moment, the LEPs – 
rightly, because that’s what they were told 
to be – are private sector led. The private 
sector have gone into it with the mindset 
of, ‘Oh, this might be something we might 
be able to get something out of ’, in terms 
of plugging something here or promoting 
something there. So at the moment they 
aren’t really fit for purpose in terms of being 
able to take a strategic role. The government 
in effect are asking them to do the job that 
County Structure Plans did in the past, 
without having planning expertise, without 
having sufficient representation from the 
public sector. So we have the dominance 
of the private sector without having an 
understanding of the responsibilities…now, 
we are trying to recast it as best we can, but 
it’s us working as outsiders, saying, ‘Look, 
LEP, you need to take more account of this’, 
and so, for instance, all eleven authorities 
in Hertfordshire work together through 
Joint Infrastructure Panels and all the rest 
of it, and we’ve been trying to increase the 
links between the existing public sector 
groupings and the LEP to get them working. 
  We have been giving them as much 
information as we can about housing 
growth, accepting that, with ten districts 
in one county, all our Plans are at different 
stages at any one time. So we give them the 
best information available. But the Treasury 
now seem to be saying to the LEPs, ‘Well, 
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if you want the money you’ve got to be 
telling your districts what to do’, and the 
LEP actually feel very uncomfortable then, 
because who are they to be telling the 
districts what they should be doing? I’m 
not sure where that one’s going, because the 
LEP have put in a draft plan to the Treasury, 
the Treasury have said, ‘Hmmm, no, go 
away and think about your housing some 
more’. I’m not sure how the LEP will get 
to that, because they’re being asked to do 
something far beyond what they originally 
thought the LEP was being set up to do. It 
was all about economic growth originally.
DC  Is it conceivable, that at some point down 
the line, they could be the ones to decide on 
a development like West of Stevenage?
SP  I’m not sure that they’ll go that far. I think 
they’ll talk far more about overall housing 
numbers. That’s just my experience of the 
local LEP we have here, it might be that 
other LEPs elsewhere in the country are 
more imposing…
DC  At least with the regions you knew where 
you stood, all right, there was some 
variation, but generally…
SP  There was variation, but they had an 
understanding that it was a statutory duty 
of them to prepare a Regional Strategy 
which set housing numbers which had to 
be followed by the Local Plan, so there was 
a clear structure, there was a clear chain of 
command and local authorities inputted 
into the regional planning process. We may 
not have liked the outcome, but we had a 
statutory duty to get on with it. The LEPs – 
where’s that clear structure? They’ve been 
formed, they’ve been told to say something 
about housing numbers, but then where’s 
the legal impetus? The LEP says you’ve got 
to do something, Ok, well, we’ll look at it, 
but not necessarily do anything, because 
Local Plans are now the only planning 
document, well Neighbourhood Plans 
below them, but Local Plans are the most 
strategic form that it gets. Now, we are 
trying through duty to cooperate to work 
together as planning authorities…the role 
of the LEPs is curious.
DC  Could I ask you about your Local Plan? I 
think the 1996 Plan is still in force…
SP  It is. Well, as I was saying, we’ve tried a 
couple of times to get new ones in place but 
each time they’ve been actually scuppered 
by national events changing. So we did 
have a Plan in 2000 that we published in 
draft consultation which had the West 
of Stevenage site in it, but that one, as 
the consultation closed, the government 
published PPG3, it got withdrawn and we 
ended up going to the High Court about 
whether we were allowed to withdraw 
it, it was quite a long saga. In 2007/8 we 
were doing a Local Plan based on the East 
of England Plan figures. That got bogged 
down for a couple of years because the 
East of England Plan hadn’t sorted out 
water and sewage, so we ended up doing a 
stupidly expensive water-cycle study. It was 
something that was a strategic matter, so 
you would ordinarily expect the strategic 
body to sort it out, but there was a bit of a 
bust-up between the Environment Agency 
and the others about, ‘Well, where is all this 
sewage from Stevenage going to go?’ 
  I don’t know if you’ve heard of Rye Meads 
sewage plant? The East of England Plan 
had put an awful lot of growth into the 
catchment area of Rye Meads sewage 
works. The sewage works doesn’t really 
have much capacity to expand, and where it 
would expand is a wildlife site of European 
importance, and the EA aren’t convinced 
that you can actually do much there, 
because it’s on the Lea and the River Lea at 
that point is one of London’s main water 
supplies. The new river that was dug in the 
1600’s from Ware to London still is one of 
the major sources of London’s drinking 
water. So to increase the size of an already 
enormous sewage-works, especially in 
the light of the European, ‘You shall have 
no detriment to the water environment’ 
directive. It’s very difficult because we did 
spend the best part of two years looking 
at Rye Meads – duty to cooperate – it’s 
nowhere near North Herts but it does serve 
where some of our sewage goes. So that 
went on for a couple of years. 
  In 2010 we were almost on the point of 
having solved the water issues, we’d got 
this draft SNAP document from Stevenage 
– which in the end we did most of the 
maps for – I was quite pleased with the 
maps! I drew some of the maps, and they’re 
good maps! But the document was never 
finished and the General Election came so 
we stopped again. Since then, it’s been a 
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few sort of abortive attempts to get going. 
Localism, but you’ve still got a Regional 
Plan in place, so you try and do something 
there but you’re told, ‘No, you’ve got to 
wait for the East of England Plan to go in 
January 2013’. In 2013 we started again a bit 
more earnestly – a couple of consultations 
last year on potential housing sites and 
numbers – we’re hoping to get a Plan out 
later this year, and that will be based on, as 
I was suggesting, the sort of 10,700 figure 
from last year, but mindful of the slightly 
higher figures that have come out. So it 
might be that we review that. We’re looking 
at unmet need from other local authorities 
– at the moment Stevenage are not asking us 
to take any of theirs. So any development we 
do on the edge of Stevenage at the moment 
would be one of two things: it would be 
either us saying, ‘We’ve looked at all the sites 
in North Herts and we think actually that 
the best site to accommodate development 
happens to be on the urban edge of 
Stevenage, which is possible, or it might be 
that we put in something saying, ‘We know 
that Stevenage would like to grow, we know 
that they probably will fill their borough 
boundaries eventually, whether it’s in this 
Plan period or not and we are mindful of 
the fact that the projections are changed on 
a reasonably regular basis – more regular 
than we are able to produce a Plan for – so it 
might be that we want to have a contingent 
thing if Stevenage is able to prove a case, 
this is where we would look to put it’. I don’t 
know if that will get through the members 
or not, but that’s something we’re looking at.
 
  On top of that 10,000 for our own needs, we 
would almost certainly need to be making 
an allowance for unmet need in Luton, 
because they have needs of the order of 18-
22,000 and they’ve only got land for 6,000. 
So a fairly massive amount of unmet need. 
Central Beds wrap around them on…I 
think they’ve got 85% of the border, we’ve 
got 15%.
DC  And is that the way the unmet need would 
be apportioned?
SP  We haven’t had that discussion yet. For the 
last six months we’ve been trying to sort out 
what exactly Luton’s unmet need is – we’re 
nearly there on that and once we’ve got a 
number we can start having the discussions 
between ourselves and Central Beds and 
other authorities in the HMA, so that also 
includes places like Aylesbury Vale and 
Dacorum, arguably it also includes places 
like Milton Keynes, Bedford and St Albans.
DC  Yes, Luton described to me the ‘ripple effect’ 
where it’s hard to know exactly how far back 
you need to look in the duty to cooperate.
SP  Yes, and I think the Inspector’s decision 
we’ve seen recently in Mid Sussex about 
Brighton was very interesting and then 
Aylesbury Vale – it was specifically Luton 
who were one of the authorities that they 
hadn’t fully cooperated with. So Aylesbury 
Vale are now coming to our meetings at 
Luton. So we tried to sort out the duty to 
cooperate there. But then of course politics 
comes in again, I don’t know if you saw the 
letter from Nick Boles last week?
DC  Yes, and we had Ed Miliband in Stevenage a 
few weeks ago…
SP   ‘Right to Grow’, yes, yes, that’s winding 
up which is political mischief and it 
doesn’t help either the officers or the local 
politicians, most of whom would just like 
to get a Plan in place. I think there’s a 
recognition that the best way of protecting 
most of your district is to do a Plan which 
says exactly where the growth is going to go. 
Something I’ve said to our members a few 
times is, ‘Greenbelt is only half a policy – if 
you want to stop growth going somewhere 
you have got to say where growth is going 
– don’t just say we’re greenbelt, that’s 
our policy, we defend that’. It’s too weak, 
the trouble is you get Nick Boles’ letter 
coming out and effectively saying, ‘Well, it’s 
greenbelt’.
DC That’s not very helpful, is it!
SP More than unhelpful! 
DC  Ok. Just generally, do you feel the NPPF is 
performing adequately?
SP  I don’t have too much of a problem with 
the NPPF, although they condensed it a 
lot most of what was in there, in the old 
guidance, the essence is still there. I have 
more of an issue with the Planning Practice 
Guidance, simply in that it’s very difficult 
to see how much guidance there is, because 
there’s no pdf copy of the document. So, just 
from a simple presentational point of view, 
you’ve got paragraphs with twelve-digit 
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reference numbers – I don’t fancy quoting 
those in Committee reports all over the 
place.
DC  Ok. So the last main area is transport. I’ve 
heard over the past week that the LEPs 
are actually quite a good forum for doing 
strategic transport.
SP  The Local Transport Board is proving quite 
effective, and they do liaise with the LEP 
through the Strategic Infrastructure Board, 
but transport does remain one of the main 
issues both from a public perception point 
of view – we always get attacked from that, 
‘Well, there’s no infrastructure, how are 
we ever going to get anywhere?’ The A1 
is already clogged, it’s already standing 
room only on the trains, which are all fair 
points. We did have the situation where the 
Highways Agency was effectively saying 
for quite some time, ‘Growth in this area 
should be limited because the A1(M) is 
so close to capacity. Stevenage used to 
come into every meeting saying, ‘Well, the 
Highways Agency said we can’t do more 
than a thousand’. A thousand houses is 
clearly nothing compared to anybody’s 
growth around here. The Highways Agency 
have now changed position on that now, 
but there remains the problem on the A1, 
particularly between Junctions 6 and 8, 
where there are only two lanes and it’s three 
lanes north and south of that. So at both of 
those points, and particularly Junction 6 
you get this funnelling effect which causes 
considerable delay, particularly in the rush-
hour. It’s difficult. 
DC  Of course this is covered by the A1 Housing 
Market Area…
SP  Well, we assessed HMAs in our SHMA and 
we used the same consultants that most of 
the Hertfordshire and all the Bedfordshire 
authorities used (ORS) and they defined 
what they called the ‘Stevenage and A1 
Market Area’. We are working together with 
Stevenage and Central Beds, trying to sort 
out what that means in terms of the NPPF, 
working across HMAs. It doesn’t include 
Luton, and the needs of the Stevenage and 
A1 HMA are much more modest than those 
arising from Luton, and are much more 
in line with what draft Plans were trying 
to do anyway. It’s a big area for Stevenage 
because it’s the only HMA they’ve got and 
I think officers there do dwell on it as one 
of the big things they’re working on. We 
straddle five HMAs, I’m in discussions with 
so many other councils, so it’s one of many 
but it’s not actually the most complicated 
one. Luton is the one that’s really proving 
difficult.
  Going back to travel and transport, trying 
to get improvements to the A1 in particular 
– although also the East Coast Main Line 
at almost exactly the same point – so both 
on the railway and the road there is this 
break-point near Welwyn, north of which 
is harder to get sufficient infrastructure 
if you’re talking about transport into 
London. When you look at the economy, 
we struggle to get local jobs here. A lot of 
the employment movements are all about 
assuming that existing commuting patterns 
into London will continue, and if you’re 
going to have the same proportion of the 
new residents in these new houses who’ve 
migrated here, so not the natural change 
but new migration – if they’re going to 
carry on commuting into London in the 
same proportions – that is going to be more 
people on the trains, more people on the 
roads. And the pinch-points are very, very 
costly to sort out.
DC  Is this something that the LEP can help 
with?
SP  The LEP is working with the planning 
authorities along the A1 and either side 
of it, who have joined together to form 
a Hertfordshire A1 Consortium which 
is working with the LEP and with the 
Highways Agency to try to lobby for 
improvements to this stretch of the A1. 
Effectively it’s asking the government to 
say, ‘You want growth in this area, we can’t 
actually pay for it’ – and this goes back to 
what I was saying before about the way the 
WSC weren’t actually able to sort things out 
between them to pay for it. It’s a very costly 
site to develop. You need public sector 
money to be put in to pay for the big bits of 
kit, be it the tunnel under the A1 there, be it 
widening the A1. Once those are sorted, if 
you’ve got a guarantee that they’re coming 
then people’s objections start to fall away, 
and if the Highways Agency particularly are 
able to say, ‘Ok, we’re not going to use our 
power to direct refusal to stuff around the 
A1, because we know that it’s programmed 
in, it’ll be widened to three lanes in 2024, 
that would be fine, but we’re not there yet!
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INTERVIEW SIX
Participant: Senior Labour Party Local Councillor, 
Stevenage Borough Council
Date: 21 January 2015
Location: Stevenage Borough Council Offices
DC  Okay, so during this past year I’ve 
interviewed a number of people, Richard 
Javes here…
SC Have you been to Luton?
DC  I’ve been to Luton, yes, I spoke with [SC, 
Luton] and [SP, Luton]. Also [SC, North 
Herts] from North Herts…
SC He’s gone.
DC Really? I didn’t know that.
SC He wasn’t selected by his own party.
DC  Well I know he was very busy renovating his 
home…
SC So he’s got more time to do that.
DC  Okay, basically what my project is about is 
how do you plan strategically – housing – 
across different local authority areas.
SC  Indeed – how do you plan strategically 
when there is no national plan? That’s a 
real dilemma. No national plan from which 
regions then have a responsibility for part 
of. The real difficulty for the DCLG is that, 
having a created an expectation for what 
they call localism, there was no doubt a 
fond belief among some local authorities 
that they were going to be able to choose 
their own housing numbers. Probably 
though, the housing numbers are just as 
rigorously applied at national level as they 
were under the regional system, but nobody 
will get up and say what they all add up to, 
so how do you decide where they go?
DC  If I could just ask for your views on one 
particular development please? The reason 
I originally got interested in Stevenage 
and the wider area was the proposed 
development west of the A1(M). 
SC  Absolutely. I suppose the issue of the west 
of Stevenage highlights one of the fault lines 
in the UK planning system, in that it was 
first identified in the 1996-98 period, agreed 
under the old Structure Plans which were 
at County level, as a suitable site to take 
a significant proportion of Hertfordshire 
growth. It went through the planning 
system during progressive changes when 
the new government came in in 1997 and 
it got into people’s Local Plans and went 
through three levels of public enquiry and 
was found to be one of the most sustainable 
sites there was. This was then challenged 
in court and two areas needed addressing 
which haven’t been addressed. During the 
course of all this, the developers, having 
taken out options on land, the landowners 
saw house prices going up and decided 
that they wanted more money so they 
weren’t willing to renew [the options] at 
the previous price. Then of course there 
was the crash, and suddenly their land was 
worth less than it would have been when 
they first agreed to sell it, so not a single 
house has been built. In crude terms, 5 
000 people who should have had a home 
under any decent planning system within 
five years of it being identified still haven’t. 
So it’s not really anything to be proud of, in 
terms of a national planning framework. 
I think it’s a very good example of how, 
under the current system, those who object 
to something have significantly more 
possibility of success than those who want 
to do something.
DC  What’s the latest on the development? I 
read a couple of months ago that there 
was a possibility of a new consortium of 
developers coming together.
SC  In our emerging Local Plan we have taken 
the portion of west of Stevenage that was 
inside the borough, which accounts for 1 
200 roughly of the homes and there is a 
consortium that does have the options over 
that. They are working on it and within the 
last 48 hours there have been discussions 
between our officers and the HCA on issues 
such as the ransom strips that exist for entry 
into that area. Clearly, though, the cost of 
going under the A1(M) for a development 
of 1 200 homes is not going to be in the 
same ratio as it would have been for a 
development of 5 000 and it was going to be 
difficult enough with the 5 000. So, yes, it is 
going down that path. I would say of course, 
now, North Herts are out consulting on 
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their preferred options which do propose 
a Green Belt review and this review takes 
their portion of the West of Stevenage 
development out of the Green Belt. We 
view that as very positive – they call it ‘set 
aside’ land – to meet the potential growth of 
Stevenage beyond the Plan period, in other 
words beyond 2031.
DC  If I could just come in there on the issues of 
planned growth and Stevenage’s needs, I’ll 
give you ex-councillor Brindley’s viewpoint, 
he was arguing that Stevenage itself doesn’t 
actually have that much need. He was 
talking about ripple effects causing people 
from Norwich and Essex to migrate and 
so need was an artificial construct. It’s no 
secret that Stevenage would like to grow and 
gain Unitary Authority status.
SC  The answer is, would Stevenage like to 
be a Unitary Authority – yes. Is it basing 
its planning policy on becoming a UA, 
the answer is no. The figures for growth 
are figures that are determined on ONS 
population projections and household 
formation rates calculated by department. 
Tom knew that as well as he was leaving. 
Those figures have consistently gone up 
every twelve months. The latest figures were 
due in December and were then delayed 
by government until early January. They’ve 
now been delayed until the end of January 
and everybody’s prediction is that, by and 
large, across the South East they’re all 
going to show an increase. There are always 
some variations of course and clearly, 
those figures do take into account outward 
migration from other areas of the UK. But 
those are not driven by governments, are 
they, they’re driven by economic factors and 
where people see opportunities. 
  House prices drive people out of an area, 
economic growth attracts people into an 
area if there are jobs. So it’s that balance – 
you could say that both governments do at 
least acknowledge that you don’t only have 
to provide housing, you also have to provide 
job opportunities. Realistically, probably 
both governments, both major parties to 
different degrees agree that you have to 
try to get economic growth where you 
can get economic growth. So that’s really 
determined by communications etcetera 
and where industry wants to be because it’s 
more convenient, more cost effective for 
them to be, and at the moment that’s still 
the problem with the North-South divide. 
So at the moment the South East is going to 
take the brunt of that. And then of course 
you get the sheer London factor and you get 
the way London is operated. 
  That’s a bigger fear for all of Hertfordshire 
authorities and to Luton and Bedford – 
exactly how many of their people is Boris 
going to house? At the moment the market 
situation in London is just really forcing 
people, average families out of London, 
or the children of average families out of 
London, if they can’t inherit their parents’ 
property. That’s a major factor, and of course 
every so often when they have meetings 
with the London Plan, well, it’s under 
constant review, isn’t it? There clearly is a 
limit as to how many houses he can build 
within their boundaries, but at the moment 
it seems like he’s more interested in selling 
them to people who don’t live in London. 
So that has a major effect. In one way, Tom 
is right, other than economically, the Local 
Enterprise Partnership identified about four 
areas in the county for growth, of which the 
Stevenage/North Herts area is one. I think 
that North Herts have gradually realised 
that they don’t have any other option but to 
meet the housing needs figure.
DC  So do you think that designation by the LEP 
was quite an important factor in the change 
of policy by North Herts?
SC  Yes, quite an important factor. Where 
they want to put their money, well we say 
‘their’ money, although it sounds a lot it’s 
not actually all that much in Hertfordshire 
terms. And the same applies to Hemel 
Hempstead and Dacorum etcetera, it’s the 
same type of situation there. It’s a bit easier 
there in that Dacorum is much bigger than 
Hemel.
DC  Okay. Can I ask you about this ‘duty to 
cooperate’?
SC  Well the duty to cooperate – we have a thing 
called the Hertfordshire Infrastructure 
Planning panel (HIP), to which all the 
districts and the county belong. We, very 
early on, said that we ought to discuss 
housing figures because that’s what matters 
and then we can talk about distribution, on 
the basis that if Three Rivers don’t house all 
their growth, then somebody else is going 
to have to do it. Whether they have a duty 
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to cooperate or not, those people are going 
to live somewhere and they’ll go next door 
and then if they don’t meet it, it goes next 
door, and so on and it works its way up 
the county effectively. If you took London 
as a starting point for it – and that might 
be unfair, there are other factors – and of 
course they didn’t want to do that. That 
was in the days, they thought, ‘Great, we’re 
going to determine our own figures, and 
probably there were one or two districts 
that were very bullish on that, Broxbourne 
was one, where the leader said, ‘Nobody’s 
going to tell me how many houses to build, 
we’ll decide how many houses’, and of 
course over a three year period it became 
obvious that the government recognised 
that they had a problem. They think they 
can determine their own housing figures 
from the NPPF, but they can’t, because the 
Inspector will want to see the evidence. 
Now, why does the Inspector want to see 
that you’re meeting ONS requirements – 
because the Department [CLG] has asked 
the Inspector to see! So this idea that the 
Inspectorate is independent is quite wrong, 
there are ground rules under which they 
operate and they’re set by the Department.
DC  Yes, I’ve heard it said that the Planning 
Inspectorate – because they were totally left 
out of the NPPF drafting process – this is in 
a way their revenge, the Inspectors are going 
out and really hammering everyone...
SC  I don’t see it like that. I see it as the 
government using them, because they do 
realise that – some people tell me, some 
of my colleagues, say that they don’t know 
what they’re doing – they know perfectly 
well what they’re doing, but they’ve ended 
up with a problem. They do realise that it’s 
an emerging social problem and it’s going to 
cause massive social unrest at some stage, if 
a government isn’t seen to try. So they had 
to be seen to try and they couldn’t really 
have ONS saying the population is going 
up by this and someone else calculating 
the household formation rate and saying, 
‘Oh look, there’s a widening gap between 
the number of families and the number of 
houses’. I mean, it’s obvious, and if it got 
beyond the pages of The Observer and The 
Independent and The Guardian etcetera 
and started appearing in the tabloids, 
they would be really worried. So I think 
they effectively said to the Inspectorate, 
‘You’ve got to make sure that these figures 
coming from local authorities have got a 
good evidence base’. I think this may be 
exemplified even more by the ex-Chief 
Inspector who retired last year. He was 
then employed by DCLG to go around and 
have ‘chats’ with those authorities that were 
having difficulty co-operating. So, he came 
and he saw Tom [Brindley], he came and he 
saw us. So he said, effectively their ground 
rule is any figure you come forward with, 
you don’t even put forward a figure that is 
less than was in your Regional Plan. Even 
though there are no Regional Plans, that’s 
our starting point. You’ve got to produce 
the evidence, here’s ONS, here’s the regional 
figure, you’ve got to be somewhere above 
those.
DC  But what has happened in a lot of draft 
Local Plans is that they have reduced their 
figures from the Regional Plans, so now it 
looks like there’s been a bit of a backlash 
against that?
SC  Yes, the Duty to Cooperate meetings have 
become much more constructive now than 
they were. It’s concentrated the mind, in that 
one way or another we’ve got to help each 
other get out. It’s still a very crude system...
why should I say poor old Inspectorate, no 
body, whether it’s us or the Inspectorate 
can claim that all their decisions are right. 
Clearly, intellectually, that’s not a viable 
statement. It’s just how wrong they are that 
you’ve got to look at in terms of decisions. 
They still have to consider one authority 
at a time, so an astute Inspector will say, 
‘Where’s your evidence base, have you 
talked to your neighbours etcetera’. You’ve 
been to Luton, you’ve spoken to them. Well, 
they held a number of round tables and we 
went to their Duty to Cooperate meetings. 
I mean, they had ten different authorities 
at that roughly, including Aylesbury Vale 
and Central Beds. And of course the other 
ingredient, which does have a spatial 
element to it, is the Housing Market Areas. 
So a lot more work has been done on 
establishing what your housing markets 
are. Now, in the case of Luton, certainly 
Luton more than us, you know our housing 
market area is going to other authorities 
who have about three different housing 
market areas which can be affected by 
requests relating to the Duty to Cooperate. 
A classic example of that is Central 
Bedfordshire. 
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  We’ve had Duty to Cooperate meetings 
with North Herts, East Herts, Welwyn & 
Hatfield and Central Beds. We’ve had other 
discussions with Luton because we have 
a mutual interest in North Herts, from 
different ends of it, and of course the fact 
that we are political colleagues of Luton, 
so clearly we do try to make sure that we’re 
saying roughly the same things. So, ‘what’s 
your line going to be?’ and ‘if you’re going 
to ask for 15,000 houses in North Herts and 
we’re going to ask for 15,000, how would 
they ever answer that?’ I think Luton did 
a lot of work on those meetings. So, the 
Duty to Cooperate is more focused, more 
concentrated, so if somebody says, ‘No, I 
can’t take any of your houses’, they realise 
they have to have a really good evidence 
base for that, whereas they might be able to 
argue about a green belt review getting their 
own houses in. 
  They probably would feel that they were 
in a weak position arguing a case for 
moving the green belt, which the SoS is the 
final arbiter on anyway, than if they were 
meeting somebody else’s requirement. It 
would be interesting to see how Pickles 
would react to that. At some stage that’s 
going to happen I assume, he will be faced 
with that kind of thing from objectors. 
Purely in terms of housing numbers it 
might work. In terms of what drives us in 
our planning I hope, it’s ‘What is the social 
purpose of building?’, in other words it’s the 
argument about sustainability, you know, we 
want sustainable developments and when 
we say sustainable, we want them to be 
economically sustainable, certainly, we want 
them to be environmentally sustainable and 
we want them to be socially sustainable. 
But they might not be socially sustainable, 
and that was brought home to me fairly 
forcefully in a difference of discussions 
between North Herts and Central Beds. To 
some extent Central Beds...
DC  Are we talking about percentage of 
affordable housing?
SC  Yes. They’re quite happy to build houses, 
what they’re not happy about is building 
affordable houses. But that’s not required 
under the Duty to Cooperate. You can only 
insist on saying, ‘Will you take some of my 
housing need?’ You know, Luton can say, I 
forget how many...
DC 18,000
SC  Yes, indeed...but they could find some 
Russian oligarchs, they could build 300 
homes and let them off at £2 million a time 
if they wanted, but that won’t meet the 
social needs of Luton, but of course it will 
count as part of their housing requirement. 
So it’s a real problem, and of course, Central 
Beds’ approach is to sell off their housing, 
although North Herts actually set up a 
mutual in terms of North Herts Homes, 
and what they’re consulting on has a 40% 
affordable housing requirement, the same 
as us. In their Preferred Options document, 
in their options to the north of Stevenage, 
all of those they say they would do in 
conjunction with Stevenage, because they 
acknowledge that they’re essentially garden 
suburbs of Stevenage.
DC  That would be part of their green belt 
review?
SC  Yes, that would be part of their green belt 
review to the north.
DC  Pardon my ignorance, but I know from 
looking at aerial photography that there’s 
a relatively new development to the north 
east of Stevenage?
SC Yes, Great Ashby.
DC But that’s in North Herts?
SC  Yes, part of it’s in Stevenage, part of it’s 
in North Herts, and there are two more 
developments there, one with 300-odd 
houses which they’ve got a planning 
application for, but they haven’t done 
anything with it until they did their Plan, 
and there’s another one with 500-odd, 
combined it comes to 827.
DC  OK, so there has been co-operation between 
yourselves and North Herts across this area?
SC  Well, we would prefer the West of Stevenage 
to come first. They’ve got their own 
rationale, so I’m not knocking that for a 
moment. When you do a Local Plan as you 
know, you go out and you ask people who 
own land whether they’re willing to sell it 
for housing, are they thinking about selling 
it for housing, but if you get zero replies...
another thing you’re meant to be able to 
prove to an Inspector is that it’s a viable 
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plan, you’re not just putting figures down 
relating to a piece of land that nobody’s 
ever got any intention of building on. You’re 
meant to be able to show an intention to 
build, so by showing a letter which says, 
‘Look, this person has an intention to sell 
their land, then they’ll believe you. So, 
in their estimate at the moment they are 
suggesting bringing forward the sites to the 
north before bringing forward the sites to 
the west. But we’re happy about the ones to 
the north. They were in what Richard [Kelly 
– North Herts] would describe as the ‘SNAP 
area’ which was the area under the old 
Regional Plans. Historically, we would have 
loved to have seen West of Stevenage come 
about, but houses are houses and if they’re 
within commuting distance...
  In my view, the sustainability argument 
shouldn’t really be affected by where the 
planning authority’s boundaries are. If 
somebody is three miles from work, it 
shouldn’t matter that that three miles starts 
in another authority, it’s a fairly sustainable 
journey. If it’s thirty miles, it’s not a 
sustainable journey. You know, it’s the first 
time for 22 years that they’ve actually gone 
out for consultation and identified sites. 
So it’s a major intellectual step forward. 
That doesn’t mean it’s sold, because if you 
follow the local presses around here at the 
moment, all their meetings at Baldock, 
Letchworth etcetera have been packed 
out and there’s been loads and loads of 
objections. So we’ll see whether they can 
keep their nerve and when they go out 
with, ‘This is our choice, based on the 
consultation’. If they stick to what’s in there 
then it will have been a major step. 
  We think it’s a good bit of sustainable 
planning. I’ve spoken to people with a 
planning hat on who happen to live in 
North Herts and who all agree that it’s quite 
a sensible plan that they’ve gone forward 
with. We can argue between the West of 
Stevenage and the north, but, since Local 
Plans have to be reviewed every three years, 
if it’s set aside for the future development 
of Stevenage, then it’s still a sensible thing 
to do. And it does include, by the way, 
things like employment land for Stevenage 
and Baldock. If we’re going to fit more 
houses within the borough boundary we’ve 
got less land available for employment. If 
there are, say, a couple of hundred people 
from Baldock who currently commute 
into Stevenage to work and we’ve got 
employment land there, they’ll be able to 
reduce their journeys. It’s the distances 
that people are living from their jobs that’s 
the important factor. North Herts have 
concentrated the majority of their growth 
around their towns. They’ve been very good 
at categorising villages, protecting those 
with the greatest character as there are and 
giving them virtually zero growth. 
DC  And of course, it’s not just distances, it’s how 
people are travelling. 
SC  Exactly, it’s how people are travelling, very 
much so. Clearly, within the sustainability 
and the viability argument is the 
infrastructure costs associated with each 
of the developments. Great Ashby is an 
example, probably about two thirds of the 
current Great Ashby is in North Herts, but 
all those North Herts people commute on 
Stevenage roads to get to the station, if they 
want to go to hospital they have to go down 
Stevenage roads and clearly we would wish 
to see another connection so that if they 
want to get on to the A1(M) they don’t have 
to go into Stevenage, for their sake and for 
the sake of the residents whose roads they 
use at the moment. 
  So there are clearly issues like that – 
schools, for example, are another issue. One 
of the sites they brought forward is where, 
under the old Regional Plan, one of the 
Stevenage schools was going to be moved – 
Thomas Alleyne in the Old Town – it would 
have closed and re-emerged in Great Ashby. 
They’ve now taken that site, which had been 
granted planning permission by themselves, 
because it’s a County Council facility and 
handed it back to North Herts who are now 
proposing to build homes there. But, they 
still need a school! So somebody will have 
to find some land for that. The fond belief 
that both main parties had, going back to 
the mid-2000’s that you could have a CIL 
system or roof tax, taking money out of 
every development and using it – well, six 
out of ten authorities don’t think they’ll 
operate CIL in Hertfordshire, because there 
just isn’t any money to take out. Even then, 
by the time the current government got into 
power the work we’d done at HIP began 
to show that CIL would never have raised 
more than a third of general infrastructure 
costs.
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DC  Right. On a similar note, could we talk 
about the New Homes Bonus, what kind of 
a role has it played so far?
SC  Well, there’s lots of different views on the 
New Homes Bonus, isn’t there? I don’t 
think Mr Lyons is particularly taken with 
it. There’s clearly a difference between 
different regions. There’s been more housing 
growth in the south, so there’s been more 
New Homes Bonus money coming to 
southern councils. Northern councils are 
not that supportive of New Homes Bonus. 
Southern councils, regardless of their 
political complexion, have probably found 
it as quite useful during this period when 
we’ve been facing 27% cuts. I think the 
difficulty some have got into is that they 
use it for revenue purposes; we don’t use it 
for revenue purposes. I mean, some have 
had to cut services and they’ve used New 
Homes Bonus money to not make those 
cuts so deep. We’ve tended to use it for 
capital projects to benefit the community, 
but there is the temptation to use it in other 
ways. At the moment an incoming Labour 
government is probably not committed 
to maintaining the New Homes Bonus, 
although that’s not always the way things 
turn out after a government’s elected, is it! 
Whether it ever was the deciding factor in 
an authority granting permission because 
they were going to get New Homes Bonus I 
don’t know...
DC  For small-scale developments, yes, but not 
on a strategic level as far as I’m aware.
SC  No, not on a strategic level. You might 
persuade a village if they’re going to get a 
new community hall out of it, because the 
parish council will get a certain percentage 
of the New Homes Bonus. So, if you’re 
heavily parished, you could see it. I won’t 
say bribing...
DC  Talking about an incoming Labour 
government, I remember Ed Miliband was 
here, promoting his new policy, the ‘Right 
to Grow’. That sounds pretty good from 
Stevenage’s perspective, doesn’t it?
SC  Yes, depending of course on how it’s going 
to be implemented. Is it actually going to 
bring with it compulsory purchase or not?
DC  You need the compulsory purchase in order 
to assemble the land?
SC  Yes. If you take the West of Stevenage as 
an example, here we’ve got the reluctant 
land owners, all waiting to get the kind of 
prices they were previously offered. You’ve 
got the developers – they can afford to pick 
and choose which sites to develop which 
will give them the best return, so they don’t 
necessarily want to develop the sites you’ve 
chosen for good spatial reasons. Whereas, 
with compulsory purchase, you would say, 
‘Ok, we’ll go through the courts, we’ll do a 
compulsory purchase for the land at West of 
Stevenage and it might bring them to their 
senses’. I mean, the whole thing is distorted 
by what people laughingly call the ‘housing 
market’. But it’s not a housing market, it’s 
a financial market! You’ve got developers 
on the one hand, saying, ‘You do realise 
that land costs so much’ – they drive the 
land price up. So it’s not in their interest to 
increase capacity. It’s much easier to be able 
to pick your sites, get in, build, and get out. 
It’s very hard to get the current government 
to admit what the total housing figure is, but 
to actually build the total number of houses 
that we need per annum – probably well 
over the 200,000 figure that’s bandied about 
– well, the TCPA held a regional conference 
at Cambridge and Barritt’s were there and 
he said, ‘You’re right John, between us 
we can’t build more than 160,000 – it can 
only be done by public intervention’. In 
some ways, even though it’s against their 
economic model, it’s nice to be able to build 
your 160,000 under market conditions and 
then for the government to pay you build 
the other ones that society wants.
DC  That’s quite an admission from one of the 
leading house-builders, that they can’t do it 
all themselves!
SC  Yes, and neither party have seriously talked 
about how to modify the housing market, 
other than saying, ‘Well, we want to build 
more, and that will bring the price down’. 
Well, yes it will, but clearly you’ve got to 
build an awful lot of new houses for that to 
happen.
DC  Barely a month goes by these days without 
another report on the green belt and it’s a 
strange one because it’s the right who seem 
to be most vociferous in calling for it to be 
chipped away at or even scrapped.
SC  Well, maybe we should address the five 
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purposes and bring it down to coalescence 
and get people to understand that that’s the 
primary purpose of the green belt. When Ed 
was visiting, we were sitting in the kitchen 
of a house in a new development and the 
point about the green belt came up. One of 
the people there asked – in my view quite 
rightly – ‘When are Hertfordshire going to 
realise that the best way of protecting the 
market towns is to have growth around 
Stevenage and have growth around Watford 
and have growth around Hemel?’ The 
danger with the extreme right wing view 
of ‘Let’s do away with the green belt’ is that 
you get endless ‘executive estates’ all over 
the countryside. Get rid of the green belt 
and we’ll have ribbon development all over 
again.
DC  Ok, so the last main area I’d like to ask 
about is the role of LEPs.
SC  Well, you have to work with the partners 
you have and the vehicles you’ve got. Do 
LEPs have some virtues? They have some 
virtues but they’re exceedingly limited 
I would say, and that’s not a criticism of 
the people. They’re not democratically 
accountable bodies. Fortunately, to some 
extent they recognise that. It’s convenient 
to have a LEP that is co-terminous with 
your county boundaries but in another 
way it’s probably unrealistic because we’ve 
got Luton and Milton Keynes which are 
big influences on us and yet you have to 
talk to another LEP. So if you’re all chasing 
the same thing and you’re all saying you’re 
going to grow by 20% - well, are you? Or is 
one of you – who’s actually going to do it? 
  So I think accountability is a problem. If I 
go to a meeting about housing growth and I 
say, ‘Well, this is supported by the LEP’, 95% 
of the audience wouldn’t know what I was 
talking about, they don’t know what a LEP 
is, so there is no visual accountability in the 
public’s eye. Yet here they are, shaping the 
future. I think a lot of LEPs don’t want to 
get drawn into housing numbers or where 
houses should be. They do want to say, 
‘Well you’re on a railway line and you’ve 
got a main road going through you etcetera 
and you’ve got a good cluster of businesses 
so this is a good place for expansion’. They 
want you to then go away and work out 
where to put the houses. There was a time 
I think that local authorities feared that 
the government was going to give LEPs 
planning powers – that all their planners 
would be TUPE’d over to LEPs and then 
if they weren’t under our control, would 
they be working for us or for North Herts? 
So there was a worry that you would be 
taking planning out of being democratically 
accountable and I think government saw it 
as a ‘bridge too far’. 
INTERVIEW SEVEN
Participant: Senior Executive, South East Midlands 
Local Enterprise Partnership (SEMLEP)
Date: 15 February 2015
Location: UCL Institute of Education
DC  If I could start by asking you about the 
Growth Areas, especially MKSM which you 
had a leading role in, and how they compare 
with LEPs?
SE  The Growth Areas under the previous 
government were designated in 2004 – the 
Plan for Sustainable Communities – and 
there was a Regional Spatial Strategy for all 
of the regions, but also for MKSM which 
covered parts of the East of England, parts 
of the East Midlands and parts of the 
South East, so it was pulling together parts 
of three plans and having this ambitious 
target to deliver new homes. So it was my 
role to bring the local authorities together 
and overcome the challenges to delivering 
housing.
  Then, with 2010, obviously there was the 
change of government which was very 
intent on getting rid of strategic planning 
and moving away from what was called 
‘top-down housing targets’. So localism 
was the order of the day and lots of 
organisations were scrapped – the RDAs 
went, Government Offices went, and a 
lot of elected members, particularly in 
Conservative authorities, felt that they 
didn’t have to deliver all these new homes, 
localism is about doing what we think is 
necessary. So I think that, initially, there was 
a feeling of relief not to have the large-scale 
strategic plans.
  LEPs came along as you know, following 
a very simple letter from Vince Cable and 
Eric Pickles to all local authorities saying, 
‘How would you like to work together? 
You can set up these LEPs. There aren’t any 
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rules, they should be focused on functional 
economic areas. We’re not going to tell 
you how to set them up, but you should 
have a Board which is private-sector led, 
so a majority of private-sector members. 
In MKSM there was a lot of discussion 
amongst local authorities and some of 
them, like Northamptonshire, wanted to 
look towards the East Midlands and maybe 
join up with Leicester and Leicestershire 
and basically we’ve ended up with quite a 
complicated geography in our area. So we’re 
a slightly unusual LEP in that we have big 
overlaps, we have seven district authorities 
and four unitaries and there are no counties, 
which does make life a little difficult when 
we get into bidding for strategic transport 
planning. So a big area.
DC  Which area has taken the lead on strategic 
transport planning then?
SE  When the LEP was set up there wasn’t 
a great deal of thinking about strategic 
planning. I have a background in that area, 
so I was really keen to try to get people to 
think in that way but there was a strong 
feeling that LEPs were about jobs and 
jobs were about businesses and business 
support and maybe skills, but not really 
about infrastructure and planning. So I 
think that was true for about the first year 
and LEPs didn’t have much funding for 
about the first year. We set up our own 
company, but some LEPs, particularly 
those with county councils, were very 
much driven by their local authorities. We 
wanted to be completely separate from the 
local authorities so we located ourselves in 
Cranfield in an innovation centre, rather 
than being located in council offices which a 
number of LEPs were. 
  So, completely separate, with an initial focus 
on business, but then people gradually 
started to realise – and we did business 
surveys – that infrastructure is really 
important for business growth and the 
recession really hit the number of new 
homes that were being built across the patch 
so people started to want to resurrect the 
previous strategic plans. So, in SEMLEP, we 
decided that we would pull together our 
own infrastructure plan, based on the plans 
of local authority areas. Of course, as you’ll 
know, each local authority was in a slightly 
different position, some of them had got rid 
of their previous Plans and were developing 
new ones, in other areas local politicians 
didn’t want to deliver as many homes as 
they had previously agreed to deliver, so 
everybody was in a slightly different state. 
  Interestingly though, because a lot of work 
had already been done to identify the 
potential housing sites and commercial 
sites as well as identifying the various bits 
of infrastructure that were needed, we has 
quite a bit to build on. So we pulled together 
an infrastructure plan, and that involved 
getting all the Heads of Planning of the 
different authorities to work together. It was 
quite a difficult process at first but once they 
got into it they realised that it was actually 
quite useful to find out what was going on 
in other parts of the patch.
  So we published this Plan on our website 
at about the same time that central 
government decided that they would ask 
LEPs to produce Strategic Economic Plans. 
So each LEP was tasked with producing 
one of these things. Again, there wasn’t a lot 
of guidance about what it meant, although 
the suggestion was that the Plan would 
be used as a basis for bidding for money 
following the Heseltine Review (‘No Stone 
Unturned’). So, we set about doing this huge 
task with not much resource and not being 
sure whether it was a bidding document 
or whether it was a long term planning 
document and I’m still not sure we’ve got 
much more clarity on that now!
  Although everyone tends to say this, I think 
we do have an interesting strategic location, 
just north of London, halfway between 
London and Birmingham and then this 
Oxford – Cambridge arc. You probably will 
have followed the Centre for Cities Report 
issued last Monday where Milton Keynes 
was named as the fasted growing place in 
the country, basically because of its strategic 
location. So we produced the Plan and, 
going back to your question about transport 
which is a very interesting one, I was really 
keen to get the surrounding county councils 
working with us to produce a Transport 
Strategy, but that has proved to be very 
difficult to implement at a political level 
because Northamptonshire CC did not want 
to work with SEMLEP, they wanted to work 
with Northamptonshire LEP, who have no 
background in transport planning as they 
were originally set up as the economic 
development arm of Northamptonshire CC, 
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and the CC did all the transport planning 
itself. 
  What I did was set up an officer-level group 
and I invited the CC Heads of Transport 
to come along. That at least enabled us to 
meet with the counties and we developed a 
Transport Strategy. We’re hoping to take this 
work one step further and have a transport 
model that covers the whole area.
DC  Yes, I did see the very detailed Transport 
Plan that you produced. I’m not sure that 
many other LEPs have gone into that sort 
of detail regarding their transport strategy, 
certainly Hertfordshire hasn’t. 
SE  No, Joan Hancock is my opposite number 
at Hertfordshire and we exchange emails 
and so on, so I know that their LEP is just 
not really focused on transport. What 
really pushed all LEPs towards transport 
was when the Local Transport Boards were 
about to be set up by the government. In 
our patch the LTB would only have been 
the four unitaries (Milton Keynes, Bedford, 
Central Beds and Luton). So that process 
was underway and they were looking at 
Highways Authority projects in the area 
and prioritising those when government 
decided that all of that funding for transport 
would come through LEPs and that was a 
big change. 
  So, of the £2bn that was available for the 
first year of the Growth Deal, I think 
around £800 or £900 million of that 
had come from the DfT and all of the 
prioritisation that had taken place as a result 
of the LTB process then fed into this. So, in 
our Plan, we just put the top four projects 
as being our strategic transport prioritised 
projects and the funding for those has now 
come through LEPs. So this has been a 
huge change for LEPs, and I know that a 
number of them have struggled with this, 
particular understanding the appraisal 
process because the DfT expects a very high 
level of modelling and appraisal for their 
transport projects, whereas a number of 
LEPs were pulling together Plans at a fairly 
high level – you know, asking businesses 
what they thought the key priorities were, 
which could range from anything from, 
‘We need more broadband’, to ‘We need 
something done about the M6’, depending 
on where you were in the country and 
so not really terribly focused on specific 
projects. I think that, because we have this 
background as a growth area, and we had 
developed a transport strategy in the old 
MKSM days which set out the key pieces of 
infrastructure that needed to be addressed, 
we managed to deliver a good Transport 
Plan. 
  Skills, of course, was the other big area and 
I think we got good assistance from the 
universities in our patch. So we’re based 
at Cranfield, and the university is very 
supportive of the LEP, we’ve also got the 
University of Bedfordshire, the University 
of Northampton and the University of 
Buckingham – we’ve got seven in total, 
and we’ve got a good grouping, they set 
themselves up quite quickly as the South 
East Midlands Universities Group. With 
the FE colleges, though, it was a bit more 
difficult to get them to work together. 
They’re naturally competing for the same 
pool of students. But once they realised 
that the LEP was holding the ring on the 
money that used to come from the Skills 
Funding Agency then they wanted to get to 
know us and they’ve set up a Schools and 
Colleges Group now. With our first tranche 
of Growth Fund money for 2015-16 were 
funding a couple of quite big projects with 
colleges – a new campus at Daventry and 
then an engineering centre at Leighton 
Buzzard.
DC  Okay, so you mentioned the first round of 
Growth Fund money. Now, I know that 
you’ve trained as an economist so I’m a bit 
scared to show you this, but this map shows 
the projected per capita spend of the first 
round of the Growth Fund and it tells an 
interesting story, certainly across London 
and the South East which largely seems 
to have lost out in comparison to the rest 
of the country. The exception, of course, 
is Hertfordshire LEP which has done 
comparatively well on a per capita basis. 
Could you tell me your thoughts on this?
SE  Well, this is really interesting. Actually, I 
did a bit of analysis about this because we 
weren’t very happy. When the amounts 
came out we thought, ‘Oh, we’ve done 
reasonably well’ given the type of projects 
that we put forward. Then there was lots 
of analysis going around, on the basis of 
exactly what you’ve just shown me, amounts 
per head and then it was apparent that 
SEMLEP was near the bottom. So our 
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Board Members picked up on that and, 
instead of saying, ‘Great, we’ve got £79m’, 
they were saying, ‘Why did we do so badly 
compared with Manchester?’ So we had a 
bit of a hard time over that. 
  I though initially that this was due to the 
large area of overlap. When we had Growing 
Places funding allocated, which was the first 
little pot of money that LEPs got back in 
2012, there was a formula attached to that. 
Where there were areas of overlap, they 
paid out on the basis of half the population. 
So I thought if we recalculated this, taking 
account of our areas of overlap, it would 
look very different. So I did that, to the 
extent that it’s possible to do that, and it still 
didn’t look great. Basically, we and others 
in this part of the country did not do as 
well and I think there was a lot of politics 
involved, although BIS and DCLG will not 
say that. 
  The whole process was handled in a 
very odd way. My background is in local 
government finance and I did the first 
Revenue Grant Support Settlement under 
the Community Charge, so I’m used to 
running a process where you’re absolutely 
clear what the criteria are, it’s all transparent 
and open and people know what they’re 
getting. I mean, they can argue about it, but 
at least they’re very clear on the criteria that 
has been used. However, this process was 
very, very different. There was no guidance 
on what we were supposed to submit. In 
terms of timing, Greg Clarke said, ‘It’s a 
dialogue, it’s a something for something, 
it’s a deal’. So we said, ‘Well, how are you 
going to assess the quality of our Plans, how 
are you going to assess the projects we’ve 
put forward – such a mixture of projects, 
a transport project and a college extension 
project – what are the precise criteria that 
you’re going to use so we can understand?’ 
Well, he didn’t really give us any criteria 
at all so I think a lot of the process was 
politically driven. 
  I think there were some very early decisions 
made – LEPs are all at different stages, 
some of them have come from pre-existing 
organisations and they are very strong; 
Greater Manchester being a case in point. 
Some of the county-based ones are not 
particularly strong in terms of being a LEP, 
but they have the CC’s resources at their 
disposal, and the government got very 
exercised about governance arrangements. 
They felt that because of our overlaps, they 
couldn’t understand how we were going to 
deliver transport projects when we didn’t 
have the counties involved. So they were 
questioning our governance arrangements 
and I think that led them to decide that they 
weren’t going to put as much money into 
our area as they did in some other areas.
  Also, I think there were particular projects 
that government favoured. I think that the 
rigour of the assessment was such that some 
LEPs seem to have been given money for 
things that are barely developed yet, which 
I’m just amazed at. With all of our projects 
we went through an independent process, 
so it wasn’t our Board saying, ‘Well, I like 
that one, I don’t like that one’, we got ARUP 
to help us do an appraisal of all the projects 
against the usual criteria, so we knew that 
we had projects that could be delivered. 
So you can only assume that there has 
been a combination of a bit of politics and 
a bit of influence going on here and not 
terribly rigorous analysis, because it was so 
difficult to know what the government were 
expecting. When we asked officials, they use 
the same approach for everybody, obviously 
they’re not going to say anything other than 
that, so they say, ‘It depends on the strength 
of your Plan and the leadership of your 
Board’. Well, it’s very difficult to argue about 
that! 
  So I think there’s a general view that in 
places like Greater Manchester there was 
a much more cohesive view about what 
they wanted, whereas in our patch we’ve 
got eleven local authority leaders, and 
they work together pretty well, but there 
isn’t sort of one LA that stands out above 
the others. Basically the overlaps make 
life very difficult. Our Board feel that they 
spend a lot of time discussing the politics 
in Northamptonshire, rather than focusing 
on SEMLEP as an area. Down here, in 
Buckinghamshire, Aylesbury Vale is being 
pulled towards Buckinghamshire; Bucks 
South Thames LEP are openly hostile to the 
fact that Aylesbury Vale is part of SEMLEP. 
They do things like writing letters to the 
local newspapers saying, ‘Do you know 
that Aylesbury Vale is taking money away 
from Bucks?’ They use the rule of half 
that influenced the Growing Places fund 
distribution, and they’ve said, ‘European 
funding, half of Aylesbury’s entitlement is 
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actually being given to SEMLEP’ and they 
try to get the local councillors worked up 
about it. But Aylesbury Vale so far has stood 
with us. So there’s lots of positioning going 
on. 
[Shows LEP funding per capita map]
  This is an interesting map. So Bucks, 
Thames Valley didn’t do particularly well, 
we didn’t do particularly well.
DC Hertfordshire did, though, do quite well.
SE  Did they have a view as to why they’d done 
so well?
DC  Well I haven’t actually managed to speak to 
anyone from the Hertfordshire LEP, but as 
everywhere, it seems that there were a lot 
of politics involved. What was the rationale 
behind being able to be in two or three 
LEPs at the same time? Clearly it would be a 
lot simpler just to have a one-to-one ratio of 
membership? 
SE  Yes. Well, the rationale was that, when LEPs 
were first being set up, it was all about, 
‘Tell us what your FEA is and you can 
have a LEP’. Government was absolutely 
adamant that this was all about localism, 
they weren’t going to prescribe anything 
so many proposals came forward. We put 
together a good economic case to say, ‘This 
is the Functional Economic Area’ and it 
was accepted. We were one of the first 
wave, I think there were something like 
24 proposals that were initially accepted 
towards the end of 2010. Then there were 
some ‘white areas’ as they called them 
around the country that didn’t have a 
LEP at all. So the second wave of LEPs 
was when it got rather more contentious, 
when people started to wake up to the fact 
that if they didn’t have one of these things 
then they might miss out on something, 
although they weren’t quite sure what that 
something was. So it was this second stage 
when people were desperately scrabbling 
around and government didn’t want any 
uncomfortable gaps left basically. They 
weren’t going to be prescriptive, although 
there was a bit of ‘behind the scenes’, there 
was the odd telephone call from Eric Pickles 
to the leader of Northamptonshire CC, but 
he didn’t really understand what was being 
said…
DC Eric Pickles didn’t understand?
SE  No, Jim Harker didn’t hear what was 
being said, he thought Eric Pickles was 
saying, ‘Yes, of course you can have a 
Northamptonshire LEP, when really what 
he was saying was, ‘Well, have you thought 
about the alternatives’. So it was that 
second wave and it happened all over the 
country. The government was desperate 
to fill in all the gaps and therefore just let 
people go with LEPs. I don’t think at that 
stage that they were thinking about giving 
significant resources to LEPs, which is 
when the overlaps issue really started to 
make a difference, when you’re using a 
distributional mechanism.
DC  So the gradual increase in funding and 
powers to LEPs is basically an admission 
by the government that they cannot do 
completely away with regional/sub-regional 
planning?
SE  Yes, absolutely, I think that’s right. The 
Heseltine Review was the first stage and I 
think that a lot of people thought that they 
would say, ‘Thank you very much Lord 
Heseltine’, and then quietly put it to one 
side, but they didn’t, they said, ‘Well there 
are some good things here’. So that’s when 
we started down the Local Growth Deal 
path and then European funding was the 
other really big difference, because without 
RDAs and GORs there wouldn’t have been 
any mechanism to disperse European 
funding. So they said, ‘We’ve got these LEPs, 
we can use them’. I don’t know how close 
you are to the European issue, but there 
should have been a 2014 – 2020 programme 
of European funding but we’re still arguing 
about it now. It might start in the middle 
of 2015. Basically the EU doesn’t recognise 
LEPs and to some extent I can understand 
why. I mean, there are 39 of them, which I 
think is far too many and we don’t have any 
statutory entity, we’re all set up in different 
ways, very small numbers of people…
DC A lack of democratic accountability?
SE  Absolutely. So I’m sure if you were sitting 
in Brussels, you’d probably have concerns 
as to how all this was going to work! So I 
think it was the European funding issue 
when the government realised that they 
needed something, they couldn’t just deal 
with the whole of England and I think it’s 
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moved on from there. So there’s almost too 
much being placed on LEPs at the moment, 
given that we still don’t have any statutory 
responsibilities. So when we use strategic 
planning, we’re very much building on what 
the local authorities have put in place. As 
an example, I had a deputation from the 
CPRE a couple of weeks ago because they’d 
been told by the local authorities that it was 
all down to LEPs now, so that was slightly 
mischievous , all these new homes that they 
didn’t want built across the patch, well they 
should go and talk to the LEP about it! So 
I had to explain that that wasn’t quite the 
case.
DC  Ok, great. So if I could move along to 
housing and what appears to have been 
quite a major shift in focus compared to 
MKSM. I’ve just pulled a couple of numbers 
out of the main report. Correct me if I’m 
wrong, but MKSM had a target of 224,000 
new homes by 2021 and now with SEMLEP 
the target is 86,700, so significantly less.
SE  Yes, it is significantly less, although those 
numbers are over a slightly shorter period, 
because the MKSM number started in 2004. 
Obviously the recession hit in 2008, actually 
just as MKSM was really just getting 
underway and delivering quite a lot of new 
homes. So these are the housing starts and 
completions in the south east Midlands, so 
we were going along reasonably well up to 
2008 and then fell like a stone. Under the 
Growth Area plan there was some funding 
– I mean, at the time we didn’t think it was 
a lot of funding – and this was given to 
what were called Local Delivery Vehicles, 
there were six in our patch but they all 
folded up in 2010. So it was a combination 
of the economy not doing well, potential 
buyers not being able to get mortgages and 
uncertainty around jobs and this feeling 
amongst local authorities that they no 
longer had this push to deliver housing 
numbers that they had under the previous 
regional planning regime as well as lack 
of funding for infrastructure, which is the 
really big issue. Most of our priority projects 
are about enabling development.
  On this map, all the orange bits are 
strategic housing sites, which were basically 
designated under MKSM days, they’re still 
there. Some of them are getting underway 
again now, but it’s been a struggle. 
Developers have just sat on the land and 
not moved forward because of the lack of 
infrastructure. So they’ve tended to build 
small numbers of new homes. In our area 
we’re fairly unusual in that most of our 
strategic housing sites are sustainable urban 
extensions and they’re big. East of Kettering, 
that’s 5,400 new homes. At the moment we 
are delivering just under 6,000 new homes 
a year. To be up with where we stated 
we would be in our Plan we need to be 
delivering nearer 11,000 new homes a year, 
so we’ve got a long way to go. 
  The key to delivering new homes is the 
funding structure, the forward funding 
of infrastructure is absolutely essential to 
deliver these big sites. So the government 
can talk about garden cities and so on 
but that’s absolutely the key to it. And 
the Community Infrastructure Levy has 
not helped at all, it’s not a good way of 
providing the necessary forward funding. 
In Milton Keynes, there was something 
called the Milton Keynes tariff, which 
enabled developers to know in advance 
that there was a particular tariff on each 
new home that was built, it was about 
£18,000 per house but the Homes and 
Communities Agency could then forward 
fund the infrastructure ahead of getting 
the money in from the completions, 
whereas CIL is entirely reliant on getting 
the money in first, so that hasn’t helped. 
The New Homes Bonus, which was the 
other way the government wanted to fund 
the infrastructure, again, the districts don’t 
feel that this is something which should be 
pooled and used to fund infrastructure. 
  There’s also a feeling that New Homes 
Bonus won’t continue, it’s something that 
this current government put in place and 
you can’t rely on a funding stream going on 
forever. So to borrow against this income 
stream, which is what you’d need to do in 
order to fund the infrastructure up front, is 
just too risky and nobody would underwrite 
that. So the government’s approach to 
funding and helping housing to be built 
is an issue in my view. Oh, and the other 
one is the business rate retention. That was 
clearly a Conservative policy to encourage 
growth, but in doing so they’ve effectively 
removed the element of the distribution of 
the Revenue Support Grant which relied 
on an assessment of needs. So, for example, 
Milton Keynes – the fastest growing place 
in the country – that population increase 
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is not being reflected in the amount of 
government grant they’re getting and so 
if the retained portion of the business 
rates is not increasing sufficiently quickly 
to provide the services that you need for 
that growing population…when you’re 
population is growing that quickly, it’s not 
just a question of a few more children in 
local schools or a hospital being a bit fuller 
than it was, you’ve got to provide new 
facilities, it’s step change. 
  So that’s a big issue, we’ve put that issue 
to government through a City Deal 
proposition and we had lots of discussions 
with DCLG around that, but basically what 
they’ve said is, ‘What’s different about you 
from any other local authority area?’, and 
we say, ‘This is growth at a level that other 
places aren’t experiencing’. In the end they 
said, ‘You can do a deal if you commit 
to delivering even more homes than you 
said you would deliver’, and we said, ‘Well 
it’s going to be difficult to deliver what’s 
actually in the Plan at the moment’ for 
the reasons I’ve just explained, so it was 
just a bit of a stand-off in the end really. 
Ministers told our local politicians, ‘Well, 
you need to commit to even more houses’, 
and they said, ‘Well, we’ve been through 
public consultation and these numbers are 
in our Plans, we can’t commit to more and 
in order to deliver even these we’re going 
to need some help’. And that is the position 
we’re maintaining and so post-election I’m 
sure we’ll be making more representations 
around that.
DC  The last issue I’d like to cover is the idea 
of co-operation, formally set out of course 
in the Duty to Co-operate. What’s co-
operation been like from the perspective of 
the LEP?
SE  Not as good as it could have been, but 
I think probably better than it would 
have been had we not had some of these 
structures in place. So, for example, I 
explained how when we decided to draw 
up an infrastructure plan, we actually 
managed to get planning authorities 
talking to each other. We set up something 
called the Planners’ Forum and that now 
meets regularly and discusses issues of 
importance. I think that a lot of local 
authorities thought that the Duty to Co-
operate was initially just really a sort of 
a tick-box exercise. Aylesbury Vale was 
particularly caught out by this, they had 
their Plan rejected and they were told that 
they needed to be working not just with 
Milton Keynes but with Luton so that came 
as quite a shock to them. 
  Then over here we have Luton and Central 
Beds who are at loggerheads most of the 
time over planning issues and a lot of 
their problems were down to the not very 
helpful way that Bedford and Central 
Beds were created, with Luton having very 
tight boundaries around it. So for Luton 
to grow, it has to either grow into Central 
Beds or into Hertfordshire and that’s 
not very popular with either of them. So 
they’re always, always arguing with each 
other about something. People haven’t 
really understood what’s wanted of them 
and it has been difficult. When we had the 
sub-regional strategy for MKSM there was 
some housing developments which people 
were reasonably happy with, which are the 
ones that have survived, but there were 
others which it was felt had been imposed, 
particularly by the South East Plan and 
in the last iteration of that there was a 
particularly contentious site on the border 
of Bucks and Milton Keynes which caused a 
lot of political difficulty. Milton Keynes felt 
that Bucks was just sort of pushing its new 
homes up here and that people would just 
use all the schools and services in Milton 
Keynes.
DC  The election is of course on the horizon, and 
there is a possibility that LEPs themselves 
may not continue, at least in their present 
form. Is there any way you can plan for this 
eventuality, or do you just keep going?
SE  Well, the Conservatives have pledged that 
they will continue LEPs in one form or 
another and so has Labour, I mean they 
have been talking about ‘county regions’ 
and city regions. I’m not really quite clear 
on what ‘county regions’ are, clearly this 
idea is a little bit worrying for us with our 
overlaps and multiple counties. My view 
is that it’s going to be an interesting few 
months, there’s going to be a lot of tactical 
positioning.
INTERVIEW EIGHT
Participant: Senior Planner, Stevenage Borough 
Council (repeat interview)
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Date: 15 March 2015
Location: Stevenage Borough Council, Planning 
Offices
DC  Okay, so it’s been almost a year since the last 
time I was here…
SP A year of change!
DC  So that’s basically my first question, what’s 
changed during the past twelve months?
SP  Well, we’ve carried on exercising our Duty 
to Cooperate with North Herts and other 
Hertfordshire councils. We’ve extended it to 
include Central Beds, which we’d probably 
done when we met a year ago, but we’ve 
got closer to mutual understanding about 
where the three key councils are; that is: us, 
North Herts and Central Beds. East Herts 
have basically indicated that they don’t want 
to play, which is fair enough, that’s entirely 
up to them. North Herts have been through 
a bit of an epiphany and have decided that 
building on the edge of Stevenage is a jolly 
wizard idea and that building lots of houses 
is a jolly wizard idea and that helping Luton 
out with its housing numbers is a jolly 
wizard idea. If you’d asked me that question 
a year, eighteen months, two years ago, 
I’d have said there’s no chance whatsoever 
of them ever doing that, or indeed that 
there’s no chance whatsoever of them ever 
producing a Local Plan, because it involved 
them making far too many, far too difficult 
decisions. But fair dos to them, they’ve 
grasped the nettle, they’ve started making 
those difficult decisions and obviously their 
Local Plan is out for consultation.
  We haven’t asked them for any housing land 
but they acknowledge in their Local Plan 
that their housing allocations that they’re 
making currently to meet their housing 
requirements immediately to the north of 
Stevenage could be used to meet any unmet 
need from Stevenage, which is actually quite 
a generous step. They’ve agreed to take their 
part of the 5,000 homes West of Stevenage 
development out of the green belt to meet 
our longer-term housing needs. Again, 
we’re very grateful for that. We’ve also had 
discussions with them about our almost 
certain inability to meet our employment 
land requirements within the borough 
boundary and they’ve identified some land 
for us at Baldock, which, again, is very 
generous of them. I don’t have any problems 
with that, my members have problems with 
that, but we can come back to that. So we’ve 
established a good, working rapport with 
North Herts and we’ve got a lot more out 
of that relationship than I would ever have 
anticipated.
DC What, in your view, has brought this about?
SP  Well I don’t know for a fact, if you ask them 
that question you get evasive answers. I 
think after 22 or 24 years of not having a 
Plan, they’ve finally become embarrassed 
about not having a Plan. I think with the 
change that was introduced in the NPPF in 
2012, I think they finally started to realise 
that if they don’t have an up-to-date Local 
Plan, they’re ceding control of what happens 
in the district to the market and to the 
Planning Inspectorate. So I think they just 
wanted to claw some of that control back 
again, and we’ll be in a not too dissimilar 
situation in the not too distant future. We’re 
fortunate, we don’t have a five year land 
supply, we don’t have an up-to-date Plan 
as defined by the NPPF but there’s no real 
pressure from the development industry 
here. You can look out the window there 
and you won’t see a single crane, you won’t 
see any house building activity going on, it’s 
as dead as a dodo. Even when the market 
picked up 18 months ago, before it went 
into its current ‘mini-dip’ there was no real 
interest in building in Stevenage. I mean, 
we had lots of pre-app discussions, many 
of which have come to naught, so we never 
actually started to see things taking off on 
the ground. So we’ve not yet felt the same 
pinch as North Herts and others have done, 
which is what I think has prompted them to 
move forward.
  Can I just go back and talk about 
relationships with others? The relationship 
with Central Beds, obviously that’s 
developed over a much shorter period and 
the three of us – North Herts, Stevenage 
and Central Beds – are the principal 
components of the Stevenage/A1(M) 
corridor HMA, as we all accept. When John 
Gardner and I met with his equivalent, 
so the planning portfolio holder, and my 
equivalent, they made lots of positive noises 
about wanting development and being 
willing to help us. But when their Local 
Plan was produced, it didn’t actually say any 
of that so we’ve been engaged in what you 
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might call increasingly difficult discussions 
with them over getting them to stick to their 
promises. So one of our team is actually 
at the Central Beds Inquiry arguing that 
they’ve not fully exercised the Duty to 
Cooperate and that they’ve not been as 
helpful in meeting our unmet requirements 
as they could have been.
  So we’ve developed a closer working 
relationship with those local authorities 
that we need to develop a closer working 
relationship with and they’ve been a lot 
more productive than we would have 
thought a year ago.
DC  One possible reason mentioned by [SC, 
Stevenage] for North Herts doing this 
U-turn was the LEP and their Plan, is that a 
valid point?
SP  Well, [SC, Stevenage] may well have had 
discussions with his counterpart at North 
Herts at which I wasn’t present, so that may 
well be true; it may equally be speculation. 
We know from experience that the existence 
of the plans of others for growth in North 
Hertfordshire district matter not a jot 
to North Herts DC. So I’d be a little bit 
surprised if that was one of the motivations. 
Their officers have never advanced that to 
me as being a reason for why they’ve done 
what they’ve done.
DC  Okay. So, Hertfordshire LEP has done 
really well in terms of per capita allocation 
from the Growth Fund compared to other 
LEPs, especially across the wider South 
East. I spoke to the Head of Planning, 
Transportation and Infrastructure at 
SEMLEP and they were pretty disappointed 
with what they had been given. So will this 
money act as a spur to getting strategic 
housing finally built?
SP  Well, let’s take that one piece at a time, 
because there are a lot of issues actually 
wrapped up in that. Again, things have 
moved on quite significantly in the course 
of a year. The projects that we applied to 
the LEP for funding a year ago are not the 
projects that we’re funding today. That’s 
because we’ve had a change of Head of 
Service, we haven’t had a Regeneration 
Team for the last year, so I’ve been Acting 
Regeneration Manager as well as Planning 
Policy and Transport Manager, and holding 
down three jobs has not been easy. But 
we’ve moved on a lot in terms of our 
thinking and our ambition. So when we 
applied for funding about 14 or 15 months 
ago we were looking for small beer really. 
You’ve probably walked across from the 
railway station and that bridge across Lytton 
Way, the sort of urban motorway, which 
takes you into the Leisure Box, which used 
to be a Blue Corridor and now has all those 
attractive photos of famous Stevenage 
people. Well, we had applied for money 
to put a roof on that bridge, so that was 
probably one of the more expensive things 
that we’d applied for money for.
  However, over the course of the last year 
we’ve said, ‘No, that’s not ambitious enough’. 
That’s partly been driven by the need to 
push the delivery of our housing numbers 
up. The last Local Plan consultation that 
we undertook was in the spring of 2013, 
at which time we thought our housing 
requirement was going to be 5,300. We now 
think that this will go up to somewhere 
between 7-7,500, which is a big jump, about 
40%. So where were those numbers to come 
from, because we were building on small 
brownfield sites and we have three urban 
extensions, so where the hell do we find 
an extra couple of thousand homes from? 
And at that point we were expecting that 
we’d get absolutely no help whatsoever from 
North Herts, so we came here to the town 
centre and we embarked on a programme 
of talking to all of the landowners and 
developers associated with the town centre 
and sites immediately adjacent to it, and 
we started saying to them, ‘Look, it’s time 
you got off your arses and you came up 
with schemes to redevelop your sites 
because they’re sat there festering away 
underachieving’. And we’re one of those 
landowners too, we’re probably the biggest 
landowner in the town centre. 
  So we said, ‘We need you to come back 
to us with major, high rise, high density 
residential schemes, and if you do that 
you will have our support’. And because 
we’d won £16m for the town centre on 
the back of the small-scale schemes, we 
started saying to them, ‘We’re prepared to 
financially support you’. So, as opportunities 
have come up, like the plaza over the road 
here, we’ve bought that site and that sent 
a positive signal to the market. We’ve 
got a planning application next door, 
where the Matalan unit is. We’ve had a 
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number of prior approvals for office-to-
resi conversions which we’ve supported. 
We’ve gone out and talked to people like 
Legal & General who own the whacking 
great leisure park site on the other side 
of the railway station, and said to them, 
‘Well, how about it, we’d like to see a retail 
redevelopment of this site’. After a good deal 
of prompting, they’ve come back and said to 
us, ‘Well, ok, let’s talk about that’. 
  So we’ve been quite proactive about going 
out there and saying, ‘We want to deliver 
something that is different, and the LEP 
money will help us to do that. We’re also 
kicking in quite a fair chunk of our own 
money, and we’re not just buying property 
and seeking to redevelop property, our 
management team have just agreed to a 
£150,000 programme of environmental 
improvements in the town centre, which is 
small beer, but it’ll give the town a refresh.
  So the things that we’ve done with the 
LEP – and we’ve had a difficult working 
relationship with the LEP – will enable 
us to do things that we would otherwise 
have found much more difficult. In terms 
of delivering strategic housing sites, no, 
they did not bid for money from West 
of Stevenage, it’s one of their longer-
term projects. It’s actually been a bit of a 
disappointment to us because they bid again 
this year and they’ve just had their award 
announced and we weren’t aware that there 
was this opportunity for us to bid, they 
didn’t ask us to bid. They decided to go on 
the principle of Buggins’ Turn, you know, 
everybody in Hertfordshire gets their go, so 
it might be another 11 years before we get 
another bid!
DC  So the main thing you’d like to bid for is the 
underpass under the A1(M)?
SP  It is, yes, and that’s somewhere north of 
£10m. So no development of 1,300 homes 
is going to be able to afford that, so unless 
some public money goes in there, you can 
kiss that particular development goodbye. 
But one of the interesting things is, that 
development, purely within the borough 
boundary, 1,300 homes, now we’re thinking 
in and around the town centre, maybe 
2-2,500 homes. So this is suddenly the 
biggest site to bring forward. So that’s 
why we’re keen to concentrate our money 
and our effort here and that’s why we’re 
intervening in the market in the way that we 
are, by buying sites like the plaza when the 
opportunity arises, so that we can pull what 
is a failed development down and put up 
something which better meets the needs of 
the town as a whole.
  I should mention, in all fairness to the 
LEP, that we the borough council have 
established a partnership, which we’ve 
called the Stevenage First Town Centre 
Taskforce. So ‘Stevenage First’ is a brand 
name that we’ve come up with, which we’re 
going to use on all of our regeneration 
projects. The ‘Town Centre Taskforce’ 
brings together principally the borough 
council, Hertfordshire CC, the Herts 
LEP and you’ve also got people like 
the Highways Agency, the town centre 
management company and six or seven 
other stakeholders. People who can assist us 
in delivering the town centre regeneration.
  We haven’t really got that on its feet as 
yet, to be honest, because we haven’t had 
the staff, we haven’t had the resources to 
put into it to make it work better than it is 
working currently. What they’re looking 
at at the moment is the creation of a town 
centre framework, which would actually 
be paid for by the borough council, which 
would help shape what kind of town 
centre we’re going to have in the future. By 
bringing in all these partners, we’re getting 
everybody to commit to that particular 
vision. So we’ve just received the bid 
documents last Friday, we’re going to do 
the first round of interviews next week and 
the second round the week after, with the 
aim of getting external consultants started 
sometime in March. So we’re moving 
towards a situation where we have a shared 
vision and we can start delivering on 
that shared vision for the first time really 
because we’ll have money of our own and 
we’ll have money coming to us from the 
LEP.
DC  Ok, so West of Stevenage is currently on the 
back burner, even in its cut-down form of 
1,300 homes?
SP Yes, again for a variety of reasons.
DC  Is it a case of, ok, North Herts are becoming 
more amenable so let’s play the waiting 
game and we can get the whole 5,000?
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SP  No, not really. There are infrastructure 
problems to be overcome even with 1,300 
homes purely within the borough boundary 
and basically the developers – WSC, 
Persimmon and Taylor Wimpey – have said 
to us that they can’t fund it, it’s not viable in 
the current market, which is what a lot of 
people are saying to us about development 
in and around Stevenage at the moment. 
It’s partly complicated by the fact that the 
HCA and we are two of the key landowners 
whose cooperation is necessary to bring 
forward development on that site. Now, 
we’re both keen to do something but the 
developers don’t have options on our land, 
they’ve not been willing to negotiate options 
on our land. They don’t have options 
on most of the actual development site. 
Basically what they’ve said to us is, ‘We’re 
going to take our 20% profit, we’re going 
to pay the private landowners a premium 
sum to get hold of their land, but you public 
sector landowners, we’re not going to give 
you anything, we expect you to give us your 
land for free’. Unsurprisingly, we’ve said to 
them, ‘Well, you can go swivel then’. 
  So there’s nothing very much happening 
on West of Stevenage at the moment, but 
we are open to discussions and we are open 
to bringing that land forward. It’s basically 
the fact that you’ve got a group of bloody-
minded developers who won’t come and live 
in the real world with the rest of us. There’s 
a deal to be struck there, they just don’t 
want to strike it. One of the things we’ve 
started doing is saying, ‘Well, because they 
don’t have options on our land, and because 
they don’t have options on most of the land 
that is the development site, why are we just 
talking to them?’ Why don’t we talk to other 
development companies and see if they’re 
more willing to play? One of the problems 
with Taylor Wimpey and Persimmons 
is that they’ve been with the site since 
1999, they’ve spent all this money on the 
abortive 5,000 and 3,600 home planning 
applications, one of which got refused, one 
of which they withdrew, so they’ve got a 
backlog of several million pounds worth of 
investments which has gone nowhere and 
they’re trying to claw that back, basically at 
our expense. We’re not going to have that. 
You wouldn’t expect us to, we’ve got to get 
the best deal for the people of Stevenage.
DC  Okay, great, so that’s recent developments 
covered. So the main thing I wanted to ask 
you about, drawing on your thirty-odd 
years of experience, was this question of 
how you plan strategically in the absence of 
regional or sub-regional plans? I mean, have 
you always worked at Stevenage?
SP  No, I started my career with East Sussex CC 
and then moved to Kent CC, then moved 
down the road to Maidstone borough, 
which was the first time I really dabbled in 
the real world, as opposed to the lofty world 
of county councils and ethereal structure 
planning. Then I moved to Medway council 
and then I moved here. So I’ve moved 
around, I’ve worked for both county 
councils, district councils and unitary 
councils, so I’ve seen the various different 
planning models that existed. I think 
county and district, the two-tier system, 
didn’t work for me. There was a disconnect, 
and, in some instances, an outright hatred 
between counties and districts. 
  Counties had lost their rights to grant 
planning permission with the local 
government reorganisation of 1974, 
which might seem like a long time ago, 
but when I first started working in local 
government that must have only been 15 
years previously. And county councils still 
bitterly resented the fact that they’d had 
to hand over their powers. So they dealt 
with people from district councils as if, 
‘Well, you’re not going to have planning 
powers for very much longer are you, I’m 
not going to talk to you’. They had a very 
patronising, arrogant attitude which used 
to get the backs up of everyone who worked 
in district councils. And it wasn’t just down 
to personalities, it was down to the fact that 
the planning system of structure plans and 
local plans was never designed to be split 
between two tiers of local government. It 
was designed for old-style county boroughs 
and counties, so all of the planning powers 
would have been held either by county 
boroughs or by county councils. Little 
district councils would never had had 
planning powers.
  So planning, to my mind, works best when 
you’ve just got one planning authority. As 
soon as you start having two or more you’ve 
got a recipe for argument, disagreement, 
delay, obfuscation and outright lying on 
occasion. There came one point when we 
had regional planning, structure plans 
and local plans and that was an absolute 
   263
nightmare. You certainly didn’t need three 
tiers.
DC  Is this around 2000 that you’re talking 
about?
SP  This would have been...yes, it would have 
been around 2000, you’re right. The county 
councils lost their plan making powers in 
2004, which was when the East of England 
Plan was published in draft. I have to 
say that then the county councils acted 
as useful intermediaries, because clearly, 
we as piffling little districts, weren’t used 
to dealing with whacking great regional 
bodies, but it did tend to depend very much 
on what the attitude of the county council 
was. In other parts of the East of England 
region, for instance, councils engaged 
positively with EERA, the regional planning 
body, but here in Hertfordshire the plan was 
to make life as difficult for EERA as it was 
possible to do. So EERA asked the county 
council, in conjunction with the districts, 
to come up with answers to the various 
questions that it posed around what levels 
of development were needed, what levels of 
development could Hertfordshire take and 
basically the stance that was adopted by the 
nine other districts and the county council 
was to just feed literally thousands of pieces 
of information to EERA and not tell them 
what it meant, and not to give them any 
decision about where it should go, and, if 
they were asked a difficult question, well, 
basically they’d lie to them. There’s no two 
ways about it, they absolutely resisted EERA 
and having regional planning bodies. They 
would talk about the democratic deficit, 
because you’ve got private industry sat on 
the board of these RPBs. How strange that 
they don’t seem to object to LEPs having 
a very similar composition? But of course, 
they don’t have planning powers.
DC Not yet.
SP  Not yet, but it did come as a surprise to 
all of us when the government said to the 
Hertfordshire LEP, who then said to us, 
‘It isn’t about supporting the economy, it’s 
about building lots more houses, and if you 
promise us lots more houses then we’ll give 
you big money’. Interesting…interesting 
abuse of a body that government had set up 
for one purpose and then gave it another. It 
kind of suggested that they didn’t have any 
confidence in the HCA.
  So I’m not sure that regional planning 
really worked. I’m not sure that county 
councils’ structure plans really worked. I 
probably wouldn’t have said that to you 
a year or so ago, because at that point we 
were still having a fraught relationship 
with North Herts and we believed that we 
would need their active cooperation. We 
now don’t believe that we need their active 
cooperation in terms of delivering housing 
numbers but they have gone through this 
epiphany so now they want to build – 
apparently. So I think, where you’ve got 
voluntary partnerships like that, where 
you’ve got willing partners, it works really 
well and far better than imposing it. 
  One of the drivers of North Herts’ sudden 
change may well be that it’s the difference 
between being in control of your own 
destiny – whether that’s because you’re 
wresting control back from the NPPF or 
whether it’s wresting control back from a 
structure plan or a regional plan – they’re 
in control of their own destiny and ideas 
which seemed utterly abhorrent to them 
when they were being proposed by other 
people suddenly seem like jolly good 
ideas when they’re coming up with them. 
It’s up to their local politicians to justify 
that to the local populous and to live 
with the consequences of that, but it’s a 
much easier relationship when you’ve got 
somebody who is a willing partner rather 
than an unwilling partner because, as 
our experience was showing with West of 
Stevenage, that had first appeared in the 
County Structure Plan, it then got picked 
up in the East of England Plan. North 
Herts had fought it every single step of 
the way; they’d fought it at every public 
inquiry, they’d fought it at every meeting, 
they’d challenged it at every opportunity, 
they’d refused the planning applications, 
they’d challenged the Planning Inspectorate 
when it came to the call-in inquiry, they’d 
challenged the decision that was issued by 
the SoS and got it part overturned – they 
fought it every single step of the way. And 
how long did that take? That took up, 
what, 12, 15 years of delaying tactics and 
you’ve gone through all this expenditure 
and in the meantime not a single house 
was built. Wouldn’t it have been far better 
to have cooperated from the outset and 
to have come up with a solution that was 
mutually acceptable to everyone? Now, 
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maybe they had to go through that cathartic 
process over 12 or 15 years. Maybe it’s only 
because they’ve been through all that shit 
that suddenly they think to themselves, 
‘You know what, it’s not that bad actually, 
it has been fully researched, we do fully 
understand it, the public are fully aware of 
it, they’re sick to death of it, they just either 
want it to go away completely or they want 
it to be built’.
  So I’m not sure that I would have adopted 
the same position that I would have adopted 
a year ago. I’m not sure that top-down 
planning necessarily works, but it’s finding 
the right mechanisms to make the voluntary 
partnerships work, and I think that’s where 
the NPPF comes into play, the fact that 
these councils who have long out of date 
plans and are not meeting their housing 
numbers, are suddenly finding they’re 
losing control over day-to-day development 
management decisions. I mean, the proof 
of the pudding will be when planning 
applications start coming in, because you 
can put stuff in a plan but then you can 
drag your feet for years over the planning 
applications.
DC  That’s just what I was going to ask…in this 
country the Local Plan is the ‘Holy Grail’ 
and it takes years to prepare in many cases, 
and then it’s almost out of date by the time 
the ink is dry on it!
SP  It’s a difficult process. I’ve had sight of 
some of the Labour Party’s thinking in 
the run up to the next election about what 
they’re going to do, and I have to say that 
I don’t necessarily agree with some of 
their proposals because I don’t think that 
they’re entirely realistic. I would think that 
sharpening up what’s already in the NPPF 
about the validity of Local Plans would be 
quite a strong incentive. At the moment 
we, and other councils that don’t have an 
up to date Local Plan, can still use our [out 
of date] Local Plan, but only as a material 
consideration. So you’ve got the NPPF, 
and that’s the primary thing you have to 
use when you’re determining a planning 
application, but you can use your out of date 
Local plan as a material consideration, so 
to some extent you can ‘offset’ what’s in the 
NPPF – you can’t give it as much weight – 
but you can still offset it. So I would think 
that if you said to local councils, ‘That’s 
fine, but from now on any Local Plan that 
is more than five, six years old, not only 
will the NPPF have primacy, but after five 
or six years you won’t be able to use it as a 
material consideration, it will be pure NPPF. 
  If I’m right about what the drivers are 
in encouraging local authorities to start 
preparing Local Plans when they never 
wanted to prepare one before, then it is 
derived from the loss of control over the 
NPPF. So putting something in there that 
says, ‘Well, after five years you won’t be able 
to use this anymore, I think that should be a 
strong encouragement to get LAs to move, 
rather than imposing an arbitrary deadline 
– i.e. you need to have a Plan in place by 
such-and-such a date and if you don’t then 
the government will intervene and the 
Planning Inspectorate will prepare a Plan 
for your area. Of course, a lot of councils 
will say to themselves, ‘That’s brilliant! We 
don’t need to make any difficult decisions, 
we’ll just hand them over to the Planning 
Inspectorate and then we can let them cop 
the shit. We don’t need to ever take any 
kind of difficult decisions!’ And of course, 
this will require primary legislation, so 
it’ll take several years to introduce and in 
the meantime, councils will sit on their 
hands. For some local authorities, if you 
offer them that as an out, they will take it. 
They’re copping it in the neck from all over 
the district because they’ve had to put so 
much development all across the district. 
If you’re a local councillor, and you’ve just 
gone into local politics to sort out people’s 
drains and to help them, and suddenly 
you’re continually catching it in the neck 
– why would you do that? Why would you 
not just sit on your hands and let somebody 
else make the difficult decisions for you? So 
I’m not sure that the Labour Party have fully 
thought through what the real incentives 
are here.
  Whilst in the past I’ve been a severe critic of 
successive governments who’ve continually 
tinkered with the planning system – the 
Labour government did exactly the same 
before it left office in 2010 – tinkering 
with the mechanisms to find what works is 
actually quite useful.
DC  The way I see it – and I’m not sure if you’d 
agree with me – since Thatcher it’s been a 
case of Conservatives coming in and pretty 
much bulldozing the planning system, then 
Labour coming back and rebuilding it and 
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this cycle repeats…you know, a two-page 
letter from Michael Heseltine and that was 
regional planning in the eighties.
SP  Yes, I think that’s probably true, and 
certainly this government has gone about 
dismantling the planning system with 
gusto, but of course I would say that, I’m 
a vested interest as a town planner. I think 
that the problem is that you never seem to 
be capable of finding an effective means 
of managing change, encouraging LAs 
to do what you want them to do whilst 
they exercise effective control over what 
development happens in their area and 
central government staying out of it. The 
Labour Party has a tendency to over-
manage and interfere too much, so you get 
this vast bureaucracy of top-down planning, 
which everybody at the bottom end just 
bitterly resents, so they just dig their heels 
in and do as little as is necessary to make 
the system work. Or, you do what the 
Conservative governments have tended to 
do, which is to say, ‘If you’re not prepared 
to take charge, if you’re not prepared to be 
adult about it, then I’m going to take your 
stereo away, your TV away and you can just 
come downstairs and sit with the family’. 
  So I think that’s why we’ve seen the loss of 
control that LAs have experienced, they’ve 
taken away our powers, but they have given 
us more responsibility. The criticism I 
would have of this government is that, like 
its predecessor, it has continually tinkered 
and it hasn’t come up with necessarily the 
right answers and it hasn’t been consistent. 
I mean, green belt for instance, that’s an 
absolute nightmare. When this government 
first came in in 2010, it was, ‘Build all 
over the green belt, don’t worry, just build 
all over it. It’s housing, housing, housing 
housing.’ Then about two years ago it was 
a case of, ‘This is down to local councils, 
it’s up to them to make decisions about the 
balance’. In the last twelve months, it’s been, 
‘No, no, no, you never, ever build in the 
green belt.’ And of course, a lot of LAs are 
not nimble enough to keep up with that. 
If you’re in a fairly inflexible plan-making 
process and you started out when it was, 
‘Build all over the green belt’, and suddenly 
you’re now finding that you’re having to say 
to your members, ‘You know we told you 
we had to build all over the green belt, well, 
you don’t!’ 
  There are a couple of authorities in 
Hertfordshire which have found themselves 
with their pants pulled down around their 
ankles – Broxbourne, St Albans, where 
their members have had a presentation 
from somebody from central government 
and suddenly the members are turning 
round to their officers and saying, ‘What 
the bloody hell’s going on here, you told 
us we had to build on the green belt and 
now we’re being told we don’t have to!’ You 
need consistency when you’ve got a long 
plan-making process. You can’t afford to 
be jumping about and changing the advice 
and guidance that you’ve been given every 
eighteen months or so. Government just 
needs to settle on a system that works and 
that leaves local authorities to get on with 
things.
DC  But has that system ever obtained during 
your career?
SP  No. No. Governments just can’t resist 
tinkering. To some extent it’s because 
they believe – and to some extent they’re 
probably right – that the system just doesn’t 
work. The problem is that people want a 
laissez-faire system when the development 
is something that they want, but they also 
want an absolutely hard-nosed, foot-
dragging system when there’s a development 
that they’re violently opposed to. So you’d 
actually have to have two completely 
different systems running in parallel and 
when somebody submitted a planning 
application, what you as a local planning 
authority would do would be to stick your 
head out the window and ask, ‘Do people 
like this? Because it depends which system 
we put it into, if you like it, we’ll put it into 
this one, and if you don’t like it, well, it’ll go 
through this one.’ Of course, you can’t work 
that way, it’s got to be an equitable system 
for everybody and developers have to have 
the confidence that, if they put a planning 
application in, they know with a reasonable 
degree of certainty what result they’re going 
to get. At the moment, it’s very much a 
lottery. That’s always been the case, it just 
seems to have got a lot worse in the last 
few years, which I’m guessing is why this 
government has increasingly put emphasis 
on the plan-making system and having 
plans made.
DC  Okay, last question is just your views on 
the pressures that central government 
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have exerted on local planning during the 
last twenty or thirty years, and how these 
pressures have changed over time?
SP  I think there’s a lot greater emphasis on 
housing numbers and on deliverability and 
evidence. I can remember when I worked 
at Maidstone, which isn’t that long ago – 
maybe sixteen, seventeen years ago – we 
had housing numbers given to us by the 
Structure Plan. We weren’t particularly 
comfortable with them but, you know, it 
was up to us where we put them. There 
wasn’t green belt surrounding Maidstone, 
it was just outside the outer green belt 
boundary…
DC So did they end up getting built?
SP  Well…no. After I left, the planning regime 
and control of the council changed, and so 
what happened in Maidstone that had been 
planned for didn’t actually happen. But we 
started out in the fairly lazy tradition of 
what LA planners had always done, ‘Oh 
well, we’ve got housing numbers, let’s just 
build a new suburb on the outskirts of the 
town.’ There was no real pressure to build 
brown before green, that didn’t really come 
along until shortly after I’d left there and 
moved on to my next job. So that was a 
big change. Since I’ve been here, it’s been 
housing, housing, housing. Increasingly 
recently, it’s been CIL, CIL, CIL which is 
related to the Infrastructure Delivery Plan, 
which is linked to, ‘You’ve got to be capable 
of demonstrating that you can build this’. 
  When I worked at Maidstone, we had 
some housing allocations that had been in 
our Local Plan for about fifteen years, and 
when I worked at East Sussex there were 
some allocations that were reflected in the 
Structure Plan which had been there for 
about thirty or forty years, and which never 
stood any realistic chance of ever being 
built, they were utterly uneconomic.
DC But they counted towards your target.
SP  Yes, they counted towards our target! 
Nowadays you just can’t get away with 
that, so there’s a lot more emphasis on 
practicality and deliverability and being able 
to demonstrate those things.
DC That’s got to be a good thing though?
SP  Yes, it’s got to be a good thing, but one of 
the consequences of that and one of the 
consequences of greater public interest 
in the planning process is the process has 
slowed down. It’s become an awful lot 
slower to prepare a Local Plan. I’m sure if 
you looked at the stats, you know, compare 
how long it took to prepare a Local Plan 
twenty years ago to how long it takes to 
prepare one today, you’d probably find that 
the development period for a plan had gone 
up from about three years to around five 
and a half, six years. That’s because of the 
increased emphasis on detail, on public 
consultation, at one point it was getting 
ridiculous. Even without those, it’s still a 
long, difficult, complicated process and at 
the end of the day – and nobody’s going to 
thank me for saying this – but the reality is 
local people and elected members are not 
my principal customer that I’m thinking 
about when I’m making a Local Plan, they 
just aren’t. I’m thinking about, ‘How do I get 
this past a government Planning Inspector?’ 
If LAs had complete free rein to prepare 
Local Plans that only they had to be content 
with, they’d look very different from the 
plans that are produced today, where you 
have to keep the Planning Inspectorate 
happy, and they are being driven by 
the briefings that they are getting from 
government ministers.
DC  Has the Planning Inspectorate become 
more powerful, draconian over the past 
couple of decades?
SP  They’ve certainly become more powerful, 
definitely with regards to plan-making. 
Whether they’ve become more draconian, 
their stance over the last five years, 
since this government came into office 
in particular, has been quite variable. 
It was quite clear in the early years of 
this government, when we were talking 
about Core Strategies, before we went 
back to Local Plans, particularly here in 
Hertfordshire, where a lot of LAs had sat 
on their hands waiting for a change of 
government and hadn’t produced Core 
Strategies in conformity with the East of 
England Plan. So clearly the briefing that 
had been given to PINS was, ‘It doesn’t 
matter what housing numbers are in them, 
just approve them, get them through.’ 
So you had a lot of Core Strategies that 
were approved between 2010 and 2013 in 
Hertfordshire where the housing numbers 
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are abominably low. Since then, government 
has sharply tightened up what the nature 
of the content of a Local Plan must be and 
they’ve changed the message that they’ve 
given to the Planning Inspectorate, and 
consequently a lot of plans have been 
rejected or found non legally-compliant. 
So in that sense they’ve become more 
draconian, but they are serving their 
masters well. They’re clearly being told 
something very different today from what 
they were being told at the beginning of 
this government. Although, this close to 
a General Election is a good time to be 
taking your Local Plan through Inspection. 
I suspect that if this lot are still in power 
after May we will find that the advice that 
the Planning Inspectorate are being given 
is once again tightened up and it will be 
much, much more difficult to get your Plan 
through.
 
